Florida International University

FIU Digital Commons
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations

University Graduate School

12-2-1992

One hundred years of servitude : the Colombian
labor movement 1848-1948
Curtis Curry
Florida International University

DOI: 10.25148/etd.FI14061575
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd
Part of the Latin American Studies Commons
Recommended Citation
Curry, Curtis, "One hundred years of servitude : the Colombian labor movement 1848-1948" (1992). FIU Electronic Theses and
Dissertations. 2699.
https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/2699

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
One Hundred Years of Servitude:
The Colombian Labor Movement 1848-1948
by

Curtis D. Curiy
Florida International University, 1992
Miami, Florida
Professor Guillermo Grenier, Major Professor
The current study seeks not only to place into focus the general patterns of social
and economic organization prevalent in Colombia in the late nineteenth centuiy and the
early twentieth (such political and economic organization has been ably illustrated by
several authors), but also strives to elucidate the systems of thought or 'ideologies' to
which such socio-economic and political structures gave rise. It is concerned with the
thought-systems that influenced the development of the Colombian labor movement, those
of actors external to organized labor and indigenous systems of thought of labor activists
themselves.
The hypothesis is that class and party-based interests channelled the early
development of organized labor toward a path that would further, or failing that, not
conflict with dominant élite interests. Artisans, proudly independent, exerted inordinate
influence over the movement, hindering the development of working class consciousness.
As the result of dominance by élites external to the labor movement itself, workers were
never able to forge an independent voice that would allow them to define their own interests
in society.

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Miami, Florida

One Hundred Years of Servitude:
The Colombian Labor Movement 1848-1948

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Aits
in International Studies

by

Curtis D. Curry

1992

To Professors Guillermo Grenier, Douglas Kinkaid and Alex Stepick:

This thesis, having been approved in respect to form and mechanical execution,
referred to you for judgement upon its substantial merit.

Dean Arthur Herriott
College of Arts and Sciences

T he thesis of C u rtis D. C u rry Is ap p ro v ed ,

Douglas Kincaid
Alex Stepick
Guillermo Grenier, Major Professor
Date of examination: December 2,1992
Dean Richard L. Campbell
Division of Graduate Studies

F lo rid a In te rn a tio n a l U n iv ersity , 1992

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES

VI

Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE ON COLOMBIAN LABOR

1
3

METHODOLOGY: OVERVIEW OF THE APPROACH

13

IDEAS AND SOCIAL REALITY

16

2. COLONIAL COLOMBIA
INTRODUCTION

31
31

The Cross and the Crown

32

The Colonial Economy

36

SOCIAL THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY IN THE COLONY AND THE
EARLY REPUBLIC

42

Economic Factors

42

Ideological Currents

45

Independence

48

CONCLUSION
3. NINETEENTH CENTURY COLOMBIA
THE EARLY REPUBLIC

49
55
55

CONFLICT AND IDEOLOGY: THE BIRTH OF THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM 59
Conservatives and Liberals

59

Regionalism and the Geography of Colombia

66

Federalism

70

Artisans and the Liberal Party: Las Sociedades Democráticas

73

FEDERALISM AND LIBERAL REFORMS

78

Emancipation of Resguardo Lands and the Abolition of Slavery

80

The Roman Catholic Church and Liberal Reforms

82

General Economic Trends Affecting Artisan Production

84

Social Conditions: The Distinct Worlds of Artisans and Upper Class

86

CONCLUSION
4. UTOPIAN SOCIALISM, IDEOLOGY AND CLASS CONFLICT IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
THE INFLUENCE OF UTOPIAN SOCIALISM

88
91
91

Page
ARTISAN CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS AND CONFLICT
The Liberal Party Fractures: Gólgotas and Draconianos
The Artisan Republic of 1854
ARTISAN PRODUCTION IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY

97
99
102

105

Rafael Núñez and the Artisans

108

The Mutualist Societies

112

CONCLUSION

115

5. VICTORY IN DEFEAT: CONSOLIDATION OF THE LIBERAL
EXPORT ECONOMY

119

MYTH OF THE DEMOCRATIC FRONTIER: LABOR AND LAND IN
THE COUNTRYSIDE

119

THE RISE OF THE EXPORT ECONOMY: TOBACCO AND COFFEE

127

RAFAEL NUÑEZ AND THE RISE OF SOCIAL CONSERVATIVISM

129

WAR OF A THOUSAND DAYS AND THE PANAMA CRISIS

131

CONCLUSION: CONSOLIDATION OF THE LIBERAL EXPORT
ECONOMY

133

6. EARLY INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE EMERGENCE OF
A PROLETARIAT

137

INTRODUCTION

137

THE NASCENT LABOR MOVEMENT’S STRUGGLE TO ASSERT ITS
AUTONOMY: 1910-1928

141

Artisans. Socialists. Anarchists, and Working Class Politics

143

Strikes and Repression

158

Dance of the Millions

166

The Conservative Party Fractures

170

CONCLUSION

171

7. LABOR AND THE LIBERAL REVOLUCIÓN EN MARCHA

111

LOS NUEVOS, SOCIALISM, AND A NEW IDEOLOGICAL
ORIENTATION

177

THE RURAL PROTEST: SMALLHOLDER STRUGGLES TO ACQUIRE
LAND TITLES

182

iv

Page
LA REVOLUCION EN MARCHA

192

CREATION OF THE CONFEDERACION DE TRABAJADORES
D E COLOMBIA (CTC)

199

CONSERVATIVE REACTION

204

THE DECLINE OF LABOR’S POLITICAL INFLUENCE

206

GAITÁN AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT

209

CONCLUSION

212

8. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

216

CONCLUSION

216

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

236

BIBLIOGRAPHY

243

V

LIST OF TABLES

T a b le

Page

3:1 Active Population in 1870

73

5:1 Coffee and Tobacco Exports in Thousands of Pesos

127

6:1 Average Annual Rates of Increase of Industrial Production, 1925-1953

139

6:2 Average Annual Percentage Growth in Value of Manufacturing
Production: 1929-1949

140

6:3 Manufacturing Population of Departmental Capitals, 1905-1951

141

6:4 Freight Moved by the Railroad and Riverboats in Tons

151

7:1 Colombian Coffee Exports 1900-1925: Volume and Value

185

7:2 Cundinamarea's Coffee Farms in 1932 and 1940

188

8:1 Parcelas Abandoned During La Violencia, 1946-1966

229

8:2 Total Urban-Rural Population 1918-1964

231

vi

CHAPTER 1
IN T R O D U C T IO N

To use a simple analogy, what happens is that in our empirical investigation we become
aware o f the fact that we are observing the world from a moving staircase, from a dynamic
platform, and, therefore, the image o f the world changes with the changing frames o f
reference which various cultures create. ...In the world o f visual objects, we acknowledge
that completely. That you can only see various perspectives o f a house and there is no
view among them which is absolutely the house and in spite o f that there is knowing
because the various perspectives are not arbitrary. The one can be understood from the
other. What we, without any difficulty, admit fo r the apperception o f the visual world, we
ought to admit fo r knowledge in general1
Karl Mannheim, in a letter to Kurt H. Wolff, April 15, 1946
The ideas o f the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the
ruling material force o f society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The
class which has the means o f material production at its disposal, has control at the same
time over the means o f mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas o f
those who lack the means o f mental production are subject to it The ruling ideas are
nothing more than the ideal expression o f the dominant material relationships, the dominant
material relationships grasped as ideas; hence o f the relationships which make the one class
the ruling one, therefore, the ideas o f its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling
class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think...The division o f
labour, which we have already seen above as one o f the chief forces o f history up till now,
manifests itself also in the ruling class as the division o f mental and material labor, so that
inside this class one part appears as the thinkers o f the class (its active, conceptive
ideologists, who make the perfecting o f the illusion o f the class about itself their chief
source o f livelihood), while the others' attitude to these ideas and illusions is more
passive...
Karl Marx, The German Ideolosv2
Images of past and present reality are created as much by the social and cultural
milieu in which the beholder observes his or her "reality" as they are by any physical,
objective "reality" that may exist apart from the observer. Man must necessarily perceive
reality through his own eyes, eyes that have been colored by the temporal and spatial
constraints imposed on each individual by birth. Such perceptions are also influenced by
the entire cultural infrastructure, complete with artifacts of a particular era, that bind an

1Letter written from Karl Mannheim to Kurt H, Wolff, (15 April 1946), quoted in W olffs "The Sociology
o f Knowledge and Sociological Theory," The Sociology o f Sociology (Larry T. Reynolds and Janice M.
Reynolds eds., New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1970), pp. 35-36.
2Quoted in Kail M arx’s The German Ideology, in Robert C. Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader (New York:
W.W. Norton and Company, 1978), pp. 172-173.
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individual to a specific temporal "reality".
In our time, the general validity of this assumption may be illustrated by contrasting
an international businessperson's view that he/she "knows the realities" of the world
marketplace, and who disparages "ivory tower" assessments of contemporary economic or
socio-political realities. At the other pole, we might look into the beliefs held by a few
academicians, who wielding the scientific method, are certain that they alone possess a
monopoly on comprehending ultimate "social reality." Who comprehends "reality", the
businessman or the academician? Both perhaps?
Certainly this phenomenon of self-certainty, of comprehending the ultimate reality
is not of recent vintage. Throughout recorded history, various factions and individuals
have claimed ultimate, exclusive rights to both truth and comprehension of reality (recall the
role Socrates ascribed to the Gold Souls in his ideal Republic, the philosopher-kings who
alone possessed sufficient knowledge and comprehension of social reality to rule the body
politic) often under various political and religious banners. At times, those who have
claimed unique insight into ultimate reality have attempted to force their visions onto
unconvinced masses, more often than not at a tremendous cost in human lives and well
being (the European heritage of the holy crusades, the Iberian Inquisition, the Conquista,
and Social Darwinism in its most extreme forms-Nazism and Apartheid, to name but a few
examples).
In Colombia's own recent historical experience, the Thousand Days War fought
between Liberals and Conservatives at the turn of the century was the most bloody civil
conflagration of the nineteenth centuiy in the western hemisphere, costing an estimated
100,000 lives. Is it possible that ideas alone are capable of moving men to such horrific
internecine violence?
Individuals view reality from their own perspective, shaped and molded by the
particular socio-historical nexus that marks their lives and lifetimes. Though this may seem
an obvious tautology to those who pride themselves in their command of the objective
scientific method, the distorting affects of historically and socially-grounded biases are
often discounted as being applicable only to non-scientists, individuals such as the ignorant
"man in the street." Is it not likely that even the wisest mortal philosopher emerging from
the cave of forms, in that first glance of daylight, is apt to view the colors and textures that
constitute reality from the temporal and spatial perspectives that inextricably bind him to
that particular historical instant?
In the current study, ideas, it will be argued, have the force to spur men to action
only to the degree that the ideas reflect deeply entrenched social interests, which are
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themselves in tum closely tied to the existing socio-political system in place at a particular
juncture in historical space. In other words, ideas serve as catalysts motivating action only
when they are, or can be made to seem to be, socially, historically, and culturally relevant
to individual or group perceived needs. The current chapter describes the methodological
approach applied in this study and discusses the intellectual sources of that approach.
Among the most important sources that have influenced the author's view of the
development of the Colombian labor movement are Charles Bergquist's excellent studies
on rural laborers in Colombia. Bergquist's works are discussed in greater detail below.
Also in the introduction is a detailed discussion of Marx's conceptualization of ideology's
role in capitalist society, a conceptualization which has profoundly influenced the author's
understanding of the powerful role of ideas in society. The work itself is not a Marxist or
even a Marxian perspective. The historical determinism inherent in Marx, the imperative of
the proletariat's historical liberating mission, inevitably convert Marxism itself into another
ideology. Moreover, those since Marx who have tinkered with the original
conceptualizations have all added their own perspectives to his.3 They have also added
their historical, cultural, social, and personal biases.
The next section provides the reader with a brief overview of current literature on
Colombian history covering the period under discussion as well as the most influential
works that deal directly with the Colombian labor movement. It is followed by an
overview of the methodological approach adapted in the present work.
R E V IE W O F T H E R ELEV A N T L IT E R A T U R E ON C O LO M B IA N LA B O R
Medofilo Medina has written a series of essays4 based on Rudé's works on the
revolutionary crowd.5 Other works that attempt to examine Colombian labor range from a
polemical "education manual" to basic narrative.6

3See David McLellan's, Marxism A fter M arx (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Co., 1979) for an excellent
introduction to the development of M arxian and M arxist thought after Marx's death. Other excellent
syntheses o f the influence o f Marx on subsequent Marxian theoreticians include Sidney Hook's Marx and
the Marxists: the Ambiguous Legacy (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1955) and George
Lichtheim's excellent historical perspective in Marxism: An Historical and Cultural Study (New York:
Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1961)
4Medofilo Medina, La Protesta Urbana en Colombia en el Siglo Veinte (Bogotá: Ediciones Aurora, 1984).
5George Rudé, The Crowd in the French Revolution (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University
Press, 1977).
6Marco A. Córdoba, Elementos de Sindicalismo (Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1984) a primer
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The majority of works treating Colombian labor can be divided into three general
camps, traditional political and labor historiography, intellectual histories and histories of
ideas/ideology, and Marxist historical perspectives. Each in turn is reviewed in the
following section.
Under the category of traditional histories, most writers have focused on providing
a political analysis or economic analysis of Colombia's development, or in writing general
or sector specific histories.7 A number of works which do not treat labor as their primary
field of investigation can be grouped under the umbrella of traditional political analysis.
Among these are included Robert Dix, Helen Delpar and James William Park's influential
works on Colombia.8 Each of these touch upon labor in the context of its relation to the
political system and the two traditional political parties. The primary focus of these works
is on the historical development of the Conservative and Liberal Parties.
Another important historical work with a primarily political focus is Albert Berry,
Ronald Heilman and Mauricio Solaún's collections of essays on the National Front era,
Politics o f Compromise: Coalition Government in Colombia, 9 Essays in this volume

covering the history, organization, and philosophy of the labor movement to be used by labor union
members and leaders, and Miguel Urrutia, The Development o f the Colombian Labor Movement, (New
Haven, London; Yale University Press, 1969) Other perspectives will be discussed in greater detail in the
body o f the text below.
7Three general histories of labor in Latin America were also used as resources in the present work. They
Include, Moisés Troncoso and Ben Burnett, The Rise o f the Latin American Labor Movement (New
York; Bookman Associates United Printing Services, I960); Victor Alba, Politics and the Labor
Movement in Latin America (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968), and; a three-volume
history edited by Pablo González Casanova, Historia del Movimiento Obrero en América Latina (Mexico:
Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1984) Nearly half of Volume Three is dedicated to Colombia, the chapter
entitled "El Movimiento Obrero Colombiano" written by Enrique Valencia.
8Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions o f Change (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1967) and The Politics o f Colombia (New York, Wesport Conn., London: Praeger
Publishers, 1987); Helen Delpar, Red Against Blue, The Liberal Party in Colombian Politics 1863-1899
(Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1981); and James William Park, Rafael Núñez and the
Politics o f Colombian Regionalism 1863-1886 (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University
Press, 1985). John W. Sloan's article "Regionalism, Political Parties, and Public Policy in Colombia,"
Inter-American Economic Affairs, 33 (3), (1979), pp. 25-46 also explores the political context of
Colombia's fierce historical regionalism. Another influential work from a political perspective covering
the period o f "La Violencia" and the National Front includes Richard Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and
Politics in Colombia (Lexington, Massachusetts, London: D.C. Heath and Company, 1973). Also see
John D. Martz, Colombia: A Contemporaiy Political Sui-vey (Durham, N.C.: The University o f North
Carolina Press, 1962). The most recent offering in this camp is the excellent study of artisan influence in
early labor organization, David Lee Sowell's "The Early Latin American Labor Movement: Artisans and
Politics in Bogotá, Colombia, 1832-1919" (Ph.d. Dissertation, University of Florida, 1986).
^Albert Berry, Ronald Heilman and Mauricio Solaún, Politics o f Compromise: Coalition Government in
Colombia (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction, Inc., 1980).
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range from works dealing with the role of the Catholic Church, labor, and challenges to the
coalition government by third parties to Solaún's excellent essay on the history of the
Liberal and Conservative parties.
Influential economic works on Colombia are led by William Paul McGreevey's An
Economic History o f Colombia published in 1971.10 A number of recent works that have
taken McGreevey as an important starting point for their own analyses focus more
narrowly on the coffee industry. These include Colombian scholar Marco Palacios' work
Coffee in Colombia, 1850-1970: An Economic, Social and Political History and Charles
Bergquist's outstanding contribution to the field, Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 18861910.11 An excellent critical review of these works and other recent sources on
Colombian economic history has been published by William McGreevey in the Journal o f
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs.12 Bergquist's works will be discussed in
greater detail below. Recent economic histories by Colombian authors include Zambrano's
traditional liberal economic analysis and Kalmanovitz' ambitious work that was nearly
fifteen years in the making, Economía y Nación: Una Breve Historia de Colombia.13
Although Kalmanovitz is influenced by both dependency theory and Marxism, his work
does not fit neatly into either school. Trained as an economist, Kalmanovitz' study is
basically a national economic history which treats the development of capitalism in
Colombia, tracing its roots back to colonial times.
General histories of Colombia include the now classic, History o f Colombia by
Colombian authors Gerardo Arrubla and Jesús María Henao, written in an engaging, grand
narrative style.14 Another influential work which focuses on the modern history of

10William Paul McGreevey, An Economic History o f Colombia (Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press, 1971).
11Marco Palacios, Coffee in Colombia, 1850-1970: An Economic, Social and Political History (London,
New York, New Rochelle: Cambridge University Press, 1980) Charles W. Bergquist, Coffee and
Conflict in Colombia, 1886-1910 (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1978).
12See William McGreevey's article "Reinterpreting Colombian Economic History," Journal o f
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol 23 No. 3 (August 1981). The article reviews the works
cited in this study by Bergquist, Palacios, as well as recent offerings by other writers.
13Bemardo Tovar Zambrano, La Inteiyención Económica del Estado en Colombia 1914-1936 (Bogotá:
Biblioteca Banco Popular, 1984) and Salomón Kalmanovitz, Economía y Nación: Una Breve Historia de
Colombia (Bogotá: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1985).
l4Jesús María Henao and Gerardo Arrubla, History o f Colombia Translated by Fred J. Rippy. (New York:
Greenwood Press Publications, 1969). The original Spanish edition was written in the 1930's.
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Colombia is Vernon Lee Fluharty's Dance o f the Millions, Military Rule and the Social
Revolution in Colombia 1930-19S615. A number of well-known histories have been
produced on individual sectors of the economy that focus on bananas,16 rural labor and the
coffee industry,17 and a number of works also focus on the historical role of the Catholic
Church in Colombian society.18
Perhaps the most important histories written to date that explore the intellectual
history of Liberalism and Socialism in Colombia are those which have been written by
Colombian socialist Gerardo Molina. His three-volume set exploring classical liberalism's
roots in Europe in the nineteenth century to the welfarist orientation of modem liberalism in
the 1930's and 1940's, has shed much light on not only the development of the
Conservative-Liberal struggle, but also on the ideological complexities and differences
among liberalisms principal advocates.19 Like the three tomes on liberalism, his volume on

15 Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance o f the Millions, Military Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia
1930-1956 (Pittsburg; University o f Pittsburg Press, 1966), Also see I. Fred Rippy, The Capitalists
and Colombia (Durham, North Carolina: 1931).
16Among works on the Banana economy include the classic study on the banana zone written by Charles
Kepner and Jay Henry Soothill, The Banana Empire: A Case o f Economic Imperialism (New York:
The Vanguard Press, Inc., 1967) The Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Colombia has also
produced a history entitled simply, Bananeras 1928-1978 (Bogotá: Ediciones Alcaraván, 1978).
17For good works on rural labor see Catherine LeGrand, "Labor Acquisition and Social Conflict on the
Colombian Frontier, 1850-1936," Latin American Studies, Vol. 16, (1985);. Gloria Gaitán, La Lucha
Por la Tierra en la Década del 30: Génesis de la Organización Sindical Campesina (Bogotá: El Ancora
Editores, 1984), and; Pierre Gilhodés, "Agradan Struggles in Colombia," in Agrarian Problems and
Peasant Movements in Latin America edited by Rodolfo Stavenhagen, (Garden City, New York: Anchor
Books, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970).
18These include Daniel Levine's two excellent works, The Catholic Church in Venezuela and Colombia
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981) and a work produced in collaboration with
A. Wilde, "The Catholic Church, Politics, and Violence: The Colombian Case," The Review o f
Politics, Vol. 39, No. 2, (April 1977). Also see J. Lloyd Mecham's book which is now regarded as a
classic in the field, Church and State in Latin America (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North
Carolina Press, 1934). Other works which focus on Church-state relations include David E. Mutchler,
The Church as a Political Factor in Latin America (New York, Washington, London: Praeger
Publishers, 1971); Frederick B. Pike The Conflict Between Church and State in Latin America (New
York: Alfred A. Knapt, Inc., 1964); Richard Funk-Harries' Pli.D dissertation, "Camilo Torres Restrepo
and the Christian Left in the Tradition of Colombian Church-State Relations," (Ann Arbor MI and
London: University Microfilms International, 1980), and; Fernán González, Partidos Politicos y Poder
Eclesiástico: Reseña Histórica 1810-1930 (Bogotá: Editorial CINEP, 1977).
of Molina's three works on Colombian liberalism were utilized in the current study, including, Las
Ideas Liberales en Colombia, 1915-1934 (Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1982) and Las
Ideas Liberales en Colombia, de 1934 a la Iniciación del Frente Nacional (Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones
Tercer Mundo, 1986). There is a rich and varied literature on political and social thought in Latin
America and Colombia, including the following works consulted in the present study: Harold Eugene

19T w o
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socialism focuses on major ideological currents, in the history of Colombia, in this case
tracing socialism’s utopian roots in the nineteenth century to the modem socialist and
communist parties.20 Also like his works on liberalism, Las Ideas Socialistas en Colombia
focuses on the impact made by political parties, influential leaders, and writers.
The most influential book dealing with the Colombian labor movement is Miguel
Urrutia's political history of labor, The Development o f the Colombian Labor Movement.21
In Urrutia's book, labor is treated in a traditional manner characteristic of the U.S.
industrial relations school, viewing labor as a partner (some view it as an equal partner,
others as an important, but rather secondary tool of capital or factor of production) in the
economic development of the nation. Explicit in this view is an overriding preoccupation
with the harmonious coexistence of all groups in society and the inevitable prosperity of
each guaranteed by an ever-expanding GNP inherent in a free-market economy. Anything
that upsets this balance is deemed undesirable and actions and events which support
harmony are deemed positive influences on the evolution of society. In Urrutia's story,
progressive Liberals actively courted labor to help the party wrest control from the
Conservatives and later to aid them in their bid to stay in power.
E.P. Thompson has called the temptation (which leftist scholars also often fall prey
to) of reading history in light of subsequent "preferred" outcomes "Pilgrims Progress
Orthodoxy". In a discussion of a 1919 historical event in Colombia, Urrutia reveals his
ideological predisposition. Socialist intellectual leadership in a 1919 rally according to
Urrutia carelessly led workers to needless violence as they displayed their "characteristic
irresponsibility" (p. 63) and "recklessly sacrificed seven lives for no reason at all" (p. 64)

Davis, Latin American Thought: A Historical Introduction (New York: The Free Press, 1974), and his
article, "Trends in Social Thought," in Man, State and Society in Latin American History, edited by
Sheldon and Peggy Liss (New York, Washington, London: Prager Publishers, 1972); Leopoldo Zea,
"The Struggle for Intellectual Emancipation," in Man, State and Society in Latin American History.
Edited by Sheldon B. Liss and Peggy Liss (New York, Washington, London: Praeger Publishers,
1972); Sheldon B. Liss, Marxist Thought in Latin America (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London:
University o f California Press, 1984); Helio Jaguaribe, "Marxism and Latin American Development,"
in Marx and the Western World, (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1966); Eric J. Hobsbawm has
written two relevant articles on ideology and the study of labor, one dealing specifically with the case of
Colombia, "Labor History and Ideology," Journal o f Social History, 1 (Summer 1974) and "Ideology
and Social Change in Colombia," in Ideology and Social Change in Latin America, edited by June Nash,
Juan Corradi and Hobart Spalding Jr. (New York, London, Paris: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers
Inc., 1977).
20Gerardo Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas en Colombia. (Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Tercer Mundo,
1987).
21Miguel Urrutia, The Development o f the Colombian Labor Movement (New Haven, London: Yale
University Press, 1969).
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while the railroad strike of 1919, utilizing "the bargaining tactic of any national union"
[those based on the U.S. model of collective bargaining] "illustrates the rationale and
effectiveness of serious trade union activity." (p. 64) Though there is usually some validity
to most approaches to social and historical analysis, as E.P. Thompson has written "My
q u a rre l.is that [most approaches! tend to obscure the agency of working people, the
degree to which they contributed, by conscious efforts, to the making of history....Only
the successful (in the sense of those whose aspirations anticipated subsequent evolution)
are remembered. The blind alleys, the lost causes, and the losers themselves are
forgotten."22
From the earliest political positions taken by the Communist Party in the 1930's to
recent Marxist academic contributions, communist views of Colombian reality have been
seriously flawed by two major problems. The first of these is that theoretical contributions
from the left have focused almost exclusively on socialist and communist leadership or lack
of leadership in the labor movement, and have looked almost exclusively at such areas as
strike history, organized urban factory workers, workers in the banana zones, and worker
protests in the nation's transportation sector.
As forcefully pointed out by Bergquist, their works ignore Colombia's primary link
to the world capitalist economic system: coffee production. The few Marxist theoretical
contributions that do address the coffee industry, such as Antonio Garcia's pioneering
Geografía económica de Caldas first published in 1937 and his later Gait/m y el problema
de la revolución colombiana published in 1955, suffer from the second major flaw of leftist
works: their strict adherence to an ideological framework that posits the inevitability of
social revolution as the result of capitalist exploitation.23 In this, Marxist theoreticians also
fall pray to the "Pilgrim's Progress Orthodoxy." As Bergquist comments, "Like Antonio
Garcia, most leftists have tried to make modem Colombian history appear to be more
revolutionary than it is. They have applied pedestrian versions of universal social theory in
a vain attempt to explain the twentieth-century histoiy of a social formation whose singular
structure and anomalous historical development cry out for original analysis."24

22E.P.Thompson, The Making o f the English Working Class (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), p. 12
23Botli works are reviewed by Bergquist in his Labor in Latin America,In his Labor in Latin America:
Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia (Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press, 1986) pp. 274-281, Charles Bergquist reviews the two major works of Antonio
García, Geografía económica de Caldas (Bogotá: 1978, Second ed.) and his later Gaitán y el problema de
la revolución colombiana (Bogotá: 1955).
24Bergquist, Labor, pp. 280-281. In terms o f other modem writers, the failure of Marxist historians such

8

Three major contributions to the field of Colombian labor merit special attention.
Though each has its unique perspective, these works all support the thesis that during the
Liberal reforms of the 1930's and 1940's, labor was increasingly incorporated into the
existing legal and political system by the Liberal state. They are Daniel Pecaut's Politica y
Sindicalismo en Colombia, Victor Manuel Moncayo and Fernando Rojas' Luchas Obreras
y Política Laboral en Colombia and Charles Bergquist's Labor in Latin America:
Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia.25 Each of these
studies built on the work of its predecessor.
Daniel Pecaut's work, the first published among the trio, argues that labor's move
towards Liberalism came about as a result of its gradual institutionalization by Liberal
governments under the Revolución en Marcha. Labor's incorporation into the
social/political fold he argues, occurred as a result of labor's weaknesses and Colombia's
relatively low level of industrialization.
Like the work of their predecessor, Victor Manuel Moncayo and Fernando Rojas'
analysis focuses on the urban working class. Also like Pecaut, they are concerned with the
labor legislation enacted during the Liberal governments of the 1930's and 1940's. The
authors argue that the legal and political reforms undertaken by Liberal governments during
these years reflected the ascendance of an industrial bourgeoisie. A major impact of the
legislation was to channel working class protest into an institutional setting that could be
readily controlled by the state. In the following statement, they elaborate on their position:
"ese fenómeno sólo puede encontrar' explicación en el interés de la clase captialista de
ordenar y encuazar la lucha reivindicad va dentro de los parámetros del sistema capitalista,
para evitar una confrontación real del mismo, o en la urgencia de producir un efecto
as Cesar Mendoza Ramos, who in the course of his work on the development of organized labor in
Barranquilla to mention the expansion of banana and coffee exports that made the city's spectacular
growth possible, instead focusing only on industrial development and industrial workers is common.
For him, and other Marxists, only industrial workers make up "la clase obrera". See Ramos,
Surgimiento y Desarrollo de la Clase Obrera en Barranquilla Paper presented at the Third Congress of
Colombian Histoiy, Universidad de Antioquia, (Medellin, Colombia, November, 1981). Ricardo
Sanchez, like nearly all Marxist historians, fails in his Historia Política de la Clase Obrera en
Colombia to appreciate the desire of campesinos to own and work their own land rather than farm on
cooperatives, and fails to appreciate fully the attitude towards work and society brought to the early
socialist movement by the highly influential independent craftsmen, (who by the way could not possibly
buy into the idea of the liberating mission of the proletariat); Ricardo Sanchez, Historia Política de la
Clase Obrera en Colombia (Bogotá: Editorial la Rosa Roja, 1982). This tendency among Marxist
writers obscures critical pieces of the socio-historical puzzle precisely because of these writers
ideological predispositions.
25Daniel Pecaut, Politica y Sindicalismo en Colombia (Bogotá: Ediciones Culturales, 1982); Victor
Manuel Moncayo and Fernando Rojas, Luchas Obreras y Política Laboral en Colombia (Bogotá: La
Carreta, 1978); and Bergquist, Labor.
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ideológico de legitimación política del sistema, o un efecto de control político de la lucha de
clases para prevenir su agudización..."26
Moncayo and Rojas' arguments detour from Pecaut by making a plausible, yet not
completely convincing case that the labor legislation passed during this era was the
industrial bourgeoisie's economic interests writ into law. They contend that the legal and
political structure erected by successive Liberal governments served to promote the
economic interests of the industrial bourgeoisie and helped to secure the hegemony of this
group over their class rivals (the landed gentry and the commercial bourgeoisie) and of
course to consolidate its dominance over other classes in society.27
Legislation such as Law 83 of 193.1, which gave unions the legal right to organize
and regulated strike activity, is painted as an effort to institutionalize the labor movement in
order to eliminate a potential proletarian threat to bourgeois rale. Overall, the long-term
strategy of the Liberals, Moncayo and Rojas claim, was to allow unions to organize and
obtain better worker benefits such as higher wages, which in turn would improve their
purchasing power. The primary result would be the creation of a larger internal market for
commercial goods produced by the industrial bourgeoisie.
It is debatable as to whether the industrial bourgeoisie had consolidated its hold on
Colombian society by the 1930's, especially given the disproportionate importance the
coffee export sector still played in the economy. Though the "industrial bourgeoisie" may
have been in the ascendency, many of the élites responsible for implementing the reforms
were themselves tied to the export economy, including the individual who presided over the
Revolución en Marcha, Alfonso López himself.28 Moncayo and Rojas unfortunately
provide no evidence that the large landholders and exporters had developed an adversarial
relationship with the industrial bourgeoisie, especially since it seems often times they were
the same individuals.29
Nor is proof offered in terms of simple statistical data showing the number of
industrialists vs. exporters serving in the Liberal governments of the 1930's and 1940's,
nor does evidence appear on how the interests of a majority of those serving in government

26Moncayo and Rojas, Luchas, p. 33.
27See these arguments on pages 52 and 57.
28President López was the son of one of the most successful coffee exporters in the nation.
29See Robert Dix's discussion of the industrial bourgeoisie in The Politics o f Colombia (New York,
Wesport Conn., London: Praeger Publishers, 1987).
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might be advanced directly by promoting policies that favored industry over exports. It
was after all, the domestic concentration of capital from coffee exports that had permitted
the industrial expansion of the 1930's in the first place.
Another problem with Moncayo and Rojas' theory is the fact that the policy of
industrialization had been launched by Conservative Rafael Reyes and accelerated by
Conservatives during the "Dance of the Millions." Import substitution policies were also
aggressively pursued by Liberal governments, and the tempo of industrialization was again
stepped up by the Conservatives after the Liberals were defeated in 1946. If the
Conservative and Liberal parties alike undertook policies favoring the growth of industry,
under the argument advanced above, we would have to presume that the industrial
bourgeoisie had gained a predominant position in both parties. Is that the case?
Unfortunately we do not know, since no analysis of the parties’ élite composition is
undertaken in their study. Could not a plausible alternative explanation be that the pro
industry, import substitution policies were undertaken by modernizing élites from both
parties who were anxious to develop their nation's economy, rather than a group of élites
guilefully forging legislation responding to the narrow economic interests of the industrial
bourgeoisie? Clearly both Liberal and Conservative governments alike favored
industrialization, but there is
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proof proffered to make a strong case that both parties, in a

still highly regionalized economy, were responding to the narrow interests of an industrial
bourgeoisie.30
Bergquist expands on the theses offered by Pecaut, Moncayo and Rojas, adding to
their analyses the sector ignored by most scholars who write on the labor movement: rural
workers laboring in the coffee economy. As Bergquist has forcefully argued in his studies
of the Colombian coffee industry, "it is study of the organizational fate and political
trajectory of workers in coffee production that gives unity to Colombian labor history and
makes the larger story of national developments in the twentieth century
comprehensible."31
Bergquist's primary argument is that workers themselves have been powerful

30Industrial activities were, and to a great degree still are, highly concentrated in Antioquia and
Cundinamarca near the large cities o f Medellin and Santa Fé de Bogotá, the nations capital. Today, Cali
has also become an important manufacturing center. For a good discussion of Colombia's historical
regionalism, see James Park, Rafael Núñez and the Politics of Colombian Regionalism 1863-1886
(Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1985). For the modem period see, John
W. Sloan, "Regionalism, Political Parties, and Public Policy in Colombia," Inter-American Economic
Affairs, 33:3, (1979), pp. 25-46.
3 bergquist, Labor, p. 281.
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agents in shaping twentieth century Colombian history. One of the major shortcomings of
modem Colombian labor historiography he asserts, is that, "Workers lacking
organizational expression have seldom been studied. Social characteristics are frequently
discussed in relation to strike demands, but not in the formation of a working class culture
or consciousness."32 Although he agrees with the basic premise offered by Moncayo and
Rojas, that the Liberal reforms represented an effort by the élite to eliminate the threat from
below, the threats in the two analyses come from different comers: Bergquist argues that
the major threat to order and progress came from the possibility of a rural insurgency rather
than an urban one.33
Coffee workers comprised the largest segment of workers in Colombian society up
through mid-century. Petty agricultural production, especially coffee production, is highly
individualist, competitive and driven by the profit motive. The relations of production in
the countryside Bergquist holds, help define the parameters of the overall development of
labor in Colombia. He writes, "The transformation of their straggle inevitably turn coffee
workers against one another. After mid-century it left their class oppressors free to forge a
new ideological and political consensus and successfully consolidate an industrializing
peripheral capitalist order...As their own collective organizations languished, the unions of
their early allies in the foreign-owned export enclaves and in transport and manufacturing
industry were left exposed to the corporativist and repressive designs of the state."34
Although Bergquist's intelligent, synthetic work is correct in asserting the
importance of coffee workers in the development of a Colombian labor movement, by
failing to address the role of the of artisan "working class" organizations in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as the competitive, independent, and
"individualist" perspectives that craftsmen-tumed-proletarians brought to the early urban
labor movement, Bergquist misses an opportunity to establish a linkage between the shared
organizational fate of workers toiling in coffee and working class organizations in the
transport sector, banana plantations, oil fields, and early manufacturing industries.35 For

32Bergquist, Labor, p. 9.
33Bergquist, Labor, p. 313.
34Bergquist, Labor, p. 312.
35Bergquist presents a carefully constructed, sophisticated analysis of the impact of the burgeoning coffee
economy on Colombian politics and society in his Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 1886-1910
(Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1978). A balanced review of Bergquist's Coffee and Conflict and
Marco Palacio's Coffee in Colombia as well as other economic treatments of the development of
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Bergquist it seems, the failure of coffee workers to embark upon a radical path independent
of the two traditional parties also sealed the fate of urban workers.
Both urban and rural workers chose to hitch their hopes and aspirations for a better
life for themselves and their families to the rising and falling tides of the two traditional
parties. Those same political parties were ruled by élites, or as the powerful upper class
stratum is most commonly referred to in the Colombian context by national writers, los
oligarcas. In order to understand the modem development of Colombian labor then, rather
than exclusively treating forms of labor expression in the countryside or focusing narrowly
on a burgeoning urban proletariat, a more holistic analysis should strive to integrate the
dynamics of development of labor forms in each. Moreover, such an analysis should
explore possible patterns in the country/city nexus such as formal and informal ties between
urban workers, artisans and migrating sharecroppers, colonos and smallholders.36
The following section details the methodological approach to the study of the
development of the Colombian labor movement which is applied in the present work.
M ETH O D O LO G Y : O V ER V IEW O F T H E A PPR O A C H
Historians and other keen observers of social phenomena have not been immune to
Colombia's coffee economy can be found in William Paul McGreevey's "Reinterpreting Colombian
Economic History," Journal o f Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol 23 No. 3 (August 1981).
William Park, who addresses roughly the same period as Bergquist in his Rafael Núñez and the Politics
o f Colombian Regionalism 1863-1886 (1985) provides a critical treatment of Bergquist's work by
offering a corrective regarding the role of regionalism, which is hardly touched upon in the latter's work.
Unfortunately, Park commits the opposite error, overemphasizing the importance of regionalism and the
influence of individual actors such as Núñez and Caro in his antiquated "famous men" approach to
Colombian history. He also oversteps the bounds of scholarly work by cavalierly dismissing
Bergquist's outstanding analysis of labor relations in the coffee sector and misinterprets Bergquist's
discussion o f the rise and fall of Liberal fortunes as a rather simplistic, overgeneralized account
characteristic of such a holistic approach. Bergquist's work is superior to Park's book on both
theoretical and analytical grounds.
36While the current study addresses the development of forms of labor expression in both the city and the
countryside, an in-depth analysis of informal and formal ties between urban workers and artisans on the
one hand and campesinos and colonos on the other, including for example kinship ties, friendships,
colleagues from prior work, or acquaintances, is an area critical to understanding the development of a
modem labor movement. Although this area demands much further exploration, substantial
demographic data on the vocational composition of the large-scale migrations that took place in the
Colombian countryside during the late Nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century is non-existent
(although some work on the early twentieth century has been done, such as McGreevey's "Urban Growth
in Colombia," Journal o f InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 16 No. 4 (November 1974)).
Many migrants were campesinos driven in search of new land or larger parcels as a result of everdiminishing landholdings caused by division of family property through inheritance as well as
encroachments by powerful hacendados. Many were also urban poor and artisans impoverished by their
inability to compete with cheap foreign manufactures. All of these groups sought to resist
proletarianization in the urban areas, many by staking claim to their own plots of land. Chapter Five
looks more closely at labor in the countryside.
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the social» political and temporal biases that affect the individual's perceptions of social
reality. ’'Historians»" E. Bradford Bums writes in his study of ideology in Latin American
historiography, "impose on society a perception of the past shaped by the topics they
study, the values they hold, and their interpretations...the knowledge of the past which
they handed down as history reflects their exclusive social position. In short, Latin
America's written memory consists largely of a limited socially constructed reality."37
At first, such incisive observations might lead one to despair that a value-free,
completely unbiased understanding of "reality" may be elusive. Quite pointedly, such an
understanding does seem to be impossible, given the present state of intellectual and
emotional development of our species and the limitations of our social sciences. How can
individuals who seek to understand the past, and by implication, how that past relates to
our present, gain insight into man’s real or objective existence? If no social scientist is free
from cultural and temporal-based biases, can a social "science" exist, and at the very least,
is one able to articulate an operational definition of "objectivity"?
Immanual Wallerstein, perhaps the best known "world systems" theorist has
remarked that, "in the present, we are all irremediably the products of our background, our
training, our personality and social role, and the structural pressures within which we
operate." For the honest observer of social phenomena then it must be acknowledged that
absolute objectivity is unattainable: one can only hope to proximate objectivity by freely
admitting such educational, cultural, temporal and spatial biases and move forward from
there. Wallerstein is instructive:
The [scientist and scholar's] role is to discern, within the framework of his
commitments, the present reality of the phenomena he studies, to derive
from this study general principles, from which particular applications may
be made...For the proper understanding of the present requires a theoretical
comprehension that can only be based on the study of the widest range of
phenomena, including through all of historical time and space.38
It is apparent that if one seeks to understand the social dynamics of any era of
man's brief existence on this planet, one must, as Wallerstein suggests, look at the "widest
range of phenomena," including the most elemental constituents of man's relationship to
society: the patterns of social and economic organization prevalent in a particular historical

37Bradford E. Bums, "Ideology in Nineteenth-Century Latin American Historiography," Hispanic
American Historical Review. 58:3, (1978), p. 409.
38Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I (New York: Academic Press, 1974), p. 9.
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era and the individual's relation to those organizations. This is the approach taken in this
study as a concerted effort is made to weave social, political, economic and historical
information into a holistic framework.
One theoretical 'school' that has targeted as its primary field of inquiry an
understanding of the relationships between ideas, individuals and society is the sociology
of knowledge. Sociology of knowledge posits the existence of a direct relationship
between the world of ideas and the existing socio-economic structures that help to define
ideas in a particular society or era. This approach implies a search for the social origins of
different modes of thought, origins ground in a "real", existential base.39
Karl Mannheim, one of sociology of knowledge's most important disciples, argued
that it was necessary to understand those who advocated a particular system of thought,
their social origins and the society in which the thought-system was developed. Mannheim
believed that the intellectual can reveal to others the social origins of various systems of
thoughts:
The principal thesis of the sociology of knowledge is that there are modes of
thought which cannot be adequately understood as long as their social
origins are obscured...the second factor characterizing the method of
sociology of knowledge is that it does not sever the concretely existing
modes of thought from the context of collective action through which we
first discover the world in an intellectual sense...In accordance with the
particular context of collective activity in which they participate, men always
tend to see the world which surrounds them differently.40
Like the sociology of knowledge, the present approach argues that systems
of thought must be understood in the social context in which they are born.41

390 f course, the socio-political structures of a particular era do not influence the creations of systems of
thought in a one-way fashion, unidirectionally. There exists a dialectical relationship between ideas and
social structure; ideas are not simply "formed" ex nihilo at a particular socio-economic juncture in
history. Ideas may actively serve as agents influencing particular social events. For example, and this
point will be argued inore forcefully below, artisan support of the Liberal Party in the middle of the
nineteenth century appeal's to be clearly at odds with their "real" economic interests, protection of their
handicrafts from foreign competition. Nevertheless, the historical record indicates that artisans more or
less consistently supported Liberal Party candidates throughout the second half of the nineteenth century.
Marxist scholars have referred to a concept known as "false consciousness" to explain such seemingly
inconsistent behavior. This concept will also presently be explored. At any rate, ideas clearly influence
socio-political developments in a reciprocal, dialectical way.
40Kar! Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harvest Books, 1955), pp. 2-5. Quoted in Larry and
Janice Reynolds, The Sociology o f Sociology: Analysis and Criticism o f the Thought, Research, and
Ethical Folkways and Its Practitioners (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1970), p. 8.
41Good introductions to the sociology of knowledge include, Larry T Reynolds and Janice M. Reynolds,
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Classical Marxism's concern with the notion of ideology and how this concept
relates to objective social reality makes Marx’s work another theoretical source that offers
insight into how ideas can be put to the service of various group or class interests.
Although neither theoretical perspective is adopted wholesale by the author, the social,
political and historical analysis presented is informed by both schools of thought.
More specifically, the present study utilizes the concept of ideology originally
articulated in Marx's corpus. This concept is useful in terms of understanding how ideas
relate to social reality in a given society, but ideology also has its explanatory limitations as
will be discussed below.
IDEAS AND SO C IA L R EA LITY
The development of the concepts of alienation and self-estrangement in Karl Marx's
work is often cited by modem defenders as powerful evidence of Marx's pronounced
humanistic orientation to the study of society. In order to understand Marx's notion of
ideology, it is necessary to review how the term relates to his conceptualization of
alienation.
In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts o f 1844, Marx argues that three
conditions exist in capitalist society which transform labor into an alienated condition: first,
the fact of private ownership of the means of production; second, as a consequence of the
development of productive forces, a process of a division of labor arises and; third, human
labor is transformed into a commodity.42
As a result, according to Marx, the concept of alienation has three main aspects:
man's alienation from the object of his production; his alienation from himself during the
activity of producing; and his alienation from his species-being, mankind, each of which
are explained in the Manuscripts.
At the core of his theory of alienation lies an idea that constitutes a unifying theme
throughout Marx's prolific theoretical output: the existence of private property ultimately
hinders man's attempts to master his social and economic environment. The seizure of the

The Sociology o f Sociology: Analysis and Criticism o f the Thought, Research, and Ethical Folkways
and Its Practitioners (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1970); James Curtis and John W.
P eto s, The Sociology o f Knowledge: A Reader (New York: Prager University Press, 1972); and, Irving
M, Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development o f Sociological Theory (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968). The aforementioned article by Kurt W olff also presents an excellent
bibliography o f sources, p. 59.
42Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts o f 1844 in Robert C. Tucker, The MarxEngels Reader (New York, London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1978)
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productive resources of society by the proletariat Marx believed, would free man to harness
nature to his needs. Communism is the vehicle by which the emancipation of the workers
from alienation could be achieved. Man for Marx, is in a process of coming-to-be.
Through the abolition of private property, man can realize his trae social nature and can
ultimately transcend his self-alienation.43 The only way man can overcome alienation then
is to seize the productive forces of society: this can only be accomplished when workers
become conscious of themselves as a class distinct from other social groups within the
social mode of production. For such a transcendence to occur, the proletariat must
overcome an important obstacle to achieving such class consciousness-the distorting
effects of ideology.
It is ideology, a (bourgeois) class-based distortion of reality, that is passed onto all
men as troth. For Marx, it is this ideology that keeps the proletariat from recognizing its
state of "false-consciousness" and prevents the working class from assuming its
progressive role in the history of society. Marx writes, "Insofar, therefore, as [a particular
class] rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident
that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as
producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age:
thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch."44
We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process
we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of
this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also,
necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically
verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics*
all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness,
thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no histoiy,
no development; but men, developing their material production and their
material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking
and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness,
but consciousness by life.45
This statement represents an important departure from classical political philosophy
as well as classical liberalism in that it posits that society determines man's nature rather
than the other way around. Men's philosophical musings cannot be divorced from the

43Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 Robert C. Tucker, p. 115.
44Karl Marx, The German Ideology, in Robert C. Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 173.
45Kail Marx, The German Ideology, Robert C. Tucker, pp. 154-155.
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historical moment and the particular society in which they are living.
Marx and Engels comment extensively on how bourgeois ideology manifests itself
in their most popular work, the Manifesto o f the Communist Party.
All objections urged against the communistic mode of producing and
appropriating material products have, in the same way, been urged against
the communistic modes of producing and appropriating intellectual
products. Just as, to the bourgeois, the disappearance of class property is
the disappearance of production itself, so the disappearance of class culture
is to him identical with the disappearance of all culture.
That culture, the loss of which he laments, is, for the enormous majority, a
mere training to act as a machine.
But don't wrangle with us so long as you apply, to our intended abolition of
bourgeois property, the standard of your bourgeois notions of freedom,
culture, law, etc. Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of
your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, ju st as your
jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law for all, a will
whose essential character and direction are determined by the economic
conditions of existence of your class.
The selfish misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of
nature and of reason the social forms springing from your present mode of
production and form of property-historical relations that rise and disappear
in the progress of production-this misconception you share with every
ruling class that has preceded you.46
Even the polity is a creation of an epoch's dominant class. In his Critique o f the
Gotha Program, Marx describes his view of the state in an attack on the reformist-oriented
German Workers Party: "Nevertheless, the different states of the different civilized
countries, in spite of their manifold diversity of form, all have this in common, that they are
based on modem bourgeois society, only one more or less capitalistically developed....in
fact, by the word 'state' is meant the government machine, or the state insofar as it forms a
special organism separated from society through the division of labor."47 Marx maintains
that in capitalist society, the state reflects the "bourgeois mentality", a false consciousness
which is produced by the constellation of social relations particular to capitalism.48 Liberal

46KarI M arx, The Communist Manifesto, in Lewis S. Feuer, Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics
and Philosophy Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, Inc. (1959) pp. 2324.
47Karl Marx, Critique o f the Gotha Program, in Robert C. Tucker, The M arx-Engels Reader, pp. 537-538.
48See Marx/Engels section II. "Proletarians and Communists" in the Manifesto for their critique of
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political theory, which he so frequently denounces, is nothing more than an ideological
justification for the existing property relations under capitalism. The state, and established
political power in general, are viewed as merely the organized power of one class for
exploiting another: "For each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before,
it is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interests as the
common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to
give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally
valid ones."49
In the course of the historical development of capitalism, the division of labor and
private ownership of the means of production inexorably lead to class conflicts as workers
begin to achieve a greater consciousness of their plight in bourgeois society. In order for
the worker to overcome his alienated and exploited condition, he must overthrow capitalist
society, just as the bourgeoisie had overthrown feudal society in order to create the
capitalist mode of production. "Freedom," Marx proclaims, "can only consist in socialized
man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing
it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature
and achieving this...under conditions most favorable to, and worthy of their human
nature."50
Social revolution will follow when the proletariat (the propertyless, working class)
achieves a subjective and objective consciousness of its own exploited and alienated role in
capitalist production: "...since all the living conditions of contemporary society have
reached the acme of inhumanity in the living conditions of the proletariat; since in the
proletariat man has lost himself, although at the same time he has both acquired a theoretical
consciousness of this loss and has been directly forced into indignation against this
inhumanity by virtue of an inexorable, utterly unembellishable, absolutely imperious need,
that practical expression of necessity-because of all this the proletariat itself can and must
liberate itself."51
Although individual agents have a role in shaping society, since man cannot escape
his environment, his culture, the legal and political system in which he was brought up, the

Bourgeois mentality, Robert C. Tucker, pp. 483-489.
49Karl Marx, The German Ideology, in Tucker, p. 174.
50Karl M arx, Capital Vol. III., Robert C. Tucker, p. 441.
51 Karl Marx, Alienation and Social Classes, Robert C. Tucker, p. 134.
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influence of his family, and other influences that bind the individual to a historical and
social epoch, historical imperative dictates that the proletariat must necessarily undertake its
mission to serve as the catalyst liberating man from exploitation. Marx comments, "Men
make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it
under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given
and transmitted from the past The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a
nightmare on the brain of the living."52 Later he writes, "Communism is the position as
the negation of the negation, and is hence the actual phase necessary for the next stage of
historical development in the process of human emancipation and recovery."53 Under
communism labor will be abolished and man will find his trae nature and engage in
associated free production with other men. The final revolution is seen as a way to procure
the permanent liberation of mankind from exploitation by other men. In the now famous
lines of the Manifesto, Marx and Engels proclaim, "All previous historical movements were
movements of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious independent
movement of the immense majority, in the interests of the immense majority."54
This was Marx's vague vision of the future. In a world where man was not fettered
by "false consciousness" nor separated from the fruits of his labor and the company of
other individuals by private property, man would transcend alienation and realize himself in
the totality of social relations.
Such a "humanistic" interpretation of Marx is shared by several scholars including
Robert Tucker, Sidney Hook, and George Lichtheim.55 Lichtheim argues that the
possibility of man achieving a liberating self-consciousness is central to Karl Marx's theory
of man and his relation to society. He writes:
The heart of Marxism (as of rationalism generally) is the belief that insight
into the nature of reality is all that is required to release the forces making
for the eventual triumph of liberty and rationality. Once men come to
understand that the circumstances of their lives are opposed to the fullest
development of human freedom, they will spontaneously strive to throw off
these external constraints...The criterion [of moral conduct] is in the nature

52Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Bm m aire o f Louis Bonaparte, Robert C. Tucker, p, 595.
53Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts o f 1844 Robert C. Tucker, p. 146.
54Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto, Robert C. Tucker, p. 482.
55Robert C. Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader, Sidney Hook, Marx and the Marxists: the Ambiguous
Legacy (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1955), and; .George Lichtheim, Marxism: An Historical
and Cultural Study (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1961)
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of things, being nothing else but the principle of rationality which is the
essence of all that is 'truly human'. To be rational is be in control of one's
faculties. Such control is freedom, and its eventual trium ph is the
undisclosed aim of the historical process.56
There are a number of limitations in employing ideology as a central explanatory
variable in social histories. Marx's assertion that the "ruling ideas of each age have ever
been the ideas of its ruling class" must be considered carefully. Certainly powerful élite
groups in society have a disproportionate influence in the creation and dispersion of ideas.
At times it seems that such ideas do indeed help "mask" social reality and prevent certain
social groups from achieving consciousness of their own position in society. However,
"ruling" ideas do not seem to be the only ideas in society at a given moment in history, and
the bourgeoisie has never been able to completely "regulate the production and distribution
of the ideas of their age."
Although few would argue that the élite groups in nineteenth century Colombian
society were less keenly aware of their privileged position
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society than peasants and

artisans, or that they did not view themselves as a special group apart from other strata in
society, it must be realized that even the élite could make decisions and act in a manner
contrary to their class interests. In the nineteenth century, the élite stratum of society
comprised of a commercial, trade-oriented bourgeoisie and large landowners, may have
possessed a consciousness of themselves as a class apart, but they were divided along lines
of two competing ideological systems, neither of which were definitively adopted by the
Colombian élite.
These competing ideological systems, each with a contrary view of the role of the
church in society, laissez-faire economics and federalism, led to dozens of violent conflicts
and numerous civil wars between followers of the Conservative and Liberal Parties.
Religion and federalism were particularly volatile issues, strongly influencing the actions of
party leaders in the civil wars of the nineteenth century. These wars pitted élite against élite
in an internecine struggle that would appear to be contrary to the directing class' interest as
a whole. Attempting to reduce such substantive issues as conflict over religion's role in
society to pure economic interests is, in the Colombian case, an exaggeration.
It is true the Catholic Church was a major political player in Colombian society. It
is also true that the Church in the early nineteenth century was also a major economic and
social force, as will be explored in the Chapter Two of the present work. However

56George Lichtheim, Marxism, pp. 238-239.
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political support or condemnation of the church more often than not occurred along multi
class party lines rather than following strict class lines. Colombian peasants have
traditionally been the most Catholic segment of society. Many artisans were also vehement
in their defence of church interests, while others were not. The same holds trae of the élite.
Complicating the entire affair is the fact that nearly all Colombians considered themselves
Catholic despite their position on the Church’s role in society. Economic interests certainly
played a role in Liberal efforts to limit the power of the church, but it can plausibly argued
that such interests were simply an attendant feature, not the primary causal agent in the
Liberals' actions.57
Of course history is not stagnant, and inter-élite straggles did not remain a matter of
Liberal free-traders vs. Conservative landowners. As Park points out in his study, there
were landholders who were staunchly Liberal and there were Conservative exporters. At
any rate, by the turn of the century, the free-trade issue had been definitively resolved in
favor of libre cambio, both parties recognizing the critical importance of the coffee export
trade.
In the twentieth century, a new division between the élite would emerge as
Colombia began a march towards modernization, industrialization and urbanization, with
the rise to preeminence of young, urban Liberals whose interests were not tied to the earth.
As the mainstream of the Liberal Party adopted an interventionist view of the state's role in
society, clamoring for greater rights for workers, the Conservative party moved in the
opposite direction opting for repression. When finally in 1946 the Liberals decisively
moved to choose pro-labor Gaitán as the Party’s leader, the ideological gulf separating
Conservatives and Liberals broadened. When Gaitán was assassinated less than two years
later, party loyalties that had become hereditary both among élites and urban and rural
workers exploded in La Violencia,.a civil conflagration that engulfed the nation and ended

57The argument that the Church's wealth in society represented one obstacle to rationalization of
agricultural production and capital concentration necessary for the full development of capitalism has
been advanced by Richard Funk-Harries in his Ph.D dissertation, "Camilo Torres Restrepo and the
Christian Left in the Tradition of Colombian Church-State Relations," (Ann Arbor MI and London:
University Microfilms International, 1980). Although undoubtedly nineteenth century Liberals wished
to curb the influence and limit the wealth o f the Catholic Church, I would argue that this came about
more as an ideological imperative o f following anti-clerical ideas adopted from Europe rather than as a
rational class conspiracy to further bourgeois economic interests. For alternative interpretations to
Funk-Harries see Daniel H. Levine's works, The Catholic Church in Venezuela and Colombia
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981) and "The Catholic Church, Politics, and
Violence: The Colombian Case," The Review o f Politics, Vol. 39, No. 2, (April 1977) which was co
authored with A. Wilde. Another source is David E. Mutchler's, The Church as a Political Factor in
Latin America (New York, Washington, London: Praeger Publishers, 1971) and an unpublished
manuscript by the author, The Catholic Church in Colombia: Implications fo r Development (1985).
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in the deaths of some 200,000 Colombians. If a consensus among the rulers that would
guarantee their economic interests had been achieved, how could such a costly event in
human as well as economic terms, pitting élite against élite and campesino against
campesino occur?
It must be asked then whether it was false consciousness on the part of the
landholders and/or bourgeoisie that kept them apart? Perhaps a lack of full consciousness
of their dominant role in society left the ruling classes vulnerable from threats below, as in
the Melo threat in 1852 or the socialist challenge in the 1920's. I will argue that profound
differences stemming from competing views of an ideal society that separated Liberals and
Conservatives dated back to early independence, and that residual "ideological" struggles
helped keep Liberal élites and Conservative élites from achieving a full consciousness of
their dominant position in society. This view is explored in the first two chapters.
It is not only that élites failed to achieve a full consciousness of their position in
society, but it seems that both artisans and colonos both achieved a fairly high degree of
consciousness of their differences at various stages in Colombian history.58 The
Colombian peasant struggling to wrest a title to a parcel of land from a large landholder had
a higher consciousness of himself, and his economic interests, as evidenced by the
powerful desire to own his means of production, than has often been argued. This
indicates an ability of both artisans and peasants to decipher at least partially their individual
interests in society. This in turn has an impact on their acceptance or rejection of the ruling
ideas in societies. For Colombian colonos, sharecroppers and small holders resisting
proletarianization in the 1930's, Liberal promises of land reform that would legalize their
holdings had a much broader appeal than did Communist ideas about forming mass
cooperatives in the countryside.
The communists' ideas on forming cooperative-based modes of production were
themselves unsuccessful competitors in the world of ideas. Such ideas failed to motivate
peasant and colono acceptance not merely because they were not the "ruling ideas" of the
age, but because of their irrelevance to rural Colombian workers' views of themselves and
their world. Colombian peasants were not merely "duped" by bourgeois ideology, they
often simply pursued individualist strategies that at times significantly improved their life
conditions.
Despite these difficulties with the Marxist conceptualization of ideology, the concept
can have important explanatory power. In modem Colombian society, the predominant

58Chapter Five discusses the development of class consciousness and the artisans.
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ideology is created by that class, and is for a time accepted as truth: it has to give its ideas
the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones. In
this study, ideology will refer to a set of political, economic and social ideas that are
adopted by a particular' group which attributes to this set of ideas the form of universality,
representing them as a universally valid explanation of how the world works or should
work. Thus classical liberalism, modem liberalism, and Marxism would count as
ideologies, since each ideology's supporters generally attempt to offer them as universal
troths, viable explanations of reality.
Although it is true that certain ideas gain wider acceptance than others in the open
market of ideas, to continue the analogy borrowed from capitalism itself, certain groups in
society have a much larger, more effective marketing division than others. To paraphrase
Marx's argument that the ideas of the rulers are the ruling ideas of the age, one must admit
that there is a great deal of validity in this proposition. It seems plausible that dominant
ideas can be imposed surreptitiously by one social class as a result in a disparity in power,
ie., control of media and most resources in society, and that such ideas can more easily be
passed off as universal truth, than say the artisan "world view" of the early years of this
century.59 However true this may be, as argued earlier, though ideologies can often
obscure truth (false consciousness), they cannot long be accepted as truth unless something
substantive in them can appeal to individual's economic, social or political interests. This
is why the individualism, profit motive and rhetoric of equality and liberty, central tenets of
liberalism achieved wide appeal among Colombian rural workers while socialized
production and social solidarity of communism did not. The scholar's role should be to
look at the ideas in society that influence men's and actions, seek out their social origins,
and weigh their relative impact on individuals' lives and society as a whole, and in each
case, strive to pinpoint the "masking effect" they may have on obscuring individuals' true
interests.
The current study examines the development of the Colombian labor movement
during the hundred years covering the period 1848-1948. In order to provide a substantive
understanding of the growth of the Colombian labor movement, the present work seeks to:
1) provide an analysis of the particular space and time contexts of various
intellectual/ideological productions that directly impacted the labor movement. This
includes the social, cultural, political and economic milieu characteristic of a particular era,
and the socio-historical processes that led to the creation of that era; 2) critically examine the

59See Chapters Four and Five of the current work.
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assumptions and beliefs held by principal actors in the process that marks the creation of
various thought-systems and the dialectical interaction of these beliefs with other catalysts
for action such as the economic conditions defining a particular time-frame (at what point
do ideas "take on a life of their own” to serve as catalysts for actions of themselves, and
how much of a role do they play in the overall scheme of things). Among such catalysts in
the Colombian case are the motives and actions of Liberal and Conservative party leaders,
labor leaders and spokespersons (journalists» pamphleteers, activists, etc.) and in some
cases, third political party and international actors. Such a macro-level analysis as that
which is being proposed implies the need to develop a theoretical framework based on the
historical processes which led to the creation of the Colombian labor movement, as well as
the dynamic interaction of the aforementioned actors which served (and, to argue at a later
point, continues to serve) to maintain the stracture of Colombian society, and; 3) provide a
synthesis that links the empirical focus on contemporary socio-economic reality to an
"objective" understanding of how the subsequent systems of thought, and actions,
influenced the course of development of the Colombian labor movement; in short, provide
the fit between theory and reality. Such an approach allows us to integrate each of these
elements into a coherent, holistic analysis of the early development of labor in Colombia.
These three critical elements; the socio-historical context, the relationship between
various actors and their ideas, empirical behavior, and ideology, and the synthesis that
links these together will be utilized to provide us with a more objective, more complete
understanding of the development of the Colombian labor movement than could be
achieved through the study of historical or political events alone. In short, following
Wallerstein's advice, the current study attempts to study "the widest range of phenomena"
possible in the historical development of Colombian labor, including social, political and
economic organization as well as the role ideas played in serving as catalysts to action.
This first chapter has provided a review of the relevant literature
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labor and an overview of the methodological approach that will be applied to the study of
the labor movement in Colombia.
Chapter Two sets the historical stage by providing an overview of the economic,
social, political and philosophical situation in the colonial era focusing on how each of
these areas impacted the later development of artisan organizations as well as the two
principal antagonistic systems of thought in Colombia, Liberalism and Conservatism.
Even though the study's primary focus is the hundred years between 1848 and 1948, in
order to understand the critical developments of the nineteenth century, the economic and
social legacy of Spain cannot be ignored.
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Chapter Three covers the nineteenth-century» focusing on historical events of midto-late century Colombia. It should be noted that several different considerations have led
the author to limit the temporal span of the study to the period of 1848-1948 while
providing a concise overview of important historical antecedents to the birth of an
organized labor movement,
The first of these is the obvious constraint of time and space. In order to provide as
thorough an examination as possible, given the limited resources which the author had to
work, the project had to be narrowed to a realistic time frame. Secondly, although one
does not witness the appearance of anything remotely resembling what may be termed an
urban working class movement (one that was predominantly comprised of wage-eaming
workers) before the turn of the century, the influence of artisans in early urban labor
organizations was critical Highly politicized artisan worker organizations existed as early
as the 1830's and the artisan sociedad democrática served as an important political force in
mid-nineteenth century Colombia. Although the failed, largely artisan-led "revolution" of
1854 diminished the political clout of organized artisan "sociedades", artisans continued to
be a social and political force throughout the nineteenth century, and later provided
leadership and organizational skills to help build the first modem unions in Colombia.
From the earliest stirrings of artisan activities in the new republic, both Conservative Party
and Liberal were involved in the creation of artisan organizations to help support their
ideological and programmatic positions.
Chapter Three explores the historical, economic and political trends evident in the
nineteenth century. It focuses on the role of contemporary ideology-laden issues such as
federalism, free-trade, and the place of the Catholic Church in society. The chapter also
discusses the creation of the artisan sociedades democráticas under the ideological influence
of liberal and conservative ideologies. Liberal ideology exerted a particularly strong
influence over these organizations, and despite the fact that the organizations' charters
proclaimed their non-partisanship, many adopted political stances supporting the Liberal
government. This occurred despite the stark reality that the material interests of the artisans
were diametrically opposed to the Liberals strong stand advocating laissez-faire economic
policies. Free-trade, which would permit cheap manufactures from Britain and other parts
of industrializing Europe to compete with local artisan production, ultimately could only
serve to undermine the artisans' position in society. Chapter Three concludes by looking at
the social gulf that separated artisan from élite and provides an overview of the affects of
Liberal reform on artisan production.
Chapter Four, entitled "Utopian Socialism, Ideology and Class Conflict in the
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Nineteenth. Century" takes a closer look at artisan "class consciousness" and the Liberal
reforms of the 1850's and 1860's. It critically examines how the artisans viewed
themselves and their role in society, as well as provides a self-portrait of Liberal party
leaders. The gulf between Liberal principles such as liberty, brotherhood, and equality and
the material interests of the elite-dominated Liberal leadership and their new-found
Conservative allies, namely supporting free-trade legislation, is also drawn out along with
the concomitant conflict with the leadership's former allies, the artisans. Events leading to
the Melo dictatorship and the "Artisan Republic" of 1854 and the subsequent civil war that
culminated in the collapse of the artisan rebellion are also discussed in Chapter Four, as
well as the development of the apolitical artisan "mutualist societies" and the rise of an
export economy in the latter half of the century.
While the early chapters of the thesis deal with the Colombian labor movement’s
historical antecedents in the nineteenth century, the last two chapters explore its
development in the industrializing Colombia of the first half of the twentieth century. The
appearance of modem industrial and craft unions had to await the gradual development of
incipient manufacturing industries and advances in the transportation sector which
accompanied the spectacular growth of the coffee trade. The closing decades of the
nineteenth century witnessed the consolidation of a predominantly export-oriented coffee
economy, resolving a longstanding conflict between the Conservative guardians of tradition
and the Liberal, trade-oriented bourgeoisie.
Chapter Five, "Victory in Defeat: Consolidation of the Liberal Export Economy,"
looks at labor in the countryside while outlining the rise of the coffee export industry. The
chapter looks at the country-city nexus, the straggle for land in the countryside and the rise
of social conservatism and Rafael Núñez. It also addresses the social and economic impact
of the the War of a Thousand Days as well as the political implications of the separation of
Panama.
Entitled "Early Industrial Growth and the Emergence of a Proletariat," Chapter Six
explores industrial developments in the early twentieth century and the first conceited effort
by organized labor to extract itself gradually from partisan politics. It also explores the
economic impact of the "Dance of the Millions," the massive influx of capital as a result of
the United States' indemnification for its role in the secession of Panama from Colombia.
Chapter Seven, "Labor and the Liberal Revolución en Marcha" discusses the
reintegration of labor into partisan party politics. It describes the development of an
influential group of "anti-élites", disaffected Liberals who became known as Los Nuevos,
comprised of such intellectuals as Gabriel Turbay, Alberto Lleras Camargo and Jorge
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Eliecer Gaitán. The chapter explores the creation of new labor organizations, the
Conservative government's repressive response to labor, the communists decision to ally
themselves with the Liberals, and the influence Los Nuevos ultimately exerted on labor.
The chapter also reviews the events leading up to the creation of the Confederación
de Trabajadores de Colombia (CTC, the Confederation of Colombian Workers) in 1936,
the first major agrarian reform in Colombia, Law 200 of 1936, and the strong support
provided to organized labor by the Liberal government. This section argues that the
government support which allowed unions to prosper was not without its costs:
government "protection" also implied increased government control. The Liberal
government subsidized several important union activities such as labor conferences and
meetings. In 1937 however, the government exerted its considerable influence in labor
affairs by passing a series of laws regulating union expenditures of government subsidies.
As had been the case throughout the nineteenth century, workers who had
organized to fight for economic benefits in society to a certain degree became electoral
pawns for the élite-dominated Liberal party. Despite Colombian "New Deal" reforms
enacted under the López Pumarejo administrations that in general helped improve the lot of
the working man, predominant élite interests still dictated the course of societal changes in
Colombian political and economic life. The Colombian élite realized the "inevitability of
working class participation in the society and economy, while also hoping to channel it into
controllable lines of action."60
1948 was chosen as the terminal point for the present study for a number of
reasons. In that year, the labor movement's Liberal champion Jorge Eliecer Gaitán was
assassinated in the streets of Bogotá. This event was the major catalyst igniting one of the
most intense and prolonged eras of civilian violence of the twentieth century, La Violencia.
As a result of a number of factors discussed in greater detail in the thesis, labor witnessed a
precipitous decline in its fortunes between the years 1946-1948. Although labor had
sought a path independent of the two traditional parties in the first two decades of the
twentieth century, it was clear that by the 1930’s the majority of Colombia's laborers had
been attracted to the Liberal Party Concomitant to the rise of a Conservative government
in 1946 hostile to labor and its aspirations, could be seen the increasing influence of the
Liberal Party, particularly Gaitán's disaffected faction, in organized labor's affairs.

60 Thomas E. Skidmore, "Workers and Soldiers: Urban Labor M ovements and Elite Responses in 20th
Century Latin America," in Elites, Masses and Modernization in Latin America, 1850-1930 edited by
Bradford Bums and Thomas E. Skidmore (London, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), p 106
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Eventually, the labor movement which had strived to assert its independence at the turn of
the century, would essentially be re-absorbed into the existing apparatuses of Colombia's
two predominant political parties: Liberal and Conservative.
In late 1946, as the new Conservative government became less tolerant of the CTC,
labor suffered a major setback. The dismal failure of a nationwide strike called by
Colombia's largest and most powerful worker's organization, the Confederación de
Trabajadores de Colombia itself, partly as a result of government repression, considerably
reduced the likelihood of creating an effective labor organization independent of the
traditional parties' interference and manipulation. Another blow to hopes for an
autonomous union movement was the establishment of the Jesuit-organized Unión de
Trabajadores de Colombia (UTC; Colombian Worker's Union), in 1946 which, in the
words of Colombian historian Paul Oquist, "became the favored instrument of the
Conservative government."61 All of these events served to weaken, and eventually, to
undermine an already vulnerable nascent labor movement. With the onset of the anarchical
period in Colombian history known as La. Violencia, laborers in Colombia had completed
their first hundred years of servitude.
The final chapter, Chapter Eight provides a conclusion, implications for future
research and a summary of the main lines of argument. This chapter also provides a brief
assessment of organized labor's impact on Colombian society and politics during La
Violencia, relating labor's influence, or rather lack of influence, to earlier events.
No matter how committed, knowledgeable and relatively unbiased an observer from
the late twentieth century may be, it is obviously impossible to view early nineteenth
century labor histoiy through the eyes of those who lived through and created it. There is
the testimony of the contemporary press, official party organs and leaders, some sketchy
economic data for the period under consideration, the artistic legacy of writers, poets, and
even politicians and records
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laws passed by the Colombian legislature. Despite this

drawback, the present study represents a conscientious effort by the author to bring to light
the limited information that does exist on how workers actually viewed themselves and
their society.
One cannot however, uncritically accept the contemporary testimony of eyewitness
observers either. It must be remembered that the actors themselves were part of the
environment that they were observing. Each actor viewed his world from the context of his

61 Paul Oquist, Violence, Conflict and Politics in Colombia, (New York, Toronto, San Francisco:
Academic Press, 1980), p. 113.
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social vantage point, and in many ways such a vista is more biased than a contemporary
social scientist's account may be. A profound gulf separates an individual's perceptions of
his own motives, actions, society, and world-view and an 'objective' understanding of
social reality. Law 200 of 1936 was the Liberal López Pumarejo administration's answer
to peasant demands for land: it represented one of the first attempts at authentic agrarian
land reform in modem Latin American history. Left-wing and moderate Liberals alike
viewed the legislation as a mechanism to clear up disputed title to lands claimed by peasants
and large landowners in favor of the former, but the historical record indicates that the
Liberals' good intentions conflicted with the actual social outcome. Law 200 was
devastating to the small independent landholder since in actuality, it sanctioned many of the
large landowners property claims and led to the legal eviction of thousands of peasants.62
One task of the historian therefore, is to attempt to go beyond the primae facie
evidence afforded by the actors' idealized visions of themselves, in an effort to strip away
ideological garments and gain a more accurate view of the social reality beneath the facade.
To do this, one must once again seek to understand how and why such self-assessments
are produced in a particular society at a particular time. This evidence must be weighed
against other variables such as the socio-economic position of the agent, possible political
ramifications of the the agent's professed views, and how such "professed" views may
vary from actually held beliefs. One must also take into account the context of the socio
temporal locus impacting the individual's perspective, and the social actor's class affiliation
and loyalties.
One problem for the student of labor history who is primarily limited to secondary
sources, is a strong reliance on the more traditional sources on union organization and
leadership, strike history, and government responses to labor's challenge. Nevertheless,
while acknowledging this limitation and those described above, the work will attempt to
view the available data and resources with a critical eye on the theoretical perspectives and
social backgrounds of the authors in sources utilized in the study, the social and educational
baggage each writer brings to the task and any biases possessed by the author of this work
as a result of his personal background.
Finally, the present study does not pretend to be an exhaustive historical analysis,
but rather seeks to provide a preliminary framework for a discussion of the early
development of the Colombian labor movement.

62Catherine Le Grand, "Labor Acquisition and Social Conflict on the Colombian Frontier," Latin American
Studies, (Vo! 16, 1985), p. 45, and Paul Oquist, Violence, p, 98 make this point forcefully.
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CHAPTER 2
C O LO N IA L C O LO M B IA

Because o f the excessive liberty the Indians have been permitted, they flee from Christians
and do not work. Therefore they are to be compelled to work, so that the kingdom and the
Spaniards may be enriched, and the Indians Christianized. They are to be paid a daily
wage, and well treated as free persons fo r such they are, and not as slaves.
Royal Order o f December 20, 1503 laying the
legal foundation fo r the encomienda system.1
...the king has sent ecclesiastics who have taught the Indians the Christian doctrine and
faith by which they could be saved. Moreover, the king has established justice in such a
way that no one may aggravate another. The king has maintained the peace so that there are
no killings or sacrifices, as was the custom in some parts. He has made it possible fo r the
Indians to go safely by all roads and to peacefully carry on their civil pursuits. He has
freed them from burdens and servitude; he has made known to them the use o f bread,
wine, oil and many other foods, woolen cloth, silk, linen, horses, cows, tools, arms and
many other things from Spain; he has instructed them in crafts and trades by which they
live excellently. All these advantages will those Indians enjoy who embrace our Holy Faith
and render obedience to our king.
Royal Ordinance o f July 13, 1573
Promulgated by Philip IP
IN T R O D U C T IO N
One may wonder why a late nineteenth/early twentieth-century exploration of the
labor movement begins with the colonial period. In order to understand the critical
developments of the nineteenth century, the economic and social legacy of Spain cannot be
ignored. Professor Gerardo Molina pointedly addressed this issue in the most recent of his
several social histories of ideas in Colombia, Las Ideas Socialistas en Colombia:
"La dominación hispánica en estas colonias fue una potente maquinaria de
creación de desigualdades...todos los factores se conjugaban en la
Península para oprimir al pueblo: una monarquía absoluta, una nobleza que
se creía de origen superior, una Iglesia cada día más ansiosa de intervenir en
los asuntos terrenales, unos propietarios de tierras que se comportaban en

1Quoted in Lewis Hanke, The Spanish Struggle fo r Justice in the Conquest o f America (Boston: Little
Brown and Company. 1949), p. 20.
2Hanke, The Spanish Struggle fo r Justice, p. 131.

31

sus respectivos feudos como reyezuelos, todo esto conspiraba contra las
gentes del común."3
Unlike Anglo colonial aspirations in North America, the Spaniards were drawn to
the New World in search of two driving and complementary concerns: the pursuit of
economic wealth and the conversion of the indigenous peoples to Roman Catholicism.
With the conquering warriors came their visions of a medieval world-view which melded
the cross of Peter with the sword of Caesar. Whether for the sacred goals of religious
conversion or the more profane desire for economic exploitation, as Colombianist Robert
Dix has remarked, either of these cases implied domination over the native population.4
The following section explores how this relationship developed and how it impacted the
development of Colombian society.
THE CROSS AND THE CROWN
1492 is remembered by American schoolchildren as the year that Columbus set sail
for the New World. In Spain however, the year is also significant for another important
event: Spain achieved national territorial integration in 1492 by driving the Moors from the
Iberian Peninsula. Militant religiosity supplied a cohesive force that made possible Spain’s
zealous drive toward nationhood, and in turn helped to cement the bonds of church and
state characteristic of Spain. Later, this relationship would be transplanted in the colonies
and become a defining characteristic of the emerging Hispanic nations of the Americas.
In the New World, the Crown and Church undertook complementary missions. As
Fernando de los Rios eloquently wrote fifty years ago in his Action o f Spain in America:
Spain was impelled to two kinds of militant action at that momentous period
of her history: the one militarist the other spiritual, both combative and eager
to conquer; in the former the purposes to conquer power, territory, and
riches prevailed; in the latter the prime aim was to win adherence to
Christianity. [That] there was an interweaving between the two...each of
which depended for its existence on absorbing a part of the vital juice of the
other, is quite fundamental for the understanding of Spanish colonization.
The will to power and the will to imperium, in the double dimension so

3Gerardo Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas en Colombia (Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Tercer M undo, 1987),
p. 35.
4Robert Dix, The Politics o f Colombia (New York, W esport Conn., London: Praeger Publishers, 1987),
p. 14.
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loved by the Renaissance, material and spiritual, reached through Spain to
its apex.5
Under Isabella, Spain became much more receptive to influences emanating from
the Renaissance which had earlier taken root in other parts of western Europe. Long
established as a major portal to knowledge held in the Islamic world, much of the
rediscovery of the ancient classics had initially been transmitted to the rest of Europe
through the Iberian Peninsula. Spain's and Portugal's energies in the fifteenth century
however, had focused on conquering and consolidating territory in the Iberian peninsula
long held by the Moors. Many of those who had served as conduits to bring the classics to
Europe were Jewish and Islamic scholars who lived in Spain. During the Inquisition, most
Jews and Muslims fled Spain, while those who remained had their lands expropriated,
were subject to trials for crimes of heresy in ecclesiastical courts, and many were put to
death. Spain lost its role as portal to Europe for the transmission of knowedge held in the
Islamic world, while the rediscovery of classical knowledge had a profound and lasting
impact on the rest of Europe: the great explorations, the rise of mercantilism, the beginning
of the consolidation of territories into powerful nation-states and the renaissance forever
transformed European societies.
Once Spain had been unified however, the Islamic threat began to recede in
importance.6 Ideas and events in the rest of Europe began to have a much more
pronounced impact on Spain. In his history of the era of reconnaissance, J.H. Parry writes
of the changes in Spanish outlook wrought by increased contact with the rest of Europe:
With a new attitude towards the individual, the Renaissance fostered a new
attitude towards the State, also Italian in origin. A sensitive new alertness, a
studied, objective attention to the most effective and most elegant means of
achieving a desired end tended to supplant the older notion of the State as a
network of fixed, traditional rights and duties over which the monarch
presided as a judge of disputes...Like many Italian rulers, Isabella of Castile
owed her throne to a mixture of war and diplomacy. A masterful restoration
o f p u b lic o rd er and d is c ip lin e w as one o f h er m ajo r
achievements...Machiavelli's principles of statecraft had no more successful
exemplars than Ferdinand of Aragon and John II of Portugal...It helped

5Femando de los Rios, "The Action o f Spain in A m erica;' Concerning Latin American Culture (New York:
1940), PP.-25-78, quoted in C.H. Haring's The Spanish Empire in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace
& World, Inc., 1946), p. 166.
6 The omnipresent threat of the Ottoman Turks in the eastern fringes of Christendom, ensured that in
Spanish eyes the threat would remain a real one as long as political Islam remained a dominant force in
world affairs. During the Inquisition, Moslems and Jews alike were coerced into converting to
Christianity or were expelled from Spain or killed.
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prepare men's minds for the immense tasks of political and administrative
improvisation which was to confront Spanish government in the New
W orld.7
As has been underscored by generations of historians, the spiritual mission of the
Catholic Church has also had a profound moral, intellectual and economic influence on the
historical development of Latin America.8 Beginning with the Cardinal Ximénez
Cisneros* reforms encouraged by Ferdinand and Isabella, successive Spanish monarchs
encouraged the symbiotic relationship between Church and state to flourish. Charles V and
Philip II gradually came to acknowledge the authority of the Pope in spiritual matters9. The
Papacy, the other half of the alliance, at one point provided the Spanish Crown with a
considerable source of income; one account estimated that some 20% of Philip II's
revenues derived from the Church.10
From the outset of the conquest however, the Church came under the direct control
of royal authorities in all matters except doctrine and royal discipline. The Patronato Real
de las Indias defined the Church's relation with the Spanish Crown. Based on a series of
Papal Bulls, the Patronato Real» as the body of royal privileges vis á vis the Church was to
become known, ceded authority to the Crown to appoint church personnel, as well as the
right to make decisions affecting the establishment of churches, monasteries, hospitals and
missions in the New World. Universalis Ecclesiae, the bull of Julius II dated July 28th,
1508, is cited by Mecham as the "principle documentary evidence of the Spanish

7J.H. Parry, The Age o f Reconnaissance: Discovery, Exploration» and Settlement 1450 to 1650 (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), pp. 32-33.
8Many o f the works utilized in this study allude to the power of the Church, including, C.H. Haring The
Spanish Empire in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1947), Lewis Hanke, The
Spanish Struggle fo r Justice in the Conquest o f America (Boston: Little Brown and Company. 1949),
J.H. Parry, The Age o f Reconnaissance: Discovery, Exploration, and Settlement 1450 to 1650 (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), Jesús María Henao and Gerardo Arrubla, Histoiy o f Colombia
Translated by Fred J. Rippy. (New York: Greenwood Press Publications, 1969), Robert Dix, The Politics
o f Colombia (New York, Wesport Conn., London: Praeger Publishers, 1987), and of course, the studies
focusing on the role o f the Catholic Church in Colombia, David E. Mutchler, The Church as a Political
Factor in Latin America (New York, Washington, London: Praeger Publishers, 1971), and Richard
Funk-Harries, "Camilo Torres Restrepo and the Christian Left in the Tradition of Colombian ChurchState Relations," Ph.D dissertation (Ann Arbor MI and London: University Microfilms International,
1980).
^Richard Funk Harries, "Camilo Tones," pp. 94-101.
10Funk-Harries, "Camilo Torres," p. 101.
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sovereigns to exercise jurisdiction over the Catholic Church in Latin America."11 In
return, the Church imposed upon the Crown the obligation of Christianizing the natives and
implanting Spanish civilization in her American domains. In practice, the kings of Spain
wielded tremendous authority over the church in America: the Crown had the right to set
the limits of dioceses, control administration of ecclesiastical taxation, and to nominate
archbishops, bishops and abbots.
In Colombia the Crown and Church were especially successful in the proselytizing
aspect of their mission. To this day, the Roman Catholic Church in Colombia is often
described as one of the most conservative, orthodox and powerful churches in Latin
America. Historian Lloyd Mecham for instance, has written that the Church has been
"more tenacious in its hold upon national and civil life in Colombia than in any other LatinAmerican country."12 Despite challenges throughout Colombia's histoiy to its prominent
role in society, the Church has maintained a great deal of influence in public life through the
virtual monopoly of various sectors in society: the educational system, charity and welfare
activities, hospitals and asylums.
In colonial days, as well as during the post-independence, neo-Bourbon era, the
influence of the Church pervaded every aspect of social life. The birth of a child was
celebrated with baptismal in the Church and an entry into official records kept by the local
parish. When one took a mate, this too was marked by a religious ceremony conducted by
a man of the cloth. And when finally a life came to an end, even death remained within the
sovereign realm of the Church: an individual was laid to rest with a vesper to God and his
memory recorded in a parish passage.
In a deeply religious society, the power to excommunicate represented the power of
spiritual life and death over individuals not only in this world, but also in the next The
ability to excommunicate gave the Church significant power over agents of the state. If not
quite an equal partner in terms of power in the New World, the Church was nevertheless
the central agent in bringing Spanish customs and laws to the indigenous peoples and in
maintaining the standards of the faith among colonist and conquistador alike.
And finally, the Church, as a result of its close bonds to the Spanish Crown, served
in many respects as an extension of royal government in the colonies. In supporting
Spain’s claims in the Americas, Rome thereby provided legitimacy to Spanish imperial

H j. Lloyd M echam, Church and State in Latin America (Chapel Hill, NC: 1934), p. 16.
12Mecham, Church and State, p. 115.
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rule. The tremendous political and social power devolved to the state through the Patronato
Real implied an indivisible union of Church and state in which the latter was preeminent.
Because of the extensive royal authority exercised under the Patronato Real, the Church in
the Americas was to become a national church, "living within the orbit not of the Roman
Papacy but of the Council of the Indies, and attached to Rome by very tenuous bonds."13
The fact that the Church may have been politically controlled by the state does not
diminish the tremendous influence the clerics exercised at home in shaping the direction of
Spanish policy in the Americas, nor its profound influence on the daily life of the colonies'
peoples, both Indian and Hispanic, Most clergy came to the New World with unswerving
belief in their faith, authentic dedication to their proselytizing mission, and a strong sense
of commitment not only to the crown but also to the tenets of the Holy Roman Catholic
Church. The spiritual mission of the Church complemented its secular mission of
maintaining the social welfare of the colony, which aided the Crown to extend its power
and authority in America. As many historians have noted, during the colonial era, the
Catholic Church became "the most powerful single agent for inculcating the lessons of
obedience and loyalty to the person of the monarch among all classes of society."14
THE COLONIAL ECONOMY
Since the primary allure of the New World for the Spanish Crown and
subsequently, for the early conquistadores, was the pursuit of precious metals, the initial
economic focus was placed on exploiting the generous gold and silver resources of the
Americas. These resources were needed to finance Spain's colonial ventures, her political
and territorial aspirations in Europe, and most importantly, to help pay for manufactures
imported from northern Europe.
In terms of the colonial society's link to the Old World's economy, it has been
argued that the early colony could be described as a form of transplanted feudalism inserted
into a European-centered mercantilist world economy. Colombian economic historian
Salomón Kalmanovitz has encapsulated the nature of the colonial economy in the following
terms:"...podemos deducir que las formas de producción en el virreinato de la Nueva
Granada, base de la nación Colombiana, corresponden, de manera por demás aproximada,

13C.H. Haring The Spanish Empire, p. 169, paraphrasing Desdevises du Dezert, L'Eglise espagnole des
Indes á la fin du XVIIIe siécle (Paris: 1917).
14Funk Harries, "Camilo Torres," p. 115. Virtually every text on colonial Spanish America alludes to this
fact, including each of those referenced in footnote 8.
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a una etapa elevada del desarrollo social del feudalismo; sus antecedentes aboiígenes, su
situación colonial y la etapa en que se hallaba el capitalismo en el mundo y que se proyecta
sobre la producción y la evolución política, le prestan características propias a la estructura
productiva y a las instituciones que la acompañan"15
It is not surprising that the Spanish would seek to establish a social and economic
system that was at once consistent with their experience at home and also aimed at the
optimum utilization of existing human resources in the territories they conquered. In her
new possessions in the Americas, particularly New Spain (Mexico) and the Peru, and
Nueva Granada rich deposits of silver and gold were discovered and brought into
production with the rudimentary mining technology known to the Spanish. The mines
were exploited with the labor initially provided by the indigenous peoples of the New
World.
Successful in their quest to subdue the major urban centers of Indian America, the
conquistadores did not completely destroy the social organization that they discovered: in
most cases, in the early years of colonization, they merely replaced the tribal chieftains and
priests who had preceded them. For villagers long accustomed to paying tribute to the
Inca, the Maya or the Aztec Empires, the transition to European rale was probably not as
traumatic as one might suppose.16
In Colombia, the Spaniards did not encounter an empire of one dominant group
such as the Aztec of Mexico or the Inca of Peru, but instead found many different tribes
varying in their degree of social complexity. On the sabana of Bogotá, which included the
later provinces of Tunja and Popayán, the Spanish took advantage of the relatively large,
sedentary populations such as the Muiscas that they discovered there, by appropriating a
portion of the Indians' production and also by using indigenous labor to construct colonial
churches and towns.17 In other areas, notably Antioquia, Santander, and Tolima, more
warlike tribes resisted the Spaniards and were largely eliminated. These regions were also
magnets for many Spanish colonizers in 17th century.18

15Salomón Kalmanovitz, Economía y Nación: Una Breve Historia de Colombia (Bogotá: Siglo
Veintiuno Editores, 1985), p, 91.
16The exceptions were non-sedentary tribes that resisted the Spaniards and of course, the caciques and priests
who were replaced.
17Kalmanovitz, Economía, p. 16.
18Kalmanovitz, Economía, p 16.
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Although comparisons are often drawn between European feudalism of the middle
ages and the economic system established in the New World, as Kalmanovitz correctly
notes in his economic history of Colombia, despite many parallels, the forms of production
which were implanted and took root in the Americas were significantly different.19
Encomienda, as the economic system which initially developed in the Spanish colonies was
known, was based on a royal concession of labor apportioned to the conquerors. In
return, the encomendero was charged with the moral and religious instruction of the
Indians. In reality, Indians were often enslaved, to work at the will of the encomendero,
even though Royal Orders as early as the celebrated 1503 decree expressly prohibited
enslavement of the native peoples. Indians provided labor to build Spanish churches and
towns, to harvest and transport food for the Spanish settlers, and to work the mines to
provide the colonists with silver and gold to purchase European-produced goods. The
encomienda was the predominant early form of labor recruitment in Spanish domains in the
Americas, and remained an important economic force for nearly two and one-half centuries.
Shortages of grain staples in the late sixteenth century led to widespread cultivation
of wheat on Spanish latifundia, which had grown up out of territories purchased or bribed
from local caciques. Despite strict legislation aimed at preserving Indian village-holdings,
such means of accumulating property were quite common . The rapid growth of these
large scale feudalistic seigniorials in the seventeenth century had the effect of reducing
traditional communal forms of agriculture that had been practiced by many Indian cultures
before the arrival of the Spaniard.
The foundation upon which the colonial economy was established, Indian labor,
began to erode soon after it was established, although not the direct result of the internal
logic of the encomienda system. European diseases to which the native population had no
immunity, chronic overwork, and damage done to food crops of Indians by grazing cattle
and sheep rapidly decimated the Indian labor force. In Mexico alone, one fairly typical
estimate shows the following decline in population between 1519 and the end of the

19Kalmanovitz, Economía, pp. 88-89. Among the salient differences noted by Kalmanovitz include the
existence o f forced labor and the mita in the Americas which had no parallel in medieval Europe; labor
mobility in America was much less restrictive than in the fiefs of the middle ages' nor were the Indians
and mestizos in need o f seignorial protection against invading outsiders; in Nueva Granada most villages
were formed by smallholders and independent renters rather than by tenants of feudal overlords'
landholdings, and; in addition to a greater physical mobility, trade was much freer between different
regions, eg. between the agricultural and mining districts and, towards the end of the eighteenth century
among the viceroyalties. This relatively freer trade in Nueva Granada (despite the considerable physical
obstacles the Andes Mountains) is contrasted to the territorial sovereignty of feudal domains, sovereignty
that interfered with trade and labor mobility.
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sixteenth century: 1519-11,000,000; 1540-6,427,466; 1597-2,500,000.20 Other regions
of Spain’s empire in the Americas also witnessed a precipitous decline in the Indian
population, including the area which encompasses present-day Colombia. By the
seventeenth century, Kalmanovitz estimates that the population of indigenous peoples in
Colombia stood at a mere 15 to 20 percent of what it had been at the time of the conquest.21
At present, less than five percent of Colombia's population is considered native Indian.
European diseases claimed the greatest number of lives, but overwork and cruelty
to Indian workers also took their toll. Particularly notorious during the colonial period was
the frequent mistreatment of Indian workers in the obrajes, the small-scale woolen industry
which supplied much of the colonies1textiles, as often by local caciques as by Spanish
overlords. Fourteen-hour workdays, except in the mines where the actual working day
was longer, kept Indians away from their villages and their own fields.22 Kalmanovitz
writes the following on the cruelty in Colombia, "los españoles redujeron salvajemente el
nivel de consumo de las sociedades aborígenes, pero a la vez les impusieron ritmos de
trabajo tan duros y desacostumbrados, que el excesivo aumento de las faenas atentó contra
la reproducción biológica de los pueblos hallados por los civilizadores cristianos."23
Although the encomienda system was not legally abolished in Colombia until 1832
by José Maria Obando after independence, as the colony grew, this form of economic
organization increasingly became inadequate as the pace of migration from Spain quickened
and the number of encomiendas available were rapidly reduced. The encomienda system
primarily benefitted the few to whom Indian labor had been granted by royal authority In a
royal effort to dismantle the system with a minimum amount of political outcry by the
powerful existing encomenderos, it became a common policy of the crown in the latter half
of the sixteenth century to take over the grants upon the death of encomenderos.

20Parry, The Age o f Reconnaissance, p. 230.
2kalm anovitz, Economía, p. 17. Kalmanovitz later cites Germán Colmenares' works. La provincia de
Tunja and La Provincia de Pamplona (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 1969), with the following
figures Tunja in 1551 counted some 196,000 Indians but in 1600, 75% of this number had disappeared;
in Pamplona, between 1560 and 1640, the indigenous population had been reduced by 86%. For
Popayán and Pasto, the population fell from 31,000 in 1558 to 10,000 in 1608. He also cites Pacheco
and Cárdenas figures (from Robert West, La minería de aluvión en Colombia durante el período colonial
( Bogotá: Universidad Nacional, 1972, p. 75.) for the mining regions for 1540, which counted more than
331,000 indigenous families; forty years later only 29,900 remained.
22Kalmanovitz, Economía, p. 17.
23Kalmanovitz, Economía, p. 23.
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Replacing this system of labor recruitment in the colonies was a form that became
known in New Spain as repartimiento and in Nueva Granada and Pera, as the mita.
Influenced by Bartolomé de Las Casas, on Christmas day, 1555 Charles V issued a royal
proclamation declaring, "Permitimos que de su voluntad, y pagándoles el justo precio»
puedan ir los indios a labrar» y trabajar en las minas de oro, plata y azogue."24 This form
of economic organization institutionalized systematic labor recruitment of the Indians by
requiring villages to provide a fixed number of individuals to work for local government
officials or private employers for a set wage in economic areas of vital interest to the local
Spanish economies such as agriculture, mining, and public works. Writes J.H. Parry of
the mita in his Age o f Reconnaissance, "Employers thus gained a regular but inefficient and
constantly changing labour force; Indians were compelled, for several weeks in each year,
to do uncongenial work in strange surroundings far from home; and the villagers lost a
proportion of the men available for communal farming, so that at home also they had to
work harder in order to live...the only way of escape was to accept the implications of a
money economy, move to a Spanish settlement, put on Spanish clothes, and become a
wage-eamer or, if his resources and skill allowed, a craftsman or small capitalist."25 The
mita differed from the encomienda system in several ways. First, Indians worked
temporarily and irregularly for the government officials and important landowners in the
Spanish communities rather than serving as an ongoing labor concession flowing directly
from the Crown. Also, laborers did not work for the encomendero, but as has previously
been mentioned, for Spanish and creole authorities and private employers in towns and
villages. The final important difference between the mita and encomienda in Spanish
America was that the Indians received a wage for their work. The wage was not paid
directly to the individual, but to the cacique or the capitán, the middle man representative
for the contract:26 20 % went to royal administration, 10% to the Church, and the rest was
usually divided between administrative costs, the local parish, and the Indian village.27 In
Nueva Granada, the mita lasted until the end of the eighteenth century.28

24Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 39.
25Parry, The Age o f Reconnaissance, p. 231.
26 These individual capitanes were usually Indians, but often were not from the same tribe.
27Kalmanovitz, Economía, pp. 34-35. Kalmanovitz also argues convincingly that the mita, or as he often
refers to this system o f labor recruitment, concertaje, contributed to the growth and consolidation of the
large cattle ranches or estancias. Since only large landowners, those who possessed 200 or more head of
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It would be an unbalanced exposition of Spanish colonization in the Americas to
suggest that economic exploitation was the sole force motivating the colonizers.
Representatives of the missionary orders of the Church often sought to protect the Indians
from unbridled exploitation by the encomenderos and local officials.29 Moreover, as
noted by Molina, Charles V regulated the mita in 1549 by setting the working day at eight
hours, and prohibiting Sunday work and work during festival days for the Indian
laborers.30 Molina comments "así, en el atrasado siglo XVI, tenemos normas que sólo
cuatro centurias después han llegado a conformar el derecho laboral."31
The diminishing Indian labor force in the Americas led to critical food shortages,
and ultimately to the massive importation of slave labor in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. In order to expand the economic productive capacity of the colonies in the face
of such chronic labor shortages linked to the decline in Indian population, the Spanish
began to import negro slaves as early as the late sixteenth century. By the eighteenth
century, the labor situation had grown critical enough in the eyes of Charles III to remove
all restrictions on the importation of slave labor into the colonies by decreeing free trade in
slaves in 1789.32 Although Spanish legislation afforded some protection for America's
indigenous people, such legislation as did exist was not applicable to slaves. African
slaves were viewed as property, and like their counterparts in the British colonies in North
America, they were frequently subject to abuse by their colonial masters.
Throughout her colonial existence, Latin America's local economies were primarily
oriented to the production and export of precious metals to Spain. In Spain the influx of
gold and silver led to spiralling inflation as imports of manufactures, textiles and even
agricultural products from northern Europe accelerated. Rather than develop her own

cattle or owned more than 20 fanegadas had the right to borrow Indian labor through the mita. See his
discussion of the mita and encomienda, pp. 22-38
28 According to M olina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 40,
29In the Papal Bull o f 1537, Indians were determined to be human-beings under Spanish laws, p.43,
Molina. For an excellent exposition of the great debates surrounding Spanish colonial views on and
treatment o f the Indians, including the views o f Las Casas and Sepulveda, see Lewis Hanke's classic,
The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest o f America (Boston: Little Brown and Company,
1949).
30Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, pp 38-39. Molina states that this is the first known labor legislation in
the Americas.
3 M olin a, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 39.
32Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 43.
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manufacturing base, Spain's economic system peipetuated the cycle of importing
manufactures from abroad and utilizing the economic wealth generated by bullion from the
colonies to help pay for these imports. The "seducción de metal'1in turn caused Spain to
ran perennial deficits with her trading partners. Improved technology facilitating the
extraction of silver from lower grade ore in the mid sixteenth century virtually
revolutionized the productivity in the mining sector in America, and helped to encourage
Spain's continued reliance on this resource as an important source of revenue for the Royal
coffers.33 The mines therefore, whether worked by Indian "free labor” or negro slaves,
continued to provide the main source of American revenue for the crown up till the time of
independence. During the colonial era, Colombia was the major gold-producing region in
the New World.
Despite the importance of mining, the region that comprises present-day Colombia
also developed a a subsistence agricultural base that permitted it to supply internal market
needs. This was a consequence more of the region’s mountainous, isolated geographical
situation than of any conscientious colonial policy.
SO C IA L T H O U G H T AND ID E O L O G Y IN T H E C O LO N Y AND T H E
EA R LY R E PU B L IC
ECONOMIC FACTORS
The crown's economic policies in the Americas had important consequences for the
social and economic life of the colonies. One critical negative impact of royal policy in the
New World on the local economy was the deleterious effect it had on the development of
early industry-handicrafts and manufactures. Since the local production of manufactured
items was discouraged by the crown in an effort to avoid competition with home industries,
the development of rudimentary manufacturing was retarded in Nueva Granada as it was in
the rest of Spanish America. Spain viewed the colonies as a primary provider of raw
materials to be sold by the mother country in an effort to help maintain the royal treasury
and as a market for her limited number of manufactured goods.
Some goods nevertheless, such as the previously mentioned apparel made in the
obrajes, were produced by small local craft industries for the local m arket Production in
colonial Spanish towns was patterned on that of Spain, the guild becoming a central feature

33In 1543 notes M olina, 65% o f the royal revenues were destined to make payments on the debt.
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of economic organization.34 Among the most important guilds were the silversmiths,
goldbeaters, harness and saddle makers, potters, weavers, hatters, and candle makers,
reflecting not only Spain's demand for gold and silver, but local market demands as well.
In addition to regulating production, the guilds also served an important social purpose.
Often organized into cofradías or cofratemities, each guild had its own patron saint and
chaplain to attend to the religious needs of its members. Guild members collected alms for
various charities such as hospitals, and often provided volunteers for the defense of the
municipality.35 In the social services that they provided to their members and their
communities, the guild cofradías may be viewed as the non-politicized forerunners of the
mid-nineteenth century artisan sociedades democráticas and the later apolitical Mutual Aid
Societies.
Haring reports that by the end of eighteenth century, the arts and crafts in the
colonies were in decline as a result of lack of adequate preparation and training of their
members.36 One problem faced by the guilds was the fact that most of the guild ordinances
that were established by the municipal cabildos to govern the the guilds in the eighteenth
and Nineteenth centuries, dated back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Many of
the ordinances had been imported from Spain with no effort made to adapt them to colonial
realities. The outmoded guild structure may have been another factor that contributed to
slow economic growth in the colonies.37
Another important socio-economic organization in Spanish America was the
consulado. Consulados were powerful corporations of merchant importers. With
functions similar to a modem chamber of commerce, the merchant guild represented the
interests of the European merchant class in the Spanish colonies. While the consulado was
comprised of predominantly ethnic Europeans, the craft guilds, for the most part were
comprised of mestizo and American-bom segments of the population.38

34Mucli o f the following discussion on the role of guilds in colonial society is based on Haring, pp. 252253.
35C.H. Haiing, The Spanish Empire, p. 252.
36 As reported by the second Revillagigedo, Haring, The Spanish Empire, p. 253. Although Spanish
efforts to discourage the development of local craft industries, and competition from cheap Dutch and
English textiles imported through the thriving black market trade may have had as much to do with this
alleged decline as a lack of adequate preparation.
37Haring, The Spanish Empire, p. 253.
38Haring, The Spanish Empire, p. 254.
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In the Americas, the mercantilist trade with Spain led to the gradual creation of a
new class of individuals bom in America, the criollos, who would serve as a bridge
between the resources and labor of the New World and the markets of the old. The
creoles, native-born whites of European descent, reigned over the Indian, the mestizo, and
negro slave alike in New Spain, Nueva Granada and Peru. Eventually this new social
strata would challenge the Spanish crown for political hegemony in the Americas.
Bourbon reforms permitting freer commerce accelerated the process, as criollos initiated
new economic ventures such as opening new mines, building sugar cane plantations, and
engaging in commerce with the other colonies in the Americas and Europe. As new
products began to be traded in ever-greater quantities, commerce continued to increase in
importance to the colonies. As more creoles engaged in commerce, the new class
expanded: an American bourgeoisie seeking a higher quality of life and posing a challenge
to vested economic interests in Iberia was bom. 39
If international commerce initially created a powerful new class in Spanish America,
it was property that helped this class consolidate its dominant position in colonial society.
In his classic work, The Spanish Empire in America, C.H. Haring succinctly describes the
major role of property in the development of an American bourgeoisie:
O f the various moral and material factors that contributed to create and
maintain an aristocracy in the Spanish American colonies-differences of
race, economic legislation, religion, land tenure-the last was probably the
most important, and was the nucleus of most fortunes, land whose value
was created by those who did not own it, by Indians and Negroes. Land
was the principal source of riches and prestige in a society which disdained
trade and industrial pursuits, and the successful miner invested his income
in farms and haciendas. Landed property was also an indispensable
requisite for the exercise of the few political rights which the colonists
enjoyed. A minority of fortunate landowning Creoles lived much like their
Spanish ancestors, imbued with similar aristocratic prejudices, and with
similar improvidence and lack of foresight40
The American landowners and bourgeoisie would eventually rise to challenge the
Spanish monopoly in the Americas. They would import and adopt an ideology that could
be readily adapted to circumstances in the colonies: the ideologies of the French Revolution
emanating from Europe and of the independence movement in North America found a
ready audience in the ascendent landowning and merchant class in Latin America.

39M olina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 61,
40Haring, The Spanish Empire, p. 241,
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IDEOLOGICAL CURRENTS
The Enlightenment that had shaken the moral and philosophical foundations of
eighteenth century Europe was also imported into Spain’s colonial possessions in the New
World. The Spanish Inquisition, which was from the outset an important force for
maintaining order in Latin America, could not keep eighteenth and nineteenth century
philosophical works from reaching the Americas. Even though Enlightenment works were
often banned by the Catholic Church and the Spanish Crown, many works of the
eighteenth-century political philosophers entered the colonies illicitly, at times brought in by
Church officials themselves.41 Inevitably, the Enlightenment ideal of reason's superiority
over emotion and superstition, coupled with a rather widespread skepticism (among
intellectuals, the European bourgeoisie, and a great number of the nobility) about the
validity of organized religion as a guiding force in man's day to day actions, would
combine to exert a powerful influence over the commercial élite forming in Spanish
America, both for those who embraced these new ideas and for those who fought to
denounce them.
According to historian Roland Hussey, the generation that led the straggle for
independence was strongly influenced by enlightenment thinking. This influence was
transmitted to Spanish America via Spain. Hussey writes:
...such Jansenist works in translation as Arnauld's Arte de Pensar (1759)
and lacquier's Instituciones filo só fic a s (1787) were a main road to
knowledge of Descartes...The Portuguese Ameida and the Spanish Feijoo,
religiously orthodox but philosophically eclectic, greatly popularized, in
their respective lands, the ideas of Bacon, Newton, Bayle, and the
Encyclopedists. The Spanish Jesuit Antonio Eximeno was ail enthusiast for
Locke and Condillac. The Peruvian bom Olavide and the Francophile
Aranda, both of them Masons, were typical of a host of enlightened men in
Spanish office.42
Such ideas were often re-interpreted within the familiar Spanish Catholic context of
natural law and other elements of traditionalist thought, particularly in conceptualizations of

41 Funk Harries, "Camilo Torres," p. 142.
^ R o la n d D. Hussey, "Traces o f French Enlightenment in Colonial Hispanic America," cited in Funk
Harries, "Camilo Torres," pp. 152-153.
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power and of the ideal society in Latin America.43 Colombian sociologist and activist Fals
Borda also notes that at the turn of the century, viceroys sent to govern the New Kingdom
of Granada brought with them books extolling the virtues of the French Revolution.44
Economically, the closing decades of the eighteenth century ushered in an era of
colonial prosperity never before witnessed in Spanish America. Principally the result of
Bourbon reforms in government taxation, administration, and most importantly, trade
policies towards the colonies, this reversed a trend of economic decline particularly
pronounced during the latter Hapsburg dynasties. Although illegal trade among the
colonies and between the colonies and the rest of the world existed throughout much of the
colonial era, as a result of Spain's inability to provide goods to the colonies on a regular
basis, after 1700 contraband trade with the English and Dutch became pervasive. Inept
management, a cumbersome bureaucracy, the antiquated system of flotas45 , the strict
prohibition of intercolonial trade, the mercantile colonial trade monopoly of Cadiz and
Seville, had all combined to create an unworkable system that led to the commercial and
industrial stagnation of both the colonies and Spain herself. In the second half of the
seventeenth century, direct Spanish trade with her colonial possessions in the Americas
progressively declined until between 1706 and 1712 only five frigates sailed to America,
and these under protection of French escort vessels.46
Gradual Bourbon reforms directed at freer trade generally increased the prosperity
of the colonies in the second half of the eighteenth century. By 1789, legislation had
eliminated most restrictions on intercolonial trade. Spain's prohibition of intercolonial trade
had been virtually unenforceable because of the difficulties inherent in policing such a huge
expanse of Spanish territory as that which ranged from California to Peru.47 Nevertheless,

43Citing works by several Spanish authors supporting this contention, Harold Davis in his Latin American
Thought (New York: The Free Press, 1974) argues that such basic concepts as the different varieties of
social contract in currency among the French and British writers had already been established by the
Thomist tradition in Spain. Davis also argues that works emanating from colonial Spanish universities,
the Laws o f the Indies and the liberal Spanish Constitution of 1812 exerted a strong influence over the
thought o f the educated strata in Latin America. See pp. 37-39.
44 Orlando Fals Borda, Subversion and Social Change in Colombia (New York, London: Columbia
University Press, 1969), p. 69.
45The Spanish practice o f periodically sending large fleets to carry supplies to the colonies in exchange for
bullion and other goods.
46Haring, The Spanish Empire, p. 314.
47Haring, The Spanish Empire, p. 314.
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up until this time, the prohibition prevented those who wished to obey the law from trading
with other colonies. Another positive reform in terms of colonial prosperity was the
abolition of the Cadiz and Seville trade monopolies with the Indies. By the end of the
eighteenth century, the colonies could trade with any seaport in Spain, and major
reductions in duties spurred trading activity. By the last quarter of the eighteenth century,
Bourbon reforms were coming to fruition. The number of ships calling at Cuban ports
alone increased from six in 1760 to 200 in 1778.48 It has been estimated that between
1778 and 1788 the total value of trade with Spain increased along the order of 700 per
cent.49
Growing economic prosperity for the colonies however did not bring universal
contentment to the élite in the Americas. Still excluded from the highest government posts
and eager to trade freely with the rest of the world, the criollo élite resented the Spaniards
who monopolized important government and ecclesiastical posts in the colonies. Criollo
interests had little representation in Madrid. Moreover, the municipal cabildos in the
Americas, which had once represented an authentic arena of local self-government50, had
by the dawn of the Nineteenth century lost any legitimate authority they once commanded
.in the legal and commercial life of the community.51
Simmering resentment toward the local Spaniards, the example of the United
State's W ar of Independence, and the revolutionary ideology emanating from France
created a desire among the criollos to press for greater control of the colonies' economic
affairs. The main goal of the criollo élite was equality between themselves and the
Spaniards, rather than a social revolution.
In Nueva Granada, Antonio Nariño translated the Declaration of the Rights of Man.
The British political thought of Adam Smith, Bentham, and Locke, and later the American
works of Thomas Paine, the Federalist papers and the U.S. Constitution influenced the
colonial élite. Davis comments that the landowning, class-conscious creoles eventually
would weave the natural law theories, the politics, economics, and ethics found in

48Haring, The Spanish Empire, p. 320.
49Haring, The Spanish Empire, p. 321.
50These included some local powers of taxation, licensing, and initiating and completing public works
projects.
51Dix, The Politics o f Colombia, p. 13.
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Rousseau» Locke, and Montesquieu, into the existing Hispanic tradition.52 This Hispanic
tradition included what Davis has referred to as an "exaggerated consciousness" of being
Spanish that was displayed by the élite. He speculates that "this criollo hispanicism was
partly the product of a feeling of class superiority traceable to the consciousness of having
subjugated the Indian and enslaved the Negro...this class consciousness criollo mentality
found such widely differing expressions as sympathy for the Anglo-American planters in
their eighteenth century revolt against Europe and acceptance of Pan Hispanism in the 20th
century."53
Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1808 and the subsequent exile of the king created a
vacuum of authority in the colonies. The necessary political conditions were established
for the criollos to assert their economic claims. Two years later, on July 20, 1810, Nueva
Granada declared its independence.54
INDEPENDENCE
As in the U.S. War of Independence, the "revolutions in America were the work of
a comparatively few enlightened, keen-witted leaders, who in many areas represented the
ambition of the educated Creole class to supplant the peninsular Spaniards in government
and trade, and in whose hands the ignorant classes were a ready tool for the
accomplishment of their aims."55 Unlike the war in North America, those who made the
revolutions in Spanish America were not a large, middle class bourgeoisie and small-scale
farmer-citizens, but rather were principally made up of gentrified, large-scale landowners.
Early in the war, there was little popular participation. As Molina notes, Bolivar
reasoned that the lack of widespread support for the rebellion was the result of hundreds of
years of brutality and ignorance as reflected in the masses' submission to crown and
church. The sociological reality Molina argues however, was that:
el pueblo no podía menos de ver que quienes lo invitaban a la refriega eran
los criollos, los mismos que los habían explotado en las minas y en las
haciendas, los mismos que conspiraban contra sus Resguardos y contra su
derecho a la tierra. En cambio, del rey recordaban las medidas paternalistas

52Davis, Latin American Thought, pp. 38-39.
53Davis, Latin American Thought, p. 11.
54Santa Fé de Bogotá proclaimed its independence at this time, but Cartagena did not follow suit until a
year later on November 11, 1811.
55Haring, The Spanish Empire, p. 324.
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que los habían protegido. Y, luego, estaba la argamasa de la religión para
cimentar su obediencia a lo ya conocido.56
Bolívar supplied the reasons for the masses to join the cause of the criollos; liberty,
the abolition of slavery, and equality.57 However, the rhetoric of liberté, egalité, and
fratemité, as far as most of the colonial élite was concerned, applied to creole equality to the
Spaniard, not equality of the masses to their "natural" superiors. Many in the first decades
of the Nineteenth century, as Davis notes in his Latin American Thought, believed that
inequality, as dictated by natural law, was the natural state of affairs.58 Natural hierarchies
existed, their form fixed by the divine legislature.59
The victory of Simón Bolívar over Spanish forces in Nueva Granada at the Battle of
Boy acá in 1819 marked the decisive defeat of Spain in South America. A social revolution
in Latin America however, did not occur. Rather, as many writers have argued, what did
take place was a mere "changing of the guard."60 Colombianist Robert Dix has argued
that, "the overall effect of royal authority in the American branches of its empire was to
forge a society of exploitative economic and social power in which distinctions of race
often reinforced those of social class"61 The social inheritance of the new ruling criollo
élite was a highly class-stratified, race-conscious society.
C O N C L U S IO N
Influenced by his own ideological predisposition, Molina argues that during the
colonial era structures were created that only a socialist regime might be able to overcome.
Such structures, which he holds, continued to hamper Colombia's development in post
independence times, included the following: "la dependencia extema, la concentración de la
tierra, el amor por el monopolio, el desperdicio de los recursos humanos y materiales, la
ignorancia, la desigualdad social, el desdén por el trabajador y la distancia entre

56Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 71.
57Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, see pages 72-76 for a discussion of Bolivar's efforts to enlist the support
o f the common man.
58Davis, Latin Am erican Thought.

59Davis, Latin American Thought, p. 14.
is apparent from their basic arguments, Davis and Molina share this view along with Robert R. Dix
and Kalmanovitz (pp. 90-92).

60A s

61 Dix, The Politics o f Colombia, pp. 14-15.
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gobernantes y gobernados. En síntesis, el atraso."62 Although it may be debatable as to
whether Molina is on firm ground with his implication about the hypothetical benefits of
socialism in Colombia, the essence of his statement is undoubtedly correct. The political,
social and economic legacy of colonialism was inherited largely intact by the creole élite that
assumed power after the defeat of Spain in the Americas. This feature of Latin American
history alone merits the period's inclusion in a discussion of the development of labor in
Colombia. The roots of the modem labor movement are not simply planted in twentiethcentury industrialization.
Much has been written about how changes in the system of economic production in
Europe, which took place well before the period usually associated with the industrial
revolution, impacted the subsequent development of capitalism in the continent.63 Building
on the work of the earlier dependency theorists,64 Immanual Wallerstein has argued that a
global economic system, whose roots reach back to fifteenth century European
mercantilism, has developed in the modem era. Following a similar line of argument as
that advanced by his dependency predecessors, Wallerstein places the nations who have
historically provided raw materials to fuel capitalist development, such as Latin America, in
a position of economic dependency. It is clear that during the colonial era Colombia served
as a colonial provider of bullion to Spain, and was along with other colonies, viewed by
the mother country as a dependent market for Spain's limited manufactures. Whether or
not the dependency school is relevant to our discussion of the development of a labor

62Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 15.
63Franklin Mendels discusses early influences on the formation of an industrial proletariat in his article
"Proto-Industrialization: The First Phase of Industrialization," Journal o f Economic History, 32:1
(1972), and Immanuel Wallerstein in his The Modern World System I (New York: Academic Press,
1974) as well as his "The World Capitalist System," Comparative Studies in Society and History,
Vol. 16., (Sept. 1974), and his later work The Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the
Consolidation o f the European World Economy, 1600-1750 (New York: Academic Press, 1980)
explores the same subject on the macro-level, tracing the development of capitalism to its roots in the
fifteenth century.
64Basic works on dependency theory include Andre Gunder Frank, "Sociology of Development and
Underdevelopment of Sociology," Dependence and Underdevelopment (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1971); Femando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin
Atnerica Translated by Marjory Mattingly Urquidi, (Berkely, Los Angeles, London: University of
California Press, 1979). For critiques of dependency theory, see James A.. Caporaso, "Dependency
Theory: Continuities and Discontinuities in Development Studies," International Organization, Vol. 34.
no 4, (Fall 1980), and David Ray, "The Dependency Model of Latin American Development: Three
Basic Fallacies," Journal o f Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 15, no. 1, (1973). For a
general critique of Wallerstein and world system theory, see Peter Worsley, "One World or Three? A
Critique o f the World System Theory of Immanuel Wallerstein" in David Held ed. States and Societies
(New York & London: New York University Press, 1983).
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movement in Colombia, and I suggest that it is, will be discussed at a later stage in the
development of the present work. What is immediately relevant to the present discussion is
such authors' insistence on the critical importance of utilizing a holistic analysis of social
phenomena which incorporates a solid understanding of the phenomenas' historical
antecedents. To understand the subsequent development of craft organizations in the
nineteenth century and unions in the 20th, the political, economic, and social legacy of
colonialism cannot be ignored.
Whether in search of individual riches or the conversion of souls for the Catholic
Church, Spaniards drawn to the New World were accompanied by their mental conceptions
of community, economic organization, social hierarchy, culture and religion. The Spaniard
did not for example, envision himself as a pioneer of a ragged frontier who should have to
forge by his own individual manual labor a new life in the isolated wilderness. Visions of
work-worn faces and callous-covered hands, of isolated villages of simple pioneer farmers
from the British Isles and northern Europe so common in American folklore do not typify
the collective Colombian memory of colonists. In contrast to this romanticized vision of
their North American counterparts, the Spanish conquistadores in the Americas are often
thought of by Colombians as a rather vulgar lot, driven by greed and an appetite for
adventure. Like the ragged individualist pioneer of the colonies of North America or the
later United States, such a picture is simply a mere caricature. Nevertheless it contains at
least a germ of truth: although there were debates about the degree of royal and
ecclesiastical protection that should be extended to the Indian, it is clear that the Spaniard
had no reservations about exploiting the abundant human resources he came upon in the
New World.
Encomenderos, secure in the certainty of their social superiority to peasants in their
native Spain, lived like transplanted nobles in the New World, enjoying a readily-available,
largely compliant indigenous workforce. The native cultures over which they reigned,
even less "civilized" from the conquistadores' perspectives than the Spanish peasantry,
were a natural, logical resource to be exploited by their Spanish "superiors." It was not
difficult to justify encomienda, the early colonial economic system of forced Indian labor,
based on the conquerors' past experience of feudalism. Encomienda in fact, must have
seemed to the conquering Spaniards to be a logical, natural method of economic and social
organization.
Also, unlike their northern counterparts the Spanish in America took for granted the
symbiotic relationship between church and state, whereas many of the colonists in North
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America were fleeing religious persecution in their own lands.65 The complementary
nature of the church and the state's objectives in the New World lent legitimacy to both
undertakings. The church undertook a paternalistic social mission, providing schools,
charity operations, asylums, and hospitals for Spanish colonists. It also provided for the
spiritual needs of the colonists and undertook the mission of conversion of the continent's
native peoples as well as extending them some protection from excessive exploitation by

encomenderos and powerful creole and Spanish landowners. The crown also provided
some legal protection for the indigenous peoples, although its primary concern was curbing
absolute exploitation that would result in the complete decimation of the labor force. The
result of the social bonding of church and state was a hierarchical power structure in the
colonies characterized by paternalism of the crown and the cross.
With new waves of immigrants in the sixteenth and particularly the seventeenth
centuries came major social and economic changes to Nueva Granada. Native Indian
groups continued to be decimated by European diseases. With the decline of the

encomiendas and the immigration of large numbers of new Spaniards who often settled in
or near resguardos, the new migrants frequently took indigenous wives and supported their
families by working as tenant fanners (arrendatarios) on the large haciendas, or for those
who were more fortunate, on small parcels of land created out of the dissolution of some of
the resguardos. Miscegenation between European and native Indian eventually created a
majority of mestizos, although white Spanish-descendents comprised a very large minority
of the population, and even today continues to be the wealthiest segment of the
population.66
As the native population declined, African slaves were introduced to compensate for
the labor shortfall, and began to replace Indian workers in the insalubrious silver and gold
mines of Nueva Granada. Slavery dominated mining production on the Pacific coast, in
the haciendas of the north coast, and in the southeast. In 1788, approximately 7.2% of the
virreinato's population was comprised of slaves: Kalmanovitz estimates that about 15-20%
of labor at the same time was in the mining sector.67 Today, descendents of African slaves
constitute another important element of Colombia's ethnic make up.

65I am not intimating that in the early colonial period in the British colonies that religious tolerance was
any more commonplace than in the Spanish colonies, but simply that the primary motivations of
colonists in North and South America were quite different.
^Approximately 20% of modern-day Colombia’s population is classified as white.
67Kalmanovitz, Economía, p. 87.
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Spanish immigrants also brought with them organizations imported from the Old
World, including the consulados which became the domain of the well-to-do mercantile
élite» and the guilds of the primarily mestizo, skilled crafts sector. The early artisan worker
organizations, the guilds, were imported from Europe. Social divisions separating guild
from consulado, artisan from merchant were not post-independence phenomena, but rather
trace their roots back to colonial times. Artisans were the major force behind urban labor
organization in nineteenth and early twentieth century Colombia; the guilds of colonial
times were the social and economic organizational forerunners of the sociedades

democráticos of the nineteenth century.
Artisan industry began to develop in various regions of the country, most notably in
Santander and Antioquia. Boosted by demand from smallholders, tenant farmers and the
large haciendas, a thriving cottage industry developed to supply simple cotton manufactures
to the local m arket Although in the countryside such artisans were usually only part-timers
since most were campesinos engaged primarily in agriculture, the products of the familybased cottage industry were not only consumed by the campesino and his family, but rather
had a much broader market.68
In Bogotá, the largest single segment of the population was comprised of
independent artisans. Though most owned their means of production and could therefore
be considered as independent craftsmen, there was a strong social wedge that separated
them from their landowning 'superiors'. In fact, even though large numbers of artisans
had fought for the creole cause during the war for independence, most were denied the
right to vote in the new republic as the result of income, property ownership and literacy
restrictions. Thus although urban artisans were not completely dependent on or
subservient to wealthy landowners as were tenant fanners, they were clearly viewed as
social inferiors by the Bogotá élite. Moreover, as will be discussed in the next chapter,
despite their numbers, as a political force organized to promote and defend their economic
interests, the artisans had to forge a partisan alliance with the élite of the established
political parties: Liberal and Conservative. The majority of artisan sociedadedes

democráticos' decisions to ally themselves with the Liberals ultimately proved to be
counterproductive when artisan activism became a threat to the established interests of the
élite of both the Conservative and Liberal Parties. Artisan dependence on the élite-led
Liberal Party in the mid-nineteenth century never resulted in the long-sought for tariff relief
that the artisans hoped would preserve their economic existence.

68Kalmanovitz discusses these artisan organizations in Economía, pp. 64-65.
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The pattern of property ownership and the system of labor recruitment were also
important features that helped not only to define social relations in colonial times, but which
continued to play a central role in the development of social and economic relations in the
Republic after independence. Under the encomienda system, encomenderos had controlled
large tracks of land and had been awarded "grants" of Indian labor by the crown. Later,
the m ita or concertaje, essentially forced Indian labor which paid a wage to the village or
labor contractor, contributed to the consolidation of the large estancias. Large landowners
were able to greatly expand the amount of productive lands under cultivation with the use
of cheap Indian labor, though at the expense of diminishing the agricultural production
available to meet the indigenous market needs of the resguardo.69
Liberal ideas, imported from Europe and the United States, provided creole
ideological justification for their quest for greater autonomy in economic affairs and
eventually, emancipation from Spain. Rising economic prosperity in the colonies and
Napoleon's fortuitous victory over Spanish royalist forces and subsequent occupation of
Spain set the stage for rebellion in America. Initially, the rebellion was largely an élite
affair between Spaniard and Spanish descendent. Eventually however, the rebellion rallied
enough support from popular* quarters with its ideological rhetoric of liberty and equality to
dislodge permanently the Spanish from South and Central America.
The great victory of the creoles in Nueva Granada did not bring equality to the
mestizo, nor did it bring liberty to the Negro slave or eliminate the exploitation of the
Indian.70 In fact, haciendas would experience their greatest expansion in history in the
mid-nineteenth century as large amounts of Indian resguardo land were freed and large
landowners enclosed more and more territory. Indians, mestizos in the countryside, and
poor whites alike worked for the hacendados, the majority as sharecroppers and tenant
farmers. Toiling under even more marked social distinctions than the inferior social
position held by the artisan vis á vis the bourgeois élite in the towns of Nueva Granada,
labor in the countryside assumed an almost completely subservient role that helped maintain
their dependence on the wealthy landowning class.

69See Kalmanovitz, Economía, pp. 33-38.
70Slavery was not abolished until 1851, only a dozen short years before it was ended in the United States.
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CHAPTER 3
N IN E T E E N T H C EN TU R Y C O L O M B IA

Colonel Aureliano Buendia...sat in a chair between his political advisors and, wrapped in
his woolen blanket, h e listened in silence to the brief proposals o f the emissaries. They
asked first th a t he renounce the revision o f property titles in order to get back the support o f
the Liberal landowners. They asked, secondly, that he renounce the fight against clerical
influence in order to obtain the support o f the Catholic masses. They asked, finally, that he
renounce the aim o f equal rights fo r natural and illegitimate children in order to preserve the
integrity o f the home. "That means," Colonel Aureliano B u e n d ia said when the reading
was over ”that all we're fighting fo r is pow er."
"They're tactical changes," one o f the delegates replied. "Right now the main thing is
to broaden the popular base o f the war. Then we'll have another look."
One o f Colonel Aureliano Buendia's political advisors hastened to in te rv e n e . "It's a
contradiction," h e said. "If these changes are good, it means that the Conservative regime
is good. I f we succeed in broadening the popular base o f the war with them, as you people
say, it means th a t the regime has a broad popular base. It means, in short, that fo r almost
twenty years we've been fighting against the sentiments o f the nation."
Gabriel García Márquez, One Hundred Years o f Solitude1

T H E EA R LY R E PU B L IC
Despite the tremendous destruction suffered by Nueva Granada's economy as a
result of damage to trade and property inflicted during the war for independence, a
remarkable pattern of continuity from the late colonial era can be witnessed during the early
post-independence period: historians in fact have dubbed this period the Neo-Bourban era.
The latifundio and landed property were preserved, along with the Spanish tariff
system, monopolies, including the tobacco monopoly {estancos), the diezmos, as well as
the central role of the Catholic Church in social and civic affairs. As has been argued in
Chapter One, the war for independence was not as much a social revolution of all segments
of Colombian society against a corrupt and burdensome Crown as it was a movement of
the indigenous élite rebelling against Spanish hegemony in commercial, political, and
ecclesiastical affairs. Moreover, as Robert Dix has argued that unlike in the United States
war of independence, the wars to the south destroyed the "only legitimate authority and the
only source of 'rights’ there had been...the wars of independence in South America,
instead of preserving legitimate institutions from outside, arbitrary interference, as they

1 Gabriel Garcia M arquez, One Hundred Years o f Solitude (New York: Avon Books, 1970), p. 162.
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largely did in the north, destroyed the fabric of authority."2 Of course Nueva Granada
was not unique in this respect, as the wars for independence yielded similar outcomes in
Mexico, Central America and other South American republics. The leaders of the new
states were nearly always wealthy or influential landowners and merchants who also came
to occupy the highest positions in the clergy, the army, and the government bureaucracies.3
Although numerous political, social, and economic ideologies competed for
hegemony over the minds of the Colombian ruling classes, two principal antagonistic
systems of thought would clearly emerge by the middle of the nineteenth century:
conservatism and liberalism. The incessant straggle between conservative and liberal ideas
would ignite dozens of armed clashes (including several major civil wars) between the
proponents of each of the opposing camps and would establish a two-party political system
that with very few minor exceptions, would dominate Colombian politics until the present
day.4
Both ideologies' intellectual roots lie in Europe, and were transmitted to the
Colombian intelligentsia within months, sometimes weeks, of their original publication.
From both Europe and the United States, liberal and utilitarian ideas were imported into
Latin America, while Comptian positivism and German idealism, especially Hegel, were
widely read.5 Davis argues that these trends led to the development of the distinct

2Dix, The Politics o f Colombia, p. 16.
3Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 15. See also Bazant, A Concise History o f Mexico: fro m Hidalgo to
Cárdenas 1805-1940 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979) and Roger Hanson’s, The
Politics o f M exican Development (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), for an account of
M exico and Woodward, Ralph L» Central America: A Nation Divided (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1976) for Central America.
4The only major exceptions were the short periods heralding transitions from Conservative to Liberal or
Liberal to Conservative rule such as the National Party of Rafael Nunez in 1885 (coalition of
Independents-Nufiista Liberals and Conservatives), and the Republican Party (Coalition of Conservatives
and Liberals emerging from the destructive Thousand Days War at the turn of the century). Both of these
were transitional coalition governments comprised of moderate liberals and Conservatives. In presidential
elections, party factionalism in 1945-46 in the Liberal Party allowed a Conservative victory and the one
o f 1934 that presaged a Conservative defeat. Presently however, the political climate in Colombia is
more complicated. A more serious challenge to two-party hegemony may be forming in the 1990's. The
official Conservative candidate came in fourth in the polling, outdistanced by a socialist contender from
the recently legalized M-19 Party, Antonio Navarro W olf who finished third. This is perhaps the
culmination o f a trend in Colombia caused by rapid urbanization, that has in turn led the Conservatives to
slowly but steadily lose electoral strength throughout the twentieth century as the party's traditional base
o f rural support has eroded.
5Funk Harries, "Camilo Torres," p. 174, Davis, Latin American Thought, p. 6.
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liberalism of France, Spain, Portugal and Latin America.6 Liberalism had perhaps its
greatest influence on the political economy, which was built around British laissez-faire and
French physiocratic doctrines. Early versions of positivism held that the laws favoring
human progress could only be determined through the application of the scientific method.
Santander himself had a particular affinity for British political and economic thought,
especially Bentham's doctrine of utilitarianism. The areligious aspect of liberal
philosophical and political thought often provoked strong reactions from traditionalist
sectors in Nueva Granada. Molina writes that, "Los medios católicosse alborotaron,
porque sostenían que el utilitarismo del sabio inglés, quien más tarde fue amigo pesonal de
Santander, chocaba frontalmente con la religión católica. Esos medios señalaban con
alarma el ateísmo de Bentham, cuyo sistema, según la síntesis hedía por Azuero, reposa en
el único y exclusivo principio de la utilidad general, de la utilidad bien entendida, es decir el
Bien es el mismo placer o la causa del placer; y el Mal el dolor, o la causa del dolor."7
Catholic traditionalist thought, which had stood in opposition to the ideas of the
enlightenment a century earlier, was to be the intellectual forerunner of nineteenth century
conservatism. Paradoxically, argues Davis, this conservative strain "also gave rise to the
Christian traditionalism of France and Spain, a form of romantic idealism that produced
distinct, yet similar expressions in Latin America.8 Why would a society such as
Colombia, one that many writers have considered deeply religious and socially
conservative, exhibit a readiness to accept such radical ideas as those emanating from the
enlightenment, the radical ideals of the French Revolution and Bentham's secular utilitarian
ethic, ideas which challenged the fundamental basis of a hierarchically organized,
paternalistic state that received its legitimacy from God and received the blessing of the
Holy Roman Church? Part of the answer surely lies with the reality that of course, such
radical ideas were never universally accepted by the Colombian élite. Moreover, the ideas
form the basis of that corpus of thought loosely termed "liberalism" that came to distinguish
its supporters from their traditionalist, later "conservative" opponents. Those who adopted
the credo of liberalism did so for several reasons, (including ideology), which will be
explored more fully below.

6Davis, Latin American Thought, p. 7.
7Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 92.
8Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 7.
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Recall the initial reluctance of the masses in Nueva Granada when urged to raise
arms against their legitimate King, who had over the years alongside the Church been the
sole protector of many of their rights against abuses by the local elite. Moreover, the king
received divine authority to govern not from the people, but from God himself. An
appreciable number of the Creole élite had also remained loyal to the Spanish Crown. Even
before the pendulum had militarily swung decidedly in Bolivar's favor after the Battle of
Boy acá however, a strong anti-Spanish movement had gained powerful momentum.
In Europe, Spain had long been viewed as backward and superstitious: its
economic affairs mismanaged through antiquated methods were further exacerbated by
layers of superfluous bureaucracy. Several factors contributed to the spread of such a
negative perception of the mother country in Latin America. The first of these is the fact
that the criollos witnessed first-hand the general administrative and economic
mismanagement of the colonies' affairs over the prior 150 years of colonial rale. Despite
the fact that colonial administration had improved dramatically during the Bourbon era, the
Creole élite sorely felt its exclusion from high posts in both government and Church.
Moreover, the economic success of Spain's free-trading rivals was readily apparent as
Dutch, English and French merchantmen conducted a thriving and extremely lucrative
contraband trade with the Spanish colonies.
After independence had been obtained, there was a powerful movement to reject the
"retrograde" Spanish heritage because, "it was not thought to be a past out of which the
future could grow, but rather an obstacle to that future."9 In its place, many attempted to
construct a "modem" Colombian outlook based

011

foreign models imported from England,

North America and France.
During the independence straggles, no political parties developed espousing a
coherent set of tenants or programmatic reforms. Molina comments, "La época no era para
partidos orgánicos, sino para facciones, grupos versátiles, sin ideología precisa, aptos sólo
para bregar* ásperamente por el mando como fuente de privilegios...Por ausencia de
formaciones políticas permanentes, los caudillos en plaza, con la mira puesta en el impulso
a los egoísmos locales, disfrazados de nacionalismo, tenían que volverle la espalda a las
grandiosas concepciones intergracionistas."10 The following section will look at the

9Davis, Latin American Thought, p. 4. See also Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, pp 60-64.

10Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 93.
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various principal issues and outlooks that developed to separate the early Conservative and
Liberal Parties.
C O N F L IC T AND ID E O L O G Y : B IR T H O F T H E TW O -PA R T Y T R A D IT IO N
CONSERVATIVES AND LIBERALS
By the mid-nineteenth century, the Conservative and Liberal Parties had become
firmly established fixtures on the Colombian political scene. In 1838, Catholic priests had
organized a "Sociedad Católica" in large measure to counteract the further spread of the
ideas of the philosophes. After the civil war of 1839-41, several liberal reforms that had
been undertaken by Santandér and which included reductions in import and export duties,
limitations on the Church’s acquisition of property through mortmain, and reforms aimed at
limiting die role of the Church in education, were all reversed under the strong
"conservative" reaction writ into law in the form of the Constitution of 1843.11 The new
constitution created a strong central government with a powerful executive, and restored the
Church to its formal privileged position in society. Quickly banned by the government
were works by Jeremy Bentham as the new regime sought to stem the tide of liberal
ideology.12
During the administration of Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera, considered by scholars
today as a moderate conservative, many infrastructural reforms were taken to bolster the
Colombian economy. Steam navigation introduced on the Magdalena considerably
improved river transportation, mule trails (the primary means of transportation in
Colombia's mountainous interior) were greatly expanded, tariffs were reduced by 25%,
construction on the inter-oceanic railway was begun in Panama, postal service was
improved, a military academy was established, one of its purposes being to train engineers,
and much of the public debt was retired.13 Henao and Arrubla, date the formal creation of
the two dominant Colombian political parties from this time: "The party in power
[Mosquera's administration] having assumed the name 'conservative,' the opposition called
themselves liberals.' This party included the liberals of the revolution of 1840, the
radicals represented by the young men educated in the cloisters and universities-men who
desired innovations, drank in the doctrines of Bentham, and opposed conservatism because

1b ergq uist, Coffee, p. 15.
12Bergquist, Coffee, p. 15.
13Bergquist Coffee, p. 11, Henao and Arrubla, History o f Colombia, pp 450-451.

it suggested quietism and reaction."14 1849 heralded a new era with the presidential
election of José Hilario López in which Liberals would dominate national politics for more
than thirty years.
What were the material and ideal interests that separated Conservatives form
Liberals? As we have already mentioned, even as early as the independence movement one
could see the outline of two general tendencies among the élite: one was broadly
"conservative", the other "liberal." The first outlook was more traditionalist, taking its
political and social aspirations from Hispanic traditions and its philosophical from the
Scholastic tradition of Catholic Spain. In the early nineteenth century, such an outlook
consisted of a hierarchical vision of society that was set in stone (each individual must
assume the station in life ordained to him by God); belief in a highly centralized, strongly
paternal state; the conception of the Catholic Church as an integral, active component of
both Colombian social and political life, and finally; a rejection of the secularizing impact of
the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, utilitarianism and positivism.
Liberals on the other hand received their ideological inspiration from the rapidly
industrializing nations - England, France and the United States. In these nations, many
Liberals travelled, studied, and witnessed first-hand the massive accumulation of capital,
the success of laissez-faire economic policies, and here also they absorbed the social
political and economic philosophies in currency among their Liberal European and
American counterparts.15 Referring to specific items on the Liberal reform agenda, an
editorialist writing to the Gaceta Oficial in 1851 is informative:
What does Nueva Granada hope to achieve in 1851? The answer is reform
of the constitution, abolition of slavery and the death penalty, free enterprise
in the economic field, organization of national guards in order to achieve the
suppression of the permanent army, the emancipation of the Church,

14Henao and Arrubla, H istory o f Colombia, p. 453.
15On nineteenth century Colombian Liberalism, see Molina's historical trilogy, Las Ideas Liberales en
Colombia, 1849-1914 (Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1979); Las Ideas Liberales en
Colombia, 1915-1934 (Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1982); Las Ideas Liberales en
Colombia, de 1934 a la Iniciación del Frente Nacional (Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Tercer Mundo,
1986). Good sources on the development o f Conservative ideology include James Park, Rafael Núñez
and the Politics o f Colombian Regionalism 1863-1886 (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State
University Press, 1985) and Frank Safford, The Ideal o f the Practical: Colombia's Struggle to Form a
Technical Elite (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1976), in addition to the works cited
above.
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popular election of bishops and priests, and adoption of a direct national tax
until the abolition of all custom duties is achieved.16
The Liberals also favored the breakup of the Indian resguardos, expulsion of the
Jesuits from Colombia, extreme federalism, and educational reform.17 Liberals also
sought, and obtained the official separation of Church and state, the first time this had
occurred in all of Latin America.
The actual political and economic reforms achieved by a nearly unbroken
succession of Liberal governments between 1849 and 1885 were remarkably consistent
with the Liberals' professed political beliefs as well as their economic interests. The
reforms had the effect of transforming Colombia's political economy from its colonial, neoBourbon beginnings to a laissez-faire, export-oriented trading nation. This feat was
accomplished by liberating tobacco production through elimination of the state monopoly; a
dramatic reduction of the alcabala and other estancos, and economic policies designed
generally to stimulate the development of export agriculture and international trade while
de-emphasizing the stimulation of local industry considered to be simply uncompetitive.
Florentino González, one of the first and foremost exponents of free-trade in Nueva
Granada wrote in 1846 before the Liberals officially came to power, "La Nueva Granada
no cuenta con facilidades para montar fábricas, ni con productos para alimentarlas, ni con
consumidores que prefieresen sus manufacturas en concurrencia con las extranjeras."18
A year later, Treasury Minister González reported to Congress that
"Europe...fulfills its mission in the industrial world by giving various forms to raw
materials. We too should fulfill our mission, and there is no doubt as to what it is, if we
consider the profusion of natural resources with which Providence has endowed this land.
We should offer Europe raw materials and open our doors to her manufactures, to facilitate
trade and the profit it brings, and to provide the consumer, at a reasonable price, with the
products of the manufacturing industry."19 In addition to advocating radical laissez-faire
economic policies, the Liberals sought to stimulate agricultural export production by freeing

Gaceta Oficial, Year X.X, no. 1184 (January 2, 1851)., quoted in Urrutia, pp. 27-28.
17Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 100-102.
18Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 98. González had become secretary of the Hacienda in 1846,
19Miguel. Urrutia, The D evelopment o f the Colombian Labor M ovement (New Haven, London: Yale
U niversity Press, 1969) p. 7.
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up unproductive Church lands which comprised perhaps one-third of the arable land in
Colombia,20 by expulsion of the Jesuits and massive confiscation of ecclesiastical
property, and by dismantling the Indian resguardos thereby adding to the market economy
substantial landholding that had heretofore been utilized for communal subsistence
agriculture by the Indians or lain unproductive in the hands of clerics.21
Nueva Granada's reform-minded Liberals were also influenced, as was usually the
case for Latin American intellectuals, by events in Europe, particularly the upheavals of
1848. Utopian socialists ideals of Louis Blanc and other socialist writers and the
revolutionary poetry of Lamartine further increased the gulf separating Colombian Liberals
from Conservatives, who were more strongly imbued with traditional Hispanic and
religious values.22
Despite these significant ideological differences however, it is important to
recognize that both Conservatives and Liberals shared important élite material interests, in
addition to their class-based prejudices. Although the Liberal's ideology was couched in
the language of liberty and equality, Liberals fundamentally shared a hierarchical view of
society in which an enlightened élite directed a "democratic" republic from above.23
According to Arrubla and Henao, during the early stages of party formation, "The young
men of both parties employed the vocabulary of the French Revolution, and the words
liberty, equality, fraternity, democracy, popular sovereignty, and universal suffrage were
much in vogue among our popular societies, whose orators used them along with the Bible
and the name of Jesus Christ; but the conservatives repudiated socialistic and communistic
ideas."24

20Urrutia, Development, p. 4.
21The profound impact Liberal reforms wrought on the structure of the Colombian economy and more
particularly, their influence on urban, artisan production will be discussed in greater detail below. Also,
the Liberal's rationale and justification for the most important pieces of Liberal legislation and the actual
social ramifications o f these significant mid-century Liberal reforms will be discussed.
22Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 7.
23The mainstream o f both parties believed in the sanctity of private property and therefore had a vested
interest in maintaining this inviolable right. Elites of both parties generally sent their sons to the same
educational institutions, dressed in the same manner, spoke with the same accents, enjoyed imported
luxuries reserved for the pocketbooks of the rich and, despite disagreement on the degree of the Catholic
Church's role in politics and society, attended the same churches.
24Arrubla and Henao, History o f Colombia, p. 458. The impact of utopian socialist ideas were not limited
to Liberal circles however. Small numbers of radical Catholic clergymen, artisans, and even some
Conservatives at times sought to use socialist arguments to support their policies or positions. The
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Although some writers have claimed that the Conservatives were not closely
involved with the export economy but rather were often identified with agricultural
production destined for domestic consumption,25 Park points out that this evidence is far
from conclusive.26 Several authors have also pointed out that both large landholders and
wealthy merchants benefitted from free trade policies by paying lower prices for imported
textiles and luxury items, and that free trade policies were actually originally initiated under
the impetus of Florentino González, Conservative Secretary of the Treasury under
Mósquera's first administration.27 Moreover, it appears that large landholders did not
uniformly support the Conservative Party, as may generally be the case elsewhere in Latin
America. Though data is scarce for the period, it is clear that landholders supported both
parties.28 Moreover, the expansion of the haciendas and Latifundia, often considered an
economically regressive phenomena by late nineteenth century Liberals, date from the era
of mid-century Liberal reforms.29
One striking similarity between the Liberal and Conservative parties has been their
class composition, which has remained fairly consistent up through the late twentieth
century. Despite rather clearly defined ideological borders,30 both parties are noted for
m ost significant impact of socialist ideas outside their obvious influence 011 the Liberal intellectual
Gólgotas was the influence of Louis Blanc 011 some of the members of the artisan sociedades
democráticos. Molina's Las Ideas Socialistas en Colombia discusses in some detail how utopian
socialism influenced these groups in the nineteenth century. Socialism's influence on the intellectual
development of the Gólgotas and the Sociedades is explored in greater detail later in the present study.
25Dix, The Politics o f Colombia, p. 18, Bergquist, Coffee, pp.7-9; 14-15, Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas,
pp. 97-101 and Urrutia, Development, p. 50.
26Although Park, Rafael Núñez (p. 269) argues that Bergquist is incorrect in his assumption that the rise
and dominance of the Liberal Party closely parallels the success and decline of the export economy, (Park
argues instead that the clear preference for centralism and church-state cooperation were the real forces
behind Liberalism's decline) he ignores the fact that the Liberals were extremely consistent in their
advocacy of laissez-faire trade policy. It is improbable that liberal ideology alone could maintain such
consistency o f policy for a half-century without clear material interests reflecting this fact. Most Liberal
leaders o f the era, such as Miguel Samper, were sons of merchant families, families engaged in export
agriculture or families tied in some way to the export economy.
27Both González and Mósquera himself however may be viewed historically as socially and politically
conservative while economically liberal..
28Park, Rafael Núñez, p. 269.
29Urrutia, Development, pp. 27-28; Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, pp. 100-102.
30Albeit they were ideologies that underwent tremendous evolution in the second half of the nineteenth and
first half of the twentieth centuries. At century's end, both parties generally agreed on their support of
free-trade, but still disagreed on issues such as the Church's involvement in the social life of the nation
and federalism. In the twentieth century, there is also a marked move by the Liberal Party away from
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their multi-class, national composition.31 Despite their obvious ideological
differences,.such similarities as those mentioned above have enabled élites of both parties
to forge alliances when a threat has arisen from below to challenge their privileged position
in society.
Distinct elements of each party's ideological positions appealed to urban and rural
labor. Although initially literacy and property restrictions limited the political participation
of large segments of Colombia's rural labor force, many of the city-dwelling artisans
actively participated in Colombian partisan political straggles from the earliest days of the
Republic. Each party was created and led not by middle class elements in Colombian
society, but by an élite"oligarchy" that forged party strength from patron-client
relationships. In his essay on the historical antecedents to the National Front, Harvey F.
Kline describes the early development of party loyalties:
[Liberal or Conservative Party'] support was probably not because of
socioeconom ic program s, but through the use of the patron-client
relationships. At the beginning of party history, the voters for the parties
were the clientele of the élites. Dependent campesinos voted for the party of
the landowner, whatever it was. The clientele of economic élites other than
the large landowners went along because of sim ilar dependency...In
Colombia, however, many families had martyrs who had died for a party in
one of the frequent civil wars. As a result, the masses developed intense
loyalties, which reinforced the initial patrimonial reason for choosing a
political party and in some sectors outlived it. Over time, the masses
became the cannon fodder for the party élites in the wars between the two
parties...The appearance of a strict and intense political socialization which
transcended patron-client relationships among the Colombian lower classes

classical laissez-faire liberalism and towards modem (welfare) liberalism in which the state plays a more
interventionist role in economic and social affairs.
31 Although Mauricio Solaún in his essay "Colombian Politics: Historical Character and Problems," in
Albert R. Berry, Ronald G. Heilman and Mauricio Solaún, Politics o f Compromise: Coalition
Government in Colombia (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction, Inc., 1980) has argued that the
parties have been ideologically heterogeneous and that party identification "has tended to be inherited
rather than the product o f thoughtful or ideological decision", the idea that the parties were ideologically
heterogeneous can probably only be generalized to the period immediately following the Thousand Days
War, and the modern period beginning with the National Front. The thesis of the "hereditary hatreds" is
also probably applicable to peasants in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century, with
certain exceptions outlined in the course o f this paper. The radical measures taken by the Liberals in the
mid-nineteenth century and Alfonso Lopéz's "Revolución en Marcha" serve as corrective examples to
illustrate the importance o f ideology among dynamic intellectual reformers. Liberal anticlericalism in
both centuries is not simply a contributing factor to the "ingrained partisan hostility" but is rather an
important ideological dimension of the conflict between Liberals and Conservatives. The "Manichean
element" o f the conflict as described by Solaún (p.5) is often related to ideological justification of
actions and positions by competing interests. He is thus correct in asserting that this Manichean fervor
was itself a source o f partisanship.
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seems to be a product of having relatives who had been killed by the other
party.32
Even today party loyalties extend to all strata of society, and one can find Liberaldominated peasant communities as well as Conservative working-class neighborhoods.
Moreover, there is empirical evidence that indicates the the masses' sense of party
identification is intensely strong, probably more powerful than that of the élite party
leadership.33 At mid-century when the parties were taking shape, both parties actively
recruited political support from the masses. Since the peasants had long relied on their
rural patrons, such political ties seemed inevitable. In urban areas, such ties also
developed, especially through the Liberal-oriented artisan sociedades democráticas and

miiTored in their Conservative, Church-influenced counterparts. Party identification
became essential for both rural and urban workers as a means to advance their individual
interests in a variety of areas including, obtaining employment, economic favors, favorable
court decisions, etc.. "Even at the level of veredas, the subdivisions of Colombian
municipios (counties)," writes Charles Bergquist in his study of labor and coffee,
"smallholders or sharecroppers of one political affiliation might enlist the support of local
urban politicians and lawyers in their resistance to large landowners-or to other

smallholders-of opposite political loyalties,"34
Although not really mass-parties in the common understanding of the term,35 the
parties have always had national, regional and local directorates as well as youth
organizations and political clubs (such as the mid-nineteenth century Republican School).
On a regional level, each party had traditional strongholds of support. The Liberals, who
have been traditionally somewhat stronger in urban areas, also have garnered strong
support from Cundinamarca, Santandér, and Boyacá while Conservatives have been
strongest in Antioquia and Tolima. In each of these cases however, it is important to
remember that there was a relatively large, and generally active opposition party comprised
of a sizeable segment of the population in each of the states.

32Harvey F. Kline, "The National Front: Historical Perspective and Overview," in Berry, Albert R .,
Ronald G. Heilman and Mauricio Solaún, Politics o f Compromise: Coalition Government in
Colombia (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction, Inc., 1980), p. 61.
33Kline, "The National Front," p. 62.
34Bergquist, Labor, p. 291.
35Kline, "The National Front," p. 60.
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Regionalism, which has always been a critical ingredient in Colombian politics, has
been important not only in the broad context of political partisanship, but has also served as
a major theme of Liberal reformers who believed that a weak federalist system was the best
guarantor of individual liberty and regional autonomy. Probably the major factor
contributing to the strong regionalist sentiment one finds in Colombia, is the nation's
special geography. It has played a critical role in the development of regional social and
cultural variations and loyalties that persist to the present day. Before considering the
impact of federalism on Colombia's political development in the nineteenth century, we will
briefly look at the nation's unique geography.
REGIONALISM AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF COLOMBIA
As every history of Colombia has noted, the geography of the nation has exerted a
powerful influence on the nation's social, economic and political development. The
towering flowing peaks of the Andes mountains has encouraged regionalism, often cited as
a powerful variable in the partisan political battles between Liberals and Conservatives.
The temperate zone of valleys and plateaus is divided by the central chain, the three Andean
chains that run north-southwest and comprised of the Cordillera Central (Central Chain),
the Cordillera Oriental (Eastern Chain) and the Cordillera Occidental (Western Chain). In
Colombia, one finds all climates ranging from the sparsely populated, steamy jungles of las
Amazonas to the tundra region, the páramos and the areas of permanent snows above
15,000 feet. It is in the temperate valleys of the Colombian highlands, particularly the
Cordillera Central and the Cordillera Oriental where one finds Colombia’s leading urban
centers, including the nation's capital, Bogotá. With a year-round cool climate, Bogotá is
situated in tierrafría. The populous, mountainous interior remains difficult to access by
ground even today, and was in the nineteenth century nearly impossible to reach overland
form the coast and difficult to reach even via Colombia's fluvial arteries.
Colombia's second leading city famed for its high level of economic development is
Medellin, found in tierra templada., temperate country in the department of Antioquia.
Medellin, currently about half as large as the capital city, was a powerful Conservative
stronghold throughout the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century. It is currently the
heart of Colombia's thriving textile industry and is the nation's leading manufacturing
center. In the Southwest between the Cordillera Central and the Cordillera Occidental lie
the important cities Cali, nearly as large as Medellin, and Popayán, today a small city, but
an important commercial and administrative center on the trade route to Quito in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
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The fact that Colombia has several important regional urban centers distinguishes it
from the typical pattern of urbanization found in other Latin American nations. Geographer
Alen Gilbert highlights this fact when he writes, "Of all the countries in the continent...»
only Colombia demonstrates the 'rank-size' hierarchy which many writers deem to be
desirable. In that case Bogotá is approximately twice as large as Medellin [today nearly
three times as large]36»three times the size of Cali and has four times the population of
Barranquilla."37 This regionalist aspect does not stop at Colombia's four leading cities.
The Caribbean port cities of Cartagena and Santa Marta, the important departmental capitals
Bucaramanga, Manizales, Cúcuta, Pereira, Ibagué, and Pasto all have more than 250,000
population and have become important commercial centers on Colombia's geographical
map.
This regional distribution of population has had two important consequences for the
development of the Colombian polity: regionally-based party organizations led by caudillos
and at the local level, gamonales (local party bosses) linked loosely to party headquarters in
Bogotá; and, regional economic and cultural centers distinct in many ways form other
regional centers.38 Strong regionalism, resulting primarily from the difficulties of access
and the lack of communications linkages between difficult mountainous terrain, has been
reinforced by racial heterogeneity, climactic variances, and differing natural endowments of
physical resources. By mid-nineteenth century for example, Indian influences remained
strong only in the eastern highland and the mountains of southern Cauca, while the
majority of the population, comprised of mestizos, was scattered throughout the country.39

36In 1989, Medellin counted nearly 1.6 million inhabitants, Cali, 1.5 million and Bogota nearly 4.5
million. Atlas y geografía de Colombia (Circulo de Lectores, 1989).
37John W. Sloan, "Regionalism, Political Parties, and Public Policy in Colombia," Inter-American
Economic Affairs, 33:3, (1979), p. 39.
38James William Park in his Rafael Núñez and the Politics o f Colombian Regionalism 1863-1886,
extensively treats the role o f federalism in Colombia's historical development during this period. His
central thesis, that Rafael Núñez laid the foundations for a stable, centralized Colombian government
which had since independence been subjected to the "debilitating forces of regionalism," elevates
federalism to the rank of the most important variable in the ideological gulf that separated Liberals and
Conservatives throughout the 1850's, and a paramount issue throughout the period of extreme federalism
in Colombia which ended with the beginning o f Núñez' second terra as president in 1884. For a brief
account o f regional economic development in Antioquia, see Alvaro López Toro, Migración y Cambio
Social en Antioquia Durante el Siglo XIX (Medellin: Ediciones Hombre Nuevo, 1979). For a good
discussion o f politics and regionalism, see John W. Sloan, "Regionalism, Political Parties, and Public
Policy in Colombia," Inter-American Economic Affairs, 33:3, (1979), p. 39.
39Park, Rafael Núñez, p. 10.
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In the major cities, white descendents of Spaniards, today comprising about 20% of the
population, have maintained their dominant positions in large-scale agriculture, commerce,
industry, and government. Black ex-slaves, first emancipated by Bolivar to gain the
support of the lower classes and later permanently guaranteed their freedom by a mid
century Liberal government, worked in the mining regions of Antioquia and Cauca and
later also settled along the Pacific and Atlantic coastal regions.
The topography of Colombia continued to nurture strong regionalist loyalties
throughout the nineteenth century. Not until the twentieth century was a communications
network built to integrate effectively the Colombian nation. Many isolated mountain
regions, large areas of the Pacific coast, the jungle Amazonas region and the vast plains
area known simply as Los Llanos (and comprising roughly 60% of all Colombian land
mass) are still not effectively served by adequate transportation links.40
Today, as has been the case for centuries, the Magdalena River Valley continues to
the major transport route in the country. In the nineteenth century, the Magdalena River
was the main artery connecting the populous interior to the Atlantic Ocean and Colombia's
trading partners in Europe and the United States. August Lemoyne's arduous journey from
Le Havre to Bogotá in 1828, related to us by Urrutia, illustrates vividly how the nation's
formidable geographical barrier impeded intercourse even on Colombia's primary transport
route. "From Le Havre to Santa Marta, on the north coast of Nueva Granada, the trip took
52 days, but between Santa Marta and Bogotá Le Moyne travelled 73 days in the most
intense discomfort. The greater part of the trip was spent on the Magdalena River on
primitive sampans, in which the passengers and cargo were exposed to all the humidity,
heat and insects of the tropics.41 Although steam navigation in the second half of the
century improved the speed of communications with the outside world, transportation
problems persist in the twentieth century.
For the period 1863-1874, Park has divided Colombia into four roughly distinct
regional groupings on the basis of geographical unity, economic interest and political
identifications.42 They are: Cauca, which was a large department whose economic base

40These regions are however extremely sparsely populated. The major concentrations of population are
today well-served by extensive air routes, rail and bus service. Efforts are being made to provide better
transportation linkages to both the isolated Pacific coast and Los Llanos.
41U nutia, Developm ent, p. 10.
42The following section on the regional groupings in Colombia for this period follows Park’s discussion in
Rafael Núñez found on pp. 26-31.
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comprised the export products tobacco and cinchona and gold mining. The second was the
tropical north coast, consisting of the states Panama, Bolivar and Magdalena. This area's
primary economic resources included the Panama Railway in the isthmus (which provided
an important source of income to the federal government, some $250,000 annually);
Bolivar and Magdalena produced cattle, marine salt destined for the domestic market, and
various export crops including tobacco, which was grown in large quantities in Bolivar.43
The central government of the United States of Colombia, as Colombia was called during
this period, also relied on the ports of Cartagena, Santa Marta and Barranquilla to provide it
with substantial revenue from customs receipts. The third regional grouping included
prosperous conservative Antioquia and its conservative cousin to the south, Tolima,
situated on the Cordillera Central. Both depended on gold mining (in 1872, Antioquia led
national production) cattle-ranching and small-scale agricultural production.44 Tolima,
through which ran the Magdalena, also exported tobacco and cacao.45 The final area
comprised the states Cundinamarca, Santandér and Boy acá located on the slopes of the
Cordillera Oriental. Cundinamarca served as a distribution hub for the modest international
commerce in a variety of goods produced in Colombia's hot, moderate and cold climates.
These included tobacco, sugar, wheat, potatoes, salt and iron implements.46 Isolated
Boyacá's economy was based

011

subsistence agriculture and the production of primitive

textiles destined for the internal market. Santandér, which boasted a diverse, prosperous
economy in the nineteenth century, produced coffee, cacao, sugar and tobacco for export,
and also produced rice and textiles geared towards domestic consumption.47 In addition to
geographical proximity, these three states also shared Liberal majorities in the middle of the
nineteenth century.
Strongly marked regionalis! feelings are evident today as Costeños, Antioqueños
and Vallecaucanos often proudly point to the distinguishing features that make their regions
distinct from the capitol and its inhabitants, the Bogotanos (often referred to as Cachacos).
Extolling regionalism and individualism, one Colombian observer has written: "Every

43Park, Rafael Núñez, p. 26-28.
44Park, Rafael Núñez, p. 29.
45Park, Rafael Núñez, p. 29.
46Park, Rafael Núñez, p. 31.
47Park, Rafael Núñez, p. 32.
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section, every valley, every hamlet of Colombia, is a unit which battles for its autonomy
and demands its privileges. And this nation, so formed, is individualist, whether
Conservative or Liberal; and it would say, if it were consulted honorably and truly, that it
loves and defends its individual liberty and detests official co-action and government
intervention in personal matters....our social organization, stemming from the Spanish
roots and planted in the Indian [social] soil, was, for its greater glory, personalist from the
dawn of the Republic."48
Upon their ascent to power in 1849, Liberal governments began to seek ways to
provide greater local autonomy to fulfill regionalist aspirations.49 The social, political and
geographic factors mentioned above provided a strong impetus to the federalist movement
of the the 1850's and 60's. The result was the extreme federalism of the period of Radical
Liberal hegemony that would end with the ascent of the second Núñez government in 1884
and the failure of the the Radical reaction of 1884-85.
FEDERALISM
One of the most important early issues dividing the Conservative and Liberal Parties
was the extent to which the new Republic was to have a strongly centralized government or
a more loosely-knit federation of departments or states.50
At the time of independence, no central authority nor a single dominant regional
élite had managed to establish itself in power. As early as 1815 in his "Letter from
Jamaica", Bolivar himself had predicted regionalist fervor would become an important
force in undermining dreams for northern South America's regional unity: "It is very
probable that New Granada may not agree to accept a centralized government because it is
extremely devoted to federation...it will form a separate state which, if it should survive,

48Vemon Lee Fluharty, Dance o f the Millions, M ilitary Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia
1930-1956 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966) quoting Professor Eugenio J. Gómez, pp.
25-26.
49Contemporary long-time Liberal champion José Maria Samper of the dominant Radical wing of the party
wrote o f these reasons in the following manner: "Very notable differences in race, very distinct customs
and economies, climates so varied that they are opposite, formidable mountain ranges that separate the
well-populated valleys and upper plateaus, enormous distances lacking good communications, a notable
diversity in the conditions of wealth...all of this made it necessary to divide the nation into a reduced
number of entities with their own independent administration[s]." Quoted in Park, p. 19.
50See Park, Rafael Núñez, pp. 7-13.
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would be very happy because of its great resources of every kind."51 Despite Bolivar's
efforts to forge a united, highly centralized Republic of Gran Colombia in 1819 (which
included present-day Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and after 1822, Venezuela),
disintegration would come swiftly. By 1831, the re-christened La República de Nueva
Granada would include only Panama and Colombia.
After the highly-centralized, royal authority had been swept away by the war for
independence, power in the early republic became widely diffused among a cadre of
regional caudillos. A single unifying force did not immediately develop to fill the vacuum.
The Colombian debate over centralization reached back to the early days of independence to
disagreements between the two great revolutionary heroes Simon Bolivar and Francisco de
Paula Santander. Bolivar favored a strong central government while Santandér argued that
a federal system was more consistent with republican principles than a centralized system.
The 1821 Constitution of Cúcuta made no allowance for regionalism but was, in the
words of Robert Dix, ''the embodiment of the best imported conceptions of liberty toward
the fulfillment of which, presumably, the new nations were to grow. Thus attempts to
apply procedures such as a widespread suffrage often led to electoral fraud.as those who
held the real power exerted it to retain control."52
The modest free-trade reforms enacted by Santandér's administration were
dismantled by socially conservative governments between the years 1839-1841.53 Drafted
following the Civil War of 1840-42, the Constitution of 1843 led to the creation of a more
highly centralized state with a strong executive power and also strengthened the Church's
role in society. Bergquist adds that policies of these years "favored the Church and sought
to arrest the spread of liberal ideology."54
Economically liberal policies pursued by the nominally conservative administration
of Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera (1845-49) focused on improving river transportation links
to the Caribbean as well as a modest reduction of tariffs in 1847.55 Election in 1849 of

51 Henao and Arrubla, H istory o f Colombia, p. 475.
52Dix, The Politics o f Colombia, p. 17.
53The reforms included a reduction in import duties, legislation to limit Church acquisition of properties
through mortmain, as well as efforts to reduce its predominant role in education. Charles W. Bergquist,
Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 1886-1910 (Durham, N.C. Duke University Press, 1978), p. 11.
54Bergquist, Coffee, p. 11.
55Park, Rafael Núñez, p. 14.
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general José Hilario López, candidate of the party now formally organized as Liberal,
continued along the path free-trade reforms and heralded a march towards increased
federalism that would culminate several years later in the 1863 Rionegro Constitution. This
document recognized the individual states of Colombia, referred to as the United States of
Colombia, as sovereign and independent entities.56
Liberals successfully vanquished a Conservative challenge to federalism in yet
another civil war in 1861: extreme federalism under the Pact of Union would help
contribute to more than 40 local civil wars as Liberals and Conservatives battled for power
in the states,57 The 1863 Charter virtually guaranteed state sovereignty in all political and
economic affairs. One article even forbade the central government's involvement in local
civil wars:
When any portion whatsoever of the citizens in any state shall rise in revolt
with the object of overthrowing the existing government and organizing
another, the government of the union shall observe the strictest neutrality
between the belligerent groups. While the civil war continues in a state, the
governm ent of the the union shall maintain its relations with the
constitutional government until its authority has been discountenanced in all
the territory of the state; and it shall recognize the new government and enter
into official relations with it after it shall have been organized in conformity
with the national constitution. 58
Federalism would remain a political reality until it was reversed during the
centralizing, "Regeneration" government of Rafael Núñez.
In terms of the ideological battles played out between the Conservatives and
Liberals in the nineteenth century, the issue of federalism ranks alongside the role of the
Catholic Church in the social and political life of the nation, and the extent that Liberal
laissez-faire economic philosophy would dominate the nation’s economic orientation.59

56Dix, The Politics o f Colombia, p. 18. Throughout its first century o f independence, Colombia
underwent several name changes; Gran Colombia (comprised of Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador),
1819-1830; República de la Nueva Granada, 1832-1857; Estados Unidos de Colombia 1858-1889; from
1889 to the present, República de Colombia.
57Henao and Arrubla, History o f Colombia, p. 488.
58Henao and Anubla, History o f Colombia, p. 488.
59The central government's attention to regional interests remains an important feature of Colombian
politics today.
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These were the great issues that shaped the outlooks of the major élite protagonists in the
armed conflicts that littered nineteenth century Colombian history.
ARTISANS AND THE LIBERAL PARTY: LAS SOCIEDADES DEMOCRATICAS
In mid-nineteenth century Colombia, independent artisans comprised a sizeable,
active force in the nation's socio-economic life. Although no figures exist to inform us
how many artisans were represented in the nation's population of nearly two million at
mid-century, in 1870 they made up approximately 23% of Colombia's population of
2,890,637.60 Table 3:1 shows estimates of the economically active population in 1870
based on figures developed by Urrutia and Henao.
TABLE 3:1
Active Population in 1870
C a te g o ry

N u m ber
P e rc e n ta g e

Agricultural/Ranch Workers
Artisans/Craftsmen
Servants
Miners
Merchants
Landowners
Vagabonds
Total:

816,812
335,424
225,000
40,000
26,668
14,373
.2 1 ,0 0 0

1,479,277

55.2
22.7
15.2
2.7
1.8
1.0
1.4

100

Source: K alm anovitz, E c o n o m ía y N ación, T able 3.3, p. 207.

The percentage of independent artisans as a proportion of the total population was
probably even higher in 1850 than in 1870 as a result of a number of factors that will be
considered below.
As early 1838, before the formal organization of the two dominant political parties,
efforts were undertaken to organize societies to inculcate in the artisans rival conservative
and liberal ideologies. One of the earliest artisan societies, the Sociedad Católica, was
organized in that year by Monsignor Baluffi, Papal Nuncio in Bogotá, to help teach the

60Molina, in Las Ideas Socialistas reports 1,812,000 inhabitants for the year 1843. The 2,890,637 figure
for 1870 is found in Salomón Kalmanovitz, Economía y Nación: Una Breve Historia de Colombia
(Bogotá: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1985), p.122. Of the nearly 350,000 individuals classified as
artisans, about 71% were women who divided their time between household chores and activities such as
sewing, weaving, making ceramic dishes and kitchen implements, footwear, and clothing.
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gospel.61 This conservative sociedad attacked the "filosofismo'' popular with the liberal
intelligentsia.
For their part, liberals created the celebrated sociedades democráticas, influential
organizations often comprised of young liberal intellectuals and artisans for the purpose of
teaching the artisans about the principles of ''liberty, equality and fraternity" and laissezfaire economics. Colombian sociologist Fals Borda argues that the democratic societies
were the most important mechanisms for change in Colombia at mid-century because of
their initial anti-clerical, anti-colonial, and anti-Hispanic stance.62 The sociedades were to
become the most important organizations of workers in the nineteenth century, and played
an increasingly important political role in the turbulent partisan political struggles of the
century.
From their inception, these associations were inextricably interwoven into the fabric
of Colombia's two party system, a path—one may note with interest,—that their modern
twentieth century counterparts, the trade unions, would also ultimately follow.
Despite the stark reality that the Liberal's free-trade stance was absolutely
incompatible with the artisans' desire to maintain their livelihood through protectionist
legislation, most of the early Societies of Artisans, many of those established between
1847-1850, were clearly identified with the Liberal party. These in turn were influenced by
the Liberal "Generation of 1849," young intellectuals who had been nurtured during the
Santandér era of secularizing, anti-traditionalist reforms. The Sociedad de Amigos de los

Principios Liberales Bajo el Sistema Democrático (Society of Friends of Liberal Principles
Under the Democratic System) for example, was pledged to "uphold under all
circumstances our present system of government... and make known the sacred principles
of equality, liberty, and fraternity,"63 Another society was more concise in the manner in
which it outlined its objectives, "being the same as those professed by the present (Liberal)
administration."64 In-order to counteract the growing influence of the Liberal-oriented

sociedades democráticas, the Conservatives, with the strong support of the Catholic

61Funk Harries, "Camilo T o ro s," p. 182.
62Orlando Fals Borda,. Subversion and Social Change in Colombia (New York, London: Columbia
University Press, 1969).
63Urrutia, Development, p. 14.
64Urrutia, Development, p. 14.
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Church, founded several societies of their own in Bogotá, Cali and many other cities
throughout Colombia.
The church had participated openly in the ideological battle waged to recruit the
artisan since the 1830's. Sowell points out that the church assured that "the proper
education, together with votes for Catholic representatives, would prevent the 'infection' of
[liberal] ideas from spreading through the nation."65 The liberal-oriented response was the
establishment of La Sociedad Democrática-Republicana de Artesanos i Laboradores
Progresistas de la Provincia de Bogotá. The Progresistas (Santandéi* liberals) launched a
newspaper to help educate artisans in democratic theory and liberal ideology, its main
objective being to "diffuse...useful knowledge...especially that of politics and morality, so
that citizens of the republic can discharge and comply with their tights and obligations with
intelligence and pnde."66
The Sociedad Democrática's mouthpiece, El Labrador i Artesano, editorialized on
the artisans' responsibility to identify "their interests with those of the state."67 . Though
the president of this society was an artisan, progressive intellectuals from the upper class,
including Lorenzo María Lleras and Florentino González, the free-trade theoretician who
would serve under Mosquera, actually controlled it.68 Prominent progresistas such as
Francisco Soto, Vicente Azuero and Rafael Elisio Santandér served as instructors, lecturing
on the nature of republican government.69
Famous contemporary Liberal writer José María Samper in his Apuntimientos para
la historia, described the rapid growth of the Sociedades' influence:
En Bogotá y en las provincias se fundaban, casi repentinamente imprentas y
nuevos diarios que aum entaban la com bustión de los espíritus en
conmoción. Las sociedades democráticas, tomando como modelo la
importante Sociedad de Artesanos de Bogotá (que para entonces contaba
con cerca de 4.000 miembros) aparecieron sucesivamente llenas de actividad
y entusiasmo y con personal numeroso en Cali, Popayán, Buga, Cartago,

65David Lee Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement: Artisans and Politics in Bogotá,
Colombia, 1832-1919," Ph.d. Dissertation University of Florida, (1986), p, 58.
66La Bandera Nacional, July 22, 1838, quoted in Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p.
61.
61El Labrador i Artesano, Sept 16, 1838, quoted in Sowell, p. 62.
68Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 62.
69Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 63.
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Medellin, Rionegro, Mompós, Cartagena, Santa Marta y Pamplona y en
casi todas las poblaciones importantes de la República. Ellas eran los
centros del movimiento, los focos de la revolución que se efectuaba en las
ideas, en las costumbres y en la vida social. Todo el mundo tomaba
participación en la política: hombres de estado, ancianos, jóvenes, mujeres,
artesanos, sacerdotes, militares. Cada cual significaba algo, porque se
había comenzado a practicar la soberanía del número.70
The most influential of the sociedades remained under the tutelage of the Liberal
Party and, despite critical fractures in the party, was broadly influenced by Liberal
ideology.71
Events influencing the sociedades included those taking place on the old continent,
of which the Bogotá intellectuals kept a close vigil. Jaime Jaramillo Uribe wrote that the
sociedades democráticas, "Fueron también el medio social y psicológico en que tomaron
cuerpo las influencias políticas de la Revolución Francesa del 48, sobre todo sus tendencias
utópicas y románticas que tenían en los sectores artesanales de la misma Francia, su mejor
ciado de cultivo. Pero las Democráticas en la Nueva Granada 110 fueron únicamente
organizaciones gremiales de artesanos. Fueron también el vehículo político de la
"intelillentia" juvenil de las nacientes clases medias y comerciantes, unidas
transitorianmenie con los artesanos en ciertos objetivos políticos."72 The artisan
sociedades early

011

became dependent on an elite-adopted, foreign-derived Liberal

ideology.
In part, this odd alliance between artisan and liberal intellectual can be accounted for
by the seduction of ideals such as liberty and brotherhood espoused by the Liberals.
Another factor was the utopian socialist rhetoric of equality between classes proclaimed by
the young Liberals during meetings of the sociedades, which remained stirring words for
reunions of artisans and élite intellectuals, but were never put into practice by these same
élites in the real world of trade and profits. Such ideals nevertheless must have exerted a
powerful attraction over an artisan class that was consciously seeking recognition for its
contributions to society. Artisans shared such lofty ideals advanced by the Liberal Party,

70Ricardo Sánchez, Historia Política de la Clase Obrera en Colombia (Bogotá: Editorial la Rosa Roja,
1982), pp. 15-16.
7internal party differences would lead to the creation of two wings of the Liberal party, one, that would be
favored by the artisans was more conservative and the other, uncompromising in its support of free trade
and feueralism. These differences will presently be discussed in greater detail.
72Quoted in Ricardo Sanchez, p. 17.
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though they could have hardly agreed with the Liberal intellectual's advocacy of a laissezfaire economic policy. Free-trade could ultimately only serve to undermine the artisans'
economic position in society. The unusual alliance between the élite advocates of laissezfaire and the artisans would prove to be transitory: artisans eventually became painfully
aware that their material interests did not coincide with those of the Liberal intelligentsia.
David Sowell in his thesis on the Colombian artisan class provides the most
comprehensive description of the artisans in the nineteenth century that has been attempted
to date. In it, Sowell effectively argues that the artisans were conscious as a class of their
economic role as producers and were intensely proud of that role in society. Many met
literary, property and other criteria to be eligible to vote and thus maintained a sense of
constituting an integral part of the nation's citizenry.73 Comprising a fairly homogeneous
class of independent producers up until the 1870's, the artisans clearly perceived
themselves as a distinct group that contributed much to the nation's development. Sowell
argues convincingly that the slow process of artisan fragmentation leading to their gradual
proletarianization, began in the 1860's as artisans reeled under the impact of unrestricted
free-trade and the expansion of the export economy.74
Threatened by the advent of new technology, particularly by the establishment of
steam navigation on the Magdalena which substantially decreased the cost of transporting
goods, and faced with rising competition from abroad, particularly English textiles, the
sociedades de artisanos increasingly turned to political activities in order to secure
government tariff protection. According to Colombian labor historian Montoya Urrutia, the
first recorded instance of Colombian workers' organization occurred in the mid-nineteenth
century.75 Probably in reaction to the reforms of President Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera,
Societies of Artisans with a more explicit political mission than earlier sociedades, began to
be established in the capital to defend the artisans' economic interests in the middle of the
nineteenth century. Artisans understood well that free trade, "the first step taken by
Florentino González, the theoretician of the new liberal economic order, meant the
destruction of the Colombian artisan class."76

73Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 4-5.
74Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 38.
75Miguel Urrutia in Part One o f The Development o f the Colombian Labor Movement.
76Urrutia, Development, p. 7.
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FE D ER A LISM AND LIB E R A L R EFO R M S
The reasons for Liberal support for Federalism have already been discussed at some
length, but the consequences of that support has not yet been explored. Federalism was a
direct cause of the civil war of 1860, one of the major factors alongside religion in the 1876
civil war, and it contributed to scores of armed partisan conflicts within and between the
states throughout the nineteenth century. Inter-state conflicts were facilitated by legislation
which permitted each to maintain ail army and by the federal government’s permissive
stance towards the unrestricted traffic in arms. Molina relates the Liberals* passionate
defense of federalism and their antipathy for the Leviathan of centralism in the following
way: "Por el amor a la autonomía de las provincias y por el temor a un Ejecutivo Central
fuerte, llegaron a un federalismo extravagante que le permitía a los estados asociados tener
ejércitos poderosos, sin que el Estado Central pudiera hacerles la guerra, pero no a la
inversa."77
Colombia embarked upon a path of export-oriented, laissez-faire economic policy in
1847. This policy, to the disdain of the artisans who had for the most part supported
Liberal candidates, was clearly non-protectionist. In that year, the tariff system was
modified and duties were decreased by one-third.78 Earlier, after the War of the
Supremes, in the 1830s and 40s certain manufactures, such as china, porcelain, iron,
(ultimately unsuccessful ventures) and glass, paper, and textiles (lasting ventures) had
enjoyed protection by the government. After 1847, laissez-faire policies were implemented
by the government. Although a mild non-protectionist duty on certain items was re
imposed in 1851, its purpose was to bolster government revenues rather than to preserve
troubled domestic industry. Five years later, fluvial taxes imposed on foreign shipping
using the Magdalena were eliminated and duty-free status was accorded several Colombian
ports.79

Under the 35-year Liberal reign, the government did not veer from its free-trade

stance.
The economic program undertaken by the Liberals was designed to insert Colombia
into the emerging Europe-centered world economy based on free-trade, accumulation of
capital, rationalization of production and an abundant and constant supply of raw materials
flowing to manufacturing centers in England and later in the century, France, Germany and

77Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 109.
78Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 27.
79Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 28.
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the United States. Colombia's role in this global system was envisioned as one of provider
of certain raw materials (especially gold) and agricultural commodities. Exports of
agricultural products like sugar and tobacco were encouraged at the same time as import
restrictions were relaxed.
Neither of these measures helped the artisans. Cheap imports obviously competed
with domestic production, while increased exports in turn created the accumulation of
wealth necessary for the élite to purchase conspicuous consumption items from Europe
such as tea, jewelry, furniture and china, siphoning away capital that could have otherwise
been invested in local manufacturing ventures. Ultimately more damaging to artisan
production however, was the unchecked import of high-quality, cheap textiles form
England. Between 1864 and 1874, textile imports soared, in turn causing rising trade
deficits.80 Hardest hit by increases in imports were the artisans, especially those of
Santandér and Boy acá, traditional centers for the domestic manufacture of textiles.81 Of all
imports during the decade 1864-74, seventy percent consisted of textiles.82 Closing off
markets to domestic producers was the primary lasting impact of Liberal policies on artisan
production. Those who remained solvent after the onslaught, were often forced into the
manufacture of coarser goods.
In response to this threat posed to the artisan's livelihood by the free-trade policies,
artisans began to organize under the banner o f " right to work," as had their counterparts in
France in 1848. Cognizant of what free trade would mean to the artisan system of
production, the new Sociedades were organized to take a protectionist stance. No longer
would they serve as a soapbox for Liberal intellectuals. Free-trade thus became a major
point of contention among artisan supporters of Liberalism and ultimately drove a wedge
between an artisan-supported faction pledged to procure some protection for artisan
industry and the Liberal bourgeois free-traders.83
With the 1849 election of Liberal General José Hilario López, legislation
liberalizing trade was accelerated and other more overtly political reforms were also put into

80See the price indices for imports graphed by Kalmanovitz on page 176, Economía, using data supplied by
Ocampo.
81 Park, Rafael Núñez, pp. 59-60. According to Park, more than 20% of the labor force was involved in
artisan activities in Boyacá,
82Park, Rafael Núñez, p. 61.
83The two factions, Gólgotas or Radicales, favoring free-trade, and the the Draconianos or Moderados, the
conservative, pro-artisan faction, will be discussed at length in Chapter Four.
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place. Universal manhood suffrage was decreed and slavery was abolished definitively in
1851. Laws prohibiting the sale of Indian resguardo land were eliminated in 1850; laws
eliminating the tobacco monopolies were finally passed in 1850; the diezmos destined for
support of the clergy were also abolished.
Over the next two decades, additional legislation would profoundly affect the
development of the Colombian polity. These included the unprecedented (in Latin
America) move to separate Church and state, declaring marriage a civil act, eliminating
both the ecclesiastical and special military fuerosy decreeing freedom of the press,
decentralizing government legislative power among the states, reducing the army from
5000 to 800 men, and, generally supporting decentralization and a laissez-faire policy
toward economic development.84 The radicals would maintain power nearly continuously
until the 1880’s.
Several of the reforms mentioned above merit more careful review. Such reforms
as the land reform, the abolition of slavery, free trade legislation, adopting a stance
favoring extreme federalism, and anticlerical laws, had a profound impact on Colombian
society, particularly the artisan class. We shall look at these more closely in the following
section.
EMANCIPATION OF RESGUARDO LANDS AND THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY
Two major mid-century reforms undertaken by the Liberals included the elimination
of restrictions on the sale of the Indian Resguardos or communal landholdings (1850) and
the definitive abolition of slavery (1852).
The first reform, ending restrictions on the sale of Indian lands ushered in the
modern period of enclosures and the creation of many of the great haciendas. Although
specific tenancy relations took many forms in the different regions in Colombia, the growth
of the haciendas exhibits a general pattern rather typical of rural Latin America in areas of
concentrated Indian populations. With the resguardos freed through legislative decree,
Indians would accumulate debt to local hacendados by borrowing money to finance the
purchase of seeds, or of foodstuffs in times of drought, etc., and would later be forced to
sell, piecemeal, their lands as they struggled to pay their debts. Typically, they would
become tenants on lands previously held communally by their tribes.
Much of the land moreover, was transformed, switched from the production of
agricultural commodities, both subsistence and to fill local market demands, to cattle

84Henao and Arrubla, History o f Colombia, pp. 468-469.
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ranching, the production of sugar cane and tobacco (depending on climate and soil
conditions) and later, to coffee plantations. This led to an increase in food prices and an
increase in the labor pool in the towns and villages, both contributing to a further
deterioration in artisan standards of living.85
The abolition of slavery two years later, though violently opposed by the
Conservatives, was embraced by the artisans as a matter of democratic and moral
principle.86 This act, supported universally by Liberal partisans, most likely also
exacerbated competition for urban employment as well as contributed to a general
stagnation in wages. The breakup of the resguardos also increased the labor supply and
probably had some impact on the stagnation of wages, although to the author's knowledge,
no definitive causal link has been empirically established. Frank Safford however, has
shown that although the prices of meat, rice, eggs and potatoes tripled and quintupled
between 1830-1873, there was no offsetting increase in wages during this period.87
The Liberal objectives for passing such legislation were both ideological and
material: on the one hand, the principles of individual liberty and the requisites of
democracy demanded the abolition of slavery and the right of the Indian to dispose of his
property as he saw fit. Molina suggests another, more material objective: "Se buscaba con
las dos medidas liberal* mano de obra para que fuera a trabajar en las plantaciones de tabaco
y de caña de azúcar, en plena expansión. Se aspiraba, igualmente, a mejorar la capacidad
de compra para los géneros y alimentos que iban a producirse o a importarse."88
Contemporary Liberals themselves viewed the reforms as progressive moves to
improve the economy and to maximize individual freedom (freedom to import or, for the
Indians, to sell their property). Although the Liberals’ intentions may have at least partially
been the noble pursuit of individual liberty, the outcome of land tenure patterns was not that
which many Liberals had wished. Land reform had the effect of strengthening rural
landholders at the expense of the Indians, in many areas transforming the former owners

85U m itia in Development, (p.28) suggests that the enclosure of Indian lands led to food shortages and
higher prices since this land was usually taken out of domestic production.

86Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 108.
87Urrutia, Development, p. 29.
88Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 104.
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into tenants.89 Miguel Samper wrote years later of the legislation that caused the
destruction of the resguardos, "Youth and enthusiasm are no excuse and cannot calm the
remorse that he who writes these lines suffers and shall suffer for his participation in this
unwise law."90
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH AND LIBERAL REFORMS
As mentioned in a previous chapter, the Roman Catholic Church in Colombia held a
powerful influence over the daily lives of Colombians, represented tremendous wealth in
the form of its substantial landholdings and capital, and was a major political actor in the
civic affairs of the new Republic. After independence, the patronato real devolved upon the
Colombian nation: this included the authority to appoint church personnel and the right to
make decisions affecting the establishment of churches, monasteries and missions.91
Many of the political conflicts between Conservatives and Liberals throughout Colombian
history have revolved around the status of the church's position in society.
The politically "conservative" governments which ruled Nueva Granada from 18301849 afforded the church the protection of the state: Catholicism was declared the exclusive
religion of the Republic. Although historians often focus on the absence of a separation
between church and state in Colombia at this time, they tend to neglect the fact that in most
nations of the world, this was the norm rather than the exception. Even in that most liberal
of nations of the period England, individuals who were not members of the Church of
England did not enjoy equal rights under the law (individuals from other denominations
could not for example attend Oxford University). Austria and the Russian Empire both had
official state religions (Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodox). Revolutionary France
and the United States were the noteable exceptions. At a time when virtually the entire
population of Colombia was Catholic (98 per cent of the population was nominally Catholic

89A contemporary Liberal politician was to write later of this legislation, "The poor Indians were induced
to sell their parcels, in which they had their own small house, some independence, and a secure
subsistence. In a few years that property fell into the hands of a few landlords, the Indian became a
tenant, the land was shifted to grass for cattle raising,and the supply of agricultural goods decreased
substantially. All this as the result of a liberty established without previous study of social conditions."
Quoted in Urrutia, Development, pp. 27-28.
90Urrutia, Development, p. 28.
91J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina
Press, 1934), p. 115.
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as late as 1970), it is not surprising that the Church and state were not separated under the
constitution.
The influence of the church was so pervasive during this period of "conservative"
rule that early congresses were often comprised of one-quarter to one-third Catholic
clergymen, and prelates frequently held important posts in the administration. Moreover,
the Church continued to be the major landholder in Nueva Granada and it continued its
virtual monopoly over education.92 Although there were undoubtedly many ''liberal”
priests, some of primitive socialist bent, Catholic bishops were more often than not
unabashedly partisan: they preached against the philosophies of Kant, Hegel, Bentham,
and the French Philosophes. They also attacked Colombia's strongly republican Masonic
Lodges, and organized conservative societies to counteract the liberal sociedades
democráticas.93
The Liberal ascendency of mid-century posed a particularly potent threat to the
Church's prominent position in society. Between 1849 and 1880 Liberal governments
curbed the Church's involvement in secular affairs. José López expelled the Jesuits, whom
Liberals considered "the most powerful auxiliary of the tremendous opposition which the
Conservative party was making against the government."94 The Jesuits were later
readmitted for a short period (1858-1861) by the Conservatives, expelled again (1861) by
the Liberals and finally allowed to return under the Conservatives in the late 1880's.
In 1853, Congress went a step further. Unprecedented in Latin America, the
Liberals officially separated church and state.95 Other important legislation which the
Liberals were able to enact with a view to limiting the power of the church included: largescale confiscation of ecclesiastical property (except actual church buildings and residences
of the clergy); the creation of public schools to end the church's monopoly over education;
secularization of cemeteries; the abolition of religious orders as well as the ecclesiastical

92See Fernán González, Partidos políticos y poder eclesiástico (Bogotá: Editorial CINEP, 1977) for a good
overview o f .h istorical relations between church and state as well as I. Lloyd. M echam Church and State
in Latin America (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1934).. An earlier paper by
the author also discusses the Catholic Church's influence in society. See Curtis D. Curry, The
Catholic Church in Colombia: Implications fo r Development, Unpublished manuscript, (1985).
93Funk Harries, "Camilo Torres," p. 181.
94Funk-Harries, "Camilo Torres," p. 191.
95Mecham, Church and State, p. 151.
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fileros»elimination of the diezmos, the legalization of divorce and a declaration that
marriage was to be an obligatory civil ceremony.96
These reforms, partly economic aimed at freeing up unproductive lands held by the
Church, and partly ideological-eliminating religious influence in matters which Liberals
viewed as purely secular, served to antagonize supporters of the Church and helped to
create an issue of "morality'* that Conservatives could and did exploit to advantage. It also
served to charge the partisan conflict between the two parties with the moral dimension that
probably heightened the combatants' spirit of engaging in a fight against an evil, irreligious
foe or in the case of the Liberals, against an undemocratic, retrograde enemy. Partisans
were able to vent these feelings in the more than 50 armed insurrections which occurred
between 1863-1885.97
GENERAL ECONOMIC TRENDS AFFECTING ARTISAN PRODUCTION
In his seminal work, Coffee and Conflict in Colombia: 1886-1910, Charles
Bergquist argues that the Liberal rise to power closely parallels the rise and decline of
export agriculture, especially tobacco, between 1850 and 1875. He writes "Colombia
experienced these export booms beginning in the 1840's with tobacco, later with cinchona
bark and to lesser degree with indigo, and finally, near the end of the century, with coffee.
During the nineteenth century, however, Colombians found that after an initial boom
period, when prices were high, they could not compete with other tropical areas when the
world supply had met demand and prices fell."98. This was true of all export products

96Mecham, Church and State, p. 155.
97Urrutia, Development, p. 47.
Coffee and- Conflict in Colombia, 1886-1910 (Durham: N.C. Duke University Press, 1978),
p. 7. In addition to Berguist's work, other important contributions to late nineteenth and early twentieth
century economic history utilized in the current study include, Paul William McGreevey's, An
Economic History o f Colombia (Cambridge, England: 1971) and his later article, "Reinterpreting
Colombian Economic History," Journal o f Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol 23 No. 3
(August 1981); Salomón Kalmanovitz, Economía y Nación: Una Breve Historia de Colombia,
(Bogotá: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1985); Marco Palacios, Coffee in Colombia, 1850-1970: An
Economic,Social and Political History. London, 1980; Bernardo Tovar Zembrano, La Intemención
Economica del Estado en Colombia 1914-1936, (Bogotá: Biblioteca Banco Popular, 1984); Gloria
Gaitán, La Lucha Por la Tierra en la Década del 30: Génesis de la Organización Sindical Campesina,
(Bogotá: 1984); David Charles Kepner and Jay Henry Soothill, The Banana Empire: A Case of
Economic Imperialism (New York, 1967.); Catherine LeGrand, "Labor Acquisition and Social Conflict
on the Colombian Frontier, 1850-1936," Latin American Studies, Vol. 16 (1985); Toro, Alvaro Lopez.
Migración y Cambio Social en Antioquia Durante el Siglo XIX (Medellin: Ediciones Hombre Nuevo,
1979); Bernardo Tovar Zembrano, La Inteiyención Economica del Estado en Colombia 1914-1936
(Bogotá: Biblioteca Banco Popular, 1984).

^ B e r g q u is t,
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until world demand for coffee became relatively stable in the early twentieth century."
Under Liberal hegemony, Colombia was brought into the political, economic and
intellectual mainstream of the gradually industrializing west.100 This had important
consequences for domestic politics and the local market.
In terms of politics, the Liberal ascendency led to the crystallization of two lasting
political parties separated if not by disagreement 011 laissez-faire economics, on important
issues including at various times federalism, the Church's role in society, slavery,
education, and their respective ideological views (one basically republican the other more
strictly hierarchical and paternalistic) of state and society.
The impact on the local market of Liberal policies was also significant. Laissezfaire's dominance led to the gradual impoverishment of a major portion of the nation's
population, the artisans, which in turn diminished artisan demand for agricultural products
such as cotton and leather, as well as for other products made in Colombia. Also, wages
were depressed and purchasing power reduced. This led to the stagnation of the growth of
a domestic market. Imports of textiles, furniture, clothes and footwear surged to meet the
demands of a small élite who could afford such items.101
Extreme federalism also exacerbated the fragmentation of the national economy into
a patchwork of different state taxes, duties and varied prices for goods. It also had the
effect of retarding the development of a high-quality, integrated national transportation
infrastructure, coordinated national economic policy and a national system providing for the
uniform education for Colombia's youth.

"A lthough by no means completely stable as current (Summer 1991) coffee prices attest, prices have
fluctuated widely earlier in this century as well. McGreevey in An Economic History o f Colombia
(Cambridge, England: 1971) notes for example, that prices fell 30% from 1905 to 1932 (although
transportation costs which fell by 74% during the same period, and increased production largely offset
losses). A crisis in demand during the first world wax' however was quite serious. Economists in the
1950's and 1960's, such as Raul Prebisch in Latin America and Sir Arthur Lewis in the Caribbean,
recognized the price volatility of export agricultural products and encouraged import substitution and
regional integration o f markets as strategies to help overcome such disadvantages. For a concise
overview o f essays discussing the ECLA school, socialism and dependencia theory in Latin America and
the Caribbean, see Helio Juaribe, "Marxism and Latin American Development," in Marxism and the
Western World (pp. 229-252); Norman Girvan, "The Development of Dependency Economics in the
Caribbean and Latin America: Review and Comparison," Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1,
(March, 1973); Carlos Johnson, "Dependency Theory and the Processes of Capitalism and Socialism,"
Latin American Perspectives, Vols. 30 & 31, No. 384, (1981); and Harry Targ, "Global Dominance and
Dependence, Post-Industrialism, and International Relations Theory," International Studies Quarterly,
Vol. 20, no. 3, (Sept. 1976).
100Bergcjuist, Labor, p. 11.
101Kalmanovitz, Economía, pp. 132-133.
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Although both federal and state income increased as a result of the surge in imports,
federal expenditures outpaced receipts and led to trade deficits in the 1860's and 70's.102
Between 1865 and 1874, federal income increased 86%, while import duties collected from
the nation's four customs ports, comprised between 64% and 71% of of total receipts.103
From mid-century, exports also increased, the most important commodities being tobacco
until the early 1870's, and coffee after 1880. Each of these two major developments,
unswerving government support for export-import policies and opposition to legislation
that would protect domestic producers, as well as decreased transportation costs, served to
undermine the position of the artisan.
S O C IA L C O N D IT IO N S: T H E D IST IN C T W O RLD S O F T H E A R TISA N S
AND U P P E R CLASS
What was quotidian life like in Colombia during the middle of the last century? We
have already mentioned the tremendous influence of the Catholic Church in the life of the
nation-its multiple roles as the social focus of community, as a major political and economic
actor, and its part in inflaming partisan passions between the Conservative and Liberal
Parties. We have also discussed the development of interests, both material and ideal, that
delineated party lines, the clientelist nature of local politics, and the impact of federalism on
the historical development of the state.
Without placing these variables into a social context, they become a set of disjointed
historical eclectica. What were some of the physical features of daily life in Bogotá and
other urban areas? What about life in the countryside? We have also briefly discussed the
emerging consciousness of the native-born upper class, but we have yet to discuss how
those perceived differences which set them apart form their countrymen affected their
decisions and actions regarding Colombia's political, economic and social development
(how artisan self-perceptions may have influenced this group's behavior will be treated
later).
The Colombian capital, Santa Fe de Bogotá, counted some 20,000 inhabitants
around 1815, at a time when a majority of the nation's people lived in the countryside and
small villages. As during colonial times writes Colombian historian Henao, "The people of
Santa Fe continued to hear mass in the mornings, breakfasted early, and dined between
twelve and one. The siesta, or afternoon nap, came next, after which a promenade was in

102park, Rafael Núñez, p. 54.
103Park, Rafael Núñez, p. 56.
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order. At twilight, sweets and chocolate were served, and then came supper after the
rosary had been recited. At nine o'clock it was bedtime."104 The "people" to whom
Henao and Arrubla refer are those who Fluharty has called the 'Great Families' who "lived,
moved and acted on a social plane far above the common herd....with its tradition of caste,
of privilege, of power tenure."105 The upper class valued not only wealth, but also good
manners and education. Journalism, according to Safford and Urrutia was a highly
prestigious profession, perhaps second only to that of trade and commerce.106
The wealthy citizens of Bogotá lived a life of luxury in the center of the city. This
contrasted sharply with the living quarters of the artisans. Henao and Arrubla write
eloquently of this contrast:
The old houses were commonly inconvenient, lacking in sanitation and
shabby in appearance...The habitations of the artisans lacked windows, had
very low doors, and barely composed a single section. The commodious
and tastefully arranged houses of the rich were few...a large reception
room, a music room, a servant's room beneath the stairway, a pool with
running water, guest rooms, a stable, and beautiful plants and fruit
trees....In those days municipal services were almost non-existent. The
sewage ran through the middle of the streets; many of the latter were
unpaved, and the three devoted to commerce had flagstone sidewalks.
Hundreds of women called aguateras were engaged in carrying drinkingwater from the public fountains to the private homes."107
For the vast majority of 30-40,000 individuals who lived in the capital in 1850
however, housing was not as luxurious.108 One account reports that the majority of
houses in the city were cheap, run down and had inadequate sanitation.109
By the mid 1860's, the economic position of the average artisan had been seriously
eroded by successive free-trade legislation, stagnation in wages and a vastly improved

104Henao and Anubla, History o f Colombia, p. 240
105Fluharty, Dance o f the Millions, p. 27.
106Umitia, Developm ent, p. 19.
107Henao and Arrubla, History o f Colombia, pp. 462-465.
108Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," places the population in 1851 at around
30,000-40,000. The 1843 census showed 40,086 inhabitants, and that of 1851, 29,649. (Sowell, p.
37). Sowell, p. 37 also writes the following: "Bogotá had several stylish houses in which rich
families had lived. Elsewhere, the dwellings were inferior, for there were few which could be leased for
more than fifty pesos annually. Nine-tenths of the city was occupied by those which cost from ten to
twenty-five pesos."
109Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 37.
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transportation infrastructure in response to the needs of the tobacco export economy.
Conditions had deteriorated sufficiently that José María Samper wrote in 1867, "Beggars
fill the streets and plazas....The worker can not find constant employment, nor can the
shop masters count on work; the property owner neither receives rent payments nor new
rents; the shop-keeper does not sell, nor buy, nor pay, nor is paid; one sees the importer's
wares undisturbed in his store and his payments asleep in his wallet; the capitalist does not
receive interest nor the employees salary.1'110
In the 1840's and 50's however, the artisans were a vibrant class in Colombian
society. One of the central questions posed by social historians is what the variables were
that intervened in those short 25 years that led to the precipitous socio-economic decline of
the artisan class. In Chapter Four, we will focus on the artisan response to the economic
policies of the Liberal Party as well as the ideological divisions that separated what became
the mainstream (Gólgota or Radical wing) of the Liberal Party from the more conservative,
artisan-supported Draconiano wing. Such divisions would ultimately force the artisans to
make an attempt forge a path independent of the Radicals by force of arms.
C O N C L U S IO N
During the first 25 years following independence, with the exception of the ravages
wrought by the war, very few economic and social changes came to Colombia. Local and
national government remained an élite affair, though now in the place of Spaniards rose
native-born merchants and wealthy landowners. The rebellion against Spain did not
produce a democratic social revolution, but merely affected a change in control of the top
stratum of the social hierarchy: a transfer of power from the hands of Spanish élites into the
hands of creole élites.
Despite deep common interests in maintaining its privileged position in society, this
new élite was by no means united in its political visions of what constituted the 'ideal'
polity. Two major competing visions emerged after the military victory over the Spanish.
Progresistas inspired by the political and economic influence of Santandér early on sought
to create a society based on British conceptions of laissez-faire economics and a nation
organized along secular, federalist principles. On the other end of the political spectrum
were those who held a more traditionalist outlook; in broad strokes, they upheld Catholic
values, supported movements to create a strong central government, and generally
supported measures to provide tariff protection for domestic industry, though they were not

110Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 29.
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nearly as antagonistic toward free-trade as the Liberals were enthusiastic in its unswerving
support.
Artisans played an early role in this emerging partisan struggle, an important but
clearly subservient role, as the Catholic Church and its conservative allies sought to limit
the spread of liberal political and economic philosophy by creating clubs/societies to combat
their influence and the liberals countered with their own sociedades democráticas. Artisans
pledged allegiance to one side or the other, pawns in a political straggle that few probably
understood.
In this evolving struggle, the surviving historical record indicates that the Liberals
emerged victorious in the battle for the minds and souls of the majority of artisans.
Egalitarian, democratic, and socialist rhetoric of the Generation of '49, initially.helped
convince the artisans that they, despite their differences with the élite strata of the Liberal
Party, shared certain fundamental ideals. Ideology clearly played a role. Also, the fact that
the Conservatives were more élitist in outlook: democratic and socialist rhetoric were not
part of their political repertoire. Conservatives had a more strict hierarchical view of
society than did the Liberals, a view in which certain elements, such as campesinos for
example, were bom to a certain station in life and it was there that they should remain.
That is how nature intended society to be organized.
It is a human attribute to be more attracted to groups which hold similarities in
common with one's social group than with those who profess pronounced feelings of
superiority. Although upper class Liberal youths may have had little in common with
working craftsmen as the above section on the major disparity in social and economic living
conditions, there was more common ground between these two groups than between the
artisans and the élitist Conservatives. It seems logical that artisans would be more inclined
to support those who at least stated they had the artisans interests at heart and were in
solidarity with their desires for liberty and equality.
The question that eventually would surface however, was what kind of equality and
liberty? What did these terms signify for the Liberal élite or the artisan? For the Liberal
intellectuals, equality meant that artisans could participate in the democratic process. In a
real-world context, this equality only apparently applied to the extent that artisans could
participate in the process as long as they recognized their place in society. Also, Liberal
ideology played a key role in providing a philosophical foundation for artisan values such
as an individualistic work ethic while simultaneously inculcating artisan loyalty to Liberal
ideas about subjects such as society, utilitarianism, and allegiance to Liberal governments.
By successfully imparting conceptions of good citizenship founded on the principle of
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obedience to established authority (the state, for the Liberals and the Church for the
Conservatives), both Liberal and Conservative leaders were able to instill a spirit of
conformity among the artisans, effectively channelling organizational energies of artisan
groups into partisan political causes.
When artisans challenged the political hegemony of the élite, Liberal intellectuals
were quick to jettison their rhetoric of socialism and equality. In the case of liberty and
freedom, the concepts also had strikingly different connotations for the two groups.
-liberal intellectuals viewed liberty in the context of free commerce and liberty to own
property. For the artisans too, liberty had a connotation of ownership, to own their own
workshops and tools, but more importantly as the later slogans of the 1849 elections
showed, freedom to earn a decent living and freedom from foreign competition.
When the Liberals assumed power, they were free to put their economic ideas into
practice. Many of their political and social reforms were supported by the artisans.
Artisans supported the abolition of slavery for example. Though many may have been
"strong" Catholics, surviving evidence points to support for curbs on power of the Church.
Most also did not oppose the decentralized, power-diffusing system implied by federalism.
The emancipation of resguardo lands by the Liberals, under which large latifundistas—a
majority of which were likely owned by Conservatives—were the primary beneficiaries,
w'as a policy towards which most artisans probably remained indifferent. The large scale
enclosures resulting from passage of this law may have also hurt the artisan, since land was
taken out of agricultural production and turned into cattle ranching; this resulted in higher
prices for basic foodstuffs.
The one major Liberal reform about which artisans were confident in their
opposition to it was laissez-faire economics: they knew this measure would have a negative
impact on their livelihood. As we will see in the next chapter, the sense of brotherhood, of
a shared belief in democracy and freedom, of liberty and equality, the consciousness of
being a partner in the creation of a new and better political and economic system for the
nation that would benefit all Colombians, the ideals that had led to a virtual alliance between
the élite intellectuals and independent craftsmen, would break down soon after the Liberals
came to power. That process is the subject of Chapter Four.
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CHAPTER 4
U TO PIA N SO C IA L ISM , ID E O L O G Y AND CLASS C O N F L IC T IN T H E
N IN E T E E N T H C EN TU R Y

"Todos éramos en ellas socialistas, sin haber estudiado el socialismo ni comprenderlo,
enamorados de la palabra» de la neovedad política y de todas las generosas extravagancias
de los escritores franceses; y hablábamos como socialistas con un entusiasmo que alarmaba
mucho al general López y a todos los viejos liberales. En uno de mis discursos
pronunciados en la tribuna de la Republicana, invoqué en favor de las ideas socialistas e
igualadoras al mártir del Gólgota y hablé de este lugar como el Sinaí de la nueva ley social
Pusiéronme en la prensa de oposición el sobrenombre de Gólgota, y luego, por ampliación,
nos lo acomodaron a todos los que, también por espíritu de imitación, nos llamabas
radicales. En puridad de verdad, no éramos sino unos candorosos y honrados
demagogos."
José María Samper in his later years1
"'Había mucho de romanticismo en los socialistas utópicos, hijos de una época
incurablemente romántica Esa hella fue visible en los grupos granadinos que se declararonseguidores del socialismo..."
Gerardo Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas en Colombia2
T H E IN FL U E N C E O F U TO PIA N SO C IA L ISM
Utopian socialism imported from Europe exerted an early influence over the minds
of a considerable number of the "Generation of '48". Liberal texts acquainted the party's
intellectuals with the works of Fourier, Saint Simon, and Robert Owen, and, as
contradictory as it may appear to us today, of the British political economists advocating
laissez-faire individualism. It appeal's that a majority were socialists on an ideological plane
while advocates of free trade and non-government interference in the more practical sphere
of daily economic life. The fact that espousing on the one hand a free trade ideology and
socialist-inspired government involvement in the economy on the other pose difficulties that
seem impossible to reconcile is testament to the obvious philosophical eclecticism to which
the Bogotá Liberal élite were apparently predisposed. In any case, the philosophicalpolitical influence that would endure the vicissitudes of the century would be that of laissezfaire economics.

lrThe original appears in Duarte French, Biografía de don Florentino González, pg. 454, quoted in
M olina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 118.
2Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 117
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In general, in terms of economic policies, the Gólgotas sought to create a state bank
to replace private banks and, according to Molina, to stimulate domestic production, which
in turn they believed, would have the effect of reducing unemployment Molina, a socialist
Colombian historian who has written extensively on the development of liberalism and
socialism in Colombia, has described the Gólgotas as romantic Utopians. Molina quotes
another Colombian source, historian Jaime Jaramillo Uribe,3 " que por obra de algunos
utopistas y de hombres de letras como Lamartine, Víctor Hugo y Eugenio Sué, adquirió
mucha prestancia en nuestro medio la idea de un cristianismo era el que alimentaba los
discursos de los jóvenes granadinos que orgullosamente se declaraban socialistas." Nieto
Arteta has also written that the Gólgotas were romantics, citing their belief in justice,
progress, popular conscience and their radical, almost anarchistic vision of liberalism as
proof of their romanticism.4
Utopian socialist ideas also gained currency among certain artisan groups. Socialist
works were sometimes discussed in the sociedades, and artisans could empathize with the
idea that the impersonal market forces of laissez-faire were destroying their livelihood. As
Valencia has suggested, "...la introducción de las ideas socialistas permitirá la creación de
organizaciones mutuales cuyo fin principal era la defensa de los artesanos en contra de la
amenaza real y destructiva del libre cambismo."5 These organizations, initially dominated
by Liberal intellectuals, eventually came under the control of the literate artisan élite as most
of the Gólgotas began to realize the incompatibility between their ideal interests in the
protection of artisan industry and government intervention in economic affairs on one hand
and their material interests in free trade on the other.
Conservatives, as well as many Liberals, reacted strongly against the new ideas,
claiming that socialism was not compatible with Catholic values and that they represented
an attack on individual liberty (especially economic liberty). Many viewed socialism as an
attack on property, morality and the family.
The Conservatives reacted most vociferously. El Día proclaimed that the Liberals
were "reds", an appellation which seems to have stuck-the Liberals are commonly referred

3Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 116. The source is Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, "Tres etapas de la historia
intelectual de Colombia", Revista de la Universidad Nacional, No. 1, octubre-diciembre de 1968, p 89.
4Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 117.
5Enrique Valencia, "El Movimiento Obrero Colombiano" in Historia del Movimiento Obrero en América
Latina Volume 3, Edited by Pablo González Casanova, (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1984), p.
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to as the party of the red and the Conservatives the party of the blue. The official Liberal
flag is red while the Conservative flag is blue and white. El Día also argued that Fourier»
"habia dicho que el socialismo es la semilla y el comunismo la cosecha» la meta del
liberalismo era» en consecuencia» la sociedad comunista y el presidente López su eficaz
instrumento."6 Mariano Ospina and future Conservative president José Eusebio Caro
complained of the influence of a handful of "lunatic" left-wing Frenchmen who by
condemning marriage destroyed the family and property rights.7
Although many prominent Liberals initially supported socialist ideas, there were
also important detractors in the the party. Alarmed by ideas that threatened the maintenance
of private property, especially Proudhon's exclamation that property was theft, Liberals
were quick to launch journalistic sullies against socialism.
Ricardo Vanegas, ail important Liberal journalist for the Neo Granadino wrote in
the December 27, issue, 1850:
El derecho al trabajo puede comprenderse de dos maneras: como el derecho
de tener ocupación de parte de los particulares empresarios; coo el derecho
de tener ocupación de parte del gobierno; Sea como quiera, siempre serán su
consecuencia forzosa: la destrucción de la propiedad; la destrucción de la
libre concurrencia; la aniquilación de todo principio de libertad.
Unas pocas palabras bastarán para demostrarlo. Cuando dais a un oficial de
sastre el perfecto derecho de ser ocupado por el jefe del establecimiento, y
de ser ocupado mediante un salario fijo, ¿qué es lo que hacéis? Hacéis de
modo que ese jefe de sastrería no tenga libertad para admitir o rehusar los
servicios de un obrero, hacéis de modo que una porción del capital del
primero pase a manos del último; y desde que obliguéis al jefe de sastrería a
dar ocupación en su taller al que se la pida, ya darla a un precio
determinado, ¿puede él por ventura decir, soy dueño de mi taller, soy dueño
de mi dinero? La propiedad de ese hombre consiste, señores socialistas, en
tener abierto o cerrado su taller, en tener o no oficales, en pagarles poco o
mucho, en trabajar o no trabajar; y desde que coartéis su libertad en
cualquiera de estos respectos, violáis su libertad, y os asemejáis al bandido
que consiente en conservar la vida a su víctima, a cambio de eso si da su
bolsa...8
If the artisans obtain permanent guarantee to work he further argued, regardless of
the quality and quantity of output, eventually industry would be destroyed: "La posibilidad

6Molina, L as Ideas Socialistas, p. 140.
7Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, pp. 141-142.
8Ricardo Vanegas, Neo Granadino, December 27,1850, No. 135 quoted in Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p.
143.
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en cada obrero de ser o no ocupado, de serlo a buen o mal precio, es el único medio de
obtener la perfección en los productos. Pero destruir esta libertad en la concurrencia de los
obreros, darles derecho a ser siempre empleados, a obtener siempre una remuneración,
trabajen poco o mucho, trabajen bien o mal, y el resultado lógico que obtendréis será la
desaparición de la industria."9
Another opponent to the new ideas was Florentino González, Liberal free-trade
theoretician. In 1848, he had argued for a "learned democracy," in which intelligence and
property direct the destiny of the people, and opposing universal manhood suffrage as a
mistake that could bring about a "barbarian democracy in which equalitarianism and
ignorance drown the seeds of happiness and bring disorder and confusion to society."10
On June 8, 1853, González was assaulted and beaten by a group of men in ruanas, one of
the many conflicts that pitted the upper-class Gólgotas against the artisan-backed
Draconianos which occurred during the violent weeks following the 1853 presidential
elections.11
Despite such opposition, that the utopian socialist ideas were at one time very
influential in Liberal circles is clear: the very name adopted by the radical wing of the party,
the group that held power throughout most of the nearly 30 years of Liberal rale was
Gólgota, in honor of the socialist ideals of the Christian martyr.12
Since the "socialist" leadership of the day was comprised of Liberal Bogotá
merchants, one of the most famous José Marfa Samper, the gulf separating ideological
verbiage and material interests quickly became apparent. Samper, who embodied the
Liberal spirit of the era, and of the young intellectuals, much later spoke of his youthful
socialism and the sociedades democráticas:
Todos éramos en ellas socialistas, sin haber estudiado el socialismo ni
comprenderlo, enamorados de la palabra, de la novedad política y de todas
las generosas extravagancias de los escritores franceses (lo que también
acontecía el doctor M urillo); y hablábamos como socialistas con un
entusiasmo que alarmaba mucho al general López y a todos los viejos
liberales. En uno de mis discursos pronunciados en la tribuna de la
republicana, invoqué al mártir de Gólgota y hablé de este lugar como el

^Vanegas, quoted in Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 143.
10Quoted in Urrutia, Development, p. 40.
^Urrutia, Development, p. 34,
12By the 1860's, this wing o f the party was more commonly referred to simply as the Radicals. It is
important to note that by this time few Radicals clung to "socialist" beliefs.
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Sinaí de la nueva ley social. Pusiéronme en la prensa de oposición el
sobrenombre de Gólgota, y luego por ampliación, nos lo acomodaron a
todos los que, también por espíritu de imitación, nos llamábamos radicales.
En puridad de verdad, no éramos sino unos candorosos y honrados
dem agogos.13
In an article in the Gólgota newspaper Neo-Granadino, Samper articulated his ideas
on what constituted socialism:
Yo quiero que el rico y el pobre, el perezoso y el trabajador, el ignorante y
el sabio, el hombre de bien y el perdulario, no estén sometidos a un nivel
oprobioso e injusto, en sus relaciones individuales. Pero quiero también
que los monopolios no existan para que el pobre pueda trabajar como el
rico; y éste es el socialismo; quiero que el católoico, el unitario y el islamita
tengan igual derecho a profesar su culto, porque todos son hombres y éste
es el socialismo. Quiero que la sociedad ofrezca el bien de la educación al
ignorante como al sabio, porque quiero el progreso humano, y éste es el
socialismo. Quiero que el bueno como el malo, tengan iguales garantías en
los tribunales, para que por unos mismos trámites sea condenado el
segundo como absuelto el primero y esta igualdad es el socialismo...14
In a call for a return to order and stability in Colombia from civil disturbances
which had been caused by partisan political battles between Conservatives and Liberals, the
same author wrote from Paris in 1861:
Dos sistemas de legislación se disputan en el mundo el predominio de las
cuestiones sociales, políticas, religiosas y económicas: el sistema socialista
y el de los economistas absolutos. El primero se funda en el absolutismo
del Estado, pretende reglamentarlo todo, intervenir en todo, y sustituir la
acción del Estado a la del individuo, centralizando toda autoridad. El
segundo, partiendo del principio de dejar hacer, aspira a fundar la
autonomía individual exclusiva, limitando la acción del gobierno a la simple
función de dar seguridad, reprimir la violencia contra todo derecho e
im partir justicia. En Hispano-Colom bia los dos sistemas han tenido
también sus defensores, si bien el socialista es el que ha tenido acepatación
general. La Confederación granadina es la sola república que ha ensayado
el radicalismo de los economistas, aceptando estos dos principios: libertad
plena para el ciudadano, en cuanto no vulnere el derecho ajeno; y abstención
del gobierno nacional de injerirse en lo que corresponde principalmente a la
actividad individual15

13Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 118.
14Quoted in Molina» Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 125.
15Taken from Ensayo sobre las revoluciones políticas, quoted in Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p 146.
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Here perhaps Samper was engaging in polemics rather than attempting to portray
accurately the influence of utopian socialism in the Liberal Party. Samper's claims that the
socialist ideas were those accepted by most Liberals is clearly exaggerated according to the
evidence of the historical record which shows that no legislation that could be construed as
even mildly socialist was adopted during the years of Liberal hegemony. Nevertheless,
such statements do indicate that on an 'ideal' plane, socialist ideas must have enjoyed
considerable currency. As Urrutia writes, "these romantic socialists believed in the fusion
of the classes and that all classes could benefit together. These beliefs were based not on
personal experience and actual communication between classes in Bogotá or Paris, but on
the intellectual theories common at the time in both capitals...the first uneasy coalitions of
intellectuals and artisans that led to the toppling of the conservative regimes in both
countries were inspired by similar intellectual illusions."16 On the material plane of
realpolitik, Samper’s claim is absurd-free-trade and non-intervention by the state can be
said to have literally defined the nineteenth century Liberal era. Later in 1873 in Samper's
Los partidos politicos en Colombia, he describes more accurately the mainstream Liberal
attitude towards socialism,"...la discussion y la lógica probaban que la veleidad o teoría
socialista, nacida únicamente de las exageraciones del sentimiento filantrópico, era
incompatible con el verdadero liberalismo, cuya síntesis consistía en la noción del derecho
individual y de una espontánea y libre iniciativa de todos los ciudadanos".17
Although there were a few prominent voices favoring some form of socialism, most
notably Murillo Toro who argued that the state should promote economic growth and
development as well as ensure the general well-being of its citizenry, such reforms were
soundly rejected in practice by a government and élite that spumed even selective policies
that might protect segments of the large artisan population from economic rain. Murillo
Toro argued for a reformist socialism that would help the poorer strata of society, and
called for the type of state economic intervention that would become so popular with Uribe
Uribe nearly half century later: "La idea socialista es la misma idea republicana; es la paite
económica inseparable de la parte política para formar el todo de la República."18 Unlike
losé María Samper and his equally famous brother, the merchant and economist Miguel
Samper, Murillo Toro rejected the sanctity of la is s e z f a ir e doctrine, arguing that d e ja d h a c e r

16Urrutia, Development, p. 22.
17Quoted in Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 147.
18Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 124.
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was also the premise to "o lo que es lo mismo, dejad oprimir, dejad robar» dejad a los lobos
que devoren los corderos,"19 Murillo Toro believed that the "free hand" of Adam Smith
did not make allowances for the possible growth of monopolies through unchecked
accumulation that would in turn eventually destroy competition. Domestic industry, he
argued, should be stimulated and protected.
It would be the conservative reign of Rafael Nuñez's regeneration government
however, that finally recognized, albeit a case of much too little too late, the importance of
selectively protecting domestic industry. Not until the turn of the century, and more
permanently, until the 1920's, would the Liberals begin to think about nurturing another
strong alliance with elements of the working class. This courtship would be spurred by the
new egalitarian, social welfare elements acquired in their ideology. By that time however,
their appeals would be directed primarily toward a burgeoning proletariat rather than a
stratum of independent artisan producers.
A R T ISA N CLA SS C O N SC IO U SN ESS AND C O N F L IC T
Most of the major liberalizing reforms enacted during the nineteenth century
occurred during the presidencies of Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera (1845-1849) and José
Hilario López (1849-53). Florentino González, Mósquera's Minister of the Hacienda,
although acting under a nominally Conservative government, initiated the era of liberal
reforms designed to stimulate free-trade and bring the Colombian economic system in line
with developments in Europe. Having travelled extensively in Europe, and widely
considered a cosmopolitan, urbane gentleman conversant with the political economic
theories current in England and France, González was impressed by the accumulation of
capital he had witnessed in those two nations, and he believed that Nueva Granada's only
route to economic growth was through free-trade.
To accomplish this, he was convinced that Colombia had to exploit those areas in
which it had a competitive advantage: export agriculture and mining. Thus, he attempted to
establish the free cultivation of tobacco and to abolish the diezmos which had long hindered
trade. Under his direction, the government also lowered import duties while eliminating
other restrictions to trade, and improved mule trails and fluvial transportation routes in
order to encourage the development of export and import businesses.20 Such a free-trade

19Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 172.
20Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 98.

97

policy would ultimately have a disastrous impact 011 both handicrafts and the early
development of manufacturing businesses in the nation. This was of course a policy by
design. González wrote, "La Nueva Granada no cuenta con facilidades para montar
fábricas, ni con productos para alimentarlas, ni con consumidores que prefieresen sus
manufacturas en concurrencia con las extranjeras."21
Although artisans comprised a sizeable proportion of Colombia's population in the
middle of the nineteenth century as we have discussed, little had been done by the
government to provide adequate health care or education to serve this class22 Mosquera
himself noted that:
"Hasta ahora casi nada se ha hecho por la clase pobre e industriosa de la
nación. Los hijos de los obreros y artesanos han sido abandonados en
nuestros planes de estudio, y solamente se ha cuidado de la intrucción
científica, enseñando conjuntamente tantas materias, que la instrucción viene
a ser la ciencia de las nomenclaturas, e resulatando, con raras excepciones,
empícos en lugar de profesores. No se han fundado escuelas especiales, ya
todo esto provee el proyecto que se presenta a las Cámaras, en el que he
fundado mis esperanzas para hacer algo en favor de la generación que se
levanta."23
Mósquera's administration did little to improve this situation however.
The artisans represented a fairly homogeneous group in Colombia, linked together
by their status as independent producers engaged in skilled trades requiring physical labor.
Many were literate, a large number met voter qualifications and regularly exercised this
democratic right. A core of dedicated, articulate artisan leaders emerged that according to
Sowell "through its relationships with élite political partisans dominated artisan
organizations, the artisan press, and the documentation which survives to illustrate the
artisans' place in the century."24 Artisans mobilized for many reasons including to provide
a social outlet for artisan groups, to serve a welfare function by providing assistance to
members, to pursue specific electoral objectives, and above all, to oppose the free-trade
policies that they believed were destroying domestic artisan manufactures. Liberal-inspired

21 Quoted in Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 98.
22Both medical care and education had in Hispanic societies traditionally remained the domain of the
Catholic Church.
23Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 102
24Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 6.
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sociedades democráticas and the Conservative sociedades populares had already been
created by party élites. These organizations would later serve as artisan vehicles to pursue
such goals.
One of the first important artisan mobilizations in defence of their economic
interests occurred in reaction to proposed legislation that would reduce tariff rates. More
than 200 individuals signed a petition to protest price reductions on items that would
compete with artisan goods: "Would it be credible" they asked, "that the same government
that we defended would now propose to ruin the useful and laboring class of society,
rewarding us for our patriotism..?''25 Congress nevertheless passed the measure in
1847.26
After this point, the Sociedades, though their by-laws generally prohibited it,
became more overtly engaged in political activities. La Sociedad de Artesanos de Bogotá,
was founded to accomplish the following purposes; to help its members find work, to
inculcate respect for the government, and to provide training and education for its members
in matters ranging from reading, writing, democratic theory, military skills and justice to
religious instruction.27 One contemporary observer wrote in late 1849 that the objectives
of the Sociedad were to, "foment industrial knowledge in the working classes of the
pueblo, now in order to improve their instruction in areas concerning their political and
social rights, and in the end to construct a liberal and patriotic coalition, that will guarantee
and sustain our inalienable rights, so many times choked under ignominious despotism."28
THE LIBERAL PARTY FRACTURES: GÓLGOTAS AND DRACONIANOS
The Utopian socialists regularly attended the meetings of the Sociedades, delivering
lectures on political subjects, social theory, and the 1848 French Revolution.29 Despite
prominent geographical obstacles, the Sociedades spread quickly to Cali, Sogamoso,

25Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 78-79.
26Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 78.
27Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 98.
28Agustín Rodríguez, in a letter dated Oct 1849, to the director of the Sociedad, quoted in Sowell, p. 98.
29These were the so-called Generation o f '49. Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p.
96.
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Facatativá, and other cities. Membership grew to around 10,000 nationally with some
1,500 members in Bogotá alone.30
Organized artisans played an important, perhaps decisive role in the election of the
first Liberal president of the republic, General José Hilario López, in 1849. Since no
candidate had received a majority, elections were thrown into Congress. Artisans from the
Sociedades threw a banicade around the building where the vote was being taken and
noisily filed into the galleries. After two undecisive ballots, and an episode that had led to
the galleries being cleared of the artisans,31 the third ballot went to López. Conservative
Mariano Ospina wrote the now celebrated lines on his ballot, "I vote for General José
Hilario López in order that the deputies may not be assassinated."32
López enjoyed the support of both the artisans and the Radicals, but the actions and
support of the artisans probably made the difference in the election. Led by an ancestor of
López Pumarejo, the famous twentieth-century Liberal reformer, the tailor Ambrosio
López, with his colleagues the ironsmith Emetrio Heredia and the shoemaker Francisco
Vasquez Vergara, the artisans believed that as the productive class in society, they had an
obligation and a right to participate in the political life of the nation.33
Commenting on the precarious alliance between the Liberal intellectuals and the
artisans, Molina writes, "Los estudiantes liberales, con una preparación intelectual más rica
y con el ansia irreprimible de contribuir al cambio social, vieron que su trinchera lógica
estaba al lado de las Sociedades Democráticas. Pero habida cuenta de que aquéllos
procedían de un estrato más refinado, rechazaban ciertas prácticas de los artesanos y
obreros. Por eso se unieron en la Escuela Republicana, de mucha figuración política en ese
entonces. Una vez lanzados a la acción, los jóvenes rebeldes comprendieron que las
diferencias entre las dos organizaciones no eran de fondo, por lo cual la Escuela
Republicana pasó a ser el brazo intelectual de las Sociedades Democráticas." He adds that
they were joined together in their mutual interest of eliminating the colonial structure of the
nation's economy to create new types of work.34

30Sowell provides these estimates, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 82.
31Since the artisans remained outside the building however, they probably still had a somewhat
intimidating effect on the deputies.
32 Arrubla and Henao, H istoiy o f Colombia, p. 455.
33Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 113.
34Molina, L as Ideas Socialistas, pp. 113-114.
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Although these common objectives, along with the democratic and equalitarian
rhetoric of the Gólgotas, were enough to bring together Radicals and artisans in a
temporary alliance, they were not enough to cement the two disparate groups together
permanently. Increasingly, the laissez-faire individualism of the Radicals drove a wedge
between artisans and the more conservative elements of the Liberal Party.
In 1850, moderate Liberals* who were to become known as the Draconianos, urged
Congress to pass legislation protecting artisan industries. One detractor, Juan
Nepomuceno Neira strongly deprecated such legislation, claiming "the project is not only
anti-economic, it is essentially socialistic or communistic...they want to tax the luxuries of
the rich for the benefit of the working class!"35 Lorenzo Marfa Lleras retorted in Congress,
"If we do not deal with the interests of the laboring class we call artisans, then we do not
legislate for the great majority of Colombians."36 The proposed bill died during the final
stages of legislation.37
After this event, divisions between the two factions gradually deepened. Radical
leaders appeared less frequently at the meetings of the Sociedades. Increasingly, the
Escuela Republicana on the other hand, became the domain of the Liberal Bogotá
bourgeoisie, the Radical Gólgotas, assuming the atmosphere of a political club.
The president of the most important Sociedad, La Sociedad de Artesanos de
Bogotá, Emetrio Heredia sought to insert the issue of protectionism into the Liberal agenda.
Although by law the Sociedades were supposed to be apolitical organizations,38 Heredia
acknowledged in 1849 that "we founded the sociedades to attempt to have spokesmen who
would ask for an increase in tariff protection on manufactured goods that could be
produced in the country."39 Ambrosio López, in response to resistance to protectionist
measures, published a social history in 1851 in which he claimed that under Liberal

35Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p, 112.
36Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p, 113.
37Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. '113.
38The sociedade's charters generally stated that members should refrain from partisan political activities,
though such statements contradicted pledges to support the party in power (Liberals) that were stated in
the same documents.
39Urrutia, Development, p. 9.

101

President López, the Colombian polity had been reduced to an "oligarchy with the name of
democracy."40
It is clear from such comments, and the events that were to unfold in 1854, that the
artisan leadership had become conscious of its interest as a class distinct from other strata in
society, and that this artisan élite had become committed to mobilizing artisan opposition to
the government's free-trade policies. It also was aware that the interests of the artisan were
subservient to those of the affluent and influential Liberal leadership. The majority of
artisans had hitched their fortunes to the Liberal party: within a few years however, it had
become apparent that the interests of the artisans were incompatible with those of the liberal
bourgeoisie.
Liberal reforms, which had seemed progressive, were actually undermining the
artisan class. Moreover, as we have mentioned, the abolition of slavery and the destruction
of the resguardos, swelled the available pool of urban labor and may have had the effect of
causing a serious decline of wages that was detrimental to the artisans. Additionally, the
liberalization of the economy, especially legislation easing import duties and restrictions,
posed a particularly formidable threat to artisans in the form of increased foreign
competition.
THE ARTISAN REPUBLIC OF 1854
By the time of the 1853 presidential elections, the artisan break with the Radicals
was irreversible. Simultaneously, the conflict of interest between the artisans and the
objectives of the mainstream (radical) Liberal Party were brought into the open. The
sociedades democráticas supported General José María Obando, the Draconiano candidate
while the Gólgotas and the bulk of the Bogotá bourgeoisie gave their support to the
candidate from Panama, Tomás Herrera. Obando, of humble origins, was very popular
with the artisans and often attended the meetings of the Sociedades.41 Urrutia writes of
O bando," a guerrilla leader, persecuted, illegitimate and poor, Obando embodied all of the
characteristics of the Colombian mestizo."42
Although the pro-artisan candidate General José María Obando defeated the Radical
Tomás Herrera, a predominantly Radical Congress continued to agitate for reforms that

40Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 119.
41Urrutia, Development, p. 9.
42Urrutia, Development, p. 32.
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would be detrimental to the artisans. When in 1853 the Conservatives won a majority in
the lower house, an anti-Obando coalition of élites formed between the Conservatives and
Radicals.43
In May of 1853, the artisans renewed their campaign for protection by submitting a
petition to Congress. The effort received bi-partisan support from Bogotá's craft sectors,
drawing artisan participation even from the Conservative-dominated Sociedad Popular de
Instrucción Mutua i Fraternidad Cristiana.44 On May 19, a confrontation between Radical
Congressmen and their supporters and the artisans erupted. Two Conservative historians
later described the violent episode that took place: "A serious fray got started, in which the
two factions were distinguished by their clothes; one group wore ruanas [woolen
Colombian ponchos] and the other casacas [coats], in other words, guaches and cachacos.
The fight ended with the appearance of President Obando and the Guard, leaving behind
one unfortunate artisan dead from knife wounds."45
Another confrontation between artisans and cachacos also ended in violence on
June 8, with one soldier killed46 and several artisans wounded by gunfire from the upperclass youths.47 The next day, a pamphlet authored by "un amigo de los artesanos” entitled
El valor de los artesanos, appeared in the streets of Bogotá. Un amigo wrote, "in this land
democracy is an illusion, we are republicans in theory and slaves in practice....We are
called the sovereign people, but the day that we speak, a rain of stones falls upon our
august sovereignty; what can we do to install a positive Democracy? Make our own valiant
efforts, and not flee at the sight of the oligarches."48
Earlier, the Radicals had also attempted to vote the army out of existence, which
contributed to the distrust between President Obando, an ex-army general, and Congress.
When Congress passed legislation to allow the free trafficking of arms, probably to supply
allies of Congress in defense of that body, and then overrode Obando's veto, the Bogotá
artisans decided to a ct Elsewhere in the Republic, members of various sociedades

43Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 142.
44Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 139.
45Urrutia, Development, p. 33.
46The national guard was primarily made up o f artisans.
47Urrutia, Development, p. 34.
48 Un

amigo de los artesanos, "El valor de los artesanos" (Bogotá, June 9 , 1853) quoted in Sowell, p 139.
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democráticas also acted, raiding the Cali armory for example, and walking out with a cache
of aims: similar incidents occurred in Chocontá, Santa Marta, Tunja, Zipaquirá, and other
towns with active sociedades.49
The confrontation between the artisans and the Radicals rapidly escalated into armed
insurrection a few weeks later. On April 17, 1854 a coup was launched by 600 artisans of
the Sociedad Democrática and the small army garrison of Bogotá directed against the
Liberal Congress.50 The city was quickly seized as simultaneous uprisings occurred in
Cali and Popayán. Because of the small number of rebels and the overwhelming numerical
superiority of the entrenched élites and their rural allies, which included many tenant
farmers and peasants, the rebellion was doomed from the beginning.
Colombian sociologist Fals Borda has called the eight-month Artisan R epublic,"
the only successfully completed revolution in the history of Colombia."51 Indeed, the
event was led by the 'working class' of the the day, though in general, the artisans could
hardly be portrayed as a progressive force in Colombian society. Artisans sought to
minimize the effects of Colombia’s insertion into the world economic system by limiting
imports and protecting artisan production, in certain respects, to "turn back the clock" to the
days before laissez-faire individualism eroded their standard of living. The protection
afforded the artisans while Nueva Granada was under Spanish rule, never was matched by
Colombian governments after independence had been achieved.
After President Obando had refused to serve as the chief of executive of the newly
proclaimed republic, General José Marfa Melo, head of the Bogotá garrison accepted the
job of dictator. Thus one of those extremely rare incidences in Colombian history of
dictatorship by a military man came to pass. However, Miguel Leon, locksmith and pastpresident of the Bogotá sociedad, has been regarded as the power behind the throne. The
actual organizer of the rebellion, Leon worked closely with Melo to chart the course for the
artisan republic. Pablo Posada, another key figure in the coup d'etat, founded the artisan
paper, 17 de Abril, to serve as the mouthpiece of the new administration. He writes in
Number Three "Nosotros somos libres, nosotros somos demócratas, nosotros no
habríamos abandonado nuestros talleres, nuestro hogar, nuestras familias, por entregar

49Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 143.
50Urrutia, D evelopm ent,

p. 45.

5Arlando Fals Borda, Subversion and Social Change in Colombia (New York, London: Columbia
University Press, 1969), pp. 85-86.
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nuestra soberanía a un solo hombre; no cambiaremos a ningún precio, nuestro título de
ciudadanos por el de súbditos."52
Elite sectors were quick to react. Although the Radicals and Conservatives had
fundamental disagreements on the political level, their common interests in maintaining
their class dominance over Colombian society brought them together in a powerful
impromptu alliance to face the common enemy, or in the apt words of Henao and Arrubla,
"to save the Republic from the audacious military dictatorship erected by an uncouth
soldier."53 In the ensuing months, a government campaign of total repression virtually
eliminated the artisan challenge to the established order. Many rebels were killed, including
Daniel Leon, and many of those who survived were sent into internal exile in Panama,
where a majority succumbed to dysentery and yellow fever.54
Along with this crashing defeat, according to Funk-Harries, the entire artisanal
system of production suffered a blow from which it would never recover.55 Although
President Mosquera in 1866 and Rafael Núñez in 1880 courted artisan support by
promising tariff reform, the continued influx of cheap European manufactures coupled with
the aforementioned developments, undermined the position of the artisans in Colombian
society. Urrutia also intimates that this historical episode virtually destroyed artisan
production. After writing about the military defeat of the artisans he states, "Thus the first
attempt at working class organization in the history of Colombia ended in
tragedy....Although the artisan system of production was doomed to disappear, from the
point of view of economic development it was unfortunate that it should have been so
rapidly destroyed."56
A R TISA N PR O D U C T IO N IN T H E SECO N D H A L F O F T H E
N IN E T E E N T H C EN TU R Y
Actually, Urrutia seems to have been a bit premature in sounding the death knoll of
artisan production. As we have mentioned earlier, in 1870 nearly one quarter of the

52Ricardo Sanchez, Historia Política de la Clase. Obrera en Colombia (Bogotá: Editorial la Rosa Roja,
1982), p. 21.
53Henao and Arrubla, History o f Colombia, p. 470.
54Urrutia, Development, p. 43.
55Funk Harries, "Camilo Torres," p. 203. Urrutia, Development, shares this view, pp. 41-43.
56Urrutia, Development, p. 43.
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population was engaged in some form of artisan production. David Sowell notes that
artisans remained active in politics even after the 1854 debacle, exerting some influence in
local, regional and national politics. These are indications that artisans were still an
important force in Colombian society.
What is clear however, is the fact that the artisans' strategy of allying themselves to
the Liberals had not succeeded in bringing them tariff relief; nor had their rebellion against
Congress, which ultimately sought to re-create a democratic society in the image of the
artisan, succeeded in giving them a vital voice in national affairs. Also demonstrated by
this mid-century event was the incredible ability of the landed élite and commercial
bourgeoisie to collaborate effectively, placing their partisan disagreements aside, when
faced by a challenge from below. However, perhaps the most striking outcome of the
conflict was the uncanny resilience of the artisans to survive such an élite offensive,
regroup and continue to battle for their economic survival through other courses of action
until they became permanently fragmented in the 1880's and beyond with the appearance of
a salaried proletariat.
In the 1850's and 1860's however, the artisans appear to have remained a vibrant
force in society. Several publications appeared, including El Artesano, which began
publication two short years years after the failure of the artisan coup. It again set about the
business of attacking Mósquera's second administration.57 El Obrero began publication in
1864 and La Alianza, the official organ of La Sociedad de Unión de Artesanos in 1866,
indicating that the artisans had not yet disappeared from Colombia.58 In fact, during the
Civil War of 1862, the artisan-comprised national guard repelled two attacks by
Conservative armies on Bogotá, while the Liberal army was launching an offensive in
Antioquia, the heart of Colombian conservatism.59 Although the events of 1854 had
eliminated the artisan challenge to the entrenched élite's control of the reigns of
government, it had not ended their productive role in society. Moreover, artisan production
remained the dominant non-agricultural productive force in Colombia through the 1920's.
The artisans briefly attempted to chart a course independent of the dominant élites in
the late 1860's, Still maintaining their self-portrait as the productive force in society,
artisan organizations sought to create an artisan consciousness that could help bind

57Sowell, Development, p. 203.
58Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 205.
59Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 203.
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disparate trades together in order to affect changes in governmental policy advantageous to
their class. Through his study of the Bogotá artisans, David Sowell has added much to our
understanding of the Bogotá artisans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a
subject heretofore neglected by both labor and social historians. In his review of the
volumes of La. Alianza»the publication of the Sociedad de Artesanos, Sowell explores the
political ideology and self-perceptions of the artisans. Here, I will quote extensively from
his review:
Artisans viewed the ideal republic as a collective social organism—a nationcomposed of various elements, each of which contributed to its symbiotic
operation. Citizens of the nation, because they were created by God, were
equal at birth; no distinctions of nobility or inferiority divided the society.
A fter birth, stratification emerged based upon one's positive social
contributions, or one's negative m anipulative abilities.
Positive
contributions consisted of virtuous behavior or work, while negative factors
of stratification included inherited privilege* force of arms, or political
gamonalismo.
Just as God's creation had endowed humanity with equality, so too did it
dictate a moral basis for social well-being....The family was held in high
esteem as the primary vehicle for diffusion of these principles...W ithout
education, good citizenship was difficult because ignorance allowed for
anti-republican manipulation....A nation, as conceived by the artisans, was
composed of numerous different social elements, foremost being producers
and consumers. Craftsmen stressed the positive social importance of work
and production, suggesting that people who consumed without producing
were violating the will of God...Workers produced by their labor and skills,
while their social opposites consumed and caused capital to circulate.
Camacho [the article's author] equated these two functions with the poor
and rich, noting that the poor had the social obligation to work and produce,
while the rich must consume and stimulate the arts. In a nation in which
property's proper social function was fulfilled, neither the rich nor the poor
abused their role, and a balance existed betw een producers and
consumers.60
Artisan leaders believed that the state had an obligation to keep the peace, rale in the
interests of the people, and support the nation's industry. In return, the artisans were
pledged to render allegiance to the government. In one article, the author argued that

60Sowell drew this information from the Artisan paper La Alianza, in the following issues: Oct 10, Oct.
20, Dec 1, 1866, Jan. 10, 20, Feb. 13, M ar 4, Apr. 3, April 13, May 14 , August 10, Sept 5, 1867,
Jan. 4, Jan 25, Feb. 8, 15, 22, 25, 29, Mar. 4, 14, Apr, 4, Apr. 11,1868. See Sowell, "The Early
Latin American Labor Movement," pp. 206-213.
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artisans must avoid engaging in partisan politics since their historical experience was one of
manipulation by the established parties.61
The artisans had finally come to the realization that they had been ill-served by the
existing parties in Colombia, and believed that by virtue of their productive role as creators
of society's wealth, that they should be accorded a worthy role in society. Possessing a
strong work ethic, as much a result of their independent status as craftsmen as from any
well-articulated philosophical position, the artisans resented the class that they perceived to
be idle; they were aware of the fact that this class was the same one that was undermining
their economic existence by supporting free-trade at the expense of artisan industry.
Artisans believed that the best strategy for them to follow would be to maximize their
opportunities to serve as an effective pressure group, regardless of the party in power, as
well as support individual artisans by providing education so that they would be able to
participate actively in the affairs of the nation, were committed to support of the most
elemental social unit, the family, and by urging artisan cohesiveness or solidarity.
RAFAEL NUÑEZ AND THE ARTISANS
In the last quarter of the century, artisans were less capable of mounting an
organized united front to bring artisan interests to the fore of societal concerns, as they had
attempted to do in the 1850's and 60's.62 This was true despite,

01*perhaps

partially as a

result of modest support artisans received from Rafael Nuñez's Regeneration government
The Liberal and Conservative Parties all but ceased to woo actively artisan support, and it is
generally agreed that artisan industry went into serious decline after 1870. Sowell
attributes this to fragmentation of the artisan class itself as wage labor began to displace the
independent craftsman as the most common form of labor.
Artisans now had an interest in mounting anti free-trade campaigns against Liberal
government policies since they sought to distance themselves from partisan politics. Their
experience in the innumerable armed conflicts of the 1850-1880 period, particularly with
the civil war of 1859-62 must have frustrated artisan hopes of receiving the reward of tariff
protection in return for the fealty they demonstrated to the Liberal government. Suggests
Sowell, these experiences helped to "reinforce a feeling of political exploitation among

6C ow ell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," pp. 206-213.
62Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," pp. 360-361.
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craftsmen, as once again they were used as canon fodder, only to be forgotten when the
battles ended."63
Craftsmen did lend their electoral support to Rafael Nuñez’s socially conservative
government. Although Núñez had long been an important figure in the Liberal Party and
was elected as a Liberal president, under his administration several extremely conservative
reforms were enacted. Such reforms not only included moderate protection for the
artisans, but also led to the reestablishment of a strong centralist government and the return
of the Catholic Church to its privileged position in society. The reforms of the
Regeneration are enshrined in the Constitution of 1886, which with minor modifications is
still in force today.64 As the Regeneration government's policies became more
conservative, Nunez's new Independent Party faced a backlash from the Radicals as
Conservative ranks supporting Regeneration policies swelled. The backlash culminated in
the Civil War of 1885, in which Radicals rose against the Nuñista-Conservative alliance.
With their victory over the Radicals, Conservatives came to control the government and
would not relinquish power for nearly 50 years.
Núñez had become convinced that neither the laissez-faire policies of the Radicals
nor the extreme federalism put into place during the years of Radical hegemony, had served
the interests of the nation. He spoke in his first term's inaugural speech of the
contemporary state of the economy:
Our agriculture is barely in its infancy. Our crafts remain stationary. Our
vast territorial expanse counts only a few kilometers of railroads. Statistical
tables reveal the disheartening fact that for several years we have not
exported enough to pay for what we import. This economic ambivalence, if
it continues, will even give rise to the alarming conjecture that the
Colombian people consume more than they produce. And in any case, it is
evident that the labor of the nation is in decay. The formidable calamity of
public poverty is thus approaching the threshold."65
Surprisingly, the protective tariffs proposed by Núñez during his first
administration were opposed by many Conservatives who feared that they would would

63Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 359.
64The 104 year-old conservative constitution has been amended. In 1990, Colombia's four largest political
parties held a referendum on December 9 to determine whether or not they approve of the constituent
assembly and the agenda for its meeting. The agenda was finally approved and a new constitution was
drawn up in 1991.
65Park, Rafael Núñez, p. 196.
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cause prices to rise as well as contribute to a possible revitalized threat from the lower strata
of society; they were opposed by Liberals on the grounds that such a move would
constitute a betrayal of the sacrosanct policy of laissez-faire.66
Nimez's support of the artisans was probably a recognition of his belief in the
artisans' importance to Colombian society. He wrote, "Is it suitable or not that a union of
artisans exists to serve as a mediating force between the social element which directs and
governs and the illiterate mass which forms the base of the pyramid?"67 It is clear also that
Núñez wished to spur domestic production to reduce reliance on foreign imports for items
that could readily be produced in Colombia. Economic historian Salomon Kalmanovitz
offers a slightly different interpretation in the following passage:
Más adelante, muchos artesanos se identificaron con el gobierno
impregnado de conservadurismo de la Regeneración que ofreció alguna
protección a las manufacturas del país, más con el ánimo de controlar la
balanza de pagos de otorgar garantías efectivas a la artesanía, para no hablar
de la industria fabril, pues el proyecto de los Regeneradores consistió más
bien en desarrollar la gran hacienda cafetera.68
In addition to tariffs that protected tailors, shoemakers, and furniture makers, a
national bank was founded in 1881, government monopolies were created for cigarette,
cigar and match production, and Núñez supported the creation of the School of Arts and
Trades, where imported vocational teachers were to instruct craftsmen using state of the art
production techniques and methods.69 The school did not open until 1891.70
Artisan relations with the Regeneration government deteriorated after dozens of
workers were killed and hundreds arrested during an 1893 protest in reaction to an article
written by a priest that claimed that the artisans drank too much. In actuality, this
spontaneous outburst was probably as much a result of pent-up frustration from the

66Park, Rafael Núñez, p. 199.
67Park, Rafael Núñez, p. 200.
68Kalmanovitz, Economía, p. 133.
69Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," pp. 33-34.
70Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," pp. 33-34.
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intolerably high food prices and rents over the period 1889-92 as to the specific incident
which provoked it.71
Even the Regeneration reforms were only selectively protectionist, and in the face
of precipitously rising food and rent prices and concomitant stagnation in wage levels,
probably did little to ameliorate the artisans' plight. As Park writes, "because of the
government's fiscal dependence on import duties, the 1880 tariff law sought to restore
balance between imports and exports rather than a move away from free trade."72
Moreover, given the government response in the 1893 riot, it would not be an exaggeration
to say that once again artisan appeal to partisan politics was only moderately successful,
probably only to the extent that the interests of the government in power overlapped in one
way or another with the interests of the artisans rather than the result of effective sustained
artisan pressure on the élite-dominated political structure.
Aside from Sowell's work, which looks at organized artisan groups, little research
has been done on the plight of those artisans displaced by the rapid economic changes of
the second half of the nineteenth century. Historian Helen Delpar writes, "It is generally
believed that the low tariff policy introduced in 1846 had a deleterious effect on Colombian
handicrafts, but we do not know what happened to the individuals displaced by foreign
competition or whether the fate of artisans throughout the country were identical."73
Catherine Le Grand has noted that many artisans were drawn toward the western frontier
during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth.74
Lured by the promise of free land, artisans as well as peasants from Cundinamarca, Tolima
and southern Santandér, displayed a remarkable readiness to migrate. Others were attracted
to the relatively high wages in the coffee industry of to the rapidly expanding banana
industry along the Caribbean coast.
After 1870, there was a movement in Antioquia towards growing coffee as gold
exports began to decline. This move was accompanied by the creation of a nucleus of
artisans who, using imported equipment, manufactured items to be used in the domestic

7C ow ell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," pp. 271.
72Park, Rafael Núñez, p. 189.
73Helen Delpar, Red Against Blue: The Liberal Party in Colombian Politics, (Alabama: The University of
Alabama Press, 1981), p.29.
74Catherine LeGrand, "Labor Acquisition and Social Conflict on The Colombian Frontier," Latin American
Studies, (Vol. 16, 1985), p. 29.
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coffee and mining industries. Along with mining and coffee equipment, two ironworks
and two factories engaged in smelting silver, and a bank were also created with foreign
capital.75 In 1864, a School of Arts and Crafts was created that by 1880 produced 20-30
qualified artisans to man the aforementioned industries.76 At this time, Antioquia counted
as much as 20 percent of its population among the ranks of urban dwellers compared to
around six percent nationally.77
In other parts of the republic, artisan reaction to the economic changes undermining
their role in society took more violent forms than in Antioquia. In Santandér for example,
violent response to an incident involving the Sociedad Democrática, La Culebra Pico de
Oro, in Bucaramanga led to the death of two German businessmen and a Conservative
landowner. This incident writes Kalmanovitz, showed how much the artisans resented the
foreign merchants. Also, he adds, it showed a "profundo odio del pueblo trabajador el
notable bumangués y en particular contra los comerciantes más grandes y prósperos que se
habían enriquecido con el tráfico de tabaco y el añil; de otra parte, un odio nacional contra
los comerciantes alemanes como malignos por Pedro J. Callejas, uno de los dirigentes de la
asonada."78 Though relatively rare after the great uprising of 1854, spontaneous acts of
violent protest by artisans occurred sporadically throughout the closing decades of the
nineteenth century.
THE MUTUALIST SOCIETIES
The mutualist societies, which were established in the last two decades before the
turn of the century, came to dominate the Colombian labor scene until the end of World
War I.79 Mutualist societies were created to benefit workers through mutual cooperation.
These rudimentary workers' organizations were extremely passive and generally apolitical.
They provided a social focal point for artisans to gather, often provided modest
unemployment benefits for their members and helped to provide health care as well as
spiritual care for the souls of their artisan membership. The example of the fate of the
artisan societies and the artisans' painful experience with partisan politics were still fresh in

75Kalmanovitz, Economía, p. 204.
76Kalmanovitz, Economía, p. 204
77Kalmanovitz, Economía, p. 204.
78Kalmanovitz, Economía, p. 205.
79M oises Troncoso and Ben Bumett, The Rise o f the Latin American Labor Movement (New York:
Bookman Associates United Printing Services, 1960), p.82.
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the minds of potential labor organizers. Moreover, the economic climate was not
conducive to the development of a new challenge by workers until the second decade of the
twentieth century.
Hobart Spalding has said that although the Mutual Aid Societies did not continue to
flourish after the first decades of the twentieth century, "nevertheless they provided many
workers with important organizational experience and sowed intellectual seeds that later
bore fruit under the impact of more militant working class ideologies.”80 An organization
capable of representing the workers' interests as well as of confronting the government and
intransigent employers had to await the emergence of the anarcho-syndicalist and socialist
labor organizations in the second decade of the twentieth century.
The process of proletarianization of the Colombian worker was a gradual and
painful one. While artisans were progressively impoverished by their inability to compete
with the flood of cheap foreign manufactures in the second half of the nineteenth century,
few industries organized on the basis of wage labor were established to absorb the surplus
of labor in urban areas. Goods that had formerly been produced by Colombia's crafts
industries were simply replaced by imported items. The Radicals' political liberal free-trade
ideology had been so pervasive that it did not occur to Liberals that the nation might not be
able to survive on export agriculture receipts and customs duties alone.
Before Núñez, few seemed to be concerned with the deleterious affects on social
and economic development brought about from an over-reliance
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laissez-faire-

diminished income for the middling classes, higher food prices as a result of the move
away from the production of domestic agricultural staples to export crops, and the
inevitable, rapid pauperization of a sizeable, often literate, segment of the nation's
population. One obvious reason for the Liberal government's virtual indifference to
industrial development in Colombia was its single-minded focus
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export-import,

stressing the preeminence of export agricultural commodities. Kalmanovitz offers an
additional reason for the conspicuous absence of any substantial industrial development
during the nineteenth century in his economic study of Colombia:
La productividad del trabajo en la artensanía es entonces tan baja como en la
agricultra y no deja en manos del productor una acumulación de capital en
cuantía apreciable. Aun la qe amase el comerciante no será muy grande, a
menos que éste consiga intermediar el trabajo de numerosos artesanos. En
muy pocos casos reales, de aquel comerciante habrá de surgir el industrial

80Hobart Spalding Jr., Organized Labor in Latin America: Historical Case Studies o f Urban Worker in
Dependent Societies, (New York, 1977), p.15.
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que contrata el trabajo con dada unidad doméstica separada para más
adelante ensamblar el producto en la fábrica...es bastante hipotético afirmar
que tal sistema se encaminaba hacia el capitalismo y que la política
librecambista del medio siglo le cerró la vía. Esto sería suponer que la única
condición para que surja un sistema capitalista industrial es la existencia de
la protección arancelaria. Pero, además de la protección, el capitalismo
surge de profundas transformaciones de las fuerzas productivas y del
desarrollo de las clases burguesas (proletarios y capitalistas), precedido
quizá por la liberación de los campesinos atados a la tierra, que se
transforman en propietarious de aparceros libres.81
Bergquist argues on the other hand, along dependentista lines, that Colombia was
already part of the world capitalist economic system by the end of the nineteenth century,
having assumed the role of provider of raw materials and agricultural goods to rapidly
industrializing Europe and the United States. In his view, Colombia was defacto part of
the world economic system by virtue of its reliance on tobacco and later, coffee exports. In
any case, it seems clear that by the end of the century, the nation was poised to embark
upon a path of economic development that relied primarily on the production of export
crops to the more economically advanced nations of the North Atlantic.
The first three decades of the twentieth century in Colombia would witness the
development of a wage-earning proletariat and the accumulation of domestic and foreign
capital in the nation. Coffee's stellar rise in the closing decades of the nineteenth century
would presage the expansion of viable public works programs geared toward improving
Colombia's export infrastructure and help to finance productive investments in industrial
and other export agriculture sectors.
The first decades of the new century would also see organized labor renew its
attempts to chart a course independent of the nation's two dominant political parties. This
course was envisioned by labor as one which would allow workers to contribute to the
creation of a new democratic and equalitarian Colombia in which labor would be
recognized for its essential role as the productive force in society. Before proceeding to a
discussion of this renewed struggle of the labor movement to assert its autonomy,
however, Chapter Five will trace the development of labor in the countryside that made the
nation's industrial expansion possible.

81 Kalmanovitz, Economía, p. 123. See also Dix, The Politics o f Colombia, p. 21 for a view that
supports Kalmanovitz' argument.

114

C O N C L U S IO N
From the earliest attempts at labor organization, one can detect a pattern of élite
support for craft organizations in attempts to enlist workingmen into the partisan political
struggles between competing dominant élite interests. Those interests were politically
embodied in the Conservative and Liberal Parties. Two ancillary objectives of the
Colombian élite were to attempt to inculcate loyalty and conformity, as well as to control
the artisan class. The following typical passage from a contemporary newspaper article
directed at an artisan audience relates a lecture in one of the early sociedades in 1838:
Ezequiel Rojas lectured on the science of morality, an address based directly
upon the utilitarian principle that happiness motivates human behavior.
Correct conduct, he explained, was based upon the need to provide for the
good of the family, or of those close to the individual. If one did not work
or were lazy, the ensuing hunger and vagrancy would plague both family
and society. Work, on the other hand, gave the individual the means to
pursue desires, provide for a family, and improve the general society. The
goodness that ensued was the essence of morality. Prayer, Rojas reasoned,
was the manner by which one thought about morality, by pondering the
course of action which would produce the most good and general
happiness.82
Paternalistic and condescending are words that succinctly describe mainstream élite
attitudes towards the artisans. Workers were clearly viewed as belonging to a social plane
distinct from that to which the Colombian élite belonged, perhaps not on the bottom, which
was occupied by freed negro slaves and peasants, but certainly well below the apex where
dwelled the tiny number of aristocratic landholders and the influential commercial
bourgeoisie of the larger urban areas, particularly Bogotá. This was an élite that on
occasion felt a powerful sense of paternalistic social responsibility towards those less
fortunate below, but an élite which also viewed as the natural state of society the fact that
the fruits of the nation flowed top downward. Under the Liberal hegemony of the
nineteenth century, even the celebrated paternalistic concern said to be characteristic of the
dominant classes in Hispanic societies was conspicuously absent: laissez-faire
Individualism ruled the thought and actions of Liberal statesmen.
Even though artisans found some relief in the policies of the Regeneration, artisans
were still viewed as the "mediating force," in the words of Rafael Núñez, between the élite
and the "baser" elements of society. Moreover, a later Regeneration administration, by that

82£7 Labrador i Artesano, Nov 11, 1838 quoted in Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement,"
p. 63.
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time thoroughly dominated by Conservatives, did not hesitate to use deadly government
force to repress a riot in 1893 said to have been initiated by artisans. Conservatives held
ambiguous views towards the artisans, recruiting support from them when politically
expedient to do so, but maintaining a wary vigilance over their actions. By the 1880's the
Conservative press, including El Deber and El Conservador, and most of the party’s
leadership strongly opposed the imposition of tariffs that would threaten Colombia's freetrade stance.83 The Conservatives' wary attitude towards the artisan is illustrated by
Conservative Carlos Martinez Silva's exhortation in opposition to the protective tariff in
1880, "Why would one wish to return to the scenes of 1853, by now completely
forgotten?"84
The artisans themselves, as has already been shown, had a very different view of
themselves and their role in national development. They exhibited a high degree of
consciousness of themselves as constituting a class distinct from those who consume and
those who do not produce physical goods. Artisans saw themselves as the honest,
hardworking, productive force in society, and they believed that their quest for the 'right to
work' was just. Moreover, artisans also believed themselves patriots who had consistently
served as the vanguard in Colombia's numerous civil wars and rebellions that plagued the
second half of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, despite their loyalty to Patria and
Party, their demands for protection were never fully addressed. Even after Rafael Nuñez's
rise to power in 1880, only a select few artisan industries benefitted from the modest
protection afforded by the conservative government.
Only during the brief period of 1853-54 did artisans mount a political challenge to
the existing system. With election to the executive of one of their own, General José
Hilario López, artisans began to realize that their economic interests were incompatible with
the interests of the liberal bourgeoisie. Molina quotes Dario Ortiz Vidales who wrote of the
uprising, "Por primera vez desde la época de la Independencia, las clases populares
buscaron soluciones políticas, sociales y económicas por su cuenta, sin detenerse a pensar
si éstas eran del agrado o no de los prepotentes detentadores del poder, que sólo toleraban
que el pueblo fuera lanzado a la guerra, cuando ésta convenía a sus personales intereses."85

83Park, Rafael Nuñez, p. 199.
84Park, Rafael Nuñez, p. 199.
85Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 137.
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Artisans had become conscious of themselves as a class with distinct interests from, those
who wielded social, political and economic power in society.
After a quick succession of events led to a coup d'état, an artisan republic was
declared. The new government’s power actually extended to Colombia's major urban
areas, including Bogotá» where artisans were numerically strong. An alliance between the
established élite comprised of both Conservatives and Liberals, rapidly mounted a counter
revolution with the support of their campesino clients. After eight months, Melo and the
artisans were defeated.
After the catastrophe of 1854, repeated attempts to develop a voice within the
framework of the existing poli-class parties that would permit artisans to serve as a
powerful pressure group, met with limited success, and never achieved artisan socio
economic objectives. Mounting a direct challenge to the existing system had failed
miserably. Artisans resumed their pre-Melo strategy of supporting the existing parties,
particularly the same Liberal party which had abandoned them in 1854. Despite efforts to
draw attention to their productive roles in party affairs by serving in Liberal and
Conservative armies and by mobilizing the artisan vote during important electoral
campaigns, artisan demands were virtually ignored until the last two decades of the
century. By that time, Colombian craft industries were in serious, irreversible decline.
This partisan political strategy also failed to achieve artisan goals. The artisans' only
remaining survival strategy was to "look out for their own" by attending as well as they
could to their economic needs and eschewing direct political action. Only much later were
they able to seek out allies among the rising class of wage-earning workers in the incipient
industries taking root in the nation, as well as workers in the expanding transportation
sector.
Although the artisans were never able to mount a well-organized, effective political
mobilization to defend their interests after the 1870's, they did play the central role in the
organization of the Mutual Aid Societies in the closing years of the nineteenth century, and
they were also active in the early development of socialist and anarchist unions in the first
three decades of the twentieth. Victor Alba in his overview of Latin American labor, argues
that the independent outlook of the artisan-become-salaried employee, was an important
factor in the incipient development of industry as well as early attempts at labor
organization. He argues that this "artisan outlook preserved the milieu of the artisan" until
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the end of the first World War.86 Actually, artisans continued to influence the the course
of labor organization well into the 1920's and 1930's, Associations of cobblers and
tailors, for example, collaborated closely with textile and construction workers to protest
working conditions, unemployment among their ranks, and poor wages during labor unrest
in Barranquilla in 1928-1929, and the cobblers union was among Barranquilla's first two
unions to receive legal status in 1937.87 Not until the post-war period of rapid socio
economic changes that would transform Colombia in the 1930's and 40's, was a
predominantly wage-eaming class gradually to emerge.

86Victor Alba, Politics and the Labor Movement in Latin America, (Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press, 1968), p.20.
87Cesar Mendoza. Ramos, Surgimiento y Desarrollo de la Clase Obrera en Barranquilla, Paper presented at
the 3rd Congress of Colombian History, Universidad de Antioquia, Medellin, Colombia, (November,
1981), p. 11.
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C H A PT E R 5
V IC T O R Y IN D EFEA T: C O N SO LID A TIO N O F T H E L IB E R A L E X PO R T
ECO N O M Y

"A m í se me iban escaseando (los peones en el trapiche), pero le mandé a picar el rancho a
un arrendatario que se me estaba altivando, y temblando o no temblando, están todos
obedientes. No hay cadena tan poderosa como la tierra...figúrese usted que les
arrendáramos el aire, así como les arrendamos la tierra que les da el sustento ¡con cuánto
'mayor respeto nos mirarían estos animales!"
Discussion between two landlords in Colombian novelist Eugenio Diaz's 1866
work La Manuela1
"La pobreza no nos deja hacer nada y como no hay caminos, allí se perdería todo botado; y
no sólo es eso, sino que los dueños de la tierra nos perseguirían. Es bueno con lo poco
que alcanzamos a tener, a medio descuido ya nos están echando de la estancia, haciéndonos
perder todo el trabajo, ¿qué sería si nos vieran con labranzas de añil, café y todo eso?"
Campesino''s response to Bogotano Gólgota Radical don Demóstenes' query about
why he plants export crops—from Colombian novelist Eugenio Diaz's 1866 novel
La Manuela2
"I know very well that an abyss stretches between Liberalism and Catholicism, the same
abyss that exists between light and darkness, between truth and error; consequently, I
declare m yself to be Conservative, politically speaking, and 1 place m yself at once at the
service o f the Christian Republic, and I offer my person in defense o f the blue and white
flag, sublime and alluring symbol o f the great Conservative party"
Nineteen year-old Liberal prisoner's declaration that he is no longer a Liberal—in his
efforts to obtain his release from the Panóptico prison.3
M Y T H O F T H E ’’D EM O C R A TIC F R O N T IE R ": LA B O R AND LAND IN
T H E C O U N T R Y SID E
In the middle of the nineteenth century, Colombia was still a nation of subsistence
agriculture. The mid-century rise of the Liberal regime paralleled the gradual
transformation of the agricultural economy from an inward, domestic orientation toward
increased production of cash crops destined for export markets. As a result of a number of
factors including the ragged, isolated geography of its major population centers, unlike
many other colonies Colombia had developed a thriving agricultural base oriented toward

E ugen io Diaz, La Manuela, (1866) p. 48, quoted in Kalmanovitz, Economía, p. 144.
2Eugenio Diaz, La Manuela, (1866) p. 79, quoted in Kalmanovitz, Economía, p. 145.
3Bergquist, Coffee, p. 169.
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meeting local demands. With the important exception of the gold, which was only mined
in certain regions and required a limited workforce, Colombia early on was relatively
isolated from the world economy. This was to change dramatically in the course of the
latter half of the nineteenth century.
First tobacco and later its export successor coffee, would become the favored
agricultural commodities for export to eager U.S. and European markets. Outside
subsistence fanning and small-scale production to meet local market demand for
foodstuffs, agricultural workers laboring in the export agricultural sector comprised the
largest single group of workers in the Colombian economy in the latter half of the
nineteenth century.
Coffee played the major role in the formation of domestic capital in the last two
decades of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth. Given the
overwhelming importance of coffee not only in making the accumulation of capital by
Colombian capitalists possible, but also its key role in attracting the massive foreign
investments in the 1920's that taken together fueled the incredible industrial growth of the
1930's and 40's, those who worked in the sector merit serious attention in any treatment of
the development of Colombian labor. As Bergquist argues in his studies of the Colombian
coffee industry, without an understanding of this critical sector, one cannot hope to make
sense of subsequent developments in labor organization4
As Bergquist correctly notes, small-time independent coffee producers and their
sharecropping allies aspiring to ownership of their own lands came to rely on the
Conservative or Liberal Parties to advance their individual and at times, their group
interests, just as ultimately the majority of urban workers would come to do. He writes:
The Liberal and Conservative parties, it is true, governed the nation in the
interest of large capitalists who dominated finance, production, and
exchange in the Colombian coffee export economy. Government land,
labor, and credit policies consistently favored the interests of large coffee
producers and exporters...given the conditions of their labor, and the
structure o f their hopes for a better life, for many workers in coffee
production the capitalist ideologies of the two traditional parties made sense.
Both the ruling class and tens of thousands o f working class people
manipulated the party system to advantage.5

4Bergquist, Labor, p. 281.
5Bergquist, Labor, p. 278.
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That coffee transformed the Colombian economy and Colombian society itself
cannot be denied. Its overarching impact was to insert Colombia permanently into the
capitalist world economy. This was accomplished in part by linking the country to the
international market through its reliance on coffee as the nation's major earner of foreign
exchange. In addition, coffee's success as the primary export crop of the late 1800's and
the early twentieth century permitted the accumulation of domestic capital in quantities that
had never before been witnessed in the nation's histoiy. In turn, this success attracted
massive infusions of foreign loans and investments which helped fuel the importsubstitution industrialization of the 1930's. The success of these new industries would
permit Colombia to supply domestic demands for a wide variety of products ranging from
shoes and textiles to nationally-made machinery for the mining, domestic agriculture and
coffee sectors.
In the countryside, labor underwent a rapid transformation occasioned by the rise of
a predominantly export-oriented coffee economy by the 1880's. Bergquist argues that
these changes created special conditions that prevented the development of an independent
labor movement in the countryside. He writes:
"The social relations of production in Colombia's unique agricultural export
economy generated a Hobbesian system of cultural values, preserved an
archaic and destructive political system, insured the viability of a peculiarly
exploitative pattern of liberal capitalist economic growth, and subverted the
formation of a powerful, class-conscious labor movement capable of
finding a progressive solution to the problem s of C olom bian
development...The influence of Colombia's coffee economy, considered as
a unique set of evolving, contradictory class relations, can thus explain the
peculiar features that distinguish modern Colombian development from
historical patterns in the other major nations of Latin America."6
Bergquist correctly asserts that the coffee economy which developed in Colombia
helped to "subvert" the creation of an independent labor movement in the countryside and
by its lack of organizational strength, contributed to the failures of organized labor in the
transport and manufacturing sectors. After the marked decline in Colombian exports
between 1800 and 1850 of more than 40 percent, the result of a combination of factors
which included the devastation wrought by the war of independence, early government
economic policies that discouraged exports, and a decline in precious metals exports, per
capita exports recovered to increase more than 29 percent over the levels of 1800 by the end

6Bergquist, Labor, p. 276.
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of the century.7 Under the impetus of Liberal governments that encouraged the export of
tobacco, cotton, dyes, leather and gold, Colombia pursued a staunch laissez-faire course up
until the early 1880's. Between 1850 and 1875 a tobacco boom, primarily taking root in
the Magdalena Valley, led to export earnings of between two and three million gold pesos
per year.8 Even after socially conservative Rafael Núñez's ascent to power, coffee exports
would continue to rise up until the time of the Thousand Days War before demand
declined, and again recover shortly after the turn of the century. By 1896, coffee exports
were valued at over 10 million gold pesos, five times more than they had been a short ten
years earlier.9
By 1875, coffee and bananas had replaced tobacco, quinine, indigo and cotton as
Colombia's chief exports. In response to the increased demand for these export crops in
the industrializing nations, domestic banana plantations as well as foreign fruit enclaves,
began to spring up in the hot wetlands of the Caribbean coast. Large scale entrepreneurs
also began to cultivate coffee in Colombia's still largely-virgin temperate midlands. The
initial economic success of a small number of large land owners soon encouraged others to
enter the arena. The revolution in transportation in Colombia, the introduction of steam
navigation on the Magdalena, the construction of new roads and the eventual establishment
of rail travel, quickly led to the growth of small markets oriented to local consumption.
These developments greatly facilitated the rapid frontier expansion witnessed during the
second half of the nineteenth century.
One major obstacle that stood in the path of the development the great haciendas
however, was the critical shortage of labor that existed in the principal areas of economic
expansion. The major concentration of population in Colombia is in the highlands along
the central cordillera. Therefore, in order to attract an adequate supply of labor, large
landowners were forced to allow the tenant, or arrendatario»to grow crops on a small
parcel of his land in return for rent, in the form of labor in the landlords' fields. This form
of tenancy was common in the older coffee-growing regions of the central highlands,

7Figures according to Kalmanovitz, Economía, page 175. See his graphic illustration of per capita
Colombian exports based on Ocampo's studies at the top of page 176.
8Bergquist, Labor, p. 290.
9Bergquist, Labor, p. 293,
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western Cundinamarca and Tolima.10 In the coffee regions of Santander, Antioquia, and
Caldas» aparcería or sharecropping was the prevalent form of tenancy. In addition, as
Catherine LeGrand notes, "almost all large rural enterprises also employed some wage
laborers for specific tasks: they were used on coffee estates at harvest time, on cattle
ranches as cowboys, and on the United Fruit Company banana plantations where some
settlers of public lands also contracted for a wage to work part-time in the banana
groves."11 Because of the chronic lack of a ready supply of labor, the rural worker had a
certain amount of leverage he could exert over the large landowners, particularly in terms of
the conditions under which he would agree to work.
Perhaps a greater source of power for the campesino however, was the widespread
availability of national land, particularly in the frontier regions. The availability of this land
also served to enhance the campesinos' position further by reducing the pool of labor.
Even in Tolima and western Cundinamarca, once peasants contracted from the highlands
through the enganche system managed to save enough to start their own farms, they
generally abandoned their landowners' fields to move to public lands in the region.12
It has been estimated that the amount of land that remained a part of the public
domain in Colombia in 1850 probably comprised about 75% of the entire Republic.13
Migrants, which included displaced artisans from the cities, peasants from the highlands,
Indians, and a general exodus of political refugees fleeing the endemic civil wars of the
nineteenth century, streamed to the frontier, attracted by the promise of free government
land. Smallholdings of 10-30 hectares sprang up near rivers, roads, and railroads that
could provide the colonizers with access to domestic markets. These smallholdings
primarily produced beans, yucca, com, and plantains but large amounts of wheat, sugar
cane, rice, cacao, and some coffee to sell in local markets.

10Catherine LeGrand, "Labor Acquisition and Social Conflict on the Colombian Frontier, 1850-1936,"
Latin American Studies, (Vol. 16, 1985), p. 36. The best general descriptions of labor tenancy in the
countryside are Bergquist's Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 1886-1910 (Durham, N.C.: 1978), and the
section on Colombia in his Labor in Latin America: Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentina,
Venezuela, and Colombia (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1986), see especially pp.
313-318. Other important contributions include: Gloria Gaitán, La Lucha Por la Tierra en la Década del
30: Génesis de la Organización Sindical Campesina (Bogotá: El Ancora Editores, 1984); and William
Paul McGreevey, An Economic H istoiy o f Colombia (Cambridge, England: 1971).
^LeGrand, "Labor Acquisition," p. 37.
12LeGrand, "Labor Acquisition," p. 33.
13LeGrand, "Labor Acquisition," p. 29.
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Initially, the Colombian government encouraged the development of smallholdings
by offering the promise of free land. LeGrand reasons that this was a logical manoeuvre
since these smallholdings on public lands may have accounted for a majority of Colombia’s
foodstuffs in the late nineteenth century.14 Since the availability of public land served to
exacerbate further the critically short supply of labor, the landlords' logical response, the
enclosure, was quick and generally effective.
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed the large-scale alienation
of public lands, the vast majority ending up concentrated in the hands of wealthy
landowners. In this period, more than 3.2 million hectares were officially alienated, while
perhaps an even greater amount of land colonized by smallholders was obtained through
illegal means such as coercion and brute force.15 The overwhelming majority of land was
not virgin land but rather land occupied by peasant settlers.
Such facts help to shed light on the common, mythical belief in Colombia's
pioneering democratic smallholder civilization in the west. In his major work on the
Colombian labor movement, Bergquist argues convincingly that while land ownership was
fairly widespread, the majority of smallholdings were only just large enough to be
productive: in lean years, owners of small properties willingly submitted themselves and
their families to ever-greater degrees of self-exploitation in order to maintain their status as
independent producers.16 Even the fabled poblaciones of Antioquia received less than ten

14LeGrand, "Labor Acquisition," p. 32.
15LeGrand, "Labor Acquisition," p. 34.
16Bergquist forcefully argues that this issue has been puiposely obfuscated by both the conservative
National Federation of Coffee Growers as well as leftist scholars, in both cases for ideological reasons.
Census takers from the National Federation of Coffee Growers chose to look at the number of farms
while ignoring the structure and tenancy of ownership. See Labor, pp. 298-304 for his thorough review
o f the coffee censuses of 1932, 1939 and 1955. He concludes that ownership in the first half of the
century was indeed widespread, especially in the more recently settled coffee producing regions such as
Antioquia and Caldas, and also, since between 1932 and 1955 the greatest expansion in the number of
coffee producing farms actually occurred in Cundinamarca and Tolima, in these older areas that had the
largest concentration o f big coffee farms in 1932. (p.301). Since a viable size for a coffee farm ranges
from 5,000 - 20,000 trees (2-8 hectares) depending on soil, age of trees etc., a majority of the farms in
Colombia during this period were probably owner-operated family farms. (303). As a result of widespread
ownership, much o f the capital generated by the industry remained in Colombia, creating local demand for
clothing, educational services and machinery used in the coffee industry. On the other hand, as a result of
coffee growers' desire to maintain their land, they and their families have been subjected to deplorable
living conditions in the coffee zones, as a result of the willingness to subject themselves to everincreasing degrees of self-exploitation. Extremely poor health care in the heart of the coffee producing
region led to high levels o f disease, higher than national averages of infant mortality, birth rates and death
rates, high incidences of malaria, yellow-fever, and other diseases throughout the first half of the
twentieth century. Bergquisl's extensive first-hand experience in the coffee zones adds realism to his
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percent of the territory that had been made available for colonists: more than 70 percent of
the total land was granted to properties greater than 1,000 hectares in size.17
Enclosure was an effective tactic to ensure an adequate supply of labor for the
landowners' fields. It was also however, a major source of conflict between landlord and
peasant during the rest of the century, as well as a recurring problem throughout the
twentieth century. During this period, smallholders were forced to sign unfavorable
tenancy contracts or to vacate their lands.
In an effort to slow the pace of the expropriations, Congress passed legislation in
1874 and 1882 which was interpreted by many smallholders as a vindication of their rights
to the land.18 The laws implied that rightful title to land should in most cases go to those
who were working it. Therefore, the settlers began to resist the enclosures with varying
degrees of success. Many banded together and hired lawyers who often fought
successfully for their claims in court. Others organized defense groups that also frequently
enabled peasants to retain their lands. Nevertheless, as previously indicated, many of the
smallholdings ended up in the hands of large estate owners who continued to employ
hacienda methods of labor recruitment. Generally, through strategies such as using their
political connections, or palanca, the large landowners could have settlers' titles declared
illegal, have local alcaldes evict the "squatters," could deny smallholders access to water
and roads, would sometimes set cattle onto their fields and at times, through physical
violence could force smallholders to abandon their lands or sign tenancy contracts.19 Once
a tenancy contract was signed, the landowner had another piece of evidence the hacendado
could use to legally claim the once-pulic, formerly colonist's land.
Nevertheless, as mentioned above the large landowners were not always successful
in their efforts to increase their landholdings and recruit labor. In common with artisan
discussion o f these problems and daily life in the coffee-producing regions. But land ownership was
central to every smallholder. Bergquist writes: "Possession of a freehold, the bigger the better, was the
goal o f every coffee worker. That aspiration is often dismissed in Marxist and liberal scholarship as an
anachronistic, irrational impulse inherited...by peasants from precapitalist social formations. It is true
that as petty commodity producers, Colombian coffee smallholders were swimming against the tide of
history...[But] it is also to fail to recognize that their struggle was but a specific expression of goals
shared by all workers in all societies: the desire to control one's own life, to decide how and when work is
done, and to appropriate the full value of one's labor." (p. 325) See Bergquist's description of coffee
production, pp. 318-330, Labor in Latin America.
17LeGrand "Labor Acquisition," culled the list of government land grants for the years 1821-1931 to
unearth this information, p. 34.
18LeGrand, "Labor Acquisition," p. 37.
19LeGrand, "Labor Acquisition," p. 39.
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workers in the cities, an overwhelming majority of smallholders looked to the traditional
parties to enhance their claims to land. Often colono claims would be upheld, especially if
they were brought against a large landowner of the party not in power at the moment.
Despite national legislation favorable to colono claims passed in 1872 and 1882, the
overwhelming majority of land disputes were resolved at the local level, at times in favor of
the colono 's claims.20 Bergquist notes that, "even at the level of veredas, the subdivisions
of Colombian municipios (counties), smallholders or sharecroppers of one political
affiliatation might enlist the support of local urban politicians and lawyers in their resistance
to large landowners-or to other smallholders-of opposite political loyalties." 21.
Colonos, settlers and sharecroppers shared a similar outlook in terms of ownership
of the means of production and a strong desire to secure or retain control of their labor
power with the independent artisans in Colombia's towns and cities. Like the artisans,
some of who made up the waves of migrants looking to Colombia's western frontier for
expanded horizons for themselves and their families in the last half of the nineteenth and the
first half of the twentieth centuries, with few exceptions, the colonos and sharecroppers
looked to one or the other of the traditional parties to improve their lot in life. Like the
artisans, this partisan strategy was only partially successful. Some individuals benefitted
by receiving land and party favors. However, as in the case of the artisans, this reliance on
élite-led Liberal and Conservative Parties also had the effect of undermining efforts at
collective action as well as subverted the development of a potential consciousness of
campesinos as a class with interests clearly apart from those advocated by the traditional
parties. At the same time, mainstream party ideologies strengthened sentiments of
individualism commonly ascribed to Colombian agricultural workers, making organization
along communal lines difficult at best, as the communists were to discover in their largely
unsuccessful organizing campaigns of the 1920’s.

20The fact that most disputes involved rival claims between poor colonos or between individual colonos
and landowners in a limited geographic area, it makes a great deal of sense that the majority of disputes
would be resolved at the local level. Given the highly diffuse power structure in an extremely federalist
Colombia at the end o f the nineteenth century (Rafael Nunez's reforms to strengthen the central
government in the 1880's would take years to show changes in local power structures and systems of
clientelism) and the concomitant weakness o f the central government, the lack of central government
intervention in resolving legal disputes before the 1930's provides an additional reason why even large
disputes involving several colonos were generally resolved at the local level.
21Bergquist, Labor, p. 292.
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T H E R ISE O F TH E E X PO R T EC O N O M Y : TO B A C CO AND C O F F E E
Rapidly expanding investments in coffee had a pronounced effect on not only the
economic growth of Colombia, but as Bergquist has argued persuasively in Coffee and
Conflict in Colombia»also had important ramifications in the political strength of export
interests in their incessant straggles with the generally conservative large landowners for
the control and direction of government trade policy, as well as over issues such as
federalism and the power of the central government.
The following table illustrates the expansion of tobacco in the nineteenth century
and of coffee exports in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
TABLE 5:1
Coffee and Tobacco Exports (Thousands of Pesos)
P e r io d
1 8 4 3 -1 8 4 4
1 8 5 5 -1 8 5 9
1 8 6 6 -1 8 6 9
1 8 7 0 -1 8 7 4
1 8 7 5 -1 8 7 9
1 8 9 5 -1 8 9 9
1 9 0 6 -1 9 0 9
1 9 1 0 -1 9 1 4
1 9 1 5 -1 9 1 9
1 9 2 0 -1 9 2 4

T obacco
159
1,924
2 ,7 2 6
2 ,0 31

______

Coffee
n.d.
338
774
785
1,142
4 ,0 0 0
5,841
1 3 ,2 4 7
2 4 ,3 7 9
4 5 ,6 8 9

S o u rce: K a lm a n o v itz , E con om ía y N ación, T a b le
3.4, p. 210.

During tobacco's heyday between 1866 and 1869, exports fetched more that two
and one-half million pesos. After the precipitous decline of tobacco exports during the late
1870’s and early 1880's, a product would not be found that could effectively fill the
vacuum created by the increased competition from the far east and a decline in leaf quality.
Coffee would not begin to fill that export gap until a decade later. By 1895-1899 however,
the export value of coffee was about twice that which tobacco had been in 1870-1874, and
twenty short years after the turn of the century, more than twelve times greater.22

22Kalmanovitz, Economía, p. 210.
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Liberal governments encouraged the export of other items, particularly after the
bottom fell out of the tobacco market after 1870. Such goods included gold, sugar cane,
cacao, cinchona bark, cotton, leather, and indigo.23
In order to facilitate the expanding export-import trade, the transportation
infrastructure, which in .1840 remained inadequate, had to be greatly improved. After
1840, the year permanent steam navigation was introduced on the Magdalena,
transportation costs plummeted. Sowell reports that steam transportation costs had
decreased by as much as one-half by I860.24 The federal government provided funding
for many transportation projects including roads and railways in various parts of the nation,
when they were deemed necessary to serve the export-import trade, in the 1860's and 70's.
Only the most important transportation projects were begun however because of a lack of
capital and other factors, and many were not completed during this period.
As early as 1880 rapid economic changes brought about by the expansion of the
coffee industry began making themselves felt throughout Colombia. The social theorist,
economist-politician Anibal Galindo wrote in 1880:
The characteristic phases of this economic revolution are three in number:
(1) the access of all classes -down to the very lowest- to the goods and
comforts o f wealth through the extraordinary growth of production and
through the extreme inexpensiveness of products made with the assistance
of these automatons who work for infinitely small salaries. Photography,
oleography, telegraphy, lithography, printing; the sewing machine and
machines for spinning and weaving cotton have made comfort, pleasures,
and benefits available to the lowest social classes that were previously the
privileges of the land's potentates; (2) the decreasing use of manual labor,
and replacement of the beast-of-burden role imposed on the worker by the
intellectual and moral work of supervision and vigilance to which the
functions of the worker in the modem workshops are being reduced. On all
side, mutatis mutandi, the porter moves into the category of the railroad
guard or watchman; and (3) the migration to great population centers in the
search for work and salary levels available in the world market owing to the
rapidity, the facility, and the economy with which trips may be made by
modem means of transportation 25

23Utilizing statistics that had been gathered from various sources including William McGreevey and Jorge
Rodríguez, Nieto Arteta and Miguel Urrutia, and Gerardo Arrubla, William Park Rafael Nunez, has
compiled information on the respective values of Colombia's most important exports as well as other
trends in the export of the most important products during this period, tobacco, cinchona and coffee, as
well as other more minor, but important commodities. See pp. 60-64.
24Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 20.
^ O rla n d o Fals Borda, Subversion and Social Change in Colombia (New York, 1969), p. 120.
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By the late 1800's, the large banana and sugar plantations had also been firmly
established. Incipient industrial activities could also be witnessed in many parts of the
country by the turn of the century.
R A FA EL N Ú Ñ EZ AND T H E R ISE O F SO C IA L C O N SER V A TIV ISM
With the election of Rafael Núñez as the new Liberal president in 1880» the
conservative wing of the Liberal Party, the Independent Liberals passed a protective tariff
and a created a National Bank in an effort to stimulate economic growth. Bergquist notes
that the Radical Liberals had begun a rapprochement with the Conservatives and the
Church.in 1878 by supporting a moderate candidate, Julian Trujillo.26 But with the ascent
of Núñez» Colombian politics were to change profoundly. A life-long Liberal from
Cartagena, socially Núñez was a conservative who sought to heal the chasm between his
party and the Catholic Church as well as reverse the party's longstanding commitment to
extreme federalism. Núñez even received the Conservative Party's endorsement in 1884 as
well as their loyalty when Radical Liberals opposed to his wide-ranging reforms staged an
unsuccessful revolution in 1885. The Independent Liberals and Conservatives joined
together in a new alliance and created the Nationalist Party.
Socially and politically conservative, this alliance dominated Colombian politics
throughout the period known as the Regeneration. Bergquist describes the ideological
orientation of the Nationalists in the following manner:
Lacking strong ties with the liberal community of the W est, these
Conservatives found their intellectual nourishment in Catholic and Spanish
thought. Nationalist Conservatives viewed society as a hierarchy of men
with different capabilities and functions. Strong institutions such as the
family, the Church, and the State were needed to control men susceptible to
evil passions and anti-social behavior unless instilled with a moral code
capable of uniting men on a spiritual level...Satisfied with their position in
life and aloof from foreign critics, Nationalist Conservatives felt no shame
for the 'backwardness' of the country, unlike their Liberal opponents they
found virtue in [Colombia's] Spanish heritage, its Catholic purity, and the
intellectual and literary achievements of its elite."27
Except for a continued reliance on an expanding coffee industry to help fuel
domestic growth through exports, Núñez abandoned the laissez-faire economic policies of
the Radicals while adopting a more interventionist stance. In terms of economic policy, he

26Bergquist, Coffee, p. 14.
27Bergquist, Coffee, p. 16.
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also argued that the central government should take a more active role in improving the
general conditions of the nation's people. Unlike during the period of extreme laissez-faire
economics in the 1850's, 60's and 70's, Núñez favored moderate protection of national
industries, as we have discussed in some detail in Chapter Four. Artisans benefitted from
mildly protectionist tariff policies for key industries, as well as through the creation of a
number of federally and locally-funded trades schools.28
Many of Núñez's reforms were vigorously opposed by the Radical Liberals. As
mentioned earlier, the newly created National Bank emitted a fixed supply of paper money
which initially stimulated coffee expansion. But when emissions were too great, as in the
1890's, stimulated even stauncher resistance by the Liberals by destablizing the economy.
Another issue that drove a wedge between Núñez and his former party, although not as
divisive as it had been earlier in the century before the problems experienced in the 1860's
and 70's, was the issue of federalism verses, centralism. In general, Liberals sought
greater decision-making power for the departments, while the Nationalist Conservatives
favored a strong central government. .Another reform strongly opposed by Liberals was
the Constitution of 1886 which restored the Church's privileged place in Colombian
society. Along with the issue of paper money, it became one of the major issues separating
the Conservatives and Liberals during the decade.
In 1891, Núñez was again elected President, though Vice President Miguel Antonio
Caro would actually serve as the head of the nation.29 Although the Conservatives split,
Marceliano Vélez running a parallel campaign with Jose Joaquin Ortiz, the Liberals decided
to continue the policy of abstention they had adopted after their failed bid to gain power
through force in 1885. Despite the support of the moderate 'Historical Conservatives', a
group of moderates whose center of strength lay in Antioquia, the abstention of the Liberals
ensured another conservative Nationalist government.30 Caro's, authoritarian style
probably helped split the Conservative Party although Bergquist argues that the main
reason was an ideological rift between the "Historical Conservatives" who opposed tariffs
on coffee exports and the "Nationalist Conservatives" who supported them. Of Caro,

28Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 331.
29Ntmez retired to his home in Cartagena, and did not actively serve during his final term.
30For the best historical account of this period, see Bergquist's Coffee and Conflict in Colombia. Helen
Delpar's Red Against Blue, The Liberal Party in Colombian Politics 1863-1899 (Alabama: The
University of Alabama Press, 1981) also provides a good account of the unfolding of events during this
period from a political perspective.
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Bergquist writes "In contrast to Núñez's philosophical eclecticism and political flexibility
(his critics would say opportunism), Miguel Antonio Caro's life and thought reveal a
remarkable consistency, an organic unity. Translator of Virgil, apologist for the Spanish
legacy in America, renowned philologist and literary critic, militant Catholic polemicist, and
Conservative political and economic philosopher, Caro approached every problem
deductively, reasoning from a set of basic Catholic, conservative values: order, hierarchy,
cultural unity.31 Caro, who notes Park, was from an élite family and received his
education in the Jesuit Colegio de San Bartolomé in Bogotá."never left the highlands
surrounding Bogotá." Consonant with Bergquist's assessment, Park adds "whereas
Núñez was worldly, flexible, possessed of a wide-ranging intellect, and capable of
arousing a loyal following through the force of his personality, Caro was insular,
doctrinaire, limited in vision, devout, and scholarly. He would compromise only under
extreme pressure by which point the political benefits of compromise were largely
mitigated."32
The Liberal Party chiefs decided that it was time to begin reorganizing publicly by
1893, though they also clandestinely prepared for war against the government. The
Conservatives reacted swiftly, arresting the Liberal leadership, shutting down the new
Liberal newspapers, and confiscating the party's treasury.33
Relations between the Liberals and the government continued to sour, curbs placed
on the press and the infamous Law of the Horses, a series of laws curbing civil liberties,
making it illegal for example to publish articles criticizing the conservative government.
Relations with the artisans also declined after the 1893 bread riot which the government
violently suppressed killing 40-45 and arresting hundreds more. The Liberals rebelled in
1895, receiving much support, though unofficial, from the Historical Conservatives.
Liberals again went to war in 1899, this time well organized and prepared to fight until the
Nationalist Conservatives were driven from power.
W A R O F A TH O U SA N D DAYS AND T H E PANAM A C R ISIS
Finally, the Liberals decided to act in 1899, launching the most destructive of all of
the civil wars of the nineteenth century, the War of a Thousand Days. Historical

31Bergquist, Coffee, p. 43.
32Park, Rafael Núñez, p. 276.
33Bergquist, Coffee, pp. 154-55.
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Conservatives had managed to have their candidate Jose Manuel Marroquin, a moderate
elected as president. Unfortunately for the Historical Conservatives, the Liberals and the
tens of thousands of Colombians who would die in the Thousand Day War, as a result of
the president's poor health, the government fell into die hands of Aristides Fernández,
director of the police in Bogotá and one time governor of Cundinamarca, who assumed
power under the banner "acabar con los liberales, esos bandoleros".34
With the presidential election of 1897, the Historical Conservatives had hoped to
implement their reformist program, Bergquist argues that "by the end of the century these
upper class factions were deeply divided along an axis of ties, or lack of them, to the
evolving capitalist system of the North Atlantic. Import-export interests, voicing their
demands through the Liberal and Historical Conservative parties, found their inspiration in
North Atlantic political liberalism and laissez-faire economics. Involved in international
trade and domestic finance they sought a return to the gold standard, lower tariffs, abolition
of government monopolies and export taxes, and proper attention to the foreign d eb t"35
The Nationalist Conservatives were not involved in export-import activities and they "based
their policies on principles derived from conservative Spanish and Catholic thought."
"Nationalists," Berquist continues, "represented bureaucratic, ecclesiastical, and apparently
(although the evidence is largely circumstantial) traditional agricultural interests who
benefited from the statist economic policies and centralist, pro-Catholic political policies of
the Regeneration governments."36
The Thousand Days War became one of the bloodiest, some experts claim the
bloodiest civil war of the nineteenth century in this hemisphere, leading to the death of tens
of thousands 37 and causing major loss of property and catastrophic economic dislocations,
particularly to roads, railways and the communications network. Uribe Uribe signed the
Treaty of Neerlandia in 1902, and General Benjamin Herrera later drew the war to a close
in the isthmus by signing the Treaty of Wisconsin in late November of the same year on the
U.S. Warship Wisconsin off Colombia's Panamanian coast. Colombianist Robert Dix

34Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas en Colombia, p. 177.
35Bergquist, Coffee, p. 51.
36Bergquist, Coffee, p. 51.
37The generally accepted estimate is 100,000 deaths. See McGreevey's interesting discussion of the origin
o f this figure in his article "Reinterpreting Colombian Economic History," Journal o f Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs, Vo! 23 No. 3 (August 1981).
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argues that one reason the waning parties decided to make Peace after more than three
years of fighting is that élite factions from each began to feel that they were losing control
over the conflict. He writes, "There is likewise some evidence that the war of 1899-1902
had begun to take on faint overtones of class revolution in the countryside. Although the
matter bears further investigation, if true, this would be an additional inducement for the
elite groups that controlled the two parties to make peace in order to stem the threat to
themselves from below."38 As in 1854, in response to a potential challenge to its class
hegemony from the laboring classes, the leadership of both parties found inter-élite
cooperation preferable to a loss of "los oligarcos'" dominant position in society.
Probably the most traumatic outcome of the conflict however was the physical
separation of Panama in 1903 after an uprising in the isthmus. The United States, which
had been supporting the rebels in an effort to get a more favorable treaty permitting it to
build and control an interoceanic canal than the one it had been negotiating with Colombia,
had sent a fleet to prevent Colombia from reinforcing its garrisons in the isthmus. The
U.S.'s intervention guaranteed the success of the rebellion: after reeling from the initial
shock, élites from both parties decided that cooperation between them was preferable to
further dismemberment of the nation.

C O N C L U SIO N : C O N SO LID A T IO N O F T H E L IB E R A L E X P O R T
EC O N O M Y
The Colombian coffee bonanza of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
had several important consequences for labor. First, the rise of coffee and the
simultaneous opening of the western frontier drew countless thousands of migrants from
the nation's central highlands in search of virgin lands in mid- and low altitudes to stake
their claims. Thousands, perhaps as many as tens of thousands of smallholders in the
coffee zones of Cundinamarca and Tolima were impoverished fanners who worked
properties with fewer than 5,000 trees during the 1930's, 40's, and 50's many forced to
work on local latifundi to make ends meet.39 Many of these were willing to submit
themselves and their families to ever-increasing levels of self-exploitation to enable them to
overcome difficult times in order to maintain their properties. Many of the migrants were
converted into sharecroppers and tenants. Others were driven forcibly from their claims

38Robert Dix, The Politics o f Colombia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987), p. 25.
39Bergquist, Labor, p. 300.
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through illegal enclosures affected by hacendados. Many thousands more successfully
acquired properties.40 Of course even the successful colonists who had struggled
intensely to maintain their claims, watched their hard-earned property fragment between
their offspring through inheritance.
In terms of national economic development, the widespread ownership of coffee
production had positive benefits, creating internal demand for products ranging from
domestic-made coffee de-hulking machines to the clothes and domestically-produced
sandals worn by most Colombian peasants. The expansion of coffee also, as explained
above, permitted the large scale accumulation of domestic capital and the attraction of
additional foreign capital to help fuel industrial development, and the creation of an urban
working class.
And finally, smallholders who also wished to cash in on the expansion of an
agricultural export economy based on coffee turned to the traditional parties to advance their
claims. Bergquist correctly assesses this impact on their long-term interests when he
writes, "Capitalist exploitation in Colombia, especially in the coffee export sector, more
often reinforced conservative individualist values and institutions than it fostered radical,
collective ones; more often solidified the social and political status quo than it threatened
progressively to transform it."41 For the overwhelming majority of laborers in the
countryside, the strategy of playing partisan politics, as in the case of their urban, artisan
counterparts, this strategy of allying themselves with the Liberal or Conservative Parties,
undermined rural workers' solidarity, prevented the formation of class consciousness, and
ultimately led to the subservience of their interests to those of the ruling élite.
A consensus had developed among the Colombian oligarchy that the strategy of
export-oriented, specifically coffee-led export-oriented growth, was the key to national
economic development. One reason for the consensus was the fact that exporting was
much less a Liberal activity than it had been in the mid-nineteenth century. By the turn of
the century, the "agricultural export economy had become bipartisan, having expanded
from Liberal domains in eastern Colombia to encompass the traditionally Conservative
domains of the Antioqueños. Colombian coffee was grown largely on small and mediumsize farms, thus providing a wide base of support and legitimacy for the post-1902 political

40The 1955 FAO/ECLA survey of coffee farms in Colombia showed that 78 percent of farms ranging from
1.1 to 10 hectares were owned by their operators, showing that "land ownership was very widespread in
Colombian coffee production and that small family farms made up the most numerous and important unit
o f Colombian coffee production." Bergquist, Labor, pp. 302-303.
4 bergquist, Labor, p. 279.
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order as well as affording a channel for enterprise and upward mobility outside the bounds
of violence-prone clientelist politics." 42 Referring to the War of a Thousand Days,
Bergquist aptly summarizes: "if the Liberal and Historical Conservative factions tied to the
export-import economy lost the war, they were to win the peace...After the secession of
Panama bolstered the political fortunes of bipartisan export-import interests by fostering a
consensus among Colombian leaders that the nation must unite politically and develop itself
materially if it were to avoid further dismemberment. "43
The War of a Thousand Days had demonstrated to both party's leadership ranks the
depth of destruction such an internecine struggle could reek among the ruling élite.
Bergquist notes that the war "left in its wake unprecedented human and economic
destruction, monetary chaos, the incipient collapse of élite social control...Coffee ushered
in a new era of ruling-class consensus, political stability, and export-oriented
development...But coffee did not transform the political system Colombians inherited from
the nineteenth century. Rather, it reinforced its socially most destructive features."44
Robert Dix agrees with this assessment, noting that the nation emerged from the nineteenth
century with a functioning Congress and electoral process, but a rather paradoxical
tendency to resolve political disagreements through violence.45 Also, with the rejection of
Reyes' extralegal usurpation of power after completing his term as president, Colombians
strengthened their tradition of rejecting dictatorships, showing an ideological preference for
"legitimate government" by a ruling class rather than by an autocratic individual.
Although the élites rejected Reyes when he attempted to extend his presidency for
ten years, initially he had been embraced by Liberals and Conservatives alike as a
moderate. Although he imposed a tariff in 1905 to help stimulate industrial growth, he had
made his fortune in international trade, and did much to eliminate differences between
partisans of the two traditional parties.46 Moreover, his overtures to the Liberal Party by
including Liberals in his cabinet went a long way toward healing the wounds caused by a

42Bergquist, Coffee, p. 236.
43Bergquist, Coffee» pp. 195-96.
44Bergquist, Coffee, p. 294.
45Dix, The Politics o f Colombia, p. 124.
46Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 33. The tariffs imposed by his administration
helped stimulate industrial growth in the capital, but particularly benefitted incipient manufacturing in
Antioquia.
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long war that had proven disastrous to both sides. The Constitution of 1910 went even
further by guaranteeing that at least 1/3 of the seats in Congress would be held by the
minority party, inaugurating a period of compromise and consensus among ruling class
élites. "Los oligarcos" had finally decided that in terms of ideological issues dividing the
two major parties, "civil" disagreements could best be resolved within the context of an
élite-dominated, Republican system.
Reyes' presidency heralded the beginning of a 45 year peace that has been dubbed
the "classic period of Colombian democracy."47 Mutual interest in supporting the coffee
export industry had developed, consolidating the political hegemony of bipartisan exportimport interests. "By 1910," writes Bergquist, "a basic ideological and programmatic
consensus had developed between dominant élites in both parties...and greatly contributed
to the political legitimacy and stability of the new order."48
Peace between the two traditional parties marked the next forty-five years.
Colombia was one of only three nations in Latin America in the early 1930's in which
civilians controlled the government.49 A Republican, as the coalition dominated by
Historical Conservatives and also comprised of moderate Liberals were called, was elected
to the presidency after the ouster of Reyes in 1910. It was also a coalition government
dominated by Liberals, but also comprised of moderate Conservatives, that brought the
government of the old Liberal Republican Olaya Herrera to the presidency in 1930 under
the political banner of National Concentration. Herrera continued the process of élite
compromise begun by Reyes by naming a bipartisan cabinet.
A challenge to this Conservative-Liberal accommodation would not come from the
right, nor from the radical left, nor even from a united labor movement. Instead, in the late
1920's and early 1930's, a new group of disaffected young Liberals, "Los Nuevos,"
influenced by utopian socialism, and heir to the "welfare Liberalism" embodied in the
thought of Uribe Uribe a generation earlier, would passionately confront "los oligarcos."

47Dix, The Politics o f Colombia, p. 25, includes the Reyes Quinquenio as part of this period since Reyes'
bid to extend his term was unsuccessful.
48Bergquist, Coffee, p. 248.
49Costa Rica and Uruguay were the other two nations that maintained civilian-controlled governments in
the early 1930's. Sloan, "Regionalism, Political Parties, and Public Policy in Colombia," InterAm erican Economic Affairs, 33:3, (1979), p. 25.
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C H A PT E R 6
EA R LY IN D U STRIA L G R O W T H AND T H E E M E R G E N C E O F A
PR O L E T A R IA T

In times past it was the Cross or the Koran, the sword or the book that accomplished the
conquests o f civilization; today it is the powerful locomotive, flying over the shining rail,
breathing like a volcano, that awakens peoples to progress, well-being and liberty,., and
those who do not conform to that progress it crushes beneath its wheels.
General Rafael Reyes, Address to the Second Pan American Conference in
Mexico City1
La Asamblea de la Confederación Obrera de Bogotá, a nombre de sus electores y en vista
de las necesidades del proletariado de Colombia, y considerando que el país atraviesa una
crisis de descomposición política, económica y fiscal; que la miseria y la ignorancia vienen
azotando desde muchos años principalmente a los labriegos y alas clases obreras de ambos
sexos, y que los males apuntados redundan en perjuicio vergonzoso del país a la vez que en
beneficio de determindadas clases privilegiadas...nos dice todo esto que ha llegado la hora
de dar el grito de 's álvese quien pueda’.
From the Preamble to the Socialist Platform. 20 May 19192
IN T R O D U C T IO N
During the government of General Rafael Reyes (1904-1909), known as the
Quinquenio, many of the large companies that are still active today initiated their
operations.3 Rapid demographic growth accompanied these economic changes, the
nation's population already topping six million by 1918. During the Quinquenio coffee
production diversified away from the eastern cordillera comprised of Santander and
Cundinamarca to expand to the central cordillera-Antioquia, Tolima and northern Cauca.
A flourish of construction on the nation's communication infrastructure to serve the
expanding export economy included roads, mule trails and railroads. The number of
kilometers of railway track doubled during Reyes' presidency and there were also notable

1Quoted in Bergquist, Coffee, p. 221,
^Reproduced in its entirety in Molina, Ideas Socialistas en Colombia, pp. 213-219.
3For a list of Colombian companies established during this period which continue to exist today, see Fals
Borda, Subversion and Social Change, p. 120.

improvements in steamship travel.4 Approximately 80 percent of the cargo moved by the
Antioquia Railway was to service the coffee trade.5
It was not until the economic boom of the 1920's and 1930's however, that the
modem socio-economic development of Colombia clearly took root. In 1918, the
Nationalist Conservative Marco Fidel Suárez» who named a bipartisan cabinet, followed a
policy of improving relations with the United States under his "Polar Star" foreign policy.
Under Suárez and his successors, Pedro Nel Ospina (1922-26) and Miguel Abadía Méndez
(1926-30), who continued the economic orientation towards the U.S., Colombia attracted
major foreign investments.6
During Ospina's presidency in 1921, E.W. Kemmerer, an economics professor
from Princeton along with a group of expert consultants, made a series of
recommendations that were ultimately adopted by the government. Congressional action
led to the establishment of a national bank, a bank extending agricultural credits, a
mortgage bank, and the construction of a pipeline for large scale oil production.7 Foreign,
particularly U.S. capital, led by the $25 million indemnification between 1920-1921 for the
U.S. role in the separation of Panama, flooded the country.8
Between 1925 and 1929 the per capita GDP grew at an annual rate of 5.2 percent,
while industrial production grew by nearly 20 percent over the same period.9 Fals Borda
paints a dramatic picture of some of the innovations that affected the Colombian economy
between the years 1919 and 1933: "The Sociedad Colombo-Alemana de Transportes
Aereos (SCADTA) began operations in 1919; its subsequent conversion into AVIANCA
airlines had great positive effects on the bourgeois economy as well as on the processes of
regional and national integration. The number of telephone lines increased from 5, 095 in
1913 to 34,680 in 1927."10 The volume of mail multiplied by four times during the same

4Bergquist, Coffee, p. 236.
5Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 190.
6Bergquist, Coffee, p. 257.
7Fluharty, D ance o f the Millions, p. 31.
8Fluharty, Dance o f the Millions, p. 32.
9Fals Borda, Subversion and Social Change, p. 124 for the former figure, see Bergquist, Labor, p. 306 for
the percentage growth of industrial production.
10Fals Borda, Subversion and Social Change, p. 124.
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period (Fluhaity 1957, 16) and by 1929 there were already 15,350 automobiles in the
country.11 Between 1930 and 1933» 842 enterprises were established, including all the
present basic Colombian industries. Public services, transportation, electric power and the
gross product of industries increased at annual rates between 7.8% and 9.1% through
1953.12 The following table illustrates the industrial growth for the years 1925-1953.
TABLE 6:1
Average Annual Rates of Increase of
Industrial Production, 1925 - 1953
Y ears
1925/29-30/34
1930/34-35/39
1935/39-40/44
1940/44-45/49
1945/49-50/53

%
3.8
10.8
7.9
8.1
9.4

Source: Richard Maullin, p. 18,

Note that even during the lean years of the world-wide depression, industry posted
rather remarkable growth, particularly during the zenith of the depression, 1930-39 when
rates of.increase of industrial production averaged more than ten percent annually. A brief
comparison of growth in Colombian manufacturing with other major Latin American
nations, shows that during this period, industrial growth in Colombia actually outpaced that
of the rest of Latin America. The following table relays Diaz Alejandro's findings on
percentage growth of industrial growth.

^Fluhaity, Dance o f the Millions, p, 16.

12Fals Borda, Subversion and Social Change, p. 124.

TABLE 6:2
Average Annual Percentage Growth in the Value of
Manufacturing Production, 1929-1949
C o u n try
1 9 3 9 -4 9
1 9 2 9 -3 9
Argentina

3.1

3.5

Brazil

5.0

7.2

Chile

3.3

4.8

C o lo m b ia

8 .8

6 .7

Mexico

4.3

7.5

Source: Data originally taken from Díaz Alejandro,
"Algunas notas" from Bergquist, Labor, p. 309,

Coffee exports also continued to expand during this period, despite a crash in world
prices. While prices declined from a high of 28 cents per pound in 1926 to an average of
10 cents per pound during the depression, between 1930 and 1.936, exports increased from
3 million to 4 million 60 kilogram bags.13 Throughout the period of coffee expansion in
the twentieth century, departmental and the national governments were able attract foreign
capital to help fuel the import substitution industrialization of the 1930's. Along with
increased customs receipts from imports, which provided the major source of income for
the government up until mid-century, the "Dance of the Millions" resulting from the
indemnification for the U.S.'s role in the loss of Panama, also provided capital for the
rapid industrialization that occurred during this period.14
While industrial production increased by approximately 20 percent between 1925
and 1929, capital investment in Colombian industry grew at an astounding rate of nearly 50
percent, enabling the country notes Bergquist, to embark upon an aggressive import
substitution industrialization policy as a result of the excess installed capacity.15
These rapid demographic and economic changes which gripped Colombia in the
1920's and 1930’s led to the creation of new channels of social mobility as well as a
transformation of social relations between increasingly distinct classes. The passing of the

13Bergquist, Labor, p. 295.
14Bergquist, Labor, p. 296,
15Bergquist, Labor, p, 306.
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artisanal system of production gradually gave way to the rise of a new system based on
wage labor in both the countiyside and in the cities.
T H E N A SC EN T LA B O R M O V E M E N T'S ST R U G G LE TO A SSER T ITS
A U TO N O M Y :

1910-1928

The period from the turn of the century, but more significantly the years 19101928» constitutes one of the most significant eras in the historical development of the
Colombian labor movement. First, viable labor unions, as elsewhere in Latin America, did
not appear on the Colombian scene until after the turn of the century. An industrial
infrastructure began to arise in the wake of the expansion of a coffee export - oriented
economy which had become predominant by the 1880's.
This industrial expansion was complemented by incredible urban population
growth. In the 1870's the population of Bogotá began to grow rapidly: by 1881, the city
counted 84,723 inhabitants, a short three years later 95,761 and 120,000 by 1912.16
Bogotá's rapid population growth was mirrored in other regional capitals. Table 6:3 shows
the spectacular growth of Colombia's most important cities during the period 1905-1951.
TABLE 6:3
Population of Departmental Capitals, 1905-1951 (thousands)
Capital
Bogotá
Medellin
Cali
Barranquilla
Cartagena
Manizales
Bucaramanga
Ibagué
Cúcuta
Pasto
Santa Marta
Neiva
Popayán
Tunja

1905

1918

1928

1938

1951

100
55
31
40
10
25
20
25
15
31
10
18
28
8

144
79
46
65
51
43
22
30
29
29
18
25
20
11

235
120
123
140
92
81
44
56
49
43
31
30
32
19

330
168
101
152
85
86
51
61
57
50
33
34
30
20

648
358
284
280
129
126
112
99
95
81
47
50
44
27

•

Sources: National censuses. Summary data on which the table is based is found in
Zambrano, La Intervención Económica del Estado en Colombia, p. 102 and
McGreevey "Urban Growth in Colombia," p. 390.

16Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 37.
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There were 13 factories in Bogotá by 1916, 25 in Antioquia, ten in Atlantico and
eight in Bolivar.17 Not only did the well-known success stories of industrialization such as
Medellin and Bogotá take place, but cities that had particular geo-physical advantages such
as Barranquilla also benefitted. Barranquilla was privileged to be situated on the
Magdalena River, connected by the Bolivar Railroad to Puerto Colombia, and served as the
nation's coastal link to the interior on the major export-import route. Between 1883 and
1900, 12 industries were created, including production of foods, liquors and hats to serve a
growing regional market.18 Between 1901 and 1920, 42 industries were established, and
the city counted 30 factories that appeared between 1921 and 1925 in the manufacturing
sector.19
In Bogotá, the Bavaria brewery was the first major permanent industry, founded by
a German immigrant in 1891, and employing 300 male and female employees. The
brewery provided a number of benefits typically enjoyed by German counterparts in
German factories such as housing, health insurance, loans, sick pay, and two liters of beer
per day.20 The company offered the highest wages in the city, and its success led its
owners to start a profitable glass factory in 1896.21 Women were also brought into the
labor market in increasing numbers. At the cigarette factory "El Rey del Mundo," which
was founded by the same German family and employed 50 women in 1904, workers were
said to have been forced to work like "human machines": German insistence on discipline
sometimes led workers to complain about management inflexibility.22
Up until 1910, only modest progress had occurred in labor organization. This was
principally the result of general economic stagnation, setbacks suffered by the artisans in
the closing decade of the nineteenth century, the transitional nature of the urban economy as

17Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 194.
18Cesar Mendoza. Ramos, Surgimiento y Desarrollo de la Clase Obrera en Barranquilla, paper presented at
the 3rd Congress of Colombian History, Universidad de Antioquia, Medellin, Colombia, November
(1981) p. 2.
19Cesar Mendoza Ramos, Surgimiento, p. 4.
20Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 35.
21Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 35.
22As a visitor remarked during a visit to the factory. See Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor
Movement," p. 36.
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more and more artisans were turned into proletarians, and the absence of leadership and
relevant ideas which could provide the impetus for such a movement.
ARTISANS, SOCIALISTS. ANARCHISTS. AND WORKING CLASS POLITICS
Alongside the anarchist and socialist influences on working class organization
during the first decades of the twentieth century was the persistent influence of artisans.
By 1893, the National Institute of Artisans, with its practical focus on improving crafts,
had been reorganized, the Taller Modelo providing artisan training was fully funded by
artisan and government contributions by 1896, and the Salesian Brothers had created their

Instituto Salesiano in 1890 to provide crafts training in caipentry, weaving and
shoemaking.23
The best organized and most numerous labor organizations at the end of the
nineteenth century were artisan. Despite efforts to avoid partisan political entanglements
generally these early organizations were influenced by one of the two major parties. Early
artisan organizations included the Typesetters' Society (1887), the Tailor's Society (1899)
and the Cobblers' Society (1899), the latter two founded with support from the
typesetters.24 The first legally recognized union in the twentieth century was the Sociedad

de Artesanos de Sonsón, Antioquia which was established in 1909 by tailors, cobblers,
carpenters and other independent artisans, and was probably founded under the guidance of
Conservative clergy»25 These organizations, like the contemporary mutual aid societies
discussed in Chapter Five, were generally concerned with short-term economic benefits for
their members and were very passive. They generally strove to avoid overt involvement in
partisan politics.
In 1904, strong artisan influence was also apparent in the Unión de Industriales y
Obreros’ tariff petition to congress and the peaceful protest march by 2,500 workers in
front of the president's residence in an unsuccessful bid to have tariffs raised.26 El Faro
and El Yunque, the former a Liberal and the latter a moderate newspaper were founded in

23Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 277.
24Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 168.
25Urrutia, Developm ent, p. 54.
26Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 290.

1905 to promote artisan interests such as tariff protection and educational reforms.27 Both
newspapers were closed when Reyes began to view them as potential threats to his
government.
One should not be surprised to find that the first modem labor organizations were
alliances of artisans and proletarians, but also often included the strange bedfellow,
industrialists. The weekly El Obrero Colombiano was published during this period and
was strongly influenced by the Catholic Church. The newspaper was financed by
entrepreneurs and was dedicated to promoting the reformist ideas of Leo XIII's Papal
Encyclical Rerum Novarum.2* One reason for this strange collaboration may be that some
of the entrepreneurs themselves were successful craftsmen who had escaped
proletarianization. Sowell cites one such example* shoemaker Marin Silva, whose shop
expanded until he employed a total of 30 people.29 His shop had two sales rooms and
offered several different styles of shoes. Sowell further notes that Silva's shop was
"probably typical of shops whose owners had taken advantage of the division of labor to
expand their productive capacity. The workers who toiled for Silva and other industrialists
probably faced a life of wage labor that offered some the hope of achieving the
independence of the artisan and only a very few the status of the industrialist."30
A group of intellectuals, artisans and workers, many of them Liberals, organized
the moderate Workers Party in 1904. Wrote antioqueño Luis Vives of the new party:
"Si el Partido Obrero se organiza, uno de sus principales cuidados será
negarles votos electorales a individuos que no se comprometan a hacer
esfuerzos iguales, por lo menos, a los del doctor Rafael Uribe Uribe en
servicio de la libertad de los obreros y contra la desigualdad que echa sobre
éstos la carga de la esclavitud militar."31
The Workers Party, which after 1909 would abandon its alliance with the Uribista
"Social Welfare" Liberals, initially served as a virtual electoral mechanism for the Liberal
Party.

27Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," pp. 293-294.
28Ricardo Sanchez, Historia Política de la Clase Obrera, p. 39.
29Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," pp.285.
30Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," pp.285-86.
31Moiina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 198.
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Other labor unions began to be organized, most important among them the the
Unión Nacional de Industriales y Obreros in 1910 (UNIO) and the Unión Obrera
Colombiana in 1913 (UOC). As Sowell notes, the unions became more overtly involved in
partisan politics: "Partisan efforts to use labor organizations intensified after the collapse of
the Reyes quinquenio; Uribista Liberals fared well with the industrialists of the UNIO»
while the Republicans found more favor with the UOC and fledgling socialist groups.*'32
The Workers Union backed the Republicans in 1909. In 1911, the Workers Party and the
UNIO sided with the Liberals.33 UNIO, which had attempted to avoid partisan political
involvement in early efforts to unify workers by supporting the independent Workers
Party, aligned itself again with the Uribe Uribe Liberals in the 1913 elections, foregoing an
alliance with the Workers Party.34 It later switched its allegiance to the Republican-led
coalition of 1915, its rhetoric shifting towards a more socialist stance in an effort to counter
the pro-social positions of the competing Unión Obrera Colombiana.35
It was not until the establishment of the Unión Obrera Colombiana that labor
organizers formally recognized the incompatibilities inherent in creating a union dedicated
to furthering workers' rights which included industrialists in its ranks. The Unión Obrero
Colombiana was the first attempt to centralize the worker's movement and free it from the
two traditional parties. The new union, unlike its'predecessors, excluded industrialists,
limiting its membership to craftsmen and wage laborers. It stated its objectives in the
following manner:
La Unión Obrera de Colombia es una institución libre e independiente, en la
cual tienen cabida todas aquellas personas que ejerciendo un arte u oficio ó
trabajando de salario estén convencidos de la necesidad de la unión obrera
par a el mejoramiento moral, intelectual y material de las clases proletarias
de Colombia....La Unión Obrera se dedicará, de preferencia: 1. A propagar
en toda la república la idea de la unión de los obreros, libre e
independientemente, alejándoles de las luchas político-partidistas...36

32Sowell, "The Early Latín American Labor Movement," p. 362.
33SowelJ, "The Early Latín American Labor Movement," p. 315.
34Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," pp. 303-315,
35Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 323.
36Quoted in Ricardo Sanchez, Historia Política de la Clase Obrera, p. 40.
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Soon, the UOC also became embroiled in partisan politics however, at different
times siding with the Republicans or Liberals. The union advocated several reforms that if
enacted, would greatly benefit workers. These included: a program of public education, a
literacy campaign, protection of national industries, increased wages, creation of a savings
bank, and protection of male and female workers against "exploitation" by "capitalists."37
The union represented an important transition in labor organization. Unlike its
predecessors, it was not founded under the ideological tutelage of one of the traditional
parties or the short-lived but influential moderate conservative, moderate liberal alliance
known as the Republican Party. The UOC's ideological role in the development of an
organized labor movement in Colombia was to raise artisan and worker consciousness of
their "distinctness" from industrialists, as well as to outline labor's stance on a number of
issues which would also be taken on by later unions. Although the union counted nearly
3000 members by August 1914, it only lasted until 1916 when it was replaced by a more
independent Partido Obrero.38
In 1915, workers entered into an alliance with both Liberals and Republicans to
challenge the ruling Conservatives in municipal elections. In a close election, the alliance
did well, even managing to place three workers on the council. However, according to
Amorocho, the Liberals and Conservatives struck a clandestine agreement which allowed
them to exclude workers from the appointment process, instead placing Liberal and
Conservatives in local offices.39 Whether or not such an agreement existed, as a result of
the lack of appointments of workers to local offices, workers felt that they had once again
been betrayed by the Liberals and Republicans.
During the period 1916-1924, workers began to assert their independence by
attempting to establish a legitimate organizational framework independent of major political
party domination that could serve to represent effectively the interests of the working class.
More and more, the movement embraced left-wing political philosophies such as
anarchism, socialism and communism as guiding ideologies. As early as 1910 certain
leftist newspapers had cropped up, such as the Comunista of Cartagena. One article in the
same year called for the establishment of an independent labor movement, secure in the fact
that "los núcleos m is avanzados del país-obreros en primer lugar-tratarán de

37Soweli, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p, 317.
■^Ricardo Sanchez, Historia Política de la Clase Obrera, p. 40.
3^Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 368.
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independizarse de los partidos tradicionales, y no únicamente en las capitales sino inclusive
en ciudades de provincia..."40
Frustrated at their impotence to change their subordinate role in society, workers
increasingly turned towards more radical groups and ideologies in a collective effort to
enhance their position. In January 1916, a new Partido Obrero was founded in Bogotá by
800 workers.41 The new union's determination to separate itself from the dominant
political parties is clearly stated in its Manifesto: "Convencidos estamos de que no existen
partidos honrados sino que la humanidad sólo se divide en dos clases: la una trabaja y sufre
hambre y miseria; la otra consume y no produce."42 The party's founders, many of whom
had been active in the union's predecessor, the UOC, were convinced of the need to
withdraw from the partisan political battle in which "ha quedado más de una vez nuestra
sangre.” It also argued that illiteracy had helped maintain the workers' ignorance: "para
blanco de las balas fratricidas en las contiendas armadas, o de esclavos de los caudillos en
las luchas electorales."
The Party's mouthpiece, also called the Partido Obrero, like the Uribista Liberals,
favored active state intervention on behalf of labor, and many of the same goals the UOC
had adapted such as worker indemnification for workplace accidents, a limit on the work
day, workplace safety, and a minimum wage.43 The party viewed the Liberal Party as its
chief competitor for the minds of the working class, Workers Party leaders arguing that
abstention was preferable to voting for one or other of the two main parties. Party leaders
however could also be pragmatic, noting the value of striking bargains with the Liberals,
Conservatives, or Republicans on occasions when such temporary accords could actually
benefit their constituents. The Workers Party called for social change, viewing society as
being composed of two classes, the élite class that denied workers the right to enjoy equally
the fruits of society and of course the workers themselves.44
The Workers Party was strongly criticized by Liberals such as Ramón Rosales,
who would later be appointed as Liberal President Alonso López Pumarejo's Minister of

40Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 199.
41Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 324.
42The following quotations from the party’s Manifesto are taken from Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, pp.

201- 202.
43Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 202.
44Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 324.
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Labor. Rosales charged that the new union was really a front for the Republican Party, and
that labor's only true ally was the Liberal Party.45
The following year, a Central Workers' Syndicate was created to study socio
economic conditions of workers and the poor in the capital. Pablo Mancera, who had been
actively involved in its creation as well as in UOC activities concluded that a socialist
solution was necessary to ameliorate the appalling conditions of the poor.46 In May 1919,
a National Workers Congress was convened to draw up a reform platform. The same year
witnessed the foundation of the Socialist Party of Colombia.
Before continuing the discussion of the development of unions that were strongly
influenced by socialism, we should first look at the early influence of the anarchists.
Anarchist organizations were deeply involved in more radical forms of worker organization
and protest in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Anarchist organizations were
particularly active in organizing strikes and worker protests.
Although little research has been done

011

the influence of anarchists and anarcho-

syndicalists in the Colombian labor movement, it is clear that in the period 1910-1919, they
were the dominant radical force in labor organization.47 Alba cites, as evidence of
anarchist involvement in the early phases of the labor movement, a number of articles sent
from Bogotá to anarchist newspapers in other countries as early as 1910.48 These articles
show that at the time, there were already many "union sympathizers acquainted with
anarchist thought."49 As was the case in Chile, Colombia's anarchists and anarchosyndicalists appear to have been overwhelmingly "home-grown."50 This stands in sharp

45Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 328.
46Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 332.
47It is interesting to note, for example, that Urrutia has dedicated less than two pages of his 260-page
analysis of the development of the Colombian labor movement to the influence of the anarchists and
anarcho-syndicalists in labor organization.
48Victor Alba, Politics and the Labor Movement in Latin America (Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press, 1968), p. 56.
49Alba, Politics and the Labor Movement, p. 56.
50For a brief comparative account o f the development of working class movements in Chile, Argentina,
Venezuela and Colombia see Charles Bergquist's excellent interpretive work, Labor in Latin America,
(Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1978). For a concise look at Chile, Argentina and Brazil, see
Skidmore's essay, "Workers and Soldiers: Urban Labor Movements and Elite Responses in 20th Century
Latin America," in Elites, Masses and Modernization in Latin America edited by Bradford Bums and
Thomas E. Skidmore, (London, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978).
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contrast to the Argentine case, where large numbers of European immigrants who had
experience with anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist ideas and organizations exerted a strong
influence on the development of labor. Nevertheless it is likely that anarchist ideas were
transmitted to Colombian workers, particularly in the transportation sector, through contact
with foreigners in Colombia's ports.
Fluharty notes that workers in both mines and ports turned to class synidicalism of
"anarchistic type" that was in his opinion, "hazily objectiveless." He continues, "but it was
based upon a consciousness of class differences and injustices, and vague as it was, it was
to challenge the old order."51 Molina also argues that the anarchist groups lacked direction,
particularly during strike activities. He writes:
El anarquismo, en boga a la sazón en Europa, tal vez contagió a nuestros
huelguistas del gusto por los saqueos y por la destrucción de bienes, como
las líneas telefónicas. Esa deformación de la huelga había de servir de
excusa a los guardianes del orden para reprimirla, y a las clases propietarias
para alinearse en contra de los contestatarios.52
Further evidence that suggests a strong early influence of the anarchists was the
popular demonstration of artisans in Bogotá in 1919. Reeling under the impact of the
economic strains brought about by the first World War, the government of Don Marco
Fidel Suárez had decided to purchase inexpensive uniforms for its police force from
abroad. A group of garment workers and craftsmen was organized by the anarchists to
pressure the government into purchasing only the material abroad while allowing the
uniforms to be made in Colombia. Although the government had decided to accede to their
demands, this information was not widely available and the demonstration turned into a
riot. Anarchist slogans were chanted in the streets and anarchist graffiti soon covered walls
throughout downtown Bogotá.53 A crowd of between five and ten thousand gathered in
the Plaza Bolivar on Sunday, March 16. When Suárez attempted to address the crowd, he

51 Fluharty, Dance o f the Millions, p. 37.
52Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 203.
53Fals Borda, Subversion and Social Change, p. 123. Miguel Urrutia (Development) insists that the
entire demonstration and resultant loss of life was unnecessary, pointing out that the government had
annulled the decree on the 15th of March, the day before the demonstration (Urrutia, p 63-64). In fact,
the government only suspended bids for uniforms on that day. In early April, an order was placed for
30,000 yards of cloth from a U.S. company according to La Gaceta Republicana, April 11,1919
(Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 337).
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was pelted with stones.54 Government reaction was swift, A state of siege was declared
the same day and the police attacked the crowd with machine guns. Dozens of
demonstrators were injured in the bloody melee which ensued, and the police made more
than 500 arrests.55
The greatest influence of the anarchists during this period was not in the capital,
however, but rather in the port cities along the Caribbean coast. The rivers, coastal ports,
and railroads were fertile ground for the early growth of labor organizations. Generally
speaking, it was not among Colombia's incipient manufacturing industries that a workingclass movement began to form. Working class unions began to slowly spring up
throughout the country along the nation's transportation arteries.
Since Colombia depended on the rivers and railroads to transport its exports to the
Caribbean ports, fluvial workers, coastal longshoremen and railroad workers had a better
bargaining position than did unskilled wage laborers in the incipient industries of the urban
areas. Any prolonged work stoppage could threaten Colombia's ability to export, and thus
its ability to purchase critically needed imports from abroad. Even strikes of short duration
could translate into costly losses in export revenues. Table 6:4 gives some indication of
Colombia's dependence on these critical transportation routes.

54Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 337,
55Alba, Politics and the Labor Movement, p. 56. Molina puts the number at seven killed and 15 injured.
He also notes that the socialists claim this episode gave them their first martyrs while Sowell and Alba
note that the crowd was probably incited by anarchists who had also posted notices of the protest
throughout Bogotá. Since both anarchists and socialists were actively wooing labor at this time, it is

quite possible that organizers from both groups were involved in the demonstration.
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TABLE 6:4
Freight Moved by the Railroad and Riverboats (in tons)
Year

Freight Moved on the
Magdalena River

1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933

Freight Moved on the
Railroads and Air Cables

582,000
663,000
776,000
779,000
1,977,000
1,521,000
1,307,000
902,000
677,000
763,000
934,000

1,582,000
1,820,000
2,101,000
2,650,000 •
3,068,000
3,315,000
3,134,000
2,197,000
1,917,000
2,128,000
2,340,000

Source: Miguel Urrutia, p. 88,

The first effective organization of workers' groups determined to press collectively
demands for better working conditions and wages in Colombian history occurred among
the fluvial and coastal port workers.
During the brief period of anarcho-syndicalist hegemony, workers' organization in
the coastal regions was spurred by post-war inflation which was cutting into wages.
Strikes such as the famous general strikes that paralyzed Colombia's coastal ports for a
short period in 1918, were anarchist-led. The anarchists were the first organized group in
Colombia to consistently use this new method of asserting working class interests.
While anarchist influence was most apparent where strike organizations had
successfully organized along the Caribbean coast and railway lines, the socialists were
making headway in the capital.
The 1919 National Workers Congress called for the creation of the Socialist Party
during its May meeting, and called for several reforms to alleviate poor living conditions of
the poor that young Alfonso López referred to as "miseria" that "oppressed the heart."56
During a period in which exports had fallen off as demand in Europe and the United States
was curbed by the first world war, salaries for workers also declined.57

56López Pumarejo, Diario Nacional, 1922, cited in Molina, Las ¡deas Socialistas, pp. 208-209.
57Ricardo Sánchez, Historia Política de la Clase Obrera, p. 44.
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Thoroughly dominated by artisans, the new Socialist Party became a reformist
movement with a meliorative, Christian orientation. Before the Labor Congress was
convened, Colombian Congressman José D, Celis, active in Bogotá's Mutual Benefit
Society, had written: "when the hour arrives for electing the members of this labor
confederation, we should look toward the truly socialist workers; those who desire the
expansion and triumph of socialism. To this new society we should not admit any one
who favors or is an agent of political ideas other than ours. We shall try to save the labor
movement from professional politicians..."58 José Celis, along with Manuel Antonio
Reyes, both artisans, were the primary authors of the Socialist Platform. The authors later
insisted on including the rale that only workers be allowed to join the organization.59
A Gaceta Republicana editorial noted that the socialism advocated in Colombia "no
se basa en el despojo de los acomodados y en la persecución de las clases superiores. El
socialismo que nos enseñó Cristo busca solamente asegurar la equidad dentro de las
relaciones comerciales y la igualdad según los principios democráticos."60 Another article
in the Gaceta relating a draft article from the Socialist Platform states, "Given the various
tendencies of socialism, each country needs a special type of socialism according to the
intellectual state of the people, the development of industry, etc. The new political party
shall be called the 'Socialist Party,' but as has been said, a special socialism tailored to our
people, that is to say, Christian."61 Article two of the final document proclaims that the
Partido Socialista is based upon "los principios del socialismo moderado...sus doctrinas no
aceptan en esencia el anarquismo, ni el colectivismo exagerado ni el comuniso...El fin
principal, es la lucha en defensa y por la elevación del pueblo trabajador que, guiado por la
ciencia, tienda a realizar una líbre e inteligente sociedad humana basada sobre la propiedad
colectiva de los medios de producción.'"62 In Article Four the point is reiterated, adding

58Urrutia, Development, pp. 60-61.
59Urrutia, Development, p. 62.
60Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 211,
61Gaceta Republicana, (February 15, 1919). Quoted in Urrutia, Development, p. 62,
62Ricardo Sánchez, Historia Política, de la Clase Obrera, p. 43, Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 214.
Exceipts from the document appear in both Sánchez, pp. 42-44 and Molina, pp. 214-219.
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that the Socialist Party did not seek the abolition of the state, society, property or private
capital, though it did favor the elimination of unjust monopolies.63
The very first article of the Workers Assembly decreed its independence from the
established parties and religions, declaring that it was instead an organization dedicated to
the fight for the rights of workers.64 Articles Five, Seven, and Eight outline the major
reforms sought by the new organization. They included: a government by and for the
people responsive to the needs of the 'pueblo'; educational reform and a major literacy
drive; legislation on the use of common lands; legislation guaranteeing hygienic housing
conditions; tax reform; a list of specific demands that included 30 points, among them
including, maternity benefits, retirement benefits, 8-hour work day, a tax reduction for
articles of necessity, obligatory public schooling, reform of workmen's injury laws,
electoral reform, nationalization of the army, police, schools, and telecommunications,
'anti-alcoholic’ legislation, Habeas Corpus, protective tariffs on nationally produced
goods, and the separation of church and state.65
Although the creation of the Socialist Party heralded the first modem formal effort
of workers and intellectuals to break with the traditional parties, the founding members
believed that forging temporary alliances with other parties in municipal and national
elections was important if the candidate could further the interests of workers. Article 14
makes it clear that such alliances were still considered necessary:
Todos los Directorios Socialistas están en el deber de trabajar porque el
partido obtenga el mayor número de representantes en los cuerpos
colegiados y para el efecto, cuando las necesidades y conveniencias lo
exijan, podrán pactar con los demás partidos afines, o que tengan mayores
puntos de contacto con las aspiraciones de este programa, siempre que los
candidatos aliados se comprometan a defender y dar su voto por los
proyectos que presenten los candidatos socialistas, requisito sin el cual no
habrá pacto, pudiendo a la vez por motivos de reciprocidad los candidatos
socialistas, hacer lo propio con los proyectos que presenten los candidatos
aliados, cuando 110 pugnen en nada con los intereses del proletariado.66

63Ricardo Sánchez, Historia Política de la Clase Obrera, p. 43.
64Ricardo Sánchez, Historia Política de la Clase Obrera, p. 42.
65Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, pp. 217-218.
66Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, pp. 218-219.

Nevertheless, the party ordered its faithful to abstain from elections in 1919,
preferring instead to wait until the party had had an opportunity to recruit workers to ran as
their own candidates.67
Workers organizations, particularly craft unions were encouraged, and in the
months following the Labor Congress, a union of tailors was established in the capital with
some 200 members, the Sociedad de Zapateros, a union of builders was organized, and
200 carpenters and cabinetmakers met to discuss the establishment of a trades organization,
these groups joining the 20 labor organizations that already existed in Bogotá in 1919.68
Urrutia notes that the organizational efforts were also successful in the departments, citing
the fact that twelve newspapers in other parts of the nation were supporting attempts to
organize workers.69 A labor central was established in April, which by June counted more
than 100 affiliates, including railway workers and several other working class
organizations.70
Although the Socialist Party was dissolved in 1924, during its short life span,
several goals related to the protection of workers and the advancement of labor organization
were accomplished. In addition to the establishment of several labor unions, both artisan
and industrial, another important benefit was the enhanced degree of artisan and worker
consciousness of their distinct position in society. Such awareness included workers' need
for basic human benefits such as rudimentary health care and sufficient wages to support
their families, as well as a realization of the value of their role as the nation’s producers.
During this period, more than 60 newspapers with a socialist orientation were being
published,71 including El Socialista in Bogota, La Lucha in Girardot, El Taller in
Manizales, El Rebelde and El Látigo of Medellin, in addition to the Gaceta Republicana
which had already been publishing in the capital.72
Another area in which the party had an impact was in organizing groups of workers
to defend their economic interests and in popularizing the strike as the method of last resort

67Urrutia, Development, p. 61.

680nly seven of these organizations had been legally recognized. Umitia,Development, pp. 60-62.
69Urrutia, Development, p. 62.
70Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," p. 336.
71 Ricardo Sánchez, Historia Política de la Clase Obrera, p. 47.
72Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 221.
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to obtain workers’ demands. The socialists helped organize several work stoppages,
supporting the Dorada Railway Strike in 1920 and the strike against the English mining
company Segovia in 1919, both resulting in outcomes favorable to the laborers. Another
notable strike occurred during 1920, the Bello Textile strike near Medellin. An article in the
Socialista describes the events that occurred:
La huelga estalló súbitamente sin preparación. De un momento a otro las
obreras decretaron el paro del trabajo y se situaron en las puertas de la
fábrica a impedir que sus compañeros, que estuvieran por fuera, entraran.
En un principio los hombres se negaron a secundarlas y ellas los dejaron en
libertad de hacer lo que quisieran, limitándose a gritarles en las puertas ¡que
debían cambiarse y llevar faldas, dejándoles a ellas los pantalones! Al fin se
generalizó la huelga y los obreros decidieron acompañar a las obreras...Los
huelguistas piden la destitución de los actuales vigilantes. Es directora del
movimiento la señorita Betsabé Espinosa. Cuando se decidió el paro, la
señorita Betsabé dirigió a sus compañeros un gran discurso...hoy se vino
para Medellin, con algunas compañeras, a entenderse con el gerente y con el
gobernador.73
In Medellin more than 3000 individuals were assembled by the Socialists to support
the strike.74 Although the Archbishop of Medellin agreed to mediate the strike, the strikers
had already achieved most of their demands.75 It is important to note also that the role of
women in early industrial development, such as those working for Bavaria in Bogotá and
those who led the Bello strike was not lost on the Socialists. In the first paragraph of the
preamble to the Socialist Platform of 1919, the party pledged to protect the rights of
workers of both sexes. Other strikes in which Socialists played a role were the
Barranquilla Railway strike, the strike by more than 2000 seamstresses and cobblers in
Bucaramanga, a mining strike in Mannato, and the Valle railway strike, all of which took
place in 1920.76
The party also made inroads in politics. In Medellin, bastion of moderate
conservatism, the 1919 electoral outcome showed the Conservatives winning in local
elections with 2,177 votes compared to the Socialists who received 1,039 and the Liberals

73Ricardo Sánchez, Historia Política de la Clase Obrera, pp, 45-46.
74Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 222.
75Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 222.
76Ricardo Sánchez, Historia Política de la Clase Obrera, pp. 46-47.
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who received only 934 votes.77 Between 1919 and 1921, Socialists also did well in a
number of elections gaining a majority in some town councils, as well as positions in
departmental assemblies and Congress.78
The infatuation of the Socialist press with the Russian Revolution was apparent
during this period, though the revolution was idealized and Leninist strategies, though
discussed in the press by Luis Tejada in his 'Oración para que no muera Lenin»' were never
seriously considered by the reformist-oriented, moderate mainstream of the party.79 This
lack of radicalism can partly be accounted for by the overwhelming influence of the socially
conservative artisans and the small numbers of the Colombian proletariat, and partly as a
result of the unlikely applicability of the Soviet model to the Colombian case. We must
keep in mind that the Socialist Party's motto emblazoned on a field of red extolled Liberty,
Equality and Fraternity, the bourgeois cry of the French Revolution of 120 years earlier,
not dictatorship of the as yet incipient proletariat. When the term proletarian was used in
the Colombian context, it referred equally to the artisan and the factory laborer.80
The independence of the Socialist Party was short-lived. When in 1,922 it seemed
that Liberal candidate General Benjamin Herrera, who demonstrated pro-labor, pro
socialist sympathies, and who seemed to have an excellent chance of unseating the

77Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 224.
78Ricardo Sánchez, Historia Política de la Clase Obrera, p. 48.

79Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 223 and Ricardo Sánchez pp, 48-49, both mention that the Russian
Revolution had a modest impact on the development of Colombian socialism, but only Sánchez
accounts for the pro-Soviet communists’ lack of influence in altering the political and programmatic
direction of the Socialist Party. As is typical of contemporary Colombian communist historians,
Sánchez attributes the lack of influence of application of Soviet communism not to its irrelevance to the
Colombian case, but rather to the reformist attitude on the part of the party's leadership. He writes "...la
simpatía por la revolución rusa aumentaba la idea de un mañana sin explotación. La influencia
reformista en los dirigentes conducía al oportunismo y a confiar en las bondades del sistema electoral.
No contó entonces el movimiento de masas con una orientación política y programática marxista o
revolucionaria que le hubiese permitido solidificar la línea por la independencia política del movimiento
y por el partido obrero y socialista." (Sánchez, p. 49.) While Sánchez is correct in noting this reformist
orientation, he fails to mention that the socialist leadership's position probably reflected accurately the
views of the organization's membership. The Party itself was primarily comprised of artisans of
middling class, who owned their means of production, probably considered themselves good Catholics
and could never support a leadership advocating the violent overthrow of the ruling élite and its
replacement, as in the case of the Soviet Union, with the dictatorship of the vanguard of the proletariat
(the Communist Party). Some members of the party were obviously influenced by the idea of a
worker’s utopia implied by the success of the Russian Revolution, but this influence never translated
into a radical program.
80Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 221.
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Conservatives, socialists joined in an anti-Conservative coalition.81 Two years earlier,
Herrera had sounded the Liberal strategy when he stated in an interview in El Universal in
Barranquilla, "No veo la razón para que se funde un tercer partido político en Colombia,
cuando dentro del liberalismo caben todas las aspiraciones de los trabajadores, porque éste
es carne de su carne y hueso de su hueso."82
Although Herrera lost a close election to Conservative Pedro Nel Ospina, who was
supported by the Catholic hierarchy, during the Convention of Ibagué convened after the
elections, the Liberals adopted virtually in its entirety the social reform platform of the
Second Socialist Party Congress that had been held in Honda in 1920.83 Once again, the
Liberal Party was able to subvert efforts to create a viable workers challenge to the existing
two-party political system and the social hegemony of the merchant and landed élite. More
radical voices were to capture the leftist fringes of the labor movement while the
mainstream of the working class cast its support to the party that had the best chance of
improving its material lot. While many artisans and laborers were able to achieve certain
short-term material goals as a result of the "top-down" pressure from the Liberal Party, at
the same time the Liberal Party was in effect able to coopt the creation of an independent,
working-class directed, labor movement.
The same year that witnessed the dissolution of the Socialist Party, 1924, also saw
the creation of the Oficina General del Trabajo by the Conservative government. The
General Labor Office was charged with overseeing the implementation of a newly created
social security system, the construction of housing for workers that had previously been
authorized by the government, investigating workers' accidents, regulation of child labor
and women's labor, technical and civic education of workers, working conditions for
arrendatarios, enforcing Law 78 of 1919 and Law 21 of 1920 to be discussed below, and
the elaboration of a labor code.84 Among the reasons cited for the interest in promulgating
a labor code by the Conservative government's Minister of Industry include the following
pronouncement:

8 Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 225,

82Ricardo Sánchez, Historia Política de la Clase Obrera, p. 50.
83Molina, Las Ideas Socialistas, p. 227.
84Bemardo Tovar Zambrano, La Intervención Económica del Estado en Colombia 1914-1936 (Bogotá:
Biblioteca Banco Popular, 1984), p. 148.
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precisa 110 olvidar-decía—que las grandes revoluciones sociales provienen,
casi siempre, de una lamentable imprevisión por parte de quienes se hallan
encargados de velar por la seguridad de los asociados; y no olvidar tampoco
que estas medidas preventivas deben tomarse en obedecimiento a un
principio de equidad y de justicia, recordando que al consagrar en la ley los
justos derechos de las clases obreras» se robustece la acción nacional y se
fomenta el industrialismo en el país» poniendo en armonía lo sintereses del
proletariado con los del empresario capitalista.85
Although the laws were seldom enforced, generally ignored by both government
and workers, they do demonstrate, along with the minister's comments, the government's
desire to control labor and avoid its absoiption by radical forces. Those who were "in
charge of ensuring the security" of society, the élite-controlled government, must be ready
to safeguard the present social relations to maintain harmony between the interests of the
proletariat and industrialist.
STRIKES AND REPRESSION
The years 1918-1920 witnessed a number of strikes, particularly among transport
workers and workers laboring in the foreign enclaves such as United Fruit and Standard
Oil. In 1920, of 31 strikes registered by the government, 13 were in the transport sector,
13 in industry, 2 in mining and one in agriculture.86 Strikes among railway and port
workers in Barranquilla, Cartagena, and Santa Marta led to riots in those cities. The
Conservative government set a precedent which would long serve as its standard course of
action in its efforts to aid in the resolution of labor-employer disputes: it declared a state of
siege and sent in the troops.
In one such incident, on January 4, 1918 workers in Barranquilla demanded a 50
percent increase in their wages. Four days later, Cartagena teamsters and port workers also
struck. The strikes, which were organized by the Sociedad de Artesanos y Obreros, were
declared as a result of unmet demands for increased wages and better working
conditions..87 In Barranquilla, the workers obtained an increase of 50 percent. In
Cartagena, the strike devolved into riots when workers' demands were not met, and a
governmental declaration of a "stage of siege" was issued for the Caribbean coast. Troops
were sent to the region, and the strike was broken after four days. Both Liberals and

85Zambrano, La Intervención Económica, p. 149.
86Zambrano, La Intei-vención Económica , pp. 122-123.
87Urrutia, Development, p. 56.
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Conservatives roundly condemned the violence of the strike and issued strong criticisms of
the behavior of the strikers in newspaper editorials throughout the country.88
In the ensuing months, the government passed legislation prohibiting the meetings
of "permanent strike committees," declared that a person who did not belong to a craft or
enterprise of workers involved in a particular labor dispute could not represent the workers,
and prohibited picketing.89 One strange provision also required that foreigners
participating in strikes would be deported, leading Urrutia to believe that the strikes may
have been led by foreigners who were anarcho-syndicalists.90 The strike spread to Santa
Marta, and as in Barranquilla, although some sporadic violence accompanied the strike, the
strike itself was largely successful in obtaining the workers' goals. The transport workers
won a wage increase of 25 percent.91
In late November, railway workers and Bogotá cable car workers also went on
strike. Urrutia believes that the railway strike, unlike the dockworkers strikes, was an
example of a "responsible" strike. He notes that the strikes did not provoke condemnation
by the Liberals and the Conservatives since they were conducted in a peaceful manner. He
writes, "In contrast to the March events, the railroad strike of November 1919 illustrates
the rationale [sic.] and effectiveness of serious trade union action."92 It seems for Urrutia
then, that if a labor action was not peaceful, not within the legal parameters established by
the state, it was not an effective expression of worker's rights, and therefore was an
example of a pre-modem phenomenon that has no place in modem labor organization.
Even though violent tactics were employed by the dockworkers, their demands were met
despite condemnation from Liberals and Conservatives, while a peaceful bakers strike the
same year was a complete failure.93 In the case of the Colombian rail workers, their

88Urrutia, Development, p. 57.
89These incidents are related in Urrutia, Development, pp. 56-58.
90See Development, pages 57-58.
9 Urrutia, Development, p. 58.
92Urrutia, Development, p. 65.
93In this incident, the strike was generally peaceful. One riot was reported when bread was smuggled into
Bogotá from the provinces.
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demands were achieved through peaceable means: the Girardot Railway workers received a
40 percent increase in their wages,94
The government response to the rash of strikes was to pass two key laws, Ley 78
of 1919 and Ley 21 of 1920, to help bring the process of labor-management relations under
more direct vigilance and control by the state. Ley 78 outlined the conditions under which
legal strikes could be earned out. The conditions included efforts to obtain more sanitary
working conditions, better working hours, salaries,etc and that the strikes be undertaken in
a peaceful manner 95 The law also regulated strikes in the public sector. Ley 21 of 1920
required direct negotiations between management and labor, and failing a successful
resolution of the dispute at this stage required government mediation before a strike could
be called, eliminating a labor strategy of surprise strikes.96 It also prohibited strikes in the
public sector.
Although anarchists were active in many of the strikes during the two years 19181919, and were very active in organizing workers during the ten years that led up to the
great strikes of 1919, the Socialists and Liberals would come to clearly dominate the labor
movement by 1919. Workers were more strongly attracted to the traditional parties and the
new, reformist-oriented Socialist Party. Reform-minded intellectuals from the élite were
also drawn to the new Christian socialist ideas, but demonstrated no enthusiasm for
anarcho-syndicalism. Colombian "leftists" had an established tradition firmly rooted in
social reformism and utopian socialism that incoiporated Christian teachings and which
vehemently excluded militant action by workers that involved the destruction of property.
From the Gólgotas who believed all classes could live together in harmony in
society but were also staunch free-traders as well as supporters of Murillo Toro, who
believed in the economic intervention of the state in order to encourage economic growth,
both of whom were active in the mid-nineteenth century, to Uribe Uribe's turn of the
century call for more active participation of the state to remedy social and economic ills, the
Colombian leftist tradition had always been peaceful and reformist. For most Colombian
leftists, anarchism made no sense: it was viewed as a foreign-inspired ideology with no
relevance to Colombian reality.

94Umitia, Development, p. 65.
95Zambrano, La Intervención Económica, p. 124.
96Zambrano, La Intervención Económica, p. 125.
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Another important factor which kept anarchism from gaining wider acceptance
among Colombian workers, virtually limiting its influence to workers in the transportation
system that linked Colombia commercially to the outside world, was the willingness of
city-dwelling proletarians who were still outnumbered by artisans, to accept the leadership
of artisans in workers' alliances in the first decades of the twentieth century. As we have
shown, although wage-earners were active in worker's organizations, socially and
politically moderate artisans played a major role in creating the workers' organizations of
the second decade of the twentieth century and played a central role in the creation of the
Socialist Party. These factors limited the appeal of anarcho-syndicalism and communism to
Colombian workers. Although the anarcho-syndicalists published the journal Claridad in
the 1920's their influence in the labor movement was greatly diminished after their brief
involvement in the strikes of 1919.
Between 1921 and 1924, during a slump in the Colombian economy, there was
very little strike activity. One Colombian historian argues that in addition to the general
economic stagnation of those years, another reason for labor’s inertia could have been its
involvement in Liberal Party politics in 1921 and 1922,97 Labor, as we have mentioned,
actively participated in Benjamin Herrera's 1922 presidential campaign.in an effort to
unseat the Conservatives for the first time since the Núñez era.
Despite the marriage of convenience between Liberals, ex-socialists and workers,
the next great wave of strikes was led by the Communist organizer Raul Mahecha.
Mahecha, son of a physician, was a one time soldier who had served as an lieutenant in the
Colombia Battalion in Panama. He had become active in labor affairs after participating in
the abortive 1904 attempt to restore the state to Colombian sovereignty. Throughout the
1920's, Mahecha edited the leftist newspaper El Luchador.98
In 1924, 500 workers went on strike at the Colombian subsidiary of the Tropical
Oil Company, which was controlled by Standard Oil of New Jersey, to demand better
working conditions. An abortive strike had occurred at the same facility two years earlier.
Toiling under wretched working conditions, as much as 40 percent of the workforce

97Paul. Oquist, Violence, Conflict and Politics in Colombia (New York, Toronto, San Francisco:
Academic Press, 1980), p. 99.
98Gonzalo Sanchez, Ensayos de Historia Social y Política del Siglo XX: Los Bolcheviques del Líbano,
Las Ligas Campesinas en Colombia, Las Raíces Históricas de la Amnistía (Bogotá: El Ancora Editores,
1985), p. 53.

161

required some hospitalization annually." In the first four months of 1924 alone, 1023
workers had fallen sick and five died.100
The oil workers demanded an eight hour work day, Sundays off, a salary increase
of 25 percent and better food at the company's commissary. After a lengthy stalemate
followed by government intervention, the workers went back to their jobs without a pay
increase. Several of the strike's leaders, including Mahecha, were jailed. The company
then proceeded to fire 1,200 persons said to have been associated with the strike.101
In 1927, the 8000 workers from Tropical Oil at Barrancabermeja again struck for
higher wages. Unlike the 1924 debacle, the strike was well organized by Mahecha, who
had been released from prison. The government reacted in its usual manner by declaring a
"state of siege." Organized labor retaliated by calling secondary strikes throughout the
nation's transport sector.
After the company had again repeatedly refused to discuss a wage increase,
workers began destroying company railroad tracks and burning company buildings. The
government responded by sending troops into the area. During a clash between soldiers
and strikers, four workers were killed and three were wounded.102 By the end of the
strike, 15 workers had lost their lives.103 Despite the government's repressive measures,
twenty to thirty thousand workers were able to remain on strike for a total of 20 days. In
the end however, the government's involvement tipped the scales. The strike was broken
without the company yielding concessions, the leaders were again jailed, and this time
Mahecha was deported.104
The bloodiest strike of the 1920's in Colombia was also, as one scholar writes, "the
most significant example of Communist failure" in Latin America.105 In 1928, workers

"Hobart Spalding, Organized Labor in Latin America (New York: 1973), p. 66.
100Urrutia, Development, p. 95.
101Spalding, Organized Labor, p. 67.
102Spalding, Organized Labor, p. 67.
103Medofilo Medina, La Protesta Urbana, p, 36.
104Urrutia, Development, p. 97.
105 victor Alba, Politics and the Labor Movement, p. 127.
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from United Fruit Company's banana plantations in Santa Marta declared a strike.106 The
workers were seeking better living conditions and higher wages, but United Fruit refused
to negotiate. In 1926, the Third Workers Congress, which was affiliated with the 3rd
International, had formed the Partido Socialista Revolucionario {Revolutionary Socialist
Party), which had begun to attempt to coordinate the labor movement,107 Workers were
forced to sign contracts so that they would not be considered full-time permanent
employees, and thus not subject to existing labor legislation covering health insurance and
accident insurance. United Fruit offered loans to its employees, who lived seven to a 2025 meter quarters, but only in scrip redeemable in the company commissaries where prices
were approximately 50 percent higher than in local stores.108
When the strike began, the Partido Socialista Revolucionario led by María Cano
helped to organize the plantation workers. The party was divided on what the purpose of
the strike should be. Raul Mahecha, who had returned from exile, believed that such a
large strike, a walkout of over 40,000 workers, should be channelled into a larger
insurrectionary movement that could bring about the demise of capitalism in Colombia.109
The Party's Executive Committee, however, urged Mahecha "not to confuse the strike with
an insurrection."110
Demands drawn up on October 6, 1928 included the following: the establishment of
collective work contracts and abolishing the individual contracts; collective insurance for all
of the company's employees; an increase of 50 percent for employees earning less than 100
pesos per month; weekly instead of monthly pay; paid Sundays off and accident
indemnification according to Law 76, 1926 and Law 57, 1915; abolition of the company
commissaries and their replacement by independent stores; abolition of company loans paid

106For a more detailed account of the Santa Marta strike see Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de
Colombia, Bananeras: 1928-1978 (Bogotá: Ediciones Alcaraván, 1978) as well as David Charles
Kepner and Jay Henry Soothill., The Banana Empire: A Case o f Economic Imperialism (New York.:

The Vanguard Press, Inc. 1967), pp. 287-330.
107Oquist, Violence, p. 100.
108Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Colombia (CSTC), Bananeras, pp. 81-83. CSTC provides a
detailed account of the events leading up to the strike, including working conditions at United Fruit.
109Alba, Politics and the Labor Movement, p. 127.
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in scrip; improvements in sanitary conditions; construction of a hospital for every 400
employees providing sufficient medicines and doctors to provide good health care.111
Initially, the government, as well as merchants and independent banana producers
throughout the Department of Magdalena were sympathetic toward the strikers. One reason
for this attitude was United Fruit's monopoly over the water supply in the region through
its extensive irrigation network. Its policy of forcing its employees to purchase their goods
at the company store also antagonized the independent merchants of Magdalena. The
Minister of Industries states in his Memoria that the "government recognizes the right of
private banana producers to industrial independence from the United Fruit Company and
should extricate them from the circle of iron which the American company has surrounded
them."112 A government inspector was sent to the scene to attempt to mediate between the
two parties. After he had reported that the strike was legal however, he was immediately
jailed.113
The government then heeded a request by United Fruit's management that troops be
sent to the region.114 On December 6,4000 strikers held a demonstration at the Ciénaga
railroad station. After ordering the crowd to disburse, soldiers fired on the assembled
workers and their families with machine guns. During this bloody episode in Colombian
history immortalized in Marquez's Cien Años de Soledad, hundreds of civilians were
killed, one estimate placing the number as high as 1,500 demonstrators mortally wounded
and an additional 400 injured.115 Under Mahecha's direction, 12,000 strikers organized in
groups, and with captured government aims, waged pitched battles against the army for
days. When the fighting ended, at least 1,004 people had died and thousands more had
been wounded.116 In the aftermath, most of the labor and communist leaders in Colombia
were jailed. The government characterized the uprising as the "initiative of Communist
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revolution."117 An editorialist justifying the army's actions wrote in the Conservative El
Espectador, "El gobierno tiene elementos de guerra suficientes para hacer una carnicería en
la región bananera» y todo parece indicar que no desaprovechará la ocasión,
persistentemente buscada, de ensayar sus efectivos militares contra un grupo anárquico de
trabajadores rebeldes."118 In another editorial in El Espectador a few days later, the
Communists were blamed for the country's labor problems; "Es casi unánime el concepto
de que con la eficaz carnicería de trabajadores que en la zona bananera está haciendo el
ejército, va a quedar definitiva y satisfactoriamente eliminado el mal llamado problema del
comunismo en Colombia."119
Commenting on the failure of the strike to achieve the workers' demands, Alba
suggests that the Communist leadership had manipulated the entire affair for its own
ideological motives:
By making the strike appear to be an insurrection, the Communists isolated
it from liberal and socialist support, without which it was doomed from the
beginning. But the Colombian Communists were at least able to report their
"heroic activity" to Moscow. Months later, at the Communist Conference
of Montevideo and Buenos Aires, Mahecha reported on the strike and said:
"If we do not make the revolution, it is certain, absolutely certain, that the
liberals will." For this Communist fear of competition the Santa Marta
strikers paid with their lives.120
Despite the failure of the strike to achieve significant results for the laborers of
Santa Marta, there is wide-spread agreement that the Conservative government's inept
handling of the affair (unleashing the army) served to undermine the Conservative's
credibility and ultimately to damage irreparably their chances for re-election in the
upcoming elections.121
At the same time, it was also a death blow for hopes of an autonomous labor
movement. The massacre of the banana zone ultimately would give Gaitán the platform he
needed to rise as the champion of labor. In the Congressional debates that questioned the
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government's handling of the affair, Gaitán, referring to the United Fruit Company's
victory celebration exclaimed, "In those glasses of champagne bubbled the blood and tears
of the people."122
Soon after the strike, membership in the communist-socialist Partido Socialista
Revolucionario began to decline as Liberal Enrique Olaya Herrera's campaign gathered
steam.123 As Fluharty notes, the Colombian Socialist Revolutionary Party had been
created by "middle class artisans and the university students." Its orthodox Marxism, in
ideology, coupled with its middle class makeup left the bulk of its membership susceptible
to overtures from the social reformist wing of the Liberal party.124
Although the Communists did not succeed in forging an independent labor
movement in the 1920's, Eric J. Hobsbawm notes that "Communism played an analogous
role in the formation of the anti-elites of the 1920's, which subsequently became the
transforming force of the Liberal Party in the 1930's and 1940's."125 Hobsbawm here
refers to the group of "anti-elites" which become known as Los Nuevos which would lead
Colombia's liberal new-dealish reform era of the 1930's. With the Conservatives
discredited and divided, the decade of the 1930's would increasingly witness the ascent of
the Liberal Party as the major protagonist of the labor movement.
D ANCE OF THE MILLIONS
In the 1920's, during a period of spectacular economic growth, the government
embarked on a massive public works program to facilitate the expansion of its export
economy. Offering relatively high wages, these public projects provided employment for
tens of thousands of unskilled wage earners in Colombia's frontier areas. It also meant
increased competition for an already scarce supply of labor for the large coffee estates and
the plantations of the tropical banana regions. In 1924 alone, the government recruited
14,000 workers for public works projects such as railroads, highways and departmental

122Urrutia, Development, p. 107.
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projects.126 At the height of government expenditures on public works projects in 1928,
between 40,000 and 50,000 workers were employed earning relatively high wages.127
A major catalyst of the economic growth of the 1920's was the U.S.
indemnification to Colombia for the role it played in the secession of Panama. In addition
to the settlement itself, $25 million, U.S. private investment in Colombia climbed from $30
million in 1920 to $280 million in 1929.128 Accompanying this massive influx of foreign
capital flowed an additional $200 million in foreign credits.129 It was during this period,
which has become known as the "Dance of the Millions," that the extensive infrastructural
improvements undertaken by the government led to the construction of thousands of
kilometers of roads and railroads as well as significant improvements in both fluvial and
Caribbean port facilities.130 Foreign capital was pouring in and the nation's economy was
growing. The civil wars were a memory consigned to the past, and an elected civilian
government was in power with an active, loyal opposition. Bogotanos proudly referred to
their capital as the Athens of Latin America.
The Dance o f the Millions accelerated a process of capital accumulation that began
slowly with the export of coffee in the closing decades of the nineteenth century and
continued, unabated, until the late 1950's, and though slowing after 1960, up until today.
The expanding coffee industry, coupled with the Dance of the Millions, helped to cushion
Colombia from the harshest effects of the world depression, and prevented political unrest
that was common in other countries. Robert Dix accounts for this by citing the lack of élite
conflict of interests during the period: "in contrast with most of Latin America, the world
depression that began in 1929 did not inaugurate an era of political instability. The fact that
Colombia's élites were more unified than conflictual in their goals may partially account for
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this circumstance; that is, those favoring policies to promote industrial development did not
clash fundamentally with landowners, especially those tied to the all-important export trade
in coffee. In many cases they were the same people, or closely related. An alliance
between the new industrialists and the workers to push aside the landowners therefore did
not em erge."131
The influx of capital, along with high levels of accumulation of domestic capital
from the coffee industry led the country to adopt policies favoring rapid industrialization,
most notably a program of import substitution. Import substitution was successful in many
industries such as textiles: in the period 1927-1928 the local production of textiles for the
national market was 19 percent and import comprised 81 percent of the textile market
whereas in 1945 the reverse was true; 82 percent of the domestic market's textiles were
nationally produced while only 18 percent were imported.132 Overall, imports fell from 30
percent of total GNP in 1929 to a mere 10 percent in 1945.133
Although the economy would continue to grow, the period of limitless employment
opportunities was to end abruptly with the onset of the 1929 World Depression.
Moreover, at a time when the government was employing between 40-50,000 workers in
public works projects, government investment which had reached nearly 70 million pesos
in m id-1928; by 1932, public investment had dropped to less than 10 million pesos.134 In
late 1929, the official government figures showed 26,700 laborers unemployed, and wages
in the public works projects were reduced from $1.20 in 1928 to $0.90 in late 1929.135
Urrutia offers the figures tallied by labor inspectors in the various departments: 6,000
unemployed in Valle; 5,171 in Bolivar; 5,000 in Caldas; 4,879 in Cundinamarca; 4,176 in
Antioquia; 1,000 in Magdalena; and 500 in Choco, a total of 25,726, close to the official

131Robert Dix, The Politics o f Colombia (New York, W espoit Conn., London: Praeger Publishers, 1987),
p. 32,
132Kalmanovitz, Economía, p. 302, Kalmanovitz' argument that Colombia's import substitution
programs were on the whole very efficient, is found on pages 308-315.
133Kalmanovitz, Economía, p. 308.
134Zambrano, La. Intervención Económica del Estado, Graph 14, Significance.of.ihejnvesttnent.in
Railroads and Highways Over the Total o f National Public Investment ExpeodituresLl926rl936, p.
171.
135Zambrano, La Intervención Económica del Estado, p, 192.

168

totals.136. The Journal El trabajador latinoamericano offers the probably extremely
exaggerated estimate of 150,000 unemployed in Colombia in 1929.137 Although the
author was unable to obtain other figures on numbers of workers laid off during the
depression, one can be certain that with a seven-fold decrease in government outlays on
public works projects, the numbers must have been in the tens of thousands, easing the
labor shortage situation in the nation and bringing down wages.
Kalmanovitz argues that despite modest economic growth between 1930-34, there
was a "drastic reduction in wages, salaries and overtime" during these years of "vacas
flacas."138 Large numbers of rural laborers had migrated to the cities only to find
unemployment along with thousands of construction workers who had been laid off from
their jobs in the public works projects. Agricultural production had already begun to
decline, and this in turn had led to a sharp increase in prices of basic foodstuffs, creating
incentives for individuals to work in the agricultural sector. Thousands of newly
unemployed wage laborers from the government programs began to chose the countryside
as their destination rather than the city.
The government was attacked on its handling of the economy by the Liberals and
the Socialists, particularly its management of the foreign capital that had flowed into the
country. In reality, the Conservatives presided over the greatest economic expansion
Colombia had ever witnessed. Nevertheless, aided by the negative impact of the
depression, Liberals levelled attacks on government corruption, unnecessary foreign
borrowing that they argued threatened the nation's solvency, and excessive concessions to
foreign companies such as United Fruit that made Colombia little more than a colony.
The Conservative response to the labor unrest of 1929, especially the banana
massacre, gave the Liberals another issue which they were able to exploit to great
advantage. In 1927, under the pretext of preventing the "communist revolution" from
being exported to Colombia from Russia and Mexico, the government had enacted "La Ley
Heroica" which placed strict restrictions on individual liberty. La Ley Heroica gave police
the right to search the homes of individuals who were suspected of holding communistic
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ideas and detain them without any warrant from the authorities.139 One year later, the
Conservative-dominated Senate approved a bill further limiting individual liberty,

prohibiting gatherings and associations of groups involved in a long list of unacceptable
causes including, bolchevism, communism, prohibiting efforts to foment "attempts"
against the constitutional government, to foment "scorn" of the Catholic Church, to support
ideas contrary to the institution of the family, to promote ideas against the feelings of
loyalty to the nation, to attack the legitimacy of private property, and of consequence to
labor, the law prohibited the promotion or support of strikes.140 Those convicted of
promoting any of these ideas in speeches, letters, or the press were subject to four months
to one year in prison.141 The laws, along with the aforementioned issues, served to
irreparably undermine the credibility of the Conservative government.
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY FR ACTURES
In late 1929, the Colombian Conservative Party were faced with a national deficit of
32 million pesos,142 higher unemployment than the nation had seen in some time, saw
itself presiding over a virtual halt in the public works programs, and was viewed by
popular opinion as responsible for the bloody massacre in the banana zone. If the situation
were not grave enough, the party entered the 1930 elections divided.
Two individuals offered themselves as candidates, Guillermo Valencia and Vásquez
Cobo, each with about equal support within the party. As had become commonplace in the
Conservative Party, the Catholic Church exercised enormous influence on who the
presidential candidate would be. After vacillating for some time, Archbishop Monseñor
Perdomo chose one candidate only to change his mind during the ensuing weeks, and once
again returning to the original candidate several weeks later.143 This was the opening for
which the Liberals had hoped. Although the Liberal Party had determined to abstain from
participating, events led them to decide to offer a candidate.
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The party decided on Dr. Enrique Olaya Herrera, an aristocrat, and a venerable
member of the oligarchy. Moderate Conservatives had also approached Dr. Olaya, and the
new candidate headed a government that would be called the Concentración Nacional.
Though the Conservatives would have preferred to win the elections, Olaya Herrera was a
moderate that was acceptable to both parties’ moderates. Many Conservatives and
conservative Liberals alike were worried about a new radical, violent tendency they
perceived among the working class. Colombian historian Antonio Garcia comments on
this preoccupation;
The oligarchies of both parties felt the foundations of their republic shake
beneath them, and in the face of the horror of revolutionary uprisings, took
advantage of the union created by the Conservative split and the
disconcerting schism within the Church, to present to the country a new
road: that of National Concentration...and Olaya Herrera, a representative
figure of opportunist, ideal-poor republicanism... National Concentration
was a tactical maneuver to avoid revolutionary explosions, by transferring
power to a Liberal chief of the privileged classes. While the ingenious
Liberal public told itself that in Olaya's election it had found a tactical road
toward the new revolutionary order...falling victim to that amnesia so
frequent in our history...the upper classes, both Liberal and Conservative,
had saved their dynastic kingdom by an able maneuver.144
Whether or not Garcia's conclusions are accurate, the moderate reforms undertaken
by the Olaya administration heralded even greater changes that would be affected under the
more progressive government of López Pumarejo. For labor, the change from
Conservative to Liberal rule would mean increased protection and support from the central
government. It also meant that labor would not forge an independent "third way," to
become an autonomous force for change in society. Instead, labor would hitch its star to
the fate of the Liberal Party.
C O N C L U S IO N
In the first decades of the twentieth century, Colombia embarked upon a period of
rapid industrialization made possible by the installed capacity created by the coffee boom in
the closing years of the nineteenth century. The $25 million Panama settlement was
followed by a massive influx of U.S. and other foreign capital, the Dance o f the Millions,
which played a major role in Colombia's drive towards industrialization. The period
witnessed rapid growth of industry, improvement of transport links, and the creation of

144Quoted in Fluharty, Dance o f the Millions, p. 42.
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massive public works programs. In turn, the nation began to experience accelerated
demographic change and population growth, especially among the nation's departmental
capitals. Employment opportunities in the growing industries of the urban areas created
new channels of socio-economic mobility. A distinct wage-earning, working class was to
emerge in the first decades of the century: that class has continued to increase steadily in
numbers through the present day, Over time, segments of this working class have
developed an evolving consciousness of their distinctness as a group with interests separate
from other major social groups in Colombia such as artisans, industrialists, and the
commercial élite. Although this consciousness has often translated into isolated straggles
(such as single-factory or single sector strikes) of groups of workers to achieve economic
goals, rarely has it involved concerted actions by large segments of the working class:
outside the tiny, post-1930 Communist Party primarily led by intellectuals rather than
workers, never did this consciousness translate into proletarian revolutionary urges.
Early on in the century, a confusing array of "workers" groups arose which
generally included artisans, wage earners, and industrialists. Early organizations of
artisans, workers and intellectuals, such as the Worker's Party, strove to distance
themselves from the traditional parties. Though it had been created with the strong backing
of Uribista Liberals, by 1909 the Worker's Party sought to carve an independent path for
industrialists and workers.
Shortly after the party had determined to pursue a path independent of the
established parties, it was pulled into backing the Republicans who held moderately pro
worker stances and possessed more electoral clout than the new party. The other major
labor group which had been recently created, the UNIO, also committed to an independent
stance, supported the Liberals. "Groups such as the UNIO," Sowell comments, "posited
that if a united industrialist/worker political front could be formed, then it could bring about
the reforms necessary to make the "system" more responsive to their will and needs.
Ideally, members of the UNIO hoped, such a movement was to be independent of the
established parties, but reality dictated relations with Republicans and Liberals,
compromises not dissimilar to those made earlier by artisans."145 Like the artisans of the
second half of the nineteenth century, the new unions chose a path of cooperation rather
than confrontation, bowing to the traditional electoral strength of the established parties in
an effort to obtain tangible economic gains for their constituents. The offer of working
class and artisan support was contingent upon the established party's promise of support

145Sowell, "The Early Latin American Labor Movement," pp. 341-42,
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for labor candidates and social and economic policies that would help improve the lot of its
members. To the leadership of the new labor organizations, this strategy seemed the most
rational path for obtaining benefits for workers and artisans.
The Unión Obrera Colombiana was the first modem labor organization that limited
its membership to proletarians and artisans, excluding from its ranks industrialists which
had formed part of the earlier organizations. Although it too fell victim to partisan politics
in an effort to win pro-worker supporters through coalitions at the ballot box, its original,
worker-created platform called for a literacy campaign and public education for workers,
protection of national industries, increased wages and a clause to stop exploitation of
workers.
Anarchist influence was also apparent early in the century, though its reach was
limited almost exclusively to Colombian ports, railroads and rivers. The anarchists were a
radical influence
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workers in these sectors, their short-lived impact most apparent in

organization of banana and oil workers and particularly pronounced in early strike
organization. Eventually, the anarchist influence was replaced by better organized, more
consistent Liberal, Socialist and Communist efforts to organize workers.
The 1916 Partido Obrero and its independent successor, the Socialist Party of
Colombia created the same year, held a more conflictual view of society than had their
predecessors, recognizing two dominant classes in society, workers and consumers. The
Socialists recognized the Liberal Party as its chief competitor for the minds of the working
class. Socialists were however, also open to creating pragmatic alliances with candidates
from other parties who supported concrete reforms that could advance workers' interests.
Between 1919 and 1929, a number of strikes took place, making the strike a
common labor method of obtaining economic benefits. Many of the strikes were
successful in achieving worker demands, despite often being accompanied by violence.
The strikes were generally spearheaded by communist, socialist or anarchist organizers,
and were only applauded by mainstream Liberals if they were not accompanied by violent
protest and destruction of property.
The new Socialist Party soon began to be perceived as a threat to many Liberals
who could not understand why workers would turn away from the party that truly
responded to their interests, the Liberal Party. Strong electoral performances by socialist
candidates in 1919 alarmed Liberals who in some areas such as Antioquia, actually received
fewer votes than the Socialists. The Socialists’ organizational efforts and leadership role in
strike activities aimed at obtaining concrete benefits, made it the first independent
movement representing workers' interests that actually worked.
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There can be no doubt that the scores of pro-Socialist newspapers, successful
organizational efforts and a moderate, non-revolutionary ideology more palatable to socially
conservative artisans and a probable majority of the nation's workers, helped to forge a
new working class consciousness. This new consciousness was observable in workers’
demands for better health care and higher wages and the demand for other segments of
society to recognize workers* value as the nation's producers, demands similar to those
made by artisans in the 1860's, 70's and 80's. Even though the Party was coopted by the
left wing of the Liberal Party after 1924, it had succeeded in establishing numerous artisan
and industrial labor unions, a left-leaning, pro-worker press, and had led a number of
successful strikes.
Why then were many of the party's supporters were willing to abandon the
Socialist Party in 1922 to support the Liberal cause? To most, it seemed that 1922 could
actually bring a strong pro-labor Liberal candidate to the presidency. Since the Socialists
never created an ideology that differed profoundly from the welfare-oriented, left wing of
the Liberal Party,146 Benjamin Herrera was sufficiently reformist to appeal to most
Socialists, drawing them into an anti-Conservative coalition.
Another reason the Liberals were able to coopt the Socialists so quickly was the
reigning Conservative government's hostility to labor. Conservative governments violently
suppressed a number of strikes and made no secret of their mistrust of working class
organizations. Moreover, the Conservatives were vociferously anti-communist, often not
pausing to make fine distinctions between the reformist, moderate Socialist Party of
Colombia and the more radical communism of Lenin's Soviet Union. Socialist
intellectuals, artisans and workers alike were willing to return to the party which had
traditionally espoused equality, brotherhood, and social change.
What these groups chose to downplay or ignore was the fact that liberalism's
traditional proponents had promoted laissez-faire economic policies which had generally
had the effect of undermining workers' interests throughout the second half of the
nineteenth century. Moreover, abandoning an independent course for workers organization

146It m ust be kept in m ind that the platform drawn up at the Liberal Convention in ¡bagué in 1922 was
very similar to the platform developed at the Socialist Convention of Honda in 1920. Although the
Socialist Party was dissolved in 1925, a new party was created in 1926 by Ignacio Torres Giraldo,
María Cano (known as the Red Virgin of the Colombian proletariat), Raúl Mahecha, and Tomás Uribe
Márquez, that would eventually become the Colombian Communist Party of 1930. Although the new
party would not become a major catalyst for working class organization, it would be very active in
organizing peasants in one important coffee region in Colombia, Tolima as well as petroleum workers.
As was mentioned, the Communists also played a role in organizing the violent 1928 United Fruit
strike of banana workers.
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created a reliance
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the goodwill and favor of the élites who controlled the Liberal Party,

Although it was true that the party was currently embracing ideas and advocating positions
that favored the well-being of laborers, who could guarantee that the party would continue
to follow this path? Could not élite Liberal Party leaders begin to exploit the subservient
condition of labor to further their own goals, while offering just enough tangible economic
benefits to workers to guarantee their electoral support, much as they had done with the
democratic rhetoric of equality, democratic reforms and brotherhood they had used to sway
the artisans in the last century?
Colombia was passing through a forty-five year period of civil peace, with a
functioning democratic electoral system. What if the nation were to return to the bloody
civil wars of the nineteenth century that pitted Liberals against Conservatives, to the victor
going the spoils of government? Under such a scenario, Conservative-dominated
governments unchallenged by a loyal Liberal opposition would likely repress labor. This
possibility seemed very remote to socialist leaders in 1924. The defecting Socialists took a
calculated risk that at the time seemed to be a rational decision.
The Socialists-tumed-Liberals looked to the example of Uribe Uribe, certain that his
state-intervention, welfare-oriented, strong pro-working class stances were the ascendent
primary concerns of a modernizing Liberal Party. In this belief, they were largely correct.
While the general concept of free markets and international trade remained important
interests of the Liberal Party, the party began to concern itself more with nurturing
domestic industry, protecting workers' rights, and generally improving the standard of
living for Colombia's masses. In the 1930's, laissez-faire was replaced by stateintervention as the Liberals' rallying standard to be applied to the economic and social life
of the nation.
What happened to socialism
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the early 1920's in Colombia was not a simple

matter of cooptation by a more moderate Liberal Party. The Socialists themselves had a
profound impact on socializing the Liberal agenda. Moreover, the Socialists' defection
eventually would tip the scales in favo** of the radical wing of the Liberal Party, helping it to
become the dominant force in the party's political and social orientation. It made sense for
the Socialists to turn to an historically established party which had a solid electoral base and
which now seemed to be embracing the very same beliefs they themselves professed.
Given the benefit of historical retrospect, the question we now must address is how
much influence workers and socialists had in molding modem Liberal ideology? How did
that modernization translate into support for labor's goals? Did the trust vested in the
Liberal party by those who had previously supported an independent party to forego an
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independent Labor movement reap tangible benefits for workers? These questions aie
addressed in Chapter Seven.
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CHAPTER 7
LA B O R AND T H E LIB E R A L R E V O L U C IÓ N E N M A R C H A

...nuestra política es revolucionaria sin ser marxista, ni clasista, pero en modo alguno
pretende desconocer el orden social existente. No conspira contra el capital, ni espera la
oportunidad para quebrantar la propiedad privada y entregar las fábricas a los obreros y las
haciendas a los campesinos.
Alfonso López Pumarejo, Obras Selectas1
We were born Spanish....We speak the tongue o f Castile because we can speak no
other....The twenty cowardly governments [of Latin America] have put themselves into the
hands o f foreign nations, dedicated to false liberalism and to masonic, atheistic
democracy....The panorama is desolate....We are still conquered territory...
Hispanoamérica, the land o f vassalage....Each day the yoke o f Saxo-Americana is
drawn tighter around our throats. Sometimes the yoke is o f steel, sometimes o f silk, soft
and perfidious...
But-all is not lost. Th ere is still heard the voice o f Laureano Gómez to tell the truth
about the future, to direct us to the road o f tomorrow, the Catholic Hispanic Empire.
A nd we will go back to Spain.
Camacho Montoya praising Laureano Gómez from the pages o f El Siglo2
The exceptional strength of Colombia's traditional élite-led political parties and their
ability to successfully coopt more radical forms of workers' organizations inhibited the
development of working class cultural and organizational solidarity and autonomy. The
current chapter explores the evolving relationships between the left and moderate wings of
the Liberal Party, socialist and communist organizations, and organized labor.
L O S N U E V O S , SO C IA L ISM , AND A N EW ID E O L O G IC A L
O R IE N T A T IO N
Inspired by the ideals of Uribe Uribe, in the 192Q's several young intellectuals
began to question both traditional Liberal solutions to the nation's problems (laissez-faire
economics) as well as the predominant ideological focal point of the Conservatives
(Hispanic Catholicism). In the poetry and prose of Los Nuevos, the group wrote about

1 López Obras Selectas, T XI, p. 160 cited in Alvaro Tirado Mejia, "Algunos Aspectos del Pensamiento de
López Pumarejo," Revista Universidad de Medellin, Medellin: Editorial Lealon, Vol. 49, (May, 1986),
pp. 164-165. '
2Quoted in Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance o f the Millions, Militry Rule and the Social Revolution in
Colombia 1930-1956 (Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1966), p. 63.
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"everyday life and common language" in an attempt to try to understand themselves, their
era and their society,3 Comprised of such young intellectuals as Luis Tejada, Gabriel
Turbay, Lleras Restrepo, Alberto Lleras Camargo and Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, Los Nuevos
were profoundly influenced by socialist ideas in their youth and many later rose to
preeminence within the ranks of the Liberal Party,
Although Socialist Clubs had existed in Colombia as early as 1849» socialist
thought in the country did not become a major force until the 1920's. The socialist ideas
that reached Colombia via Barcelona, were inspired by the socialist writings of the idealists
Luis Tejada and Luis Vidoles.4 This socialist influence in the labor movement, particularly
among Los Nuevos helped shape the ideological development of the modem Liberal Party.
The other major influence on the thought of Los Nuevos was Uribe Uribe,
primarily in his advocacy of state intervention to enhance the welfare of the nation's poor,
his idea of "State Socialism." As early as 1904 Uribe Uribe had written:
Solo el Estado, que es perpetuo, representa los intereses perpetuos
de la sociedad; sólo él puede hacer desembolsos reproductivos a
través de los años; sólo él puede, con larga visión, imponer
sacrificios a las generaciones actuales para preparar a las venideras
una existencia mejor. En nuestra Colombia, sólo el esfuerzo
colectivo, bien dirigido y honradamente manejado, puede sacamos
de la postración, presente para convertimos en lo que debemos ser:
un pueblo rico, grande y glorioso, el primero en Hispanoamérica."5
Uribe also proposed other legislation that helped to make him popular with the
"new generation" such as indemnification for accidents in the workplace, workers'
disability pay, healthier working conditions, public assistance, obligatory education, free
medical care and legal service for the poor, construction of popular theaters, music halls,
libraries and museums, profit sharing, protection of industries, low-interest loans from the
government for workers and campesinos, cooperatives and a limit on the rights of
inheritance for the rich.6 Most of Los Nuevos, like Uribe Uribe, also stopped short of

3Kalmanovitz, Economía, p. 267.
4Victor Alba, Politics and the Labor Movement in Latin America (Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press, 1968), p. 106,
5Gerardo Molina, Las Ideas Liberales en Colombia, 1915-1934 (Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Tercer
Mundo, 1982), p. 183.
6Gerardo Molina, Las Ideas Liberales en Colombia, 1915-1934, pp. 185-86.
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supporting what he had disparagingly termed "street socialism," efforts to abolish private
property.
Although many Liberals such as Alberto Lleras Camargo, a future president of the
republic, believed that major reforms along such lines would improve the living conditions
of Colombian agricultural workers and laborers, nearly all of them also believed that reform
of the existing democratic system could affect the needed change while maintaining the
social system intact. While striving to support labor by openly pressing many of its
demands to the Conservative government, most Liberal élites were actually seeking allies
and electoral support: from the beginning, they wished to funnel and control labor rather
than work as an equal partner. Labor's aspirations could in their view, and in the view of
many labor activists, most effectively be asserted through the Liberal Party. An
independent party representing working class interests was unnecessary.
When the Liberals finally came to power, they institutionalized this sentiment by
passing legislation that included an article that prohibited workers’ groups from engaging in
independent political activities: "A los sindicatos les está prohibida cualquier ingerencia
directa o indirecta en la política militante del país. La contravención a lo dispuesto en éste
artículo tendrá como sanción la disolución inmediata del sindicato, previo concepto del
Ministerio Público, y será decretada por la Oficina General del Trabajo."7 This legislation,
and the later insistence of the last Liberal government before the terrible onslaught of la
Violencia, the administration of Alberto Lleras Camargo, to enforce it, is the most visible of
the Liberal Party's effort to control labor.
Legislating control of the process regulating relations between labor and capital
effectively limited political participation by labor to the two traditional parties. Liberals
certainly held an advantage as a result of their social-welfarist orientation. The Liberal
government's control of the labor movement also definitively ended earlier bids by groups
such as the old Republican party and the Socialist Party to play major roles in the
organization of workers. Such competition had concerned Liberal leaders who believed
that urban workers were a natural constituency. In the second decade of the century,
Liberal leaders were correct in this assumption. By the elections of 1921, the Liberals had
become justifiably alarmed by the successes of the Socialists. In an editorial in El
Espectador, a Liberal leader commented: "It is necessary that the Socialists understand that
since the Conservative Party is presently the only obstacle to the initiation of social reform,

7Article 23, Law 83. Quoted in Gómez Támara, "La intervención de los sindicatos en la política," RevistaUniversidad de Antioquia, (1945), p. 519.
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only by helping to defeat it through a successful campaign by a unified Liberalism, is one
really working to further the interests of the people,"8
In October of 1921, the Socialists ran their own candidates in municipal elections.
The success of the competition, writes Urrutia, "was instrumental in bringing about a
radical change in the ideology of the Liberal Party at the party convention later in the
month." Contemporary José Mar wrote:
In its convention the Liberal Party adopted the moderate and viable
socialist ideas....In view of this fact, the modest reforms for which
our serious socialist groups have been aspiring come under the most
efficient sponsorship—that of the Liberal Party, which advocates a
new ideology and has abandoned the old in d iv id u alist
doctrines....In view of this new attitude, completely new, and
logically divorced from ineffective individualism, the Liberal forces
shall be strengthened 011 the one hand, and on the other hand will be
forced to advocate the reforms for which the small and enthusiastic
socialist groups have valiantly fought. 9
José Mar correctly assessed what was happening within the ranks of the Liberal
Party: a perceptible shift away from the classical liberalism of Bentham, Locke, and Adam
Smith towards modem, or welfare liberalism which advocated a more interventionist
government stance in efforts to secure the general welfare of the nation's citizenry.
Seeking socialist support, Liberal presidential candidate Benjamin Herrera wrote in a letter
to the executive committee of the Socialist Party, "it is within the Liberal Party that the
groups which favor socialist organization can work with the greatest hope of success and
achieve the reforms which would improve the living standard of the masses."10 During the
months following the elections, the Liberal Party began to admit young Socialist
intellectuals, including Gaitán. In 1924 Gaitán wrote the following about the Liberal Party:
It is not by destroying the political tendency that in Colombia
represents the opposition and progressive party that one works best
for the triumph of the reforms that the people wish; we believe that it
is better to fight so that the progressive forces of Colombia inscribe
on their banners the new ideas, and so that they make their own the

8Richard Funk Harries, "Camilo Torres," p. 247.
9Miguel Urrutia, Development o f the Colombian Labor Movement, pp. 74-75.
10 W. O. Galbraith, Colombia: A General Survey (Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 144. Quoted in
Funk Harries, "Camilo Torres," p. 248.
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battle for the welfare of the proletariat and for the necessary
vindication of the serfs of capital.11
The political realization that the Liberal party faced a bona fide threat from the
Socialists coupled with the chorus of influential voices of the party’s ascendent leaders
from Los Nuevos whose ideological outlook had much more in common with the British
Fabians and Keynes than with Adam Smith, helped to move the party's focus to the left.
The rhetoric of the left wing of the Liberal party helped it capture the votes, if not the
complete trust, of most workers:
Antes de caer la metafórica hegemonía» cuando se vivía bajo eol
imperio de un reaccionarismo elemental, palpibaban en el subsuelo
político una multitutd de grupos revolucionarios, en su mayor parte
extremistas, y entre los cuales hallábase la flor de la juventud
anticonservadora de aquellos tiempos. El espíritu revolucionario no
podía traducirse sino en actividades clandestinas, condenadas y
perseguidas por el monótono celo de los mantenedores del orden de
cosas existente. Por fuera de aquellos esquivos núcleos juveniles
reinaba el horizonte conservador en todas las latitudes. La esfera
ideológica de la nación giraba sobre los dos polos de la extrema
derecha, cristalizada en el gobierno y en sus hombres, y de la
extrema izquierda, donde las inteligencias puras de Gabriel Turbay,
José Mar, Luis Tejada, Moisés Prieto y otros tan buenos se habían
atrincherado, desoladas, rebeldes, en el marxismo de la Tercera
Internacional.12
Even during the Liberal Party's political shift toward more active government
involvement in social welfare issues such as creating a system of social security and
supporting labor legislation that provided safeguards for laborers, mainstream Liberal
thought and actions remained firmly planted within the boundaries of the existing political,
economic and social system. Mainstream liberalism in Colombia in the 1930's sought not
to forge a new society based on socialist principles, but rather to reform the existing system
to make it more responsive to the needs of the pueblo. To labor, the message of the Liberal
party was clear: Colombian liberalism is pledged to advance the material cause of workers.
In view of its historical electoral strength, the Liberal party seemed the only reasonable
choice for laborers who wished to see the defeat of a Conservative government which held
an antagonistic stance towards workers and the labor movement. Liberalism's message

^Miguel Urrutia, D evelopm ent, p. 79.
12Acción Liberal, No. 40, 1936, p.29. Quoted in Gonzalo Sánchez, Ensayos de historia social y política
del siglo XX, (Bogotá: Ancora, 1984), p. 57.
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was seductive. The decade of the 1930's witnessed the virtual absorption of labor into the
Liberal camp. In the process, the Liberal party coopted the creation of an autonomous
labor movement and preempted the articulation of an independent workers' voice in
society's affairs.
T H E R U RA L PR O T E ST : SM A LL H O L D ER ST R U G G LES TO A C Q U IR E
LAND T IT L E S
The 1920's and 1930’s witnessed a period of agrarian unrest as conflicts erupted in
foreign enclaves such as fruit and oil and between hacendados eager to expand their
landholdings in the new territories and peasant colonos. One reason for this timing argues
historian Erich Hobsbawm, was that at the beginning of the twentieth century a peasant
consciousness began to emerge. In addition to Gaitán's Union Nacional Izquierdista
Revolucionaria (UNIR) and the Colombian Communist Party, anarcho-syndicalist groups
such as the group led by Juan de Dios Romero, the Movimiento Agrario del Sumapaz, as
well as the smaller Partido Agrario Nacional (PAN) began to press for agrarian reform.13
Hobsbawm maintains that the collapse of the international primary products market in 1929
aggravated what had already become an acute social crisis: "Foreign-owned enterprise such
as United Fruit provided a natural spark-plug for explosion, though its significance in the
Colombian economy at the time was limited."14 As has been alluded to previously,
communists, and with much greater success, liberals began to attempt to organize rural
workers. In foreign enclaves, particularly the fruit companies, the communists played a
role in organizing workers, such as in the 1928 Santa Marta strike.
Despite concerted efforts by communist leaders to organize peasants, communists
met with little organizational success in the countryside. There conflicts largely arose from
disputes between individual peasants or between peasants and large landowners over land
claims. Since land disputes frequently involved individual colonos seeking to better their
own conditions by owning their own means of production, and since many disputes pitted
one colono against another, in most cases these individuals did not easily lend themselves
to concerted, cooperative action.

13A good discussion o f the ideological differences of each o f these groups can be found in Gonzalo
Sánchez's excellent essay, "Las ligas campesinas en Colombia", in Ensayos de historia social y política
del siglo XX, (Bogotá: Ancora, 1984).

14Eric Hobsbawm, "Ideology and Social Change in Colombia," in Ideology and Social Change in Latin
America, edited by June Nash, Juan Corradi and Hobart Spalding Jr. (New York, London, Paris: Gordon
and Breach Science Publishers Inc., 1977), p. 193.
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The Russian Revolution had exerted a special attraction for the far left wing of the
labor movement as early as 1924. Fluharty notes that Colombian Communists were active
in the creation of the Latin America Confederation of Unions (CSLA), which exerted a
strong influence on labor throughout the continent between 1924 and 1934.15 The appeal
of communism was strengthened by intellectuals, such as Raul Mahecha, who brought
ideas from the international labor conferences held in Moscow in 1927 and 1928 to
Colombia.16
The ideological differences among the small number of leftists who did not defect to
liberal ranks, adherents to the new Communist Party, as to the type of support and
resources that should be dedicated to organizing peasants rather than proletarians also
helped to stifle a more conceited organizational effort. As Fluharty notes, the Communist
Party in Colombia "came from the unrest of middle class artisans and the university
students. It was orthodox Marxist in theory, but the peasants and workers knew it not, and
its intellectual adherents later veered away into the Socialist party and the reformist wing of
the Liberal party."17 Bergquist in his Labor in Latin America also alludes to the
communists' failure to capitalize on their early successes organizing peasants as a result of
ideological blinders: "It is a curious fact that the Colombian Communist Party, officially
formed in 1930, complained to the International in 1935 that its membership was
insufficiently proletarian, being composed primarily of peasants and Indians, rather than
workers (International Press Correspondence 1935: 1348)"18 Although active in
organizing a national coffee strike in late 1934 and early 1935 and enjoying limited success
with the ligas campesinas, the Communists had waited too long to begin efforts to organize
rural laborers. The following year the Communist Party made a fateful decision to enter
into a direct alliance with the Liberal government.
In addition to the ideological reasons impeding effective early organization of rural
workers by the Communists (proletarians, not peasants are the driving force of history in
the Marxist paradigm), tactical errors were made based on misinterpretations of Colombian
socio-economic realities. Even after the 1928 United Fruit strike had failed to generate a
revolutionary movement and had led to the ensuing carnage at Ciénaga, in an address to the

15Fluharty, Dance

o f the Millions, p. 36.

16Fluhaity, Dance

o f the Millions, p. 36.

17Fluharty, Dance

o f the M illions, p. 36.

18Bergquist, Labor, p. 194.
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Socialist Revolutionary Party of Colombia (PSR) in February 1929, the Third Communist
International still hinted that conditions were nearly ripe for a massive insurrection directed
at the major expressions of "imperialism", the U.S. fruit companies; "Existen, pues, en
Colombia, -se afirmaba-todos los signos de una crisis económica, financiera y política
próxima."19 Many in the PSR interpreted Moscow's message to mean that large-scale
strikes could be channelled and converted into a broad scale revolutionary movement,
despite their experience of the dismal failure of the .1928 strike to generate anything even
proximating revolution. In the process of forging a social revolution from massive strike
activities, socialist leadership hoped to employ the same strategy Liberáis were to adapt so
successfully in the immediate future: coopt and absorb liberal elements into the straggle.
Once the battle lines had been drawn the Communists believed, many liberals would be
absorbed into the movement, liberals who "were really revolutionaries in the popular and
democratic sense, or who could evolve in such a way, in the heat of the revolutionary
movement of the masses."20 The Communists failed to attract left-wing liberals to their
cause. They also failed to ignite social revolution.
It would at first glance seem that the coffee sector might be fertile grounds for leftleaning organizers, especially given the numerous struggles between powerful landowners
and poor colonos. Coffee supported a substantial portion of the Colombian workforce:
estimates range from between 500,000 to one million workers engaged in full-time or
harvest-work in coffee production, the latter figure representing nearly one eighth the entire
population of Colombia in the late 1920's.21 Between 1905 and 1920, coffee exports
expanded from just over one-half million 60 kilo sacks with a value of slightly more than
five million pesos to approximately two million sacks in 1925 with a value of more than 65
million pesos. (See table 7:1)
Another factor favoring communist organizers was the depression. The onset of
the depression and the downsizing of public works projects created a new pool of
unemployed rural laborers. Urrutia notes that these workers helped to "radicalize" rural
protests:

19Message from tlie Communist International to the Socialist Revolutionary Party of Colombia, Moscow,
February 1929 cited in Gonzalo Sánchez, Ensayos, pp. 68-70.
20Ignacio Torres Giraldo, Los inconformes, (vol. 4, Editorial Margen Izquierdo, Bogotá, 1974), p. 48.
2bergquist, Labor, pp. 332-333.
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The men who had been in contact with the anarchist labor organizations in
the oil fields, the banana zone, and among the railroad and dock workers
refused to accept the archaic tenant landlord relationship of the Colombian
latifundia. W ith the help of communist agitators, the peasants formed
leagues in Cundinamarca, Tolima, and Valle, and attempted to obtain the
right to their own land. In same cases they invaded uncultivated haciendas
and defended their newly acquired land by force of arms.22

TABLE 7:1
Colombian Coffee Exports 1900-1925
Volume and Value
Y ear
1 9 0 0 -4
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1 911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1 921
1922
1923
1924
1925

E xports (sacks
of 6 0 kilos)

Value (Col.
P eso s)

5 0 0 ,8 1 1
6 3 6 ,0 0 5
5 6 8 ,3 7 7
6 0 6 ,7 4 9
7 0 7 ,0 2 0
5 7 0 ,0 1 1
6 3 1 ,6 6 6
9 3 2 ,2 2 2
1 ,0 2 0 ,7 4 1
1 ,0 3 2 ,1 3 6
1 ,1 2 9 ,8 4 9
1 ,2 1 1 ,1 4 5
1 ,0 4 7 ,3 9 4
1 ,1 4 8 ,8 4 0
1 ,6 8 4 ,1 0 7
1 ,4 4 3 ,9 4 7
2 ,3 4 5 ,5 9 5
1 ,7 6 4 ,8 2 3
2 ,0 6 0 ,6 5 8
2 ,2 1 5 ,8 2 4
1 ,9 4 6 ,7 3 0

5 ,0 3 6 ,2 4 0
6 ,1 3 1 ,7 6 0
5 ,3 3 8 ,2 7 3
5 ,5 4 9 ,0 6 4
6 ,3 4 6 ,9 5 2
5 ,5 1 7 ,4 0 8
9 ,4 7 5 ,4 4 8
1 6 ,7 7 7 ,9 0 8
1 8 ,3 6 9 ,7 6 8
1 6 ,0 9 8 ,1 8 5
1 8 ,2 7 8 ,6 3 1
15 ,9 9 6 ,0 3 1
1 7 ,6 5 1 ,5 6 9
2 0 ,6 7 5 ,0 2 3
5 4 ,2 9 1 ,6 3 8
3 6 ,3 2 8 ,3 3 3
4 1 ,9 4 5 ,0 5 2
3 6 ,2 9 1 ,8 1 2
4 5 ,0 8 8 ,9 0 6
6 8 ,7 9 3 ,3 5 3
6 6 ,5 2 4 ,0 5 6

Source: Charles B ergquist, C o ffee a n d C onflict, Table 10:1, p. 255.

One area where socialist and communist organizers in fact enjoyed modest success
was in the support they extended to the peasant leagues, las ligas campesinas, most
involving coffee workers. In order to stimulate agricultural production, which had
continued to decline since 1929, the Liberal governments of the 1930's had decided it was
necessary to adopt a more positive stance toward the nation's small-holders. Law 83 of

22U rrutia, Development, p. 130.
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1931 gave labor groups the right to organize.23 Law 200 of 1936 sought to provide de
jure recognition of colono and peasant land claims, voiding titles if original deeds could not
be produced by landholders.
By the early 1930's, several peasant leagues and been organized and had
successfully carried out land invasions. Both Jorge Eliécer Gaitán's UNIR and the Partido
Comunista de Colombia (PCC) helped to organize successful land occupations by
peasants.24 Though Gaitánismo appealed more powerfully to the urban poor than in the
countryside, there is some evidence that the great populist demagogue made a significant
impact among the peasantry."25 Famous among the PCC's efforts was the 1925-1929
organizing campaign of the Red Flower, María Cano, poet and daughter of a Liberal family
in Medellin who owned an important newspaper.26
Ideologically, the peasant leagues drew inspiration from the pens and pamphlets of
leftist leaders, many of whom were artisans. In places such as in the rural coffee municipio
el Líbano, in northern Tolima, the "bolcheviques del Líbano" received strong grass-roots
support from artisans.
One such individual was the radical publicist Jorge Ferreira who worked and wrote
in el Líbano. In his Testamento del Diablo in 1931, he deplores the vicious cycle of
indebtedness of the arrendatarios:
¿Qué le queda al cafetero
de tantas angustias, ¿tántas?
deudas, males y recuentos
de la cosecha que pasa
por eso voy a donarle
una remota esperanza
de otra que se aproxima
que será la que lo salva;
lo dejo mis ilusiones
y mis cuentas problemáticas
para que llegue pensando
al final de la jomada llevando entre su morral
un puñado de esperanzas:

23Urrutia, D evelopm ent, p. 118.
24Paul. Oquist, Violence, Conflict and Politics in Colombia, pp. 96-97.
25Hobsbawm, "Ideology," p. 195.
26An excellent, contemporary source on the organizational efforts of the Communist Party, UNIR and
other socialist organizations is Gonzalo Sánchez's collection of essays Ensayos de historia social y
política del siglo X X (Bogotá: Ancora, 1984).
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tisis» paludismo, anemia
y hasta el alma hipotecada.27
An insurgency in el Líbano led by radical artisans which attempted to seize state
power in 1929, was defeated by Colombian militia, police,and army units.28
One of the most famous examples of successful invasions of haciendas was the
Colonia Agrícola de Sumapaz in Cundinamarca. Over 6000 peasants successfully returned
to this area, claiming that it had been illegally taken from them.29 Other invasions
elsewhere in Cundinamarca and Tolima also proved successful.
Communist and UNIR organizational efforts helped to serve as catalysts to action
among coffee smallholders in instances when a large number of squatters, invasores, or
legitimate owners who had been robbed of their land through enclosures, sought to press
their claims against one or two landowners who were resisting their efforts to occupy or
gain title to the land. Here socialist ideals and organizational skills, consistent with the felt
needs of the farmers, were able to mobilize rural workers to resist landholder efforts to
expel peasants and help them to press their own claims to title for the land.
Throughout the 1930's, the government was active in solving disputes that would
arise from landowner - squatter conflicts. The general course of action under Liberal
governments was to buy the occupied land form the landowner and then sell it back to the
peasants on credit. At times, the government declared the invaded land national land, and
gave the squatters legal title. Even in one of the earliest areas of Spanish colonization in the
nation, Cundinamarca, the total number of coffee farms notably increased in the 1930’s,
strongly suggesting that Liberal reforms coupled with local activism yielded some positive
results, at least in terms of returning formerly owned lands that had been enclosed by
powerful landholders. Table 7:2 gives some idea of the effect the division of haciendas had
on the numbers of coffee farms in Cundinamarca during this period.

27Colorado (pseudonym o f Jorge Ferreira) in El Testamento del Diablo, Tipografía Líbano, August 1931
quoted in Gonzalo Sánchez, "Los bolcheviques del Líbano," Ensayos de historia social y política del
siglo XX (Bogotá: Ancora, 1984), pp. 48-49.
^Gonzalo Sánchez, in "Los bolcheviques," discusses this event in detail in chapter four.
29 Catherine LeGrand, "Labor Acquisition and Social Conflict on the Colombian Frontier, 1850-1936,"
Latin American Studies, Vol. 16, (1985), p. 46.
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TABLE 7:2
Cundinamarca's Coffee Farms in 1932 and 1940
Year

Number of Farms

Production in 60-kilo Sacks

1932
1940

13,812
30,270
Source: Miguel Urrutia, p. 132.

364,379
370,018

Without a doubt, forced sale of lands controlled by large landowners but cultivated
by campesinos led to authentic land reform in certain regions of the country. Bergquist is
correct when he asserts that such success achieved by collective action "in the early 1930's,
as in parts of Cundinamarca and Valle (Informes 1934) was largely due to such organized
movements, which obviously also affected the subsequent national legislation of the López
government."30
Although successes such as the victory achieved at the hacienda Sumapaz were
numerous, particularly where the movements were given organizational impetus by UNIR
or the Communist Party, many land occupations failed to attain legal title for peasants.
Among these include the December 1931 occupation of 1,500 campesinos in Caldas who
claimed titles to various portions of four haciendas, "La Argentina", "La Española", El
Orinoco", and "Nápoles". After several "fact-finding" missions by local, departmental and
national officials had been undertaken, all four property disputes were adjudicated in favor
of the hacendados.3l In 1936, again in Caldas, 150 colonos were ejected from the
properties that they had occupied for at least fifteen years when an unfavorable judgement
was handed down by the Ministry of Industries.32
Indian resguardo lands also often fell victim to the new legislation. In one case,
Indians were driven off their communal lands in south Tolima by the powerful landowners
Marco Tulio Alvira, Leonardo Salamanca, and Gustavo Mosquera, with the complicity of
local and regional officials.33 The lands were then successfully claimed by the landowners
under the pretext of Law 200 by claiming that the land was commons. In Cauca, a group
of Indians were also violently expelled from their lands in "El Chero" under the same

30Bergquist, Labor, p. 194.
3Gonzalo Sánchez, Ensayos, p. 180.
32Gonzalo Sánchez, Ensayos, p. 181.
33Gonzalo Sánchez, Ensayos, p. 203.
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pretext.34 Thus, while Law 200 was relatively effective in some regions in restoring lands
to peasants and colonos, such as in Cundinamarca and Antioquia, it was ineffective in other
regions which had strong traditions of powerful hacienda owners such as in Caldas, and
achieved mixed results in regions such as Tolima and Valle del Cauca. Although the
agrarian reform was successful at reducing agrarian conflicts, it also undermined many
claims made by peasants and other smallholders to the plots of land that they had occupied
and worked.
One factor that worked against communist and left-wing liberal organizers and
provided stiff resistance to cooperative forms of organization was the strong individualist
sentiment of the Colombian peasant.35 Labor shortages in the late 1920's and early 1930's
gave workers in the Colombian coffee industry special leverage. The large hacendados had
to pay top salaries to attract workers to bring in the coffee crops, and in many cases, the
landowners had to make concessions in terms how their tenants used the land; many
landowners were forced to allow tenants to grow coffee on the plots of land where the
peasant and his family lived.
Also during this period, colonos and other workers who were engaged in growing
coffee formed alliances with élites of the Liberal or Conservative parties, in many cases
permitting the smallholder to make a successful bid to obtain individual title to a parcel of
land through such clientelist ties. Although initially one route adapted by the smallholders
was collective action against encroachments of powerful large landowners through
organized resistance taking the form of the ligas campesinas, many employed the
successful strategy of using their individual clientelist ties with the traditional parties to
advance their claims. Such successful individualist strategies coupled with the strong
desire to own their own land helped make many rural workers far more receptive to élite
ideologies which also happened to extol the virtues of individual ownership of private
property, than to leftist messages of communal ownership of property. Bergquist writes
the following in defence of this view:
If the terms of struggle reinforced their individualism, their receptivity to the
ideological message of the ruling class, and their conformity to the clientelist
politics of the traditional parties, it left them resistant to collective
organization and leftist ideology and carried them inexorably toward
fratricidal conflict-it was not because smallholders were rendered less

34Gonzalo Sánchez, Ensayos, p. 203.
35This point has been discussed in Chapter Six o f the present work. See Bergquist's argument on the
Colombian peasant-as-entrepreneur in his Labor in Latin America, pp. 320-331.
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human by their experience and their straggle. It was because their
intelligence and enormous energy were channeled by the structural
imperatives of their existence into a destructive individualist dynamic
beyond their control. It was the very success of coffee smallholders that
sealed their fate as a class and ensured the decline of popular social and
political forces in Colombia during the 1930's and 1940's. That process
castrated an insurgent labor movement, led to the co-optation of the political
left, and ended in the Violence at mid-century.36
Even though small-holders were relatively successful at obtaining title to land, as
William McGreevey argues, the Federación Nacional de Cafeteros allowed the élite to
maintain control over the coffee industry by controlling transport, marketing, and export
functions. Their strategy, argues McGreevey, was to "...let production units fall back to
their natural size, roughly that which could be managed and cultivated by a single
arrendatario and his family along with a crew of seasonal workers. Restrict the access of
those producers to the market by filtering their product and sales through a national
organization controlled by the nation's senior economic leadership. Operate the system not
for individual gain but for a class of senior executives identified by the industry as a
w hole."37
While individual peasants struggled to obtain right to the lands they worked by
employing the individualist strategy of utilizing their clientelist ties, their endeavors
coincided with a dramatic change in the tactics of the Colombian Communist Party. The
Liberals did not merely articulate and employ a carefully designed strategy to coopt the left,
they were actually abetted in their plans by tactical manoeuvres of the left itself, moves
which ultimately played into the hands of the Liberals. The Communist Party's decision in
1937 to adopt the strategies elaborated at the VII Congress of the Communist International,
which basically promoted alliances with social democrats and other bourgeois groups with
a reformist bent, was as one contemporary communist writer states, "disastrous for the
revolutionary movement."38
During the Third National Worker's Congress held in Cali in 1937, the Communist
Party declared its desire to "facilitate its unification with the three currents which oriented
and directed the popular movement, leaving it nearly entirely in the command of liberalism,

36Bergquist, Labor, p.330.
37William Paul McGreevey, "Reinterpreting Colombian Economic History," Journal o f Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs, Vol 23 No. 3 (August 1981). p. 359. Bergquist makes the same argument.
38GonzaIo Sánchez, Ensayos, p. 199.
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which at this time corresponds to the historic mission to conserve democracy.”39 While it
is true that as early as 1928 the Social Revolutionary Party had welcomed the Liberals as
allies who "embraced a revolutionary ideology and temperament"40 in their effort to present
a united front in order to defeat the reactionary Conservatives, by declaring its solidarity
with the government of López, the Communist Party went much further, renouncing its
leadership of the revolutionary movement, and declaring itself the champion of order and
peace: "en reconocer desde ya la preeminencia debida al Partido Liberal, como partido
democático de mayores masas dentro de las organizaciones del pais."41 A year later, the
rationale for the Communist Party's stance was succinctly stated in another article
appearing in the party's official publication, Tierra: "...Pensamos que hay estadios (sic.)
que llenar antes de nuestro tumo, y que es el liberalismo quien debe ejecutar esa tarea..."42
Strict adherence to the national party's interpretation of the International's line and
the party's insistence on rigidly adhering to ideologized visions of the ideal society based
on foreign, external models, obscured from the party's leadership actual Colombian social
reality in the countryside. What Helio Jaguaribe wrote of the Communist Party in
Argentina is equally true of the Colombian Communist Party:
Founded to be the party of the working class and the great masses, the party
was not able to extend its appeal beyond the restricted circle of specialist
workers...and still less to mobilize the great masses. Eventually it gained
academic and political respectability and became representative of a certain
sector of the middle class, mostly composed of intellectuals and
bureaucrats, who at the theoretical level adopted the most radical view but in
a purely abstract form-a view which was essentially unconnected with their
socio-historical conditions and their concrete lives.43
While the Communist Party sowed the seeds of its own destruction,44 in terms of
national influence in the affairs of labor, the issue had already been decided:

39Tierra, January 1937, quoted in Gonzalo Sánchez, Ensayos, p. 199.
40Gerardo Molina, Las Ideas Liberales en Colombia: 1915-1934, p. 230.
^ T ierra, February 1937, No. 152, quoted in Gonzalo Sánchez, Ensayos, p. 199.
^ T ierra , January 14, 1938 No. 150, in Sánchez, Ensayos, p. 200.

43Helio Jaguaribe, "Marxism and Latin American Development," in Marx and the Western World (1966),
pp. 229-252.
44In the latter half of 1938, members openly debated whether or not to abolish the party. See Gonzalo
Sánchez, Ensayos, p. 201.
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overwhelmingly, Colombians remained loyal to the two traditional parties. Although rural
workers seemed to have been roughly evenly divided in their support of the liberal and
conservative parties, urban laborers displayed a strong preference for the Liberal Party.
Hobsbawm correctly asserts that during this period, "a tendency to chose Liberalism as the
party 'of the people' makes itself felt, encouraged by the development of socially conscious
or "New Deal" forces within the Liberal Party.45
The following section will explore how those "New Deal" forces became a Liberal
blueprint for social reform during la Revolución en Marcha.
LA REVOLUCÍON E N MARCHA
By the 1930's, as a result of rapid urban growth the balance of power in Colombia
had tipped in favor of the Liberal Party, which had traditionally been stronger in the cities.
Liberal governments in the 1930's and 1940's strongly encouraged the growth of labor
organization, largely due to the influence of Los Nuevos. As Hobsbawm writes, "no
doubt in 1928-48 the force which transformed Colombian politics came from popular
movements. No doubt the institutional changes which followed found a more suitable
vehicle in the Liberal Party, for partly ideological reasons - because this party believed in
"progress," "economic growth" and "the people" rather than in "order," "tradition" and
"hierarchy." No doubt the small groups of radical ideologues who provided the impetus of
the change (in terms of politics and ideas) contributed to the institutional changes."46 With
the election of the first Liberal government in nearly fifty years, a trend leading to the
Liberal corporativist incorporation of labor movement was set in motion 47
The Liberal governments of Enrique Olaya Herrera (1930-1934) and Alfonso López
Pumarejo (1934-38, 1942-45) embarked on a path of social and economic reform. Several
socialists held important post during their administrations, each contributing his own
individual efforts to orient the party towards labor. Among the voices from the left were
Lleras Restrepo, the former president of the socialist-oriented National Student Union, who
became Minister of Finance in 1938 and Jorge Eliécer Gaitán who held ministries and

45Hobsbawm, "Ideology," p. 197.
46Hobsbawm, "Ideology," p. 189.
47See Manuel Moncayo and Fernando Rojas' Luchas obreras y política laboral en Colombia (Bogotá: 1978)
for an incisive analysis of (lie affect this corporativist legislation had on coopting Colombian labor.
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mayoralties between 1936 and 1942 and occupied the office of Vice President of the
Republic.48
At a time when the one overriding concern of Colombian politicians was to attract
foreign capital, Enrique Olaya Herrera, a moderate, was chosen by the Liberals.
Ambassador to the United States» Olaya was also selected because he was a compromise
candidate that the Conservatives could live with. Highly erudite, from an old established
family, the believed that Olaya would serve as an ideal candidate to lead a transitional
government of "concentration"49.
In broad terms, the Liberal program sought to modernize the state by modernizing
state administrative functions, rationalizing finances, and developing a group of highly
trained technocrats to ran government programs and offices efficiently. Olaya's
government continued to follow the path of import substitution through protection of
domestic industries and also protected agricultural production. During the first three years
of Olaya's term, more than 840 industries were created under this program.50 Other
reforms undertaken during Olaya's presidency include the creation of limited public
housing programs, regulation of the oil industry, and reforms leading to increased access
by average Colombians to education and public health programs.
In labor politics, Law 83 of 1931 recognized the rights of workers to legally form
unions. The law also provided for government regulation of the unions' right to strike.
Other legislation passed during Olaya's term included Law 105 of 1931 that outlined
circumstances in which salaries could not be garnished and Law 134 that recognized the
legal status of cooperatives.51 The following year legislation covering retirement
compensation was passed and Law 10 established specific guidelines for workers' rights to
vacation, sick leave, and compensation for unjust dismissal52 Finally a presidential decree
in 1934 legalized a right for which laborers had long straggled: an 8-hour work day.53

48Fa!s Borda, Subversion, p. 139.

49For the social and political thought of Olaya Herrera, see Gerardo Molina, Las Ideas Liberales en
Colombia, 1915-1934 (Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1982).
50Molina, Las Ideas Liberales en Colombia, 1915-1934, p. 247.
51Molina, Las ideas liberales en Colombia: 1915-1934, p. 247.

52Molina, Las ideas liberales en Colombia: 1915-1934, p. 248.
53Daniel Pecaut, Politica y sindicalista en Colombia, p. 121.
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Despite such progressive reforms, a number of strikes were called during Olaya's
presidency, including a strike of Antioqian railroad workers in 1.932 that the government
declared illegal on June Second.54 Most strikes between 1931 and 1934 however, were
resolved in favor of workers.
One reason for the great increase in strike activity during Olaya's presidency, in
addition to the legitimization of labor organization, was the economic crisis of 1929-31.
During that period national income fell from 75 million pesos to 35 million, while at the
same time foreign trade declined in value from 122 million pesos in 1929 to 80.4 million
pesos in 1931 and 68 million in 1933.55 Imports fell during same period from 162 million
pesos in 1928 to around 50 million pesos between 1931-33.56 On the other hand,
industrial growth proceeded apace, 842 industrial establishments created during this same
period,57 growth averaging 10.8 percent per year between 1933 and 1938.58
The strongest pro-labor government of the 1930's was the first presidency of
Alfonso López (1934 - 1938). Although Law 83 of 1931 had had the effect of legalizing
both labor unions and collective bargaining,59 the López government passed additional
legislation that increased the protection of laborers and provided them with important social
welfare benefits.
López, son of a wealthy coffee exporter, early gained a reputation in politics in the
1920's by attacking the Conservative government, especially the fiscal policies of Méndez
"prosperity by debt" that López believed were leading to "the stratification of the nation.1’60

54Ricardo Sanchez, Historia Política de la Clase Obrera en Colombia (Bogotá: Editorial la Rosa Roja»
1982.), p. 89.

55Gerardo Molina, Las Ideas Liberales en Colombia, 1915-1934, p. 243.
56.Gerardo Molina, Las Ideas Liberales en Colombia, 1915-1934, p. 244.
57Gerardo Molina, Las Ideas Liberales en Colombia, de 1934 a la Iniciación del Frente Nacional (Bogotá,
Colombia: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1986), p. 23.
58Moncayo and Rojas, Luchas, p. 58.
59Moises Troncoso and Ben Bumett, The Rise o f the Latin American Labor Movement (New York:
Bookman Associates United Printing Services, 1960), pp. 82-88; and Oquist, Violence, p. 160.
60Fluharty, Dance o f the Millions, p. 47. For the political thought of López Pumarejo, see the concise
article by Alvaro Tirado Mejia, "Algunos Aspectos del Pensamiento de López Pumarejo," Revista
Universidad de Medellin, Medellin: Editorial Lealon, Vol. 49, (May, 1986). Also see Gerardo Molina,
Las Ideas Liberales en Colombia, de 1934 a la Iniciación del Frente Nacional and Thomas C. Tirado,
Alfonso López Pumarejo: El Conciliador (Bogotá: Planeta Editorial S.A., 1986).

194

López had a work background ideally suited to the task of modernizing the government.
He had served as an agent for Baker-Kellogg investment bankers, helping to direct the
massive influx of American investments during the Dance of the Millions, worked as both a
newspaper writer and editor, and had served a term as Colombia's ambassador to England
in 193 L 61
Despite López' upper class background, it was he rather than Gaitán who first
shook the traditional élite-dominated political establishment. Socialist historian Gerardo
Molina describes him in the following way: "Ese burgués libre de prejuicios, imaginativo y
penetrante» tenía una personalididad fuera de serie que le permitía ir contra el orden
comente de las cosas....López se fue radicalizando hasta el punto de que durante su primer
mandato se enfrentó a su clase y a ratos era el más expresivo vocero de los insumisos e
inconformes."62
López detested caudillismo» and was uncompromising in his defense of democracy
as he understood the concept. An advocate of universal suffrage, for López, the middle
class, urban workers, campesinos, and lastly, the upper classes comprised the pueblo, and
each individual had a right to participate in society's political affairs. He believed that the
majority, mostly workers, campesinos, and the growing middle class represented the true
will of the pueblo, and given the assistance of a basic education, could well guide the
development of the nation. López went so far as to criticize the "oligarchy" which had long
ruled Colombia as being out of touch with social reality and national imperatives. In his
acceptance speech as candidate for the Liberal party in November 1933, he proclaimed:
No encuentro en la historia nacional el ejemplo de un período de gobierno
que nos se haya constitutuido como una oligarquía, más o menos
disimimulada, o que no haya derivado hacia esa forma de mando, olvidando
sus obligaciones con los electores. El poder público ha rotado así durante
un siglo, azarosamente en los días de guerra civil y con indiferencia en la
paz, de una oligarquía a otra, de un círculo a otro, de una casta determinada
a su antagonista o a la heredera de sus simpatías..."63
Among López' intellectual debts are included his Liberal forerunner, Uribe Uribe,
the Peruvian Apristas and the Mexican Constitution of 1917, the first constitution in the
continent to outline the legal responsibilities of the state in the economy, education, and the

61Huharty, D ance o f the M illions, pp. 47-48.
62Gerardo Molina, Las Ideas Liberales en Colombia, de 1934 a la Iniciación del Frente Nacional, pp. 11-12.
63Gerardo Molina, Las Ideas Liberales en Colombia, de 1934 a la Iniciación del Frente Nacional, p. 49.
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first to declare the social function of property.64 Other sources included the policies of his
contemporary in the United States, Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, as well as Socialist and
Marxist thought.
López saw himself at the head of a movement to create a revolutionary new social
and economic order through his, Revolución en Marcha, but not through violent
revolution. He wanted to disperse more widely land-holdings because he believed both
that the land would be more productive and that such a measure was democratic: it would
help raise the standard of living of rural masses effectively enabling them to participate
more fully in society. He was also keenly aware of the power differential between the
oligarchy and workers. It was the state that had a moral obligation to protect the rights of
workers.
It was the state that also assumed the obligation to undertake the primary
responsibility for educating the nation's citizenry so that all Colombians could be informed
participants in the political life of the nation. Under López, the Catholic Church's role as
the nation's provider of education was dramatically reduced, the primary role being placed
in the hands of the state.65 López also pushed education programs for workers, including
programs to create a technically qualified group of professionals to run modem society. In.
an address to Congress in 1935, he stressed the need for new types of professionals:
"Faltan químicos industriales, directores de taller, mecánicos, agrónomos y no tenemos
institutos que estén tratando de prepararlos. Las facultades universitarias producen
abogados, doctores en filosofía y ciencias socialies, médicos, ingenieros y dentistas. Y
esto no es suficiente. Es urgente ponemos al día en el manejo elemental de una civilización
importada, cuyos recursos ignoramos y cuyos instrumentos escapan a nuestro dominio.
Mientras ello no ocurra no habrá autonomía nacional, no habrá independencia económica,
no habrá soberanía."66 As a result of his belief in the power of education, between 1935
and 1938 the national budget allocated for education quadrupled, primary school was made
free and compulsory, normal schools were established, and the Universidad Nacional,

64Robert Dix in his earlier book, Colombia: The Political Dimensions o f Change (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press), 1967, p. 82.
65The legislation removed church control of primary education, barred priests from holding public offices,
and removed the clause in the Constitution declaring Catholicism the official state religion. See
Fluharty, Dance o f the Millions, p. 54.
66Quoted in Gerardo Molina, Las Ideas Liberales en Colombia, de 1934 a la Iniciación del Frente Nacional,
p. 25.
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which boasted a more modem, practical cuniculum than traditional universities, was
founded,67
In 1936 constitutional codification was undertaken, giving the state a legal role in
economic development of the nation. The codification provided a legal means to protect
domestic industry and agriculture, promote economic growth by establishing credit
institutions and strengthening those already existing. Article 19 also provided the basis for
the creation of social welfare programs, declaring that, "Public assistance is a function of
the state. It shall be given to persons who, being physically incapable of working, lack the
means of self-support or the right to demand the same of other persons. The law will
determine in what form assistance shall be given, and the cases in which the State should
give it directly."68
Article 20 of the Codification was probably the most radical measures of all,
declaring that property had a specific social function.69 Article 20 states:
Private property and other rights legally acquired in accordance with the
civil laws by natural or juridic persons shall be guaranteed; nor may they be
disavowed by later laws. When the enforcement of a law passed for
reasons of public utility or social interest conflicts with the rights of
individuals, private interests must give way to the public or social interests.
Property is a social function which implies obligations. For reasons of
public utility or of social interest, as defined by the legislature, property may
be expropriated by judicial decree with prior indemnification. Nevertheless,
the legislature, for reasons of equity, may deny indemnification by means of
an absolute majority vote of the members of both Houses.70
Explaining the rationale for the new law, López offered the following: "El partido
considera el territorio de la república como patrimonio de todos los colombianos; favorece
cualquier iniciativa que tienda a lograr que la propiedad territorial cumpla satisfactoriamente
la función social que le corresponde y reconoce al trabajo como fuente primordial de la
propiedad privada."71 Fluharty argues that the inordinate length of time stipulated in.
Article 39, ten years, castrated the provision, "in practice, almost no land returned to public

67Fluhaity, Dance o f the Millions, p. 54.
68Fluharty, Dance o f the Millions, pp. 53-54,
69FIuliaity, Dance o f the Millions, p. 54.
70Quoted in Funk Harries, "Camilo Torces Restrepo", p. 259.
71Gerardo Molina, Las Ideas Liberales en Colombia, de 1934 a la Iniciación del Frente N ational, p. 18.
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hands under this provision."72 Nevertheless, the new legislation drew unconditional
condemnation from Conservatives and right-leaning Liberals alike. More likely than not, it
was the direct catalyst leading to the creation of the Asociación Patiiótica Económica
Nacional (APEN) in 1936» a coalition of latifundia owners, entrepreneurs, and
industrialists formed to resist the new pro-labor, pro-smallholder legislation.73
Another important and controversial law passed the same year was Law 200 of
1936. The first major agrarian reform in Colombia, it was designed to clear up conflicts
over land titles. As discussed earlier, Law 200 actually set back many small independent
landholders since it sanctioned many of the large landholders' property claims.74 While
legitimating land claims for thousands of small-holders and colonos, it also led to the legal
eviction of thousands of peasants. Regardless of its outcome, the intent of Law 200 was
clear: to provide idle land for campesinos to put into productive use. Soon after López had
been elected, he was besieged by letters form large landowners in Cundinamarca and
Tolima demanding that the government take action against squatters who had invaded
uncultivated lands. His response was unsettling to the landowners:
the law cannot be put to the unconditional service of injustice, and although
the country's legal institutions were made to defend the owner of property
and to maintain the level of misery of the rural wage earners, the
government, without ignoring its duty to protect the landowners whose land
was cultivated against squatters, preferfs] to wait until the constitutional
reforms it [has] proposed [gives] it better instruments for intervention in the
social problems of agriculture.75
He added that the government's main intention was to improve the campesinos’
standard of living and "to condition the right of property to its rational economic use."76
Among the most unpopular laws in the eyes of the élite passed during López tenure
were the provisions that led to the creation of a progressive income tax (Law 78). As
Fluharty notes, taxes in Colombia were ineffectually collected: "No one paid taxes, except
in the manner of a government making a symbolic payment on its external debt." Under

72Fluharty, Dance o f the Millions, p. 54.
73Fals Borda, Subversión, p. 139
74LeGrand, "Labor Acquisition", (p.45) Oquist Violence, (p.98) and Gloria Gaitán, La lucha por la tierra en
la década del 30, (Bogotá, 1984), pp. 90-92, all hold this view.
75Miguel UiTutia, Development, p. 123.
76Miguel Urrutia, Development, p. 123.
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the new law, the following provisions were enacted: the maximum tax on net income was
17 percent; a patrimony tax was put into place on profits in excess of 12 percent per year
and these could run as high as 30 percent.77 Most unnerving for the wealthy however was
the government's determination to collect these taxes: in 1939, new revenue amounted to
more than nineteen million pesos and the number of tax-paying business concerns
increased by 256 percent over pre-Lopez days.78 This move led to a major expansion of
government revenues as well as a shift away from customs receipts in favor of income tax
as the major revenue earner.
Again, this legislation alienated the nation's industrialists prompting APEN to
launch a campaign to fight the tax reform.79 Its members claimed that this move, along
with the social function of property clause mentioned previously and other reforms, was a
communist inspiration.
While such government initiatives as the national income tax made him many
enemies among the élite,80 López received broad-based support for his programs from
workers and rural laborers. As a result of the unease felt by both moderate and right-wing
Liberals at the pace of the reform program however, moderate liberals led by Eduardo
Santos in Congress argued that it was time to slow the Revolución en Marcha in an effort,
they claimed, to consolidate the party's gains. In 1938, Santos was selected over the
Lópista candidate by a slim margin at the Liberal Party Congress, and was subsequently
elected president of the Republic. In 1942 however, López was again elected to the
presidency.
C R E A T IO N O F T H E C O N F E D E R A C IÓ N D E T R A B A JA D O R E S D E
C O LO M BIA (C T C )
As discussed above, Law 83 passed during the Olaya Herrera presidency legalized
the rights of unions to organize. As a consequence, the Confederación Sindical de
Colombia, later renamed the Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia (CTC) was
organized in 1936. By 1943, the Confederación would be comprised of 900 locals and

77Gerardo Molina, Las Ideas Liberales en Colombia, de 1934 a la Iniciación del Frente Nacional, p. 53.
78Fluharty, Dance o f the Millions, p. 55.
79Gerardo Molina, Las Ideas Liberales en Colombia, de 1934 a la Iniciación del Frente Nacional, p. 53.
80Laureano Gómez, leader of the Conservative party apparently justified plots to assassinate López. See
Urrutia, Development, p. 124.
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nearly 100,000 workers.81 The López government along with the Liberal Congress passed
a series of laws to improve the conditions for workers. Article 18 of the codification gave
unions, except those comprised of workers in the public services, the right to strike; the
law was subsequently implemented by Presidential Decree No. 2350, Law Number 6.82
Shortly after the CTC was organized, it began to receive financial support from the
government Not only did the Liberals support the Confederation by generally favoring
labor over business in labor disputes in which government arbitrators intervened, the
Second Labor Conference of the CTC was actually financed by a subsidy from the Liberal
government. Minister of Government Carlos Lozano emphasized the importance the López
administration placed on labor:
The government considers unions as organisms especially designed to
improve the situation and discipline of workers and peasants, who by
organizing will acquire a greater understanding of their duties and their
rights.
Unions help to develop culture and professional education and contribute in
many ways to the intellectual and social progress of the workers. [This]
government wishes to sustain, encourage, and protect unions, watching that
they limit their activities to those ends for which they have been created,
without becoming immersed in political activities which weaken their
authority and injure the worker's interests.^3
As one might infer from this statement, such government "protection," also implied
increased government control. In 1937, the government passed a series of laws regulating
union expenditures of government subsidies.84 The following year, Decree 2342 was
promulgated creating a division of union supervision in the Labor Ministry, that was
charged with the responsibility of regulating union elections, inspecting financial records,
and endowed with other regulatory powers over the unions.85
The government also issued many veiled warnings such as the one above advising
labor to avoid political activity. Under Santos’ government in fact, the government would

81The figure o f 100,000 is from Urrutia, Development, p. 183 and the 900 figure is taken from Fluharty,
Dance o f the M illions, p. 49.
^ F lu h a rty , Dance o f the Millions, p, 49.
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take an even more active role in limiting the influence of the communists in labor unions.
Oquist describes what was happening to the labor movement during the Revolución en
Marcha: "Progressively the labor movement became an instrument of the Lopista Wing of
the Liberal Party which maintained a popular from alliance with the Communists in the
Labor movement. Thus, the once belligerent labor movement was institutionalized and
controlled by the Liberal governments of the 1930's."86
Although the Liberal Party extended its support to labor groups, it did so in
selective fashion. It held out as carrot its support for moderate unions and labor
organization while applying the threat of martial law as a stick for those it considered too
radical. For example, the government supported the laborers of Tropical Oil in
Barracabarmeja during a labor dispute in 1934. It also pressured the management of
United Fruit to make wage concessions during the 1935 strike in the Department of
Magdalena. However, in response to a violent rail strike in Antioquia, the government
declared martial law.87
It is important to note that all major strikes during the late 1930's were settled only
after the government had intervened. Between 1935 and 1939 of 218 labor-management
conflicts, 155 were resolved after official intervention, 70 after the workers had resorted to
a strike and 38 were resolved by direct negotiations between the parties.88 Most conflicts,
as mentioned above, were resolved in favor of labor.
During the Presidency of Eduardo Santos (1938-1942), the Liberal Party's
relationship with labor became strained. Most labor leaders had supported Santos'
opponent in the campaign, Lopez' Minister of Education, Dario Echandia. Santos, though
not especially antagonistic towards labor, was especially interested in keeping the socialist
and communist influence in the CTC at bay. He stated:
Yo he visto con inquietud varias veces expresando públicamente, el hecho
de que la confederación sindical de Colombia aparezca presidida y dirigida
por elementos que son en su mayoría enemigos del liberalismo. Yo no
considero que sea indiferente para los intereses del liberalismo, ni que sea
inocente para los fines que debe perseguir la organización sindical el que a la

86Oquist, Violence, p. 161.
870quist, Violence, p. 161.
88Ricardo Sánchez, Historia politica de la clase obrera en Colombia, p. 91.
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cabeza de ella figuren todos, absolutamente todos, los jefes del socialismo y
del comunismo en Colombia89
Born to a wealthy family and editor of the prestigious Liberal newspaper El
Tiempo, under Santos the government sought to slow the growth of labor organizations.
During his presidency, labor was less combative and there was a dramatic reduction in the
total number of active unions. As a result of over-reliance on state protection, the number
of unions (one probably exaggerated estimate places the number of active unions at 16
reduced from a pre-Santos total of 1.67) as well as a drastic decline in strikes.90. The new
Liberal government also sought to control unions through government control of funds, by
requiring government officials' attendance in union meetings, by prohibiting strikes in the
public service sector* and by designating the plant union as the principal bargaining unit for
collective negotiations (preventing the collective pressure that could be brought under
industry-wide unions).91
The 1941 Liberal convention was a frenetic one, pitting the moderate forces of
Santos against the left-wing of the party dominated by the Lopistas. The moderate Liberals
and the Conservatives supported Arango Velez, a well-known Bogotá attorney. López
won the election by a mere 200,000 votes. Conservatives charging that the elections had
been rigged.
Under the second government of Alfonso López, the tempo of social reforms
slowed dramatically. Socialist writers mark the period of 1942 through 1946 as the era in
which the industrial bourgeoisie placed the labor movement under the definitive control of
the state.92 It does appeal* theat the pace of the institutionalization of labor quickened while
the government's former focus on social change was greatly diminished. In 1943, for

89Cited in Moncayo and Rojas, Luchas, p. 61, n, 29.
90Daniel Pecaut, Política y Sindicalismo en Colombia (Bogotá: Ediciones Culturales, 1982), pp. 194195.
91 Pecaut, Política, p. 197.
92Cesar Mendoza Ramos, Surgimiento y Desarrollo de la Clase Obrera en Barranquilla, Paper presented at
the Third Congress of Colombian History, Universidad de Antioquia, Medellin, Colombia, (November,
1981), p. 11. In reality, the Liberals sought to control labor from the beginning of the first Liberal
governm ent in 1930. Law 83, for example, prohibited unions from engaging in politics upon the threat
o f dissolution by the government.

202

example, the Congress passed legislation limiting unions' rights to strike and established a
requirement for obligatory arbitration after 30 days of strike.93
While the second López administration was more restrictive, the period also
witnessed a major expansion of unions. Of the 1,645 unions that existed in 1947, nearly
half, some 719, were new unions established.during Lopez's second presidency.94 After
an abortive military coup, López determined to push through legislation that would
systematize labor-management relations. Justifying his actions, in 1944 López wrote:
Las leyes existentes son insuficientes, son contradictorias, son ineficaces
para prevenir tales conflictos y no los encauzan hacia desenlaces de justicia
sino con lentitítud exasperante. La huelga, la fuerza sindical, la coacción,
imponen después de un tremendo forcejeo que altera la paz social, ventajas
que muchas veces han sido reconocidas a las clases asalariadas por las
propias leyes. El Gobierno carece de medios suficientes para hacer aceptar
sus dictámenes y por tanto sus intervenciones son generalmente estériles.95
In an effort to consolidate the labor laws that had been passed during the 1930's
and 1940's, in 1945 presidential efforts led to the promulgation of Law 6, which became
known as the Colombian Labor Code. Law 6 established a minimum wage, regulations for
severance pay, pay for Sundays not worked, regulations on workplace safety,
compensation for work-related accidents, and nonoccupational illnesses, two-week paid
vacation, overtime pay and job security guarantees for union leaders.96 It also prohibited
management from contracting scab labor during legal strikes. Legal is the operative word,
referring to strikes that were not in the public services, that had objectives which were not
legally proscribed, that followed the legally prescribed conciliation procedures, that the
strike was peaceful, and that the strike be declared by a majority of members in the union,
as long as the unions was comprised of more than 50 percent of the enterprise's workers.97
Despite the more moderate pace and tone of López' second government however,
opposition to his programs continued to mount

93Pecaut, Política, p. 203,
94Pecaut, Política, p. 196«
95El Tiempo, October 10, 1944, cited in Moncayo and Rojas, Ensayos, p. 66.
96Urrutia, Development, p. 163.
97Urrutia, Development, p. 163-164.
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C O N SER V A TIV E R E A C TIO N
Strong Conservative opposition to the extensive reforms of the Liberal government
began making itself felt as early as 1935, and thereafter accelerated. After 1937» opposition
from the right wing of the Liberal Party also began to appear, but the moderate presidency
of Eduardo Santos temporarily suspended it from becoming a major threat. Conservative
chieftain Laureano Gómez' criticism of the Liberal government was even more vocal during
Lopez' second term, playing on the interests of both landowners and entrepreneurs who
felt threatened by a Liberal government dedicated to ensuring that labor received a larger
share of the benefits of industrial development, Lopez's agrarian policy had made many
enemies among the powerful large landowners, and his secularizing reforms had alienated
the hierarchy of the still-powerful Catholic Church.
In an effort to counteract the growing influence of labor groups, businesses and
large landowners stepped up the activities of APEN. Other organizations such as the
Asociación Nacional de Industriales (ANDI) and the Federación Nacional de Comerciantes
(FENALCO) were also created to preserve and further the interests of business and to
attempt to halt the Liberal reforms.
Acción Católica led by Father Vicente Andrade established a new labor central, the
Union de Trabajadores de Colombia (UTC), the Workers Union of Colombia in 1946.
Although the new confederation declared that it would not become embroiled in political
partisanship, the Conservative government smiled broadly upon the UTC while decisively
repressing the CTC. By early 1949, the new union would have as many members as the
CTC. Moreover, while the UTC did not declare its partisanship openly, the influence of a
resurgent, conservative Catholicism is apparent. In Article Three, the founding fathers
wrote, "The Confederation shall adopt as the fundamental basis for its straggle, the
principles of Catholic Social Doctrine, as taught by the Popes. The Confederation shall
inspire and orient its campaigns according to these doctrines, and within the law."98 The
momentum that a semi-autonomous labor movement had gained under successive Liberal
governments abruptly ended in 1945.
In his second term, President López was not only faced with criticism from the
Conservatives, but also began to be faced with growing dissent among moderate and right
wing elements in his own party. As a result of mounting pressure applied by these groups
that were disenchanted by the broad scope and rapid pace of his social reforms, and racked

98Urrutia, D evelopment, p. 212.
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by a scandal in his family that seriously damaged his credibility, President López resigned
in 1945.
In his resignation speech, López talked about the chasm between politicians and
workers, focusing on the right wing's flirtation with European fascism and hinting at the
development of a working class consciousness that could become revolutionary and
threaten Colombian dem ocracy," He wrote:
It alarms me that there should be created-as it appears there has been
created-a political class far removed from the vital interests of the
Colombian worker, from his present preoccupations and his legitimate
ambitions...there are new factors of disorder which did not exist before.
Such as the active industrial development which is causing and creating
interests of such magnitude that they openly defy the force of the laws, the
power of the Executive Branch and of Justice itself. Such as the awakening
of a sleeping social consciousness which can turn toward violence more
easily when it learns that violence produces concrete results. Such as,
finally, the disorganization of the contemporary world, in which it was our
lot to see abolished by force, and still not yet reestablished, the essential
principles of our political and social civilization, and the victory, though
fleeting, of other forms, all arbitrary and subversive of our classical
tradition.100
In Lopez's place stepped Alberto Lleras Camargo, who adopted a markedly
different stance towards organized labor. During his administration, government
intervention on behalf of the workers during labor disputes was all but ended.
A pronounced shift in the mood of the Liberal Party is reflected in a Liberal writer's
comment in late 1945 in Revista de la. Universidad de Antioquia that although many unions
had been forced to organize outside the law before 1931, the Liberal Party had championed
their cause after that date by enacting pro-labor legislation. The author cautioned, however,
that "la intervención política de los sindicatos, infortunadamente para los trabajadores, para
el Estado, para la Nación Colombiana y para el Liberalismo, ha venido siendo dirigida por

"B erg q u ist argues that this division was what the reformers were frightened of: "[what] moderate reformers
within the Liberal and Conservative parties feared most was the polarization of Colombian politics into
a reactionary repressive bloc, led by the right wing of the Conservative party, and a revolutionary
socialist movement, formed out of an alliance between a Marxist labor movement and the left wing of
the Liberal party." Bergquist, Labor, p. 241.
i m M ensaje de Renuncia del Presidente López, cited in Fluharty, Dance o f the Millions, pp. 76-77.
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los comunistas. Y el gobierno liberal, amigo de los trabajadores» en bien de ellos, no
puede permitir que siga el estado actual de las cosas."101
Along with the goal of providing oversight of the unions, the same author
comments that the Departamento Nacional del Trabajo was created to obtain an "exact
understanding of the activities" of the unions, and to carry out "investigations necessary to
determine the conduct of unions suspected of violating statutes and according to the
case...ad vising the appropriate Circuit Judge who may decree the dissolution of the union,
in accordance with Law 83 of 1931."102
Another dramatic example of the change in official government policy was
Camargo’s reaction to a strike of Magdalena river transport workers in November, 1945.
Threatened by post-war inflation and increased levels of silting which had decreased river
transportation, FEDENAL, the most powerful union in Colombia at the time, had
organized a strike.103 After shipping companies had labeled the strike "revolutionary," in
a radio address delivered to the nation, Camargo declared: "In this country there is only one
government, mine. If the workers do not return to their labors today, they will receive
exemplary sanctions. It cannot be permitted that there are two governments, one on the
river and another in the rest of the country."104
T H E D E C L IN E O F LA B O R 'S P O L IT IC A L IN FL U E N C E
In a show of support for FEDENAL strike, the Confederación de Trabajadores de
Colombia called for a nation-wide sympathy strike. The government sided with the
shipping company and sent troops to the area to keep the strikers from interfering with the
company's operations. Although the work stoppage lasted until January 19, the strike
ended in failure. "The labor movement lost momentum and autonomy," Borda writes,
"and was unable to became firmly established among the people. For this reason it was
relatively easy for President Lleras Camargo to subdue a labor strike on the Magdalena

101 Adolfo Gómez Támara, "La intervención de los sindicatos en la política," Revista Universidad de
Antioquia, (December, 1945), p. 520.
102Adolfo Gómez Támara, "La intervención de los sindicatos", p. 521.
103Oquist, Violence, p. 112.
104Oquist, Violence, p. 112.
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river; it meant the end of the Confederation of Colombian Workers as an effectively
organized labor force.*'105
The labor movement suffered another setback in 1946» though it was not related to
an abortive strike. The Liberal Party faced the 1946 presidential elections with two
candidates; Gabriel Turbay, a moderate Liberal supported by the Communists and officially
by the CTC, and Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, who garnered the support of urban labor. Gaitán
conducted a populist campaign in the name of the país nacional, or the pueblo against the
oligarchy, the pais politico.
The right 011 the other hand was well prepared to enter the presidential race. At the
time, the most influential leader in the Conservative Party was Laureano Gómez, the same
caudillo who had endorsed Acción Intrepida, an earlier effort to assassinate López.
Fluharty writes the following on Gómez:
Laureano Gómez, in many ways the real leader of the Conservative Party in
these years, was particularly vehement in his denunciations of Liberalsindeed, of all who disagreed with his self-proclaimed mission to save
Colombian society form "heresy" and "communism," and to preserve
traditional Catholic values. Gaitán had conducted his 1946 campaign not so
much against a party as against the 'oligarchy' that, in his view, ruled both
traditional parties.106
Gómez, who edited the Conservative newspaper El Siglo, was educated as a civil
engineer, was deeply Catholic and had a strong belief in law and order. Gómez adhered to
a form of social Darwinism, believing that Colombia's indigenous peoples, blacks and
even the mestizos who comprised the majority of the population were inferior. He claimed
that mestizos were, "fisiológica y psicológicamente inferiores a las razas componentes."107
As was common in the right wing of the Conservative Party, Gómez admired
Franco's Spain. El Siglo, the main Conservative newspaper was arguably pro-Axis. In a
speech made at a 1937 banquet attended by diplomats from the Franco government visiting
Bogotá, Gómez praised the Falange:
Spain, marching forward as the sole defender of Christian civilization, leads
the western nations in the reconstruction of Hispanidad, and we inscribe our
names in the roster of its phalanxes with unutterable satisfaction...we bless

105Fals Borda, Subversion, p. 141»
lOfipiuharty, Dance o f the M illions, p. 35.
107From Laureano Gómez, Interrogantes sobre el Proge so en Colombia, (Bogotá, Populibro, 1970), pp.
44, 46-47. Quoted in Kalmanovitz, Economía, p. 269.
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God who has permitted us to live in an era of unutterable transformations,
and who has given it to us to utter, with a cry that springs from the very
depths of our hearts: "Up Catholic, Imperial Spain!”108
Gómez' partisans went so far as to organize the Camisas Negras»the Colombian
equivalent of the Falange, at the Conservative leader's office at El Siglo.109
The rupture within the Liberal Party allowed a compromise Conservative candidate,
Mariano Ospina Pérez, to be elected with only 41 percent of the vote.110 President Pérez,
the candidate oí "National Unity,” had little interest in cultivating labor's support. He
stepped up the anti-labor policies begun by his Liberal predecessor. In 1946, for example,
he sent troops to the Cauca Valley to quell a labor dispute that had arisen in Cali. Violent
confrontations between strikers and the army led the government to declare a state of siege
in the region.111 Again, in the face of government repression, the strike failed.
The reason for Ospina Pérez' antagonism towards labor should be viewed in terms
of how he interpreted the nation's problems:
"Colombia [needs] an orderly revolution within the framework of peace.
That is what we propose to bring about, from our position of power, in
order to effect an authentic national transformation which will make
Colombia a responsible and strong State...a small urban nuclei who have
been led astray by demagogic propaganda, who do not see the worker's real
interest, but only a chance to make political capital....The Country is tired of
anarchy... it is not a question of repressing liberties, but of making liberty
responsible. Every day I become convinced that we must make our national
motto a reality: Liberty and Order. It is necessary to harmonize, not to
oppose, these two factors of social energy.”112
In 1948, new decrees mandated government approval of union meetings and
agendas, removed from the courts the right to declare public sector strikes illegal placing
them instead in the hands of the executive branch, and weakened laws providing protection

^ F lu h a rty , Dance o f the M illions, p. 63.
109Fluharty, Dance o f the Millions, p. 63.
110Robert Dix, The Politics o f Colombia (New York, Wesport Conn., London: Praeger Publishers,
1987), p. 47.
11 ^ a ls Borda, Subversion, p. 142.
112Fluharty, Dance o f the Millions, p. 110
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from arbitrary firing ot union organizers.113 A new labor code was also begun in 1948
that would continue to reverse much of the pro-labor legislation enacted during the
Revolución en Marcha.
Throughout Pérez' presidency, Gómez served as the "power behind the throne,"
advising the President and virtually dictating the Conservative Party line. In 1949 Gómez
decided that at long last it was his time to assume the presidency.
In 1950 ultra-Conservative Laureano Gómez (1950-1953) was elected to the
presidency. During his term, which eventually earned even the disapprobation of his own
party, new laws enforced provisions calling for government approval in order to hold
union meetings, required the attendance of police officers or soldiers at labor functions, and
led to the dismissal of many labor leaders from their jobs.114
After this event, labor organizers realized that their best chances of obtaining real
bread and butter benefits for the workers, rested with the Liberal Party. The only other real
alternative, was to accept a subordinate role to capital, along the lines of the UTC model,
by utilizing collective bargaining strategies under Conservative governments hostile to
militant labor activism. Oquist comments on this development: "The fate of the most
important labor organizations thus became inextricably linked to the partisan struggle of the
Liberal Party to block the formation of Conservative political hegemony."115 In actuality,
as we have argued throughout this paper, labor had always been embroiled in the partisan
struggle between the two great parties, taking brief spells of respite during occasions when
its leaders felt that partisanship held no hopes of supporting the aims worker demands.
G A ITÁ N AND T H E LA BO R M O V EM EN T
Gaitán has been criticized by many observers as an unscrupulous demagogue who
manipulated the masses for his own political ends. Conservative President Mariano Ospina
Pérez' brother-in-law Julio Hernández wrote, "[Gaitán] was an able jurist, but a
demagogue with a vague policy which he defined in his party slogan 'Charge,' without
making it clear against what, in what direction, or with what purpose...our demagogues,

113Bergquist, Labor, p. 357.
114Urrutia, D evelopm ent, p. 223.
115Oquist, Violence, p. 114.

209

whose principal was Gaitán, [took] advantage of the intellectual weakness and economic
conditions of the poor people."116
Yet reading his Las Ideas Socialistas en Colombia, one realizes that Gaitán's
philosophy was relatively consistent throughout his political career.117 A demagogue
perhaps, but he was not the opportunistic demagogue painted by Hernández. Gaitán
constantly strived to achieve his ideal, to establish "el necesario equilibrio entre la gran
mayoría que nada tiene, contra una minoría que posee todos los medios de producción y
que explota al infeliz."118
Gaitán grew up in a marginal neighborhood, the son of a used bookshop keeper.
Imbued with a deep respect for artisans and small business owners whom he had seen
work hard to "salir adelante, Gaitán fought against corruption in government, other
privileges accorded the élite in society as a benefit of their status, and a system in which
patronage jobs were doled out help to non-professionals. A captivating speaker, he
disapproved of both communism and fascism believing both to be undemocratic. In his
eyes, a straggle existed in society between the Pueblo or the país nacional (everyone except
the élite) and the oligarquía or the pais politico. Those who produced in society, the
workers who created wealth, received unjust rewards from their labors. Gaitán's support
base was the urban artisan and industrial worker.
Alberto Niño, Conservative and chief of national security under the Ospina Pérez
government was a friend of Gaitán's. He described him thus:
Gaitán was a living paradox. He was a revolutionary who hated disorder;
he loved the people...he attributed all virtues to them and execrated himself
when, in his dealings with them, he discovered some of their defects. He
liked politics, but lacked the tortuous and hypocritical discretion of the
politician...he believed in truth, his truth was the Good, and for it he was
dogmatic...incom parable leader of the masses, and an enemy of class
conflict, still he roused in the country that very conflict by molding his
actions and his words as an instrument for creating the consciousness of
class among the popular masses.119

116Quoted in Fluharty, Dance

of the Millions, p. 78.

117Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, Las Ideas Socialistas en Colombia Tesis de Grado, 1924, (Bogotá: Librería
Publicitaria, 1976).
1^Q u o te d in Molina, Las Ideas Liberales en Colombia, de 1934 a la Iniciación del Fi ente Nacional, p.
252.
119Fluharty, Dance o f the Millions, p. 80

210

By 1947, the schism in the Labor Party had healed and Gaitán was recognized as
the undisputed leader of the National Liberal Directorate. The Communists, who had
abandoned Gaitán in the 1946 presidential elections and had supported the moderate
Turbay, sought to return to the fold. Gaitán rejected their offer however, realizing that he
no longer needed their support since Communist influence in Colombian labor and politics
had long since waned. In March of 1948, Gaitán ended Liberal participation in the
'National Unity' cabinet of Ospina Pérez.
During the second world war, markets for Colombian exports such as coffee and
bananas were constricted severely leading to a downturn in the economy and general
decline in workers' standards of living. A 1947 issue of Foreign Commerce Weekly
reported the following:
The cost of living index for Bogotá was 171.7 at the end of 1944, in
comparison with 142.4 at the end of the previous year. In other cities the
range was about the same. Industrial wages rose at a slower rate than the
cost of living, and real wages had declined steadily since 1941.
In November, 1946, the cost of living index of a workingman's family
reached 229 (1937 as 100). It has continue to rise to record figures during
each month since June, 1945. Food rose to 233.6, rent to 214.9, clothing
to 223.5. The index for the Bog food market showed an increase,
advancing from 384.6 in October, 1946, to 405.9 in November. As a result
of public pressures against rising prices and the high cost of living, the
Colombian government reinstituted price control in 1946. The measure was
not very successful, and at year’s end, inflation appeared to be
unchecked.120
Adding to the misery caused by the economic crisis was the continuing problem of
cityward migration from the countryside which swelled the ranks of the unemployed.
Warning of increased social strife caused by the economic dislocations, Gaitán requested
that the government establish a Casa del Refugiado in order to ease the problems of
homelessness. The government refused, stating, ""Should we create, in our very
homeland, an institution which formalized the fact, at arms' length , of persecution and
.martyrdom? Political violence is now only an exception to the rule, a misfortune which
will gradually disappear."121 The latter half of the Conservative governments response
turned out to be a wishful prediction.

120From Foreign Commerce Weekly (Washington: US. Department of Commeice, M ai. 1, 1947), p.5,
Quoted in Fluharty, Dance o f the Millions, p. 92.
121Fluhaity, Dance o f the Millions, p. 88.
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Gaitán's leadership of the Liberal Party was short lived. In 1948, during the
meeting of the Inter-American Conference in Bogotá, Gaitán was assassinated. The next
day, rioters destroyed large areas of downtown Bogotá in what has become known as the
Bogotázo. The Ninth of April, as the event is known in Colombia, erupted as the first
episode of the most violent period ever experienced in the history of Colombia - La
Violencia.122 Partisan political violence pitting Liberals against Conservatives would
became the social norm in Colombia for the next twenty years.
C O N C L U S IO N
Gradual, but profound changes in liberal ideology in the first three decades of the
twentieth century helped to orient the political party to become much more responsive to the
economic and social plight of the nation's workers. The Liberal Party was infused by the
ideas and idealism of many young intellectuals such as Turbay and Gaitán among others,
los nuevos, who had been active in the socialist movement of the 1920's. Other Liberal
professionals not directly descending from a socialist tradition, such as those who had
adopted Uribe Uribe’s notion of state interventionism in the economy (Alfonso López) or
those who were impressed by Keynesian economics (López and Herrera), also made their
imprint.
It was the incorporation of socialist intellectuals, who had a great deal of influence
among early labor organizations, into the Liberal fold that paved the way for the Liberal
cooptation of an independent labor movement. At the same time however, it also made
possible Alfonso López' Revolución en Marcha, the series of dramatic social and economic
reforms undertaken by the Liberal governments of the 1930's and 1940's that helped to
enhance workers' rights and working conditions considerably.
Significantly, during the time of López' first term, no other country in the nonCommunist world had a more comprehensive package of progressive labor legislation than
Colombia. Liberal governments gave unions the right to legally organize, to strike for
better benefits, and provided legislation to improve safety conditions, to establish the earlier
socialist dream of a forty-hour work week, eight-hour work day and many other laws that
generally improved living and working conditions for laborers. Other social reforms
included creating and implementing a graduated income tax, nationalizing primary

l22See Paul Oquist, Violence, Conflict and Politics in Colombia (New York, Toronto, San Francisco:
Academic Press, 1980), Another interpretation by the radical priest-tumed guerrilla in 1965 is Camilo
Torres Restrepo, "La violencia y los cambios socioculturales en las areas rurales colombianas," Paper
presented at the First National Sociology Conference, Bogotá, March 8-10, 1963. Torres was killed in
an engagement with Colombian army regulars in 1965.
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education (which was also made compulsory) and increasing outlays on education four
fold, eliminating literacy and property restrictions on the vote, constructing new roads to
link the country's regions more effectively, and establishing new credit institutions.123
The Liberals also sought change in an area traditionally considered as a primary Liberal
mission: reducing the role the Catholic Church played in society. This was accomplished
by resting control over public education from the Church and by striking the phrase in the
Constitution of 1880 that recognized Catholicism as Colombia's official religion.
The government also passed a major agrarian reform law and took the
unprecedented step of declaring that property had a social function: if it were not put into
productive use as defined by the legislation, the property was subject to expropriation by
the state. Law 200, part of the agrarian reform package, sought to clarify land titles and to
make unused land productive. Despite the actual outcome of 'the legislation which has been
described in some detail above, in its primary sponsor’s eyes, Law 200 was an attempt to
diffuse more widely land ownership in order to allow a greater share of the wealth to go to
smallholders as well as an effort to make the land more productive. In short, it would
ideally undergird the nation's democratic system by making relations in the countryside
themselves more democratic.
Under reformist Liberal governments, organized labor flourished. The powerful
Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia was created during these years and tens of
thousands of workers were unionized. While the number of unions multiplied, workers
won important bread and butter gains, often through government intercession in labor
disputes with capital.
Following the pause during Santos' term in the peaceful 'social revolution'» López
was again elected to the presidency in 1942. Although some important reforms were
pushed through Congress during Lopez' second term, opposition to continuing the reform
program led to a more modest pace. The change in the political climate forced López to
face a more formidable opposition from within the Liberal ranks themselves.
In .1945, after an abortive military coup, charges of rampant corruption in his
administration and a personal scandal involving his family, López resigned. Right-wing
Liberal Alberto Lleras Camargo took office determined to complete the year remaining in
López term as the president of "National Union," attempting to affect a rapprochement with
the Conservatives. A year later, Conservative Mariano Ospina Pérez would be elected to
the presidency after the Liberal Party had split into two camps, one favoring continued

123Robert Dix, The Politics o f Colombia, p. 34.
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reform and a close relationship to organized labor, the other focusing broadly on improving
the nation's economy and maintaining an ambivalent, though not necessarily antagonistic
attitude towards labor.
The Conservatives were much less friendly towards organized labor. Conservative
governments discouraged independent union activities, restricted the use of strikes and
promulgated a new labor code that sought to reverse much of the pro-labor gains achieved
under the Revolución en Marcha. One labor federation that was supported by the
Conservatives was the Unión de Trabajadores de Colombia (UTC). Vicente Caycedo, first
president, later secretary general and ultimately historian of an important UTC affiliate in
Barranquilla, remarked that the labor federation's strategy was to focus on economic
negotiations, avoid strikes if at all possible, and wage war on communism.124 Like the
vast majority of UTC leaders, Caycedo also viewed the labor-capital relationship as a
partnership: "...la UTRAL y la UTC, han creido que la mejor forma de defender los
intereses de los trabajadores, es a base de la aplicación de relaciones justas, respetuosas y
equitativas, donde se trabaje con la mira siempre puesta en función de empresa,
entendiéndose como tal la unión del capital con el trabajo, pués el uno sin el otro no podrán
m archar."125
After the assassination of Gaitán, there was a breakdown of public authority as
Liberals declared war on the Conservative government. Traditional party hatreds that had
been so common in the dozens of aimed conflicts of the nineteenth century again gripped
the nation.
The Conservatives' social, economic and political policies were eerily similar to the
laissez-faire policies the Liberals advocated throughout the second half of the nineteenth
century. Fluharty, writing nearly thirty years ago commented
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the Colombian

Conservatives' version of trickle-down:
the masses would be benefitted as prosperity seeped down to them. Less
government interference would stimulate business and production; and the
government [would] create a more favorable attitude toward those who
produce wealth, rather than holding them up as public enem ies...The
amazing assumption that workers do not produce wealth was typical of the
"no-one-else-exists" view the oligarchy seems steadily to have maintained
during this troublesome time...Remind the masses that the oligarchy is the
source of all good-that is the basic assum ption of this report....[the
oligarches] were men 'who believed it the duty of everyone to conform to

124From Reseña histórica de la UTRAL, Barranquilla, quoted in Ramos, Surgimiento, p. 13.
125Ramos, Surgimiento, p. 13.
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the station of life into which he had been born,' and leave the management
of all affairs for all classes in the hands of the privileged, enlightened ruling
caste.126
From 1949 to 1953 the nation was again convulsed by civil war, Liberals fighting
against a Conservative government they claimed lacked legitimacy. In 1953, the ultraConservative government of Laureano Gómez was overthrown by the Colombian military
in a coup supported by both moderate Liberals and Conservatives. By 1956, the new
government had converted itself into the second military dictatorship in Colombian history,
the dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla. In 1957 moderate Liberals and Conservatives again found
middle ground in order to depose the caudillo. It was time, leaders of both sides argued, to
resolve the historical hatred between the Red and Blue and to bring an end to the violence
that threatened to maintain the nation in a state of permanent anarchy. The compromise
devised by elites from the two traditional parties was the National Front, a power rotatingsharing agreement in which the party in power would include a large number of members
from the opposite party in cabinet positions and in which the parties would rotate control of
the presidency for a period of sixteen years. Through the vehicle of the National Front, by
institutionalizing a power sharing arrangement between the Liberal and Conservative
Parties in 1958, the industrial bourgeoisie was able to decisively derail organized
opposition to its preeminent position in Colombian society.127 Not until 1958 could one
claim that this social group reigned ascendant.

126Fluharty, Dance o f the Millions, p. 109.
127See Albert R. Berry, Ronald G. Heilman and Mauricio Solaún, Politics o f Compromise: Coalition
G overnment in Colombia (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction, Inc., 1980) for an excellent
series of essays on the National Front.

215

CHAPTER 8
C O N C L U SIO N AND IM P L IC A T IO N S F O R F U T U R E R E S E A R C H

C O N C L U S IO N
From the Sociedades Democráticas of the nineteenth century to the Confederación
de Trabajadores de Colombia and the Unión de Trabajadores de Colombia of the present
century, worker's organizations have been immersed in the partisan political battles of
Colombia's two traditional parties. This study examines the genesis and subsequent
growth of the Colombian labor movement during the hundred years covering the period
1848-1948. As the title of the work suggests, over this period ordinary workers - artisans,
peasants and laborers - were caught up in the ideological battles between élites from the
Liberal and Conservative Parties. In this straggle, artisans and rural workers paid the
highest price in human and economic terms fighting for one or the other of these
ideologies, neither of which workers could claim as their own. This thesis has specifically
focused on the historical role various intellectual and ideological productions played in
influencing men's actions in various epoches.
The study also examines the influence of foreign ideologies, to what degree they
were or were not altered to fit the Colombian case. Included among the most important
ideological currents affecting the political, economic and social policies and programs
implemented during the one hundred years covered by the study are the profound influence
of classical liberalism in the nineteenth century, socialism at the turn of the century, the
influence of the communist international on the workings of the Colombian Communist
Party, the impact of modem liberalism in the middle of the twentieth century and finally,
the influence of fascism and ultra-conservatism on conservative thought and actions at mid
century.
The analysis presented is holistic: it is a socio-historical interpretation of the
evolution of working class organization-élite relations. In an effort to provide a more
objective, more complete understanding of the development of the Colombian labor
movement than could be achieved through the study of historical or political events alone,
special emphasis is placed on the dynamic inteiplay between philosophical and political
ideas, ideology and empirically-observable behavior. Concuning with world systems
theorist Immanuel Wallerstein's insistence on studying "the widest range of phenomena,
including through all of historical time and space," in order to understand the present reality
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of any particular object of inquiry, the approach that has been adapted in the present work
is one which analyzes the social, political and economic context of the historical
development of Colombian labor as well as the role ideas played in serving as catalysts
inspiring individuals and groups to action. The impact of ideas and ideologies on men's
actions is central to the analysis presented.
In the Colombian context, Marx's assertion that the "ruling ideas of each age have
ever been the ideas of its ruling class" must be considered carefully. One key variable in
the development of organized labor is the gulf in power between social classes: small élite
groups in Colombian society have always had a disproportionate influence in the creation
and dispersion of ideas. Since it is the élite who have historically dominated the social
mechanisms responsible for disseminating information - the press, parochial and public
schools, and the political machinery of the two traditional parties - it is also they who have
primarily controlled the socio-political content of ideas.
Elite sectors of society have enjoyed a good deal of success in employing ideas to
"mask" social reality in efforts to prevent other social groups from achieving full
consciousness of their own relative positions in society. Nevertheless, while it is
acknowledged that the Colombian bourgeoisie have been generally successful at marketing
their visions as "the ideas" undeipinning society, they have never been able to completely
"regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age."
As discussed throughout this work, "ruling" ideas were not the only ideas
competing in society, and at times, during the 1930's for example, many of the ruling ideas
were translated into actions that materially benefitted the working classes. Alfonso López'
Revolución en Marcha was in great measure the artisan-inspired Socialist platform of 1919
writ into law.1 The following section discusses the rise to prominence of liberal ideology,
its challenge by conservative ideology and the successes and limitations of its influence
with rural and urban workers. In summary fashion, it retraces the major arguments made
in the thesis.
Since the socio-historical analysis presented here seeks to interpret the development
of labor-capital relations in the twentieth century utilizing a holistic, historical perspective,
the thesis begins by exploring the legacy of colonialism in Nueva Granada. Chapter Two

1Among the Socialist planks later adopted by the Liberals were educational reform, legislation on the use of
common lands; legislation providing for public housing; tax refonn; retirement benefits; the fabled 8hour work day; obligatory public schooling; refonn of workmen's injury laws; secularization of the
nation's schools; nationalization of the army; and efforts distancing if not quite separating Church from
State, and finally, modest protective tariffs on nationally produced goods.
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analyzes the basic Spanish pattern of colonization in Colombia, focusing special attention
on the economic systems of encomienda and mita. Under the first system, encomienda,
Spanish conquistadores were initially awarded the use of large tracts of land and its
resources by the Spanish Crown, including royal concessions of labor by indigenous
Americans in Colombia. In return, the encomenderos were charged with the defense and
religious indoctrination of the native peoples, much the same as Spanish overlords in Spain
had been charged with the protection of their feudal fiefs. In Spain's colonial possessions
as at home, the Church and State undertook complementary missions: the state's role was
to colonize new territories and teach their inhabitants to be productive citizens loyal to the
crown, and the Church's mission was to convert the indigenous peoples to Christianity
while looking after their spiritual and physical welfare.
By the end of the seventeenth century, the encomienda system was displaced by the
mita. Mita was the system of labor recruitment of indigenous peoples under which villages
provided a certain number of individuals to work for local governments or private
employers for an established wage. Although in theory individuals were to work of their
own free will, in practice no where in Nueva Granada was this the case. The mita was
obligatory. Generally, the salaries paid were well below those which could support a
family, and the system of labor recruitment forced native peoples to work away from their
villages in the unhealthy gold and silver mines of Nueva Granada.2 The mita helped hasten
the decline of traditional forms of communal agriculture, and contributed to the rapid
decline of native populations.
As Spanish towns began to flourish in the New World, the division of urban labor
became more complex. The mercantile élite established consulados, powerful corporations
of export/import merchants while artisans organized cofradías, guilds that provided for
members' spiritual guidance and in lean times, their social welfare. In colonial times,
distinctions based on social rank and status were perhaps even more pronounced than they
are today: the European-descended landowners occupied the highest ranks of society in the
countryside and were paralleled by the mercantile trading élite of the cities. These were
closely followed by primarily ethnic-European professionals such as journalists and
physicians. The middling sectors were occupied by a predominantly mestizo artisan class,
followed by mestizo campesinos. On the lowest rungs of the social hierarchy in colonial
times were the indigenous peoples and below them, African slaves. Artisans, indigenous

2 When men were recruited during planting or harvest-time, this practice contributed to a particularly
pronounced decline in village standards of living.
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labor, and slaves provided the labor which produced colonial goods, provided the workers
who planted and harvested crops to feed the towns and villages, and supplied the slave
labor to mine the bullion which was sent to Europe.
The American-born, "criollo" élite wrested political power from Spain in the early
nineteenth century, but a fundamental transformation of society did not occur. Although
the new ideological movement of liberalism transformed the way the criollo» or nativeborn, merchant élite viewed itself, despite its egalitarian and democratic rhetoric, liberalism
simply did not affect a change in social and economic relations between artisans and
merchants, or between campesinos and landowners. Nor did it affect changes in the social
relations between whites and mestizos and native Americans, nor despite the early
republican abolition of slavery, between the ruling élite and Colombians of African descent.
Independence simply reflected a bloody and destructive transfer of power from continental
Spaniards to a European-descended, predominantly white American-bom élite. Chapters
Three and Four analyze in detail the social and economic relations between classes in the
nineteenth century as well as the impact of liberal and conservative ideologies on artisan
production.
Despite the abiding interests of the upper class in maintaining its advantageous
social position, two ideological currents divided the élite into antagonistic camps: Liberal
and Conservative. Although the issues that separated the two parties were to change
dramatically in the twentieth century, Liberal-Conservative conflicts defined Colombia's
political landscape for nearly 150 years after the nation's independence from Spain.
In the nineteenth century, Liberals promoted the creation of a secular state by
limiting the power and authority of the Catholic Church to religious affairs. They argued
for a federalist form of government, believed in individualism, and promoted laissez-faire
economics. Conservatives favored traditional Catholic values and a powerful role for the
Church in education, health, welfare, and in social functions such as performing marriages,
maintaining official birth and death records, and performing other record-keeping tasks.
They also fought for a strong central government, and generally held a more strictly
hierarchical view of society than did the Liberals. Conservatives believed that in society
nature dictated the social plane to which each individual belonged. Conservatives were also
more inclined to support protection of domestic industry than Liberals, though protection
did not become an important political issue until the Núñez era.
The radical democratic rhetoric of the "Generation of '49" seduced artisans into a
mid-nineteenth century alliance with the Liberal Party. This alliance had the overall effect
of placing political power firmly in Liberal hands. Sermons on democracy, egalitarianism,
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individual liberty and brotherhood held a strong appeal to artisans and their individualistic
work ethic. Liberal-inspired sociedades democráticas and the Conservative sociedades
populares were created by party élites to propagate Liberal and Conservative ideologies.
Liberals clearly garnered the bulk of artisan allegiance as a result of the party’s more
egalitarian, less hierarchical vision of the ideal society. Nonetheless, at mid-century the
party suffered an internal division between artisans who favored protection of domestic
industry, represented in the main by the Draconiano wing of the Liberal Party, and the
Gólgotas, who favored unfettered laissez-faire economic policies.
Artisan sociedades mobilized to provide welfare assistance to needy members, to
pursue specific electoral objectives, and above all, to oppose the free-trade policies that
artisans knew were destroying domestic manufactures. By 1853, Liberal and Conservative
artisans alike decisively rejected the radical liberal free-trade thesis, throwing their support
behind the Draconiano candidate, José Maria Obando.
In general, nineteenth century artisan groups were well-organized, and were led by
literate, committed artisans. By mid-century, artisans clearly had become aware of the
economic and political differences between themselves and the radical Liberals. An
indication of this emerging artisan class consciousness is apparent in the words of artisan
leader and writer, the tailor Ambrosio López who exclaimed in 1853, "We turned aside
from our main objective [that of obtaining tariff protection] and we became interested in
raising to power certain men, believing that they truly loved us...but we in good faith,
served only as stepping stones and today these men sacrifice us and destroy the
Republic,"3 The artisan challenge mounted by the Sociedad Democrática de Bogotá and
General José María Melo to the Liberal élite in 1854 led to the establishment of an "Artisan
Republic" which lasted for eight months. The élite response was decisive: the
Conservative Party and the Radical wing of the Liberal Party put aside their ideological
differences long enough for the élites of both parties to violently suppress the threat from
below.
After the insurrectionary challenge to élite rale had am its course, artisan
organizations adopted the role of welfare organizations dedicated to looking out for the
physical well-being of their members, as well as occasionally acting as pressure groups
within the Liberal Party. Most artisans continued to support the Liberals even while Liberal
economic policies continued to undermine the artisans' means of making a livelihood. Less
expensive European imports continued to flood unabated into the Colombian market.

3Urrutia, Development o f the Colombian Labor Movement, p. 24.
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Liberals themselves were committed to a policy of economic non-intervention and non
protection as much out of economic interests as out of ideological commitments. Most
artisans, who must have believed that a worst fate might befall them in the hands of a
Conservative government, continued to serve as cannon fodder for Liberal armies
throughout most of the second half of the nineteenth century.
In the countryside, peasants faced a similar situation. Chapter Five, which also
discusses the rise of the coffee export economy in the late nineteenth century, describes
how Liberal reforms made possible enclosures of vast tracts of land, including indigenous
resguardo lands that had previously been indivisible. Despite the successes large
landowners enjoyed in enlarging their holdings, scarcity of work-hands was a recurrent
problem for landowners throughout the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. While
labor shortages gave peasants and colonos some leverage in terms of their straggles with
large landholders, political connections with the local party in power often proved decisive.
Coffee had a major impact on labor relations in the countryside. Tenant farmers,
who as a result of labor shortages frequently received favorable contract terms, were often
permitted to cultivate and harvest coffee on small family plots to sell on the open market or
to the landowner. Smallholders, in an effort to avoid proletarianization, submitted
themselves and their families to ever-increasing levels of self-exploitation in order to hold
on to the source of their existence as independent producers-their lands. On their small
plots of land they struggled to produce corn and beans to feed their families, and devoted a
great deal of energy to clearing fields, planting, harvesting and marketing their coffee.
Tenants had the additional obligation of working the hacendado's fields.
The presence of the expansive, largely virgin northwestern frontier presented an
attractive alternative to campesinos imbued with a strong desire to own their own land and
eager to avoid becoming wage earners in the haciendas. Thousands of landless peasants,
minifundistas, and even displaced artisans set out to stake their claims in the new frontier.
A trickle in the second half of the nineteenth century, the migrations became a flood in the
first half of the twentieth. In order to increase coffee production for export and food
production for the domestic market, after 1930 Liberal governments encouraged
immigration, passed legislation designed to award land titles to smallholders, and generally
sought to democratize agricultural production in older regions of the nation.
The colonist movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century helped to
make coffee production a widely dispersed, if highly unequal phenomenon. As discussed
in Chapter Five, smallholders and large landowners alike benefitted from coffee. A
majority of farms were small or medium-sized. Earnings from coffee exports trickled
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down to thousands of smallholders, leading to the eventual creation of a domestic market
for consumer goods. From coffee-trilling machines to domestically-produced clothing,
coffee was also a boon for local manufactures. Since the business was controlled by
Colombians, even the export-import functions which were often controlled by large-scale
coffee producers allowed significant accumulation of domestic capital. This, along with the
impact of the "Dance of the Millions", attracted millions of dollars in foreign capital. This
influx of capital in turn enabled the Colombian "industrial revolution" to take root between
1920 and 1960.
The widespread benefits of coffee must not be exaggerated. Elites controlled every
aspect of the marketing process, and thus effectively controlled the industry. Smallholders
and colonos still had to rely on the palanca they exercised with their local party patrons in
order to win title disputes with large landowners and among themselves.
Elites also controlled the political parties. Party loyalties that extended from
generation to generation, local patronage patterns, and frequent intra-class disputes over
landownership undermined campesinos' collective efforts to resist enclosures. These
factors also prevented the full development of a class consciousness of their plight. Their
interests, like the artisans', also became subservient to élite interests.
After 1910, Colombian industry began to grow at a remarkable pace, partly as a
result of import substitution made possible by foreign receipts on coffee, and partly as a
result of the $25 million windfall in the early 1920's from the United States'
indemnification for its role in the separation of Panama. While Colombia received $30
million in direct foreign investment in 1920, the sum had grown to nearly $300 million per
year and an additional $200 million in foreign credits by the end of the decade.4 Expanded
public works projects provided employment opportunities for thousands of unskilled and
semi-skilled laborers. Import substitution policies also led to the creation of a wageearning proletariat.
Along transportation routes, in Colombia's ports and in the small foreign enclaves,
the banana and petroleum industries worked the majority of wage-eamers in the first
decades of the century. In terms of organization, initially transport workers were
influenced by the anarchists who led several strikes in the second decade of the century,
including a major strike of port and river workers in 1918. Even before the creation of the
Socialist Party in 1919 however, anarchist influence was primarily limited to the Caribbean
coast and the Magdalena river. After the Socialist Party was founded, most anarchists were

4Oquist, Violence, p. 93.
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absorbed into its fabric, and never again played a major independent role in labor
organization.
At the turn of the century, early workers' organizations in Colombia's towns and
cities were strongly influenced by artisans, still the predominant form of production in
urban Colombia in the first half of the twentieth century. In the first decade of this century,
artisans, workers, and Liberal intellectuals created the Workers Party. At first, the new
party actually served as an electoral recruiting tool for the Liberal Party, but in 1909 the
Workers Party sought to chart a course independent of the Liberal Party. In 1912 the
Workers Party even went so far as to support the Liberal-Conservative coalition Republican
Party before later returning to the Liberal fold. Many of the early worker's organizations
were unique in that they included industrialists as in the case of the Unión Nacional de
Industriales y Obreros in 1910 (UNIO).
Three of the most important early unions declared their insistence in maintaining a
course free of partisan politics. All three ended up supporting either the Liberals or the
Republican coalition. In addition to the Workers Party and UNIO, even the grass-roots
Unión Obrera Colombiana (UOC), founded in 1913 as the first union to limit its
membership to workers and artisans, could not manage to prevent itself from throwing its
support behind the Liberal Party. Still, the UOC played an important role in the
development of an organized labor movement in Colombia by raising artisan and worker
consciousness of their "distinctness" from industrialists. The union also advocated a great
number of socio-economic reforms, such as improved education, higher wages, and the
passage of legislation guaranteeing the safety of male and female workers, refonns which
would subsequently be championed by later unions and by a revitalized, reformist-oriented
Liberal Party,
The period 1916 -1924 witnessed an attempt by artisans and salaried workers to
establish an organizational framework independent of major political party domination.
Workers hoped that such an organization could effectively serve to represent the interests of
the working class. A new Partido Obrero was founded in 1916. Significantly, the Partido
Obrero publicly recognized the Liberal Party as its greatest competitor in the struggle to
gamer working class support. Its partisans understood that while the Liberal Party was
reformist enough to attract workers, its real interests were dictated by the élites who
politically dominated the party. The Partido Obrero and its successor, the 1919 Socialist
Party of Colombia were strongly attacked by the Liberals, who claimed that their own
Liberal Party was the true party of the working class.
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Dominated by artisans, the Socialist Party embodied a meliorative, Christian
socialism which explicitly rejected communism and anarchy. Although it sought to
represent the interests of Colombia's workers, the party did not seek the abolition of private
property, nor did it advocate class warfare. Its primary goals were economic benefits for
workers: better public education, better housing conditions for workers, a government
sponsored literacy program, and a number of specific items such as an eight-hour work
day, retirement benefits, maternity benefits, protective tariffs, legislation to curb the use of
alcohol, and the separation of church and state. The Socialists were not above entering into
alliances that might further their constituency's interests, but were very careful only to
support candidates who advocated positions that would further workers issues in
accordance with the Socialist Party's platform. The Socialists were largely successful in
raising consciousness among workers and artisans as well as among leftist Liberals.
Winning many votes in urban areas, Socialist successes began to worry Liberals.
The Liberal Party stepped up its diplomatic efforts to coopt the movement in order to bring
Socialists and workers into the Liberal fold. In 1922 they succeeded. Socialists threw
their support behind the Liberals in an effort to bring down the Conservative government.
When the Liberal Party platform was drawn up, it was uncannily similar to the earlier
Socialist Platform. It is not surprising that Socialist Party leaders believed that the Liberals
were advocating virtually the same programs as they had been supporting. In 1924 the
Socialist Party was dissolved, a large majority of its members casting their lot with the
Liberal Party.
Socialists made significant inroads into the internal politics of the Liberal Party.
Defecting Socialists helped write the new Liberal agenda. Nearly all of the reforms
Socialists had advocated in 1919 became laws under the Liberal governments of the 1930’s
and 1940's. These reforms improved workers’ lives in tangible ways. Nevertheless, the
dissolution of the Socialist Party meant the end of efforts to create a workers movement
independent of the traditional political parties, one that might be relatively free from
interference by élite sectors of society. The Revolutionary Socialist Party, the radical spin
off of the Colombian Socialist Party, could never manage to convince workers that it was a
viable vehicle for carrying forward the workers' struggle.
The change in orientation of the Liberal Party, its adoption of modern liberal
ideology which advocated a more active state role in the economy and social life, was made
possible by a change in Liberal leadership. Under Liberal governments, the conditions
under which workers labored improved tremendously, despite the first shock waves of the
world depression. While the pace of industrialization actually continued to quicken after
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the onset of the Great Depression, in 1929 and 1930 workers suffered deterioration in their
wages much the same as their counterparts elsewhere in the hemisphere. This was the
result of a near-halt in foreign investment, a plunge in world coffee prices and the general
impact of the world depression itself. Fortunately for workers, there were also precipitous
declines in the cost of foodstuffs and building materials. In any case, by the early 1930's
the trend had been reversed.
Under the Liberal governments of the 1930's and 1940's, workers witnessed major
improvements in their quality of life not only through an increase in real wages but also as a
result of Liberal legislation that mandated safety standards to protect workers, set a fortyhour work week, mandated overtime pay, Sunday and holiday pay and required companies
to provide severance pay. Unions were also recognized and the right to strike for better
benefits was legalized. Both urban and rural workers chose to hitch their hopes and
aspirations for a better life for themselves and their families to the rising and falling tides of
the two traditional parties which were politically dominated by exporters, importers and
large landowners. In the process, while workers prospered during Liberal rule, they
prospered at the expense of their organizational autonomy. When Conservatives hostile to
organized labor came to power, organized labor was simply forcefully suppressed.
A handful of other works have explored the themes of ideology and labor in
Colombia, the most influential recent works among them Charles Bergquist's Labor in
Latin America: Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia and
Moncayo and Rojas' Luchas Obreras y Política Laboral en Colombia. While the present
study builds on these works, there are important differences.
Moncayo and Rojas in their interpretations of the ideological content of labor
legislation passed during la Revolución en Marcha argue that the Liberal governments of
the 1930's and 1940's attempted to diffuse the threat to élite rale posed by those from
below, the proletariat. Bergquist's analysis focuses on the threat posed to established order
from rural laborers.5 While Bergquist focuses almost exclusively on rural workers and
fails to explore potential ties to urban labor, Moncayo and Rojas emphasize salaried
workers, ignoring labor in the countryside.

5Bergquist argues that the Liberal’s primary worries were the rural workers while M oncayo and Rojas argue
that a Liberal industrial bourgeoisie had ascended to power and that their perceived enemy was primarily
the urban working class. See Moncayo and Rojas, Luchas, and Charles Bergquist's works, Coffee and
Conflict in Colombia, 1886-1910 (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1978), and Labor in Latin
America: Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 1986).
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Bergquist, persuasively arguing for a more prominent place for coffee workers in
Colombian labor historiography, writes the following:
In recent decades, Colombia, like the other Latin American nations, has had
to adjust to a new division of labor in the world capitalist system. The
decentralization of manufacturing industry in the world economy has
promoted both the expansion and the denationalization of Colombian
industry. With this pattern of industrial development, coffee has served as
the Colombian surrogate for heavy industry. It has continued to provide
foreign exchange to purchase the growing volume of capital goods and
industrial raw materials needed by Colombian industry and service a foreign
debt that has ballooned in the process of the nation's postwar expansion.
But Colombia’s relative success in pursuing this model of development has
depended as well on the organizational weakness of the Colombian labor
movement and the impotence of the political left. Coffee ensured that both
remained minor impediments to the postwar liberal developmentalist plans
of the Colombian ruling class.6
He argues further that Liberal reformers worried that workers deprived of land in
the countryside contributed to a chronic state of social tension that could possibly lead to
open conflict. Violent, class war, could in turn endanger capitalist development of the
country. Bergquist writes, "the body of labor law perfected between 1930 and 1945
sought to eliminate the revolutionary potential of these workers and reduce conflict in
industrial relations.''7
While agreeing that one outcome of the labor legislation enacted during the period
was to reduce the possibilities of violent class conflict, to argue that this was the overriding
goal of the Liberal reformers, as do Moncayo and Rojas, overlooks the significant
influence that socialist ideas played in the social formation of the reformers themselves.
True, it was in the interests of the élite to reduce the potential for labor conflicts both in the
city and in the countryside, but accommodation and compromise was not the only élite
avenue for control of labor. After 1946, the Conservatives adopted another option,
suppression, and arguably did a much more effective job of controlling labor than did the
Liberals with their reform-oriented Revolución en Marcha.
Rather than create pawns that the Liberal Party leadership could shrewdly
manipulate to advance their own class' economic interests, most party reformers genuinely
viewed labor as a partner to capital, a partner that had been unjustly compensated for its

^Bergquist, Labor, p. 310.
7Bergquist, Labor, p. 348.
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contributions to the productive process. Liberals sought to pass legislation that would
bring labor a greater share of society's wealth. Although labor never became an equal
partner with agro-export capitalists such as Alfonso López himself, as became clear from
subsequent events under the Liberal government of Camargo and the Conservative
governments which followed him, to argue that the Revolución en Marcha was a carefully
planned élite conspiracy solely designed to diffuse a potentially radical labor movement is
in effect re-interpreting histoiy to conform to a particular ideological perspective.8
Virtually ignored by Rojas and Moncayo is the fact that workers realized many
tangible bread-and-butter gains during the Liberal hegemony. These included higher
wages, safer working conditions, improved benefits, and significantly, the right to
organize. These gains were an essential component of the Liberal reforms of the 1930's
and 1940's. One could plausibly argue in fact that these were the primary goals of
Colombian liberalism, based on the Liberals' understanding of how to go about the
business of constructing the 'good society'. Although the labor movement did indeed
become channeled into mainstream Liberal politics, whether or not labor had had any
'revolutionary potential' before the mid-1940's is highly debatable, especially in light of the
socially conservative nature of all the major, artisan-dominated labor organizations before
mid-century.
Given the benefit of historical hindsight, while it could plausibly be argued that
Conservatives perceived a strong threat from both rural and urban workers, a threat that
urgently needed to be eliminated, it is much less convincing to argue that the ex-socialists,
social-welfare oriented Liberals and labor activists who comprised the vanguard of the
Liberal reform movement viewed workers with the same distrust as Conservatives.
Liberals in fact looked forward to welcoming workers into a progressive alliance that had
the potential of toppling the 'reactionary' Conservative government. When the
Conservatives assumed political power in 1946» they set about the task of dismantling
many of the labor reforms undertaken by the Liberals, in the process demonstrating that
repression and overt cooptation (as in the case of the creation of the Catholic-inspired UTC)
was as effective as reform in controlling the laboring classes.
On the other hand, Liberals did undoubtedly wish to limit the influence of the
Communist Party among workers and working class organizations. This fact probably had
a strong impact on writers such as Moncayo and Rojas in their analysis of the intent and
ideological content of labor legislation during the Revolución en Marcha. However, the

8This is the central argument advanced by Moncayo and Rojas, Luchas Obreras y Política Laboral.
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Communist Party too hoped to limit the Liberal Party's influence

011

workers, believing, as

did the Liberals, that it was the appropriate vehicle for expressing working class interests.
Here one must be careful not to make the egregious error of uncritically assuming that the
Communist Party represented the true interests of urban or rural workers, and therefore
reason that Liberal attempts to curb the power of the Communists were tantamount to
efforts to coopt working class organizations.
Another point on which the present work differs from works by authors such as
Moncayo and Rojas, Fals Borda» Cesar Mendoza Ramos and Ricardo Sanchez is in the
argument that the period explored does not witness the consolidation of power by the
industrial bourgeoisie.9 The industrial bourgeoisie may as Rojas and Moncayo argue, have
been

the ascendancy, but it is difficult to accept the proposition that by the 1930's they
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had consolidated their class hegemony.
First, although Bergquist clearly recognizes this fact, writers such as Moncayo and
Rojas fail to understand the importance of rural labor in the overall picture of labor in
Colombia. Not until the 1960's were the majority of the nation's citizens urban-dwellers,
and in the period in which Moncayo and Rojas claim that the industrial bourgeoisie had
gained the reigns of power, between 1930 and 1945, only one-third of the nation’s people
lived in urban areas. The following table shows the trend of urbanization in the twentieth
century.

9Each o f these writers make the basic argument that the industrial bourgeoisie consolidated its power during
the 1930's. See, Orlando Fals Borda, Subversion and Social Change in Colombia (New York, London:
Columbia University Press, 1969); Cesar Mendoza Ramos, Surgimiento y Desarrollo de la Clase Obrera
en Barranquilla, paper presented at the Third Congress o f Colombian History, Universidad de Antioquia,
Medellin, Colombia, (November, 1981), and Ricardo Sanchez, Historia Política de la Clase Obrera en
Colombia (Bogotá: Editorial la Rosa Roja, 1982).
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TABLE 8:1
Total Urban-Rural Population
1918-1973 (thousands)
Y ea r

1918
1925
1930
1938
1945
19 5 1
1953
1964
1973

T otal
P o p u la tio n
5 ,9 5 6
6 ,7 2 4
7 ,4 2 5
8 ,7 0 2
1 0 ,1 5 2
1 1 ,5 8 9
12,111
1 7 ,4 8 4
2 0 ,7 8 5

S o u rce: E C L A c e n su s d a ta c o m p ile d b y

U rban

1,231
1,5 6 0
1,934
2 ,5 0 2
3,4 4 7
4 ,6 6 2
5 ,1 7 7
9 ,2 4 0
1 2 ,4 8 9

------- Wo-----------

21
23
26
29
34
40
43
53
65

R u ra l

—

4 ,6 2 5
5 ,1 6 4
5,4 9 1
6 ,2 0 0
6 ,7 0 2
6 ,9 2 7
6 ,9 3 4
8 ,2 4 4
7 ,8 6 8

ir ~

19
11
74
71
66
60
57
47
35

Medofilo M ed in a, A nex o 4» La P ro te sta U rbana, p. 208.

This in itself is not sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the urban bourgeoisie had
displaced landholders and agro-exporters as the leaders in the nation's social and political
affairs. In order to determine the plausibility of the thesis that the Revolución en Marcha
represented the ascent to power of an industrial bourgeoisie, one can look at the state of
development of Colombian industry at the time as well as the Liberal government's
relations with agro-exporters.
One problem with Moncayo and Rojas' interpretation, as mentioned in Chapter
Seven of this work, is that sufficient evidence that the export sector and López were at
odds, even less so the Liberal governments of Herrera or Santos, is not offered.10
Although the Federación de Cafeteros opposed import substitution programs on the
grounds that they constituted a poor use of scarce capital resources, and the conservative
Asociación Patriótica Económica Nacional (APEN) stood against the agrarian reform, on
the whole, the industrial bourgeoisie and the agro-exporters were not antagonistic. Many
of the Liberal reformers' families were themselves agro-exporters and it was coffee exports
that had made industrial growth possible in the first place. Commenting on the growth of
the financial resources of the Federación de Cafeteros, Pecaut argues along the same lines:
"Se comprenderá pues la importancia que adquirieron los debates desarrollados entre este
sector y el gobierno durante la administración de López. Pero en ningún momento se trata

l°A s mentioned numerous times above, López and other Liberal reformers were themselves coffee
exporters.
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de un sector en crisis que se enfrenta a un gobierno cuya divisa es la de lograr intervenir en
la política cafetera."11
In the Colombian case, the differences between exporters and industrialists were
not profound ones: industrialists depended on foreign coffee earnings and the concomitant
rise in smallholder income to help create domestic demand for goods made in Colombia.
Rather than view industrialists and agro-exporters as adversaries, it is much more accurate
to speak of a sometimes uneasy partnership between them that was frequently colored by
rivaling self-perceptions.12
Perhaps the most critical variable missed by Moncayo and Rojas was the rather
unrevolutionary, individualistic nature of the majority of Colombia's workers themselves,
both urban and rural workers. Even Bergquist fails to see the significance of the socially
conservative nature of the artisans. At the time of the Revolution en Marcha, most urban
workers were still artisans. The early labor movement was permeated by the conservative
values of artisans in Colombia's towns and cities and campesinos in the countryside. Of
central importance to campesino and artisan alike was a desire to own their own means of
production, as I have discussed throughout the thesis.
Many fanners in the twentieth century who migrated to Colombia's cities and the
frontier regions had once owned their own property, and did not immediately lose their
dream of owning their own means of production. As has been amply demonstrated in
Bergquist's excellent works on the Colombian coffee industry, thousands of colonos and
landless peasants sought support from their political parties and their local party patrons in
their conflicts with each other as well as in their tireless straggles to obtain land titles
against the claims of large landowners. This desire to be master over ones own work
meant that colonos and smallholders did not easily lend themselves to organization by leftist
groups advocating communal forms of agricultural organization.
After La Violencia began, immigration to the cities increased. While two-thirds of
the nation's population lived in the countryside in 1945, by the mid 1960's after the worst
effects of La Violencia had already been experienced, less than one-half Colombia's

^ D an iel Pecaut, Politica, p. 119.
12When they were not engaged in export themselves, long-established landed families sometimes viewed
themselves as somewhat socially superior to those involved in export-import. Both groups initially
looked upon themselves as superior to industrialists, linking this group to its artisan forerunners. Some
artisans in fact do seem to have made the transition from artisan to industrialist. See David Sowell, "The
Early Latin American Labor Movement: Artisans and Politics in Bogotá, Colombia: 1832-1919, (Ph.D.
Dissertation University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, 1986).
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citizens were rural dwellers,13 A large part of this influx came from the hundreds of
thousands of parcelas abandoned during La Violencia (See Table 8:2).
TABLE 8:2
Parcelas Abandoned During La Violencia»
1946-1966 by Department
_

D epartm ent

P a rce la s
A b an d on ed

V alle

9 8 .4 0 0
5 4 ,9 0 0
5 0 .4 0 0
3 8 .4 0 0
3 6 ,8 0 0
2 7 ,1 0 0
2 6 ,6 0 0
2 6 .4 0 0
1 6 ,2 0 0
3 ,0 0 0
1 4 ,6 4 8

Tolima
Cundinamarca
Santander del Norte
Antiguo Caldas
H uila

Santander
B o y a cá

Antioquia
Cauca
All Other
Source: Oquist, Violencia, Table 6:4» p .323.

Much of the abandoned land was claimed by powerful landowners, continuing a
process of enclosures that had begun in earnest in the closing decades of the nineteenth
century and which continue through the present day. The impact that rural laborers who
had been deprived of their lands had on the urban labor movement is an area which merits
much further research. At the very least, it is not implausible to believe that their
individualist work ethic complemented and reinforced the individualist work ethic of the
urban artisan, and made them much more receptive to modem liberal ideological
proselytizing.
Despite the enclosures, violence in the countryside, and the changing agrarian and
labor policies of the two traditional parties, campesinos have never lost their desire to own
their own land. A questionnaire-based study conducted by Marxist scholar Nicolás
Buenaventura of migrant workers in the mid-1970's found that 39 percent of those polled
had once been owners of a small farm . Sixty-one percent responded that their fathers had
been

small landholders, while only 12 percent said that they presently owned their own

13Medofilo Medina, La Protesta Urbana , p. 208, Between 1964 and 1973 the rural population actually
declined from 8.2 million to 7.9 million as a result of migration to the large cities.
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land.14 More than three-fourths responded that they hoped one day to acquire a small farm
or business so that they could escape migrant work15 and 84 percent of those chose a
small farm over a business.16 One of the most telling responses, disappointing as it must
have been to its Marxist author, was that an overwhelming majority of those questioned (92
percent) believed that the land would produce better if it were organized in a different way,
70 percent of these responding "it would be better divided up into family-owned farms"
and only 30 percent responding that it would be best "organized into cooperatives or
community enterprises."17
As mentioned above, Colombian campesinos»proud of their status as independent
producers, were not ready clients for Marxist or other collective-advocating organizers.
This had consequences for rural laborers' struggles in the countryside, a point which has
been noted by Bergquist:
Inexorably, however, as [rural workers] progressed toward their goals,
they abandoned the collective strategies that won their early victories. At
great cost to themselves and to their society, the collective struggle of
workers in coffee production degenerated into private, individual affairs
sanctioned by traditional politics. The transformation of their straggle
inevitably turned coffee workers against one another. After mid-century it
left their class oppressors free to forge a new ideological and political
consensus and successfully consolidate an industrializing peripheral
capitalist order..in winning the battle for the land, these workers in coffee
production thus lost the struggle to transform the exploitative capitalist
society in which they labored. They helped instead to modernize that
society, and to reinforce the liberal values and institutions on which it
rested.
By looking at the stage of industrial development achieved by Colombia in the
1930's, one cannot help to note another important variable that Bergquist and Moncayo and
Rojas' works ignore; that artisans still played a predominant role in labor organization in
the 1930's. Consider the following statistics. Despite the questionable quality of census
data, even approximate estimates present clear trends for the 1938 census: 450,000

14This information is from Nicolás Buenaventura's "Proletariado agrícola, 'temporeros,'" Estudios
M arxistas, 9 (1975) is cited in Bergquist, Labor, pp. 372-374.
15Bergquist, Labor, p. 373.
^Bergquist, Labor, p. 373.
17Bergquist, Labor, p. 374.
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individuals worked in la industria which also included artisan industry.18 Of these
workers, an astonishing 80 percent were classified as artisans (working in establishments
with fewer than five individuals). Based on this data, Pecaut estimates that no more than
80,000 to 100,000 workers could have been considered wage earners working in modem
industry, most of these holding jobs in textiles, beverages, cement and tobacco, a high
percentage of these workers women. Pecaut offers the following estimates for 1938: in the
textile industry, 24,125 workers; in tobacco, 10,167; in the beverage industry, 6,358 and
in cement and affiliated products, 1,861.19 As these numbers indicate, 1938 urban
Colombia was still the milieu of the artisan.
Organizational activities undertaken by artisans earlier in this century and
throughout the last, are important foci of this work. Artisans shaped the programmatic
direction of labor groups throughout the first decades of this century, and artisans were the
most influential voices in the early socialist movement. The strong influence they had in
Socialist and workers organizations has been discussed in Chapters Six and Seven.
Liberals were quite successful in efforts to inculcate artisan loyalty to the state and
to the Party.20 Conformity seemed to come cheaply. Artisans believed in equality, which
only the Liberals preached. They shared the Liberal élite's view of the importance of
education, though Liberal concern in the nineteenth century seldom ran deeper than the
party's rhetoric. Artisans also viewed themselves as the productive force of society,
holding a strong individual work ethic bom of their highly individualistic craft occupations.
They owned their means of production, and placed incalculable value on their status as
independent producers. Liberal ideology seemed to embody these values. The
Conservatives, on the other hand, did not possess an ideology capable of capturing the
imagination or loyalty of workers. Their hierarchical view of society contrasted sharply
with the Liberal ideals embodied in the expression liberty, equality, and brotherhood.
While the disparity of political power is a key variable in explaining why artisans
generally went along with Liberal Party politics, it also may be the case that the artisans'
compelling interests in tariff protection were partially obscured by the ideologizing effects
of liberalism, of "false consciousness" in the Marxian sense. In any case it is clear that

18Tlie following numbers for 1938 census data, appear in Pecaut, Politica» p. 115.
19D aniel Pecaut» Politica, p. 115.
20Both sought to inculcate precepts of loyalty and conformity.

233

after 1854, artisan economic and political interests were completely subservient to the
ruling caste.
Even under the government of Rafael Núñez» whose own ideological vision of
society led him to favor mildly protectionist legislation, artisan protests in Bogotá in 1893
were violently suppressed. Artisans were nonetheless relatively more successful as a
pressure group under this government. Here too the deciding factor was political power.
Only because the Regeneration supported artisans and favored protecting domestic
production was legislation passed that "responded" to artisan concerns. Reforms flowed
from the top-down.
While élite liberal ideology may have helped obscure artisan and peasant class
interests, it is argued in the thesis that Colombian history is replete with examples of
classes acting in a manner contrary to their economic and political interests, including the
nation's élite. In the nineteenth century, a commercial bourgeoisie and large landowners
held in common a shared culture, a shared "way of life". They attended the same social
clubs, studied at the same schools, were married in the same churches, ate the same kinds
of food prepared by their servants, and generally enjoyed a social status well above the
common crowd. Although they possessed a consciousness of themselves as a class apart,
they were divided along lines of two competing, antagonistic ideological systems.
Real differences in world views divided Conservatives and Liberals: each side held
opposite views on the role of the Catholic Church in Colombian society, on the value and
applicability of laissez-faire economics to the Colombian case and
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the relative merits of

federalism vs. a strong central government. These substantive differences led to numerous
violent civil wars during the nineteenth century, culminating in the bloody War of a
Thousand Days at the turn of the century. Costly both in terms of wealth and lives, these
conflicts were contrary to élite interests, yet persisted throughout the nineteenth century and
flared up again in the middle of the twentieth. Religion and the social and political role of
the Catholic Church continued to be a particularly volatile issue in both centuries, despite
major changes in liberal and conservative ideologies. While such issues divided élite
sectors of society, as was argued in Chapter Seven, they also divided partisans from the
middle classes, artisans and workers.
The ruling classes were also vulnerable from threats below, as in the Melo threat in
the nineteenth century or the socialist challenge in the twentieth, as a result of the absence
of a full consciousness of their dominant role in society. It has been argued in the first two
chapters that profound differences in views of what constitutes the ideal society divided
Liberals and Conservatives and that "ideological" straggles between Liberal and
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Conservative élites hindered them from achieving a full consciousness of their dominant
position in society.
While the two predominant élite groups divided by competing ideological systems
failed to achieve complete consciousness of their position in society, at various times, both
artisans and peasants achieved a surprisingly high degree of consciousness of their
differences from the élite sectors of society.21 There were many examples from early
Colombian labor history where artisans and rural workers alike achieved a partial
consciousness of their relative position in society. While the mid-nineteenth century
artisans chose to support Melo to fight for the continued existence of their position as
independent producers in society, the same class later threw the bulk of its support behind a
Liberal Party which pursued political and economic policies that were rapidly eroding the
position of artisans in Colombian society. Later they supported the moderate Conservative
governments of Rafael Núñez and Rafael Reyes who at the very least provided modest
tariff relief. By this time the artisan system of production was in decline: while Núñez'
reforms undoubtedly were at least partially targeted at providing protection of craft goods,
Reyes was much more interested in promoting the growth of industry rather than protecting
artisan production. Thus throughout the period covered by this study, even among
working class leaders, an evolving "working class consciousness" was permeated with
ideological elements imparted by history and by the élite
The consciousness achieved by artisans, campesinos, and salaried workers often
translated into isolated struggles of groups of workers to achieve economic goals, but
rarely in Colombian history has it led large segments of the working class to mount a
challenge to the established political system.22 Even the peripheral Communist Party, led
by intellectuals rather than workers, was an unqualified failure in raising proletariat
consciousness and funnelling it into either revolutionary or sustained political action.
While many artisans and salaried workers in the twentieth century were aware of their
distinctness as social classes, they could never buy into the idea that the intellectual,
joumalist-led Communist Party was a relevant vehicle or a legitimate alternative for
representing their political and economic interests. Far, far better to place their hopes in a
welfare-oriented, evolving Liberal Party that might actually have the power and the will to
improve their material conditions. The labor movement sought refuge in increased

21 Chapter Five discusses class consciousness and the artisans in extensive detail.
22TMS does not include the notable exceptions of the Melo coup in the nineteenth century and the artisandominated, moderate, reformist Socialist Party in the twentieth.
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government protection under the Liberals, ultimately at the expense of expanded
government regulation and control.
However trae this may be, as argued earlier, though ideologies can often obscure
real interests (false consciousness), they cannot long be accepted as truth unless something
substantive in them can appeal to individual's economic, social or political interests. This
is why the individualism, profit motive and rhetoric of equality and liberty, central tenets of
liberalism, achieved wide appeal among Colombian workers while socialized production
and social solidarity of communism did not. The scholar’s role should be to look at the
ideas in society that influence men's and actions, seek out their social origins, and weigh
their relative impact on individuals' lives and society as a whole, and in each case, strive to
pinpoint the "masking effect" they may have
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obscuring individuals' true interests. This

is precisely the goal that the present work has strived to achieve.
IM P L IC A T IO N S FO R FU TU R E R ESE A R C H
The research conducted to produce One Hundred Years of Servitude: the
Colombian Labor Movement 1848-1948 was primarily based on published materials,
including government legislation, Memorias of government officials, as well of course of
the voluminous secondary literature on politics and history. It is to some degree a
traditional exercise in labor historiography, with a strong emphasis placed on the role of
unions, parties and political élites. The study is a mid-level, national analysis, though it
certainly points to important implications for the nation's full insertion into the world
capitalist economy in the early twentieth century as a result of the rise of the coffee
economy.
A structuralist approach which explored the social, political, and economic
ramifications of Colombia's insertion into the world capitalist economic system could be
profitably employed to deepen our understanding of the development of Colombian labor.
Such an approach would look at the linkages between the development of the export
economy, Colombia's ties to the developed economies of the north Atlantic, and the
relations between élites in the "core" countries and Colombia.
Although foreign economic interests did not play the dominant role as did the
foreign banana companies in Honduras,23 the major influx of foreign capital during the

23 By the 1950's seventy percent of export revenues were earned from the sale of tropical fruit, and over
eighty percent of the business was in the hands of U.S. corporations. See James Dunkerley's, Power in
the Isthmus: A Political History o f M odem Central America (London, New York: Verso, 1988), p. 191.
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Dance of the Millions had the effect of integrating Colombia more completely as a player in
the world capitalist economic system. Additionally, as a result of economic "desarrollo
hacia afuera," based primarily on coffee exports, structural differences have arisen in the
patterns of industrialization in the "Core" or "Center" countries of the North Atlantic and
the "Periphery" or "Non-core” nations of the "South," nations such as Colombia.
"Dependency" and "World Systems Theorists" such as André Gunder-Frank, Fernando
Cardoso, Theotonio Dos Santos and Immanuel Wallerstein have long argued that
historically-conditioned patterns of development in the "underdeveloped" nations of the
world have forced poor countries into occupying the inherently inferior role of raw
materials/primary export producers in a world capitalist system from which, under the
present economic system, there is no escape. Because of the structural constraints imposed
by a global economic order, there is no possibility for economic and social development in
the underdeveloped world,24
The primary value of a structuralist, comparative approach are the heuristic benefits
to be reaped from placing labor and Colombia into the world context of which both are a
part. A structuralist approach, in short, could provide a macro-framework to study
Colombian labor, in the process building on the essentially mid-level approaches taken by
Bergquist, Sowell and the present work. While such an approach might usefully be
applied to the study of Colombian labor, particularly for comparative puiposes, it should be
employed to complement, rather than supplant, a mid-level approach. Only a mid-level

240 n dependency theory see Andre Gunder Frank, "Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of
Sociology," Dependence and Underdevelopment (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971); Fernando
Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America translated by
M arjory Mattingly Urquidi, (Berkely, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1979);
Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure o f Dependence," Readings on U.S. Imperialism (Boston:
Sargent, 1971); Surendra J Patel, "The Technological Dependence o f Developing Countries," The
Journal o f Modern African Studies, Vol. 12 No. 1, (1974). For good introductory overviews of
dependency, see Harry R. Targ, "Global Dominance and Dependence, Post-Industrialism, and
International Relations Theory," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Sept. 1976) and Carlos
Johnson, "Dependency Theory and the Processes of Capitalism and Socialism," Latin American
Perspectives, Vols. 30 & 31, No. 384 (1981). On "world systems theory" see Immanuel Wallerstein's
The Modern World System I (New York: Academic Press, 1974), "The World Capitalist System,"
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 16, (Sept. 1974), and his later work The Modern
World System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation o f the European World Economy, 1600-1750
(New York: Academic Press, 1980). For critiques of dependency theory, see James A.. Caporaso,
"Dependency Theory: Continuities and Discontinuities in Development Studies," International
Organization. Vol. 34. no. 4 (Fall 1980), and David Ray, "The Dependency Model of Latin American
Development: Three Basic Fallacies," Journal o f Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 15, no.
1 (1973). For a general critique of Wallerstein and world system theory, see Peter Worsley, "One World
or Three? A Critique of the World System Theory of Immanuel Wallerstein" in David Held ed. States
and Societies (New York & London: New York University Press, 1983).
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approach can take into account specific variables in the economic and social development
puzzle which may be unique to the Colombian case.
One major difference between Colombia and other cases, for example, is the
surprisingly small sums of foreign capital investment made in the nation's primary export
eamer-the coffee industry. Production and marketing in the coffee business remained in
Colombian hands, and production was widely, if unequally distributed among smallholders
and large landholders. The export functions rested firmly in the hands of a national trading
elite. Colfee in turn was the primary source of capital formation in Colombia. While much
foreign capital entered the country in the 1920's, the majority of industry and agriculture
remained firmly in the hands of domestic capitalists.
In another example of a limitation of generalizing too broadly in order to make
reality fit theory, it is sometimes assumed that the nations of the underdeveloped world
possessed a weak artisan tradition.25 While Colombian artisans may have lacked the
militancy of their European counterparts after having suffered through the mid-nineteenth
century Melo debacle, as the thesis has argued, their presence was strongly felt in labor
organization at least through the first three decades of the twentieth century. The artisan
milieu continued to be the predominant form of urban labor through the middle of this
century before finally being displaced by a salaried proletariat.
Nevertheless, another important variable that lends weight to the idea of a
complementary macro-level structural analysis is the fact that the primary income generator
in the critical epoch of the formation of an urban labor movement, coffee, was produced for
foreign markets and subject to the vicissitudes of developed-world demand. Also
important, but to a much lesser degree, were the small enclave economies of banana and
petroleum production, both of which played a much more limited role in the development
of Colombia’s economy and in the formation of the Colombian working class.
While the present work has begun to explore the process of proletarianization of
artisans and rural laborers, as Thomas E. Skidmore has suggested, Latin American labor
history, and in this specific case, Colombian labor history, could greatly profit from a socalled "bottom-up" analysis in which special emphasis is placed on worker's

25jn
comparisons between the development of the working class in Europe and Latin America, this is
one of the arguments advanced by Michael Hanagan and Charles Stephenson, Proletarians and Protest:
The Roots o f Class Formation in an Industrializing World (New York, Westport, Connecticut, London:
Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 15-18.
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perspectives.26 Such an approach, argue Szuchman and Sofer in another work, sees social
history as "a historical framework that emphasizes the inclusion of ordinary men and
women into the historical process, and attempts to approximate their perspectives on that
process...Thus, examining ordinary people from their perspective affords us the
opportunity to reconstruct an alternate world view-the one belonging to the historically
anonymous."27
In terms of this study, segments of artisan-produced newsletters, portions of
published works by literate artisans, the public positions of the artisan-dominated Socialist
Party and newspaper accounts were consulted in an effort to discover worker perspectives.
A careful appraisal of artisan perspectives has reinforced my belief that artisans were not
merely passive actors whose true interests were completely obscured by the blinding effects
of élite ideologies, though as argued above, ideology did play a role. In terms of rural
workers, the author had limited access to primary resources. Instead secondary resources
based on primary research conducted by Gloria Gaitán, Bergquist, Moncayo and Rojas,
and Marco Palacios were extensively consulted. Although the bottom-up perspective is
shared by the author, unfortunately, several limitations precluded a rigorous examination of
Colombian labor history along such lines.
First, there exists a dearth of historiographical literature of this nature specifically
devoted to Latin America. Although some preliminary work has been done in this area on
Chile, Argentina and Brazil, monographical treatment (or for that matter, to the author's
knowledge, any treatment) of the Colombian case utilizing a "bottom-up" perspective, is
non-existent. As discussed in the introduction, a number of works have been written by
Communist authors eager to champion the interests of the working class. Scholarly works
written by the proletariat's vanguard do not however in themselves constitute a bottom-up
perspective. Medofilo Medina has written a series of essays28 inspired by Rudé's works
on the revolutionary crowd,29 but while he skillfully mines the legislation passed during

26See Thomas Skidmore's essay, "Workers and Soldiers: Urban Labor Movements and Elite Responses in
20th Century Latin America," in Elites, Masses and Modernization in Latin America (Austin: 1978).
27E. Sofer and Mark Szuchman, "City and Society: Their Connection in Latin American Historical
Research," Latin American Research Review, XIV:2, pp. 113-129 (1979), pp. 113-114.
28Medofilo Medina, La Protesta Urbana en Colombia en el Siglo Veinte (Bogotá: 1984).
29George Rudé, The Crowd in the French Revolution (Oxford: 1959).

239

the liberal Revolución en Marcha for its ideological content, his work does not incorporate
the perspectives of workers.
The closest attempts to date to write histories that incorporate workers' perspectives
include the aforementioned studies by Sowell and Bergquist. Sowell spent a good deal of
time sifting through newspapers, laws, flyers produced by Bogotá's craftsmen, and other
historical accounts to piece together his doctoral dissertation on artisans in the capital.
Bergquist worked with Colombian campesinos while serving as a Peace Corps volunteer in
the 1960's, affording him special insight into life in the campo and specifically into the
conditions under which smallholders produce coffee. First-hand experience complemented
by extensive archival work, pouring over original government documents, census records
and parish documents, and laboriously reviewing contemporary newspapers, pamphlets
and other print materials produced by workers yield important clues about the lives of
workers in the early twentieth century. Conducting this type of intensive primary research
can help to piece together the story of the historically anonymous by providing information
on births, baptismals, deaths, marrying, moving, and acquiring or selling property.
Ideally, a bottom-up approach should also take into account the influence of rural
worker's ideologies on the growth of an urban proletariat. To understand how rural
ideologies influenced urban workers or vice versa, one would have to analyze the patterns
of migration from country to city. As argued by Michael Hanagan in his introduction to
Proletarians and Protest, "In order to understand the circumstances under which political
influences moved from country to city or the reverse, it is necessary first to explore the
links by which workers moved to the industrial city, or the mechanisms through which
they were recruited to urban industrial works."30 Unfortunately, while works such as
McGreevey's article "Urban Growth in Colombia," have begun to look at general trends in
rural-urban migration, significant demographic data for variables such as migrant
composition during the major migrations that took place in the first half of the twentieth
century has yet to be unearthed.31 This underdeveloped area of labor studies demands
much fuller investigation.
By more carefully identifying who urban migrants were, one is in a much better
position to explore urban links to the countryside and to understand more accurately the
development of urban working class consciousness. I suspect for example that among

30Hanagan and Stephenson Proletarians and Protest, p. 5.
31 w illiam Paul McGreevey, "Urban Growth in Colombia," Journal o f InterAmerican Studies and World
Affairs, Vol. 16 No. 4 (November 1974).

240

migrants who hailed from coffee growing regions, the "moral economy" thesis has little
application to the Colombian case,32 Any idealized past life in the countryside brought by
migrants to their new urban environment would have to stretch reality beyond recognition:
coffee production in the countryside was a highly competitive, individualist occupation, not
a peaceful, communal existence. In the Colombian case, idyllic recollections of the
countryside by both migrants and élite conjures up memories of the widespread benefits of
the coffee economy shared by smallholder and large landholder alike. The image evoked is
one of a smallholder democracy in which individual farmers grew com and beans for their
own consumption needs and grew coffee to augment their income. As I have argued
above, it left the Colombian peasantry more susceptible to capitalist ideology that held out
the promise oí land than to communist Ideology that offered a communal way of rural life.
With the exception of the resguardos, native communal forms of social life, if such a way
of life ever existed among the majority ladino population, did not exist in the small coffee
farms of Colombia. Such images would seem to be alien to the collective memory of a
peasant-become-salaried worker.
The author hopes that this study has provided an interpretive framework capable of
elucidating some of the most critical elements in the early development of the Colombian
labor movement. It looks at the complex inteiplay of variables such as geography,
regionalism, religion, the colonial legacy and the persistent influence of the political party
structure inherited from the nineteenth century. By utilizing an interdisciplinary, holistic
analysis which incorporates economic, historical, political, and sociological factors, the
study has explored the relationship between élite ideologies, the social evolution of artisan
and peasant consciousness, and action.
While the study posits that élite interests played a commanding role in both the
construction of the dominant culture and the regulation of relations between social classes,
it recognizes that the culture constructed by the élite was never completely dominant. An
élite itself divided between two competing ideologies until after La Violencia, artisan and
peasant modes of production themselves helped forge certain cultural attributes and
attendant value structures independent of élite forms of cultural expression. Working class
forms of cultural expression that challenge the ruling versions have not been systematically

32Moral economy refers to workers' efforts to use "moral terms of rural culture to forge a critique of urban
industrial capitalism." See the discussion by Hanagan and Stephenson on the application of the concept
in their introduction to Proletarians and Protest, pp. 4-18.
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articulated. In terms of labor relations in Colombia during the nineteenth and the twentieth
centuries, working class interests have been subservient to élite interests.
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